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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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ibOSTON 


PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


HEARINGS 

BEFORE  THE 

JOINT  COMMITTEE  ON  THE  INVESTIGATION 
OF  THE  PEAEL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

conctKess  of  the  united  states 

SEVENTY-NINTH  CONGRESS 

FIRST  SESSION 
PURSUANT  TO 

S.  Con.  Res.  27 

A    CONCURRENT    RESOLUTION    AUTHORIZING    AN 

INVESTIGATION  OF  THE  ATTACK  ON  PEARL 

HARBOR     ON     DECEMBER     7,     1941,     AND 

EVENTS  AND  CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING  THERETO 


PART  37 
PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the 
Joint  Committee  on  the  Investigation  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  Attack 


BOSTOT^ 
PUBLIC 
UBRARY 


PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


HEARINGS 

BEFORE  THE 

JOINT  COMMITTEE  ON  THE  INVESTIGATION 

OF  THE  PEAKL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

CONGRESS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH  CONGEESS 

FIRST  SESSION 
PURSUANT  TO 

S.  Con.  Res.  27 

A  CONCURRENT  RESOLUTION  AUTHORIZING  AN 

INVESTIGATION  OP  THE  ATTACK  ON  PEARL 

HARBOR    ON     DECEMBER     7.     1041,    AND 

EVENTS  AND  CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING  THERETO 


PART  37 

PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the 
Joint  Committee  on  the  Investigation  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  Attack 


S^ 


UNITED   STATES 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING   OFFICE 

WASHINGTON  :   1946 


JOINT  COMMITTEE  ON  THE  INVESTIGATION  OF  THE  PEARL 
HARBOR  ATTACK 

ALBEN  W.  BARKLET,  Senator  from  Kentucky,  Chairman 
JERB  COOPER,  Representative  from  Tennessee,  Vice  Chairman 
WALTER  P.  GEORGE,  Senator  from  Georgia    JOHN   W,   MURPHY,   Representative  from 
SCOTT  W.  LUCAS,  Senator  from  Illinois  Pennsylvania 

OWEN  BREWSTER,  Senator  from  Maine  BERTRAND    W.    GEARHART,    Representa- 

HOMER  FERGUSON,  Senator  from  Michi-        tive  from  California 

gan  FRANK    B.    KEEFB,    Representative    from 

J.   BAYARD   CLARK,   Representative  from        Wisconsin 
North  Carolina 


COUNSEL 


(Through  January  14,  1946) 

William  D.  Mitchell,  Oeneral  Counsel 
Gerhard  A.  Gesell,  Chief  Assistant  Counsel 
JDLB  M.  Hannaford,  Assistant  Counsel 
John  B.  Masten,  Assistant  Counsel 

(After  January  14,  1946) 

Skth  W.  Richardson,  Oeneral  Counsel 
Samuel  H.  Kaufman,  Associate  Oeneral  Counsel 
John  E.  Masten,  Assistant  Counsel 
Edward  P.  Morgan,  Assistant  Counsel 
Logan  J.  Lane,  Assistant  Counsel 


HEARINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE 


Part 

Pages 

Transcript 

No. 

pages 

1 

1-  399 

1-  1058 

2 

401-  982 

1059-  2586 

3 

983-1583 

2587-  4194 

4 

1585-2063 

4195-  5460 

5 

2065-2492 

5461-  6646 

6 

2493-2920 

6647-  7888 

7 

2921-3378 

7889-  9107 

8 

337^3927 

9108-10517 

9 

3929-4599 

10518-12277 

10 

4601-5151 

12278-13708 

11 

5153-5560 

13709-14765 

Hearings 

Nov.  15,  16,  17,  19,  20,  and  21,  1945. 
Nov.  23,  24,  26  to  30,  Dec.  3  and  4,  1945. 
Dec.  5,  6,  7,  8,  10,  11,  12,  and  13,  1945. 
Dec.  14,  15,  17,  18,  19,  20,  and  21,  1945. 
Dec.  31,  1945,  and  Jan.  2,  3,  4,  and  5, 1946. 
Jan.  15,  16,  17,  18,  19,  and  21,  1946. 
Jan.  22,  23,  24,  25,  26,  28,  and  29,  1946. 
Jan.  30,  31,  Feb.  1,  2,  4,  5,  and  6,  1946. 
Feb.  7,  8,  9,  11,  12,  13,  and  14,  1946. 
Feb.  15,  16,  18,  19,  and  20,  1946. 
Apr.  9  and  11,  and  Mav  23  and  31,  1946. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE 


Part 

No. 

Exhibits  Nos. 

12 

1  through  6. 

13 

7  and  8. 

14 

9  through  43. 

15 

44  through  87. 

16 

88  through  110. 

17 

Ill  through  128. 

18 

129  thj-ough  156. 

19 

157  tlu-ough  172. 

20 

173  through  179. 

21 

180  through  183,  and  Exhibits-Illustrations, 

22  through  25  Roberts  Commission  Proceedings. 

26  Hart  Inquiry  Proceedings. 

27  through  31   Army  Pearl  Harbor  Board  Proceedings, 
32  through  33   Navy  Court  of  Inquiry  Proceedings. 

34  Clarke  Investigation  Proceedings. 

35  Clausen  Investigation  Proceedings. 

36  through  38  Hewitt  Inquiry  Proceedings. 

39  Reports  of  Roberts  Commission,   Army  Pearl  Harbor  Board, 

Navy  Court  of  Inquiry  and  Hewitt  Inquiry,  with  endorse- 
ments. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  661 

[See  Index  of  Exhibits,  supra  pp.  2-4] 

He\yitt  Inqtjiey  Exhibit  No.  11 

(This  exhibit  is  the  book  entitled  "BATTLE  KEPORT— Pearl 
Harbor  to  Coral  Sea,"  by  Commander  WALTER  KARIG,  USNR, 
and  Lieutenant  WELBOURN  KELLEY,  USNR.  It  was  published 
(1944)  for  The  Council  on  Books  in  Wartime,  by  Farrar  &  Rinehart, 
Inc.,  New  York,  N.  Y.,  and  is  not  being  reproduced  here.) 

Hewitt  Inquiey  Exhibit  No.  12 

TOP  secret 

United  States  of  Amebica, 
Federal  Communications  Commission, 

Washington,  D.  C,  August  18, 1944. 
I  hereby  certify  that  the  attached  are  true  copies  of  documents  described  as 
follows : 

Document  No.  1  is  a  true  copy  of  the  weather  messages  which  Major 
Wesley  T.  Guest  (now  Colonel),  U.  S.  Army  Signal  Corps,  requested  the 
Commission's  monitors  to  be  on  the  lookout  for  in  Tokyo  broadcasts  and 
to  advise  Colonel  Bratton,  Army  Military  Intelligence,  if  any  such  message 
was  intercepted.  This  request  was  made  on  November  28,  1941  at  approxi- 
mately 2140  GMT. 

Document  No.  2  is  a  true  copy  of  a  weather  message  from  Tokyo  station 
JVW3,  intercepted  by  Commission  monitors  at  approximately  22  GMT,  De- 
cember 4,  1941,  which  at  9:05  p.  m.  EST,  December  4,  1941,  having  been 
unable  to  contact  Colonel  Bratton's  office,  was  telephoned  to  Lieutenant 
Brotherhood,  20-G,  Watch  Officer,  Navy  Department,  who  stated  that  he 
was  authorized  to  accept  messages  of  interest  to  Colonel  Bratton's  office. 

Document  No.  3  is  a  true  copy  of  a  weather  message  from  Tokyo  station 
JVW3,  intercepted  by  Commission  monitors  at  2130  GMT,  December  5,  1941, 
which  was  telephoned  to  Colonel  Bratton  at  his  residence  at  7 :  50  p.  m. 
EST,  December  5, 1941. 

Document  No.  4  is  a  true  copy  of  two  weather  messages  intercepted  by 
Commission  monitors  from  Tokyo  stations  JLG4  and  JZJ  between  0002 
and  0035  GMT,  December  8, 1941,  and  telephoned  to  Lt.  Colonel  C.  C.  Dusen- 
bury,  U.  S.  Army  Service  Corps,  at  the  request  of  Colonel  Bratton's  office  at 
approximately  8  p.  m.  EST,  December  7, 1941.  Document  No.  4  also  contains 
the  Romaji  version  of  these  messages, 
on  file  in  this  Commission,  and  that  I  am  the  proper  custodian  of  the  same. 

In  Witness  wheeeof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand,  and  caused  the  seal  of  the 
Federal  Communications  Commission  to  be  affixed,  this  twenty-first  day  of  August, 
1944. 

T.  J.  Slowie, 
T.  J.  Slowie, 

Secretarjj. 
Document  No.  1 

GROUP  ONE  IS  EAST  WIND  RAIN. 
GROUP  TWO  IS  NORTH  WIND  CLOUDY  AND. 
GROUP  THREE  IS  WEST  WIND  CLEAR  STOP. 

GROUPS  REPEATED  TWICE  IN  MIDDLE  AND  AT  END  OF  BROAD- 
CAST. 
The  above  are  the  weather  messages  Maj.  Wesley  T.  Guest  requested  the 
Commission  to  monitor  on  November  28,  1941. 

Document  No.  2 

TOKYO  TODAY  NORTH  WIND  SLIGHTLY  STRONGER  MAY  BECOME 
CLOUDY  TONIGHT  TOMORROW  SLIGHTLY  CLOUDY  AND  FINE 
WEATHER 

KANAGAWA  PREFECTURE  TODAY  NORTH  WIND  CLOUDY  FROM 
AFTERNOON  MORE  CLOUDS 

CHIBA  PREFECTURE  TODAY  NORTH  WIND  CLEAR  MAY  BECOME 
SLIGHTLY  CLOUDY  OCEAN  SURFACE  CALM 
Weather  message  from  Tokyo  station  JVW3  transmitted  at  approximately 
2200  GMT,  December  4, 1941. 


662       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Document  No.  S 

TODAY    NORTH   WIND    MORNING    CLOUDY    AFTERNOON    CLEAR 
BEGIN  CLOUDY  EVENING.     TOMORROW  NORTH  WIND  AND  LATER 
FROM  SOUTH,     (repeated  3  times) 
Weather  message  from  Tokyo  station  JVW3  ti'ansmitted  at  approximately 
2130  gmt  December  5, 1941. 

Document  No.  Jf 
English  Romaji 

THIS  IS  IN  THE  MIDDLE  OF  THE  NYUSU    NO    TOCHU    DE    GOZAI- 

NBWS  BUT  TODAY,  SPECIALLY  AT  MASU  GA  HONJITSU  WA  TOKU  NI 

THIS    POINT    I    WILL    GIVE    TEtE  KOKO  DE  TENKI  YOHO  WO  MOSHI- 

WEATHER  FORECAST :  AGE  MASU 

WEST  WIND,  CLEAR  NISHI  NO  KAZE  HARE 

WEST  WIND,  CLEAR  NISHI  NO  KAZE  HARE 

THIS  IS  IN  THE  MIDDLE  OF  THE  NYUSU    NO    TOCHU    DE    GOZAI- 

NEWS  BUT  TODAY,  AT  THIS  POINT  MASU  GA  KYO  WA  KOKO  DE  TOKU 

SPECIALLY     I     WILL     GIVE     THE  NI    TENKI    YOHO    WO    MOSHIAGE 

WEATHER  FORECAST :  MASU 

WEST  WIND,  CLEAR  NISHI  NO  KAZE  HARE 

WEST  WIND,  CLEAR  NISHI  NO  KAZE  HARE 

Above  are  the  two  weather  messages  from  Tokyo  stations  JLG4  and  JZJ  trans- 
mitted by  them  between  0002  GMT  December  8,  1941. 


Hewitt  Inqxhrt  Exhibit  No.  13 

INDEX 

A — Messages  relating  to  Japanese  interest  in  ships 1,  2, 

3,  7,  9,  10, 13, 14,  15, 16, 18,  19,  22,  23,  24 

B — Messages  relating  to  "winds  code" 4 

C — Message  advising  Germany  of  war  between  Japan  and  Anglo-Saxon  nations 5 

D — Messages  relating  to  "hidden  word"  code 6,  8, 11, 12,  17,  20 

B — Message  indicating  steps  to  be  taken  as  to  Holland  on  opening  of  war  with 
Britain  and  America 21 

TOP  SECEET 

The  Seceetaby  of  the  Navy, 
Washington  25,  D.  0.,  14  May  19^5. 
Op-2a-4-mp 
Serial  0002020 
(SC)A17-24(1) 

From :  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

To :  John  F.  Sonnett,  Special  Assistant. 

Subj :  Testimony  and  documentary  evidence  to  be  presented  to  Admiral  H.  Kent 

Hewitt,  USN,  concerning  further  Pearl  Harbor  investigation. 
Ref :  (a)  Precept,  dated  2  May  1945,  to  Admiral  H.  Kent  Hewitt,  USN,  concern- 
ing further  Pearl  Harbor  investigation. 

1.  Forwarded  herewith  are  photostatic  copies  of  the  following  dispatches, 
certified  in  jacket  form  NJA  24,  to  be  used  in  the  proceedings  directed  by  refer- 
ence (a) : 

JD-1:  1842  JD-1:  7063  JD-1:  7214 

JD-1:  5696  JD-1:  7111  JD-1:  7280 

JD-1:  5730  JD-1:  7148  JD-1:  7294 

JD-1:  6850  JD-1:  7157  JD-1:  7360 

JD-1:  6943  JD-1:  7158  JD-1:  7335 

JD-1:  6985  JD-1:  7178  JD-1:  7370 

JD-1:  7029  JD-1:  7179  JD-1:  7511 

JD-1:  7122  JD-1:  7212  JD-1:  8007 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  663 

2.  Your  attention  Is  directed  to  the  fact  that  these  dispatches  are  classified 
TOP  Secret.  When  used  in  accordance  with  reference  (a),  the  return  of  these 
dispatches  to  this  oflSce  is  directed. 

James  Foebestal. 


From:  Honolulu  (Okuda). 
To:  Tokyo  (Gaimudaijin). 
10  March,  1941. 
(J18K8)* 
#043 

Vessels  seen  in  Pearl  Harbor  on  (9th)  were  the  following: 

Four  battleships  (two  of  the  New  Mexico  class  and  two  of  the  Pennsylvania 
class). 

Five  heavy  cniisers  (two  of  the class,  one  of  the class,  and 

two  of  the class). 

Six  light  cruisers  (four  of  the class  and  two  of  the  Omaha  class). 

Yorktown. 

25  destroyers  ( ) 

Two  destroyer  tenders. 

Several  submarines. 

One  submarine  tender. 

Several  transports. 

Mailed  to  Washington,  San  Francisco,  Los  Angeles,  Seattle. 

•Note :  This  is  first  translation  of  J18K8,  a  new  system  effective  1  March,  1941. 

JD-1:     1842    Navy  Trans.     4-5-41     (S) 


SECEET 

From:  Tokyo   (Toyoda). 
To :  Honolulu. 
September  24,  1941. 
J-19. 
#83. 

Strictly  secret. 

Henceforth,  we  would  like  to  have  you  make  rejwrts  concerning  vessels  along 
the  following  lines  insofar  as  possible: 

1.  The  waters  (of  Pearl  Harbor)  are  to  be  divided  roughly  into  five  sub-areas. 
(We  have  no  objections  to  your  abreviating  as  much  as  you  like.) 

Area  A.  Waters  between  F'ord  Island  and  the  Arsenal. 

Area  B.  Waters  adjacent  to  the  Island  south  and  west  of  Ford  Island.    This 
area  is  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Island  from  Area  A.) 
Area  C.  East  Loch. 
Area  D.  Middle  Loch 
Area  E.  West  Loch  and  the  communicating  water  routes. 

2.  With  regard  to  warships  and  aircraft  carriers,  we  would  like  to  have  you 
i-eport  on  those  at  anchor,  (these  are  not  so  important)  tied  up  at  wharves,  buoys 
and  in  docks.  (Designate  tyi>es  and  classes  briefly.  If  possible  we  would  like 
to  have  you  make  mention  of  the  fact  when  there  are  two  or  more  vessels  along 
side  the  same  wharf. ) 


JD-1 :  5696 

From:  Honolulu  (Kita). 

To :  Washington. 

29  September  1941. 

Circular  #041. 

Honolulu  to  Tokyo  #178.  * 

Re  your  #083.* 

(Strictly  secret.) 

The  following  codes  will  be  used  hereafter  to  designate  the  location  of  vessels : 

1.  Repair  dock  in  Navy  Yard  (The  repair  basin  referred  to  in  my  message  to 
Washington  #48**)  :  KS. 

2.  Navy  dock  in  the  Navy  Yard  (The  Ten  Ten  Pier)  :  KT. 

3.  Moorings  in  the  vicinity  of  Ford  Island :  FV. 

4.  Alongside  in  Ford  Island :  FG.     ( East  and  west  sides  will  be  differentiated 
by  A  and  B  respectively. 

Relayed  to  Washington,  San  Francisco. 

JD-1:  5730    23312     (D)  Navy  Trans.     10-10-41     (X) 

•Not  available. 

••Available,  dated  21  August. 


664       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

From:  Tokyo. 
To :  Washington. 
19  November  1941. 
(J19). 
Circular  #2354. 

When  our  diplomatic  relations  are  becoming  dangerous,  we  will  add  the  fol- 
lowing at  the  beginning  and  end  of  our  general  intelligence  broadcasts : 

(1)  If  it  is  Japan-U.  S.  relations,  "HIGASHI." 

(2)  Japan-Russia  relations,  "KITA." 

(3)  Japan-British  relations,  (including  Thai,  Malaya  and  N.  E.  I.),  "NISHI." 
The  above  will  be  repeated  five  times  and  included  at  beginning  and  end. 
Relay  to  Rio  de  Janeiro,  Buenos  Aires,  Mexico  City,  San  Francisco. 

JD-1:     6850     SECRET     (Y)    Navy  Trans.     11-26-41     (S) 


SECBET 

From:  Tokyo. 

To:  Berlin.  j 

November  30,  1941. 

Purple.    (CA). 

#985.     (Parti  of  3.)' 

Re  my  Circular  #2387." 

1.  The  conversations  begun  between  Tokyo  and  Washington  last  April  during 
the  administration  of  the  former  cabinet,  in  spite  of  the  sincere  efforts  of  the 
Imperial  Government,  now  stand  ruptured — broken.  (I  am  sending  you  an  out- 
line of  developments  separately.) 

In  the  face  of  this,  our  Empire  faces  a  grave  situation  and  must  act  with 
determination.  Will  Your  Honor,  therefore,  immediately  interview  Chancellor 
HITLER  and  Foreign  Minister  RIBBENTROP  and  confidentially  communicate 
to  them  a  summary  of  the  developments.  Say  to  them  that  lately  England  and 
the  United  States  have  taken  a  provocative  attitude,  both  of  them.  Say  that 
they  are  planning  to  move  military  forces  into  various  places  in  East  Asia 
and  that  we  will  inevitably  have  to  counter  by  also  moving  troops.  Say  very 
secretly  to  them  that  there  is  extreme  danger  that  war  may  suddenly  break  out 
between  the  Anglo-Saxon  nations  and  Japan  through  some  clash  of  arms  and  add 
that  the  time  of  the  breaking  out  of  this  war  may  come  quicker  than  anyone 
dreams. 

JD-1:   6943     ARMY     25552     SECRET     Trans.     12-1-41      (MR) 

"  Part  2  not  available. 
»>  Not  available. 


SECBET 

From:  Tokyo. 
To:  Berlin. 
November  30,  1941. 
Purple.   (CA). 
#985.    (Part  3  or  3.) 

4.  If,  when  you  tell  them  this,  the  Germans  and  Italians  question  you  about 
our  attitudes  toward  the  Soviet,  say  that  we  have  already  clarified  our  attitude 
toward  the  Russians  in  our  statement  of  last  July.  Say  that  by  our  present 
moves  southward  we  do  not  mean  to  relax  our  pressure  against  the  Soviet  and 
that  if  Russia  joins  hands  tighter  with  England  and  the  United  States  and 
resists  us  with,  hostilities,  we  are  ready  to  turn  upon  her  with  all  our  might; 
however,  right  now,  it  is  to  our  advantage  to  stress  the  south  and  for  the  time 
being  we  would  prefer  to  refrain  from  any  direct  moves  in  the  north. 

5.  This  directive  is  important  from  a  strategic  point  of  view  and  must  under 
all  circumstances  be  held  in  the  most  absolute  secrecy.  This  goes  without  say- 
ing. Therefore,  will  you  please  impress  upon  the  Germans  and  Italians  how  im- 
portant secrecy  is. 

6.  As  for  Italy,  after  our  Ambassador  in  Berlin  has  communicated  this  to 
the  Germans,  he  will  transmit  a  suitable  translation  to  Premier  MUSSOLINI 
and  Foreign  Minister  CIANO.  As  soon  as  a  date  is  set  for  a  conference  with  the 
Germans  and  Italians,  please  let  me  know. 

Will  you  please  forward  this  directive  to  Rome,  together  with  the  separate  one 
following. 
JI>-1:6943    ARMY    25553    SECRET    Trans    12-1-41     (RIR) 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  665 

From:  Tokyo. 
To:  Washington. 
27  November  1941. 
(J19) 

Circular  #2409  (In  4  parts,  complete). 
Rio  de  Janeiro  to  Santiago  as  Circular  #324. 

(Washington  sent  to  Ottawa,  Mexico  City,  Bogota,  Caracas,  Havana,  Panama, 
New  York,  and  New  Orleans  as  unnumbered  message). 

(Part  1) 

Handle  as  Chief  of  OflSce  routing. 

With  international  relations  becoming  more  strained,  the  following  emergency 
system  of  despatches,  using  INGO  DENPO  (hidden  word,  or  misleading  language 
telegrams)  is  placed  in  effect.    Please  study  this  carefully. 

Make  up  a  table  with  the  left  column  containing  the  code  words  and  the  right 
the  corresponding  plain  (decoded)  text.  Please  see  that  there  is  no  mistake  in 
transcribing  this. 

EXAMPLE :  A  message  meaning : 

"Japan  and  U.  S.  S.  R.  military  have  clashed",  will  read : 
"HIJIKATA  and  KUBOTA,  clerks,  have  both  been  ordered  to  your  em- 
bassy on  15th  (begin  spell)  STOP  (end  spell)." 

In  order  to  distinguish  these  cables  from  others,  the  English  word  STOP  will 
be  added  at  the  end  as  an  indicator.  (The  Japanese  word  "OWARl"  (end) 
will  not  be  used). 

{Part  2) 

Code  Word  Meaning 

ARIMUR.A Code  communications  prohibited. 

ASAI Communications  will  be  by  radio  broadcasts. 

ASAKURA Will  communicate  by  radio  broadcast.    You  are  directed 

to  listen  carefully.    . 

ASIKA.QA Reception    of    overseas    broadcast    impossible    due    to 

interference. 

AZUMA Pressure  on  Japan  increasing  continually. 

EDOGUTI Prepare  for  evacuation. 

HANABUSA Preparations  for  evacuation  have  been  completed. 

HANAZONO  (?) Prepare  to  entrust  Embassy  property  to  suitable  foreign 

envoy  (or  consul)  there. 

HATAKEYAMA Relations    between    Japan    and  .  .  .   (blank)   .  .  .  have 

been  severed. 

HATTORI Relations  between  Japan  and  .  .  .  (blank)  .  .  .  are  not 

in  accordance  with  expectation. 

(Part  S) 

HIZIKATA Japan's    and  .  .  .  (blank's)  .  .  .  military    forces    have 

clashed. 

HOSINO Japan  and  .  .  .  (blank)  .  .  .  are  entering  a  full  fledged 

general  war. 

IBARAGI Communicate  to  us  probable  date  of  breaking  off  of  rela- 
tions between  Japan  and  the  country  to  which  you  are 
&ccrpditGd 

INAKAKI Have  you --?-- the  .  .  .  (blank)  .  .  .  matter? 

ISHIKAWA I  have—?    the  .  .  .   (blank)   .  .  .  matter. 

KASHIWAGI- We  are  commencing  military  action?  against . . .  (blank) 

KOBAYAKA.WA Stop  issuing  all  entrance  and  transient  visas  to  Japan,  to 

persons  of  .  .  .  (blank)  .  .  .  nationality. 

KODAMA Japan. 

KOMIYAMA China. 

KOYANAGI England. 

KUBOTA U.  S.  S.  R. 

KURIBARA France  (?). 

KUSUNOKI Germany. 

MATUTANI Italy. 


666       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

{Part  ^) 

MINAMI U.  S.  A. 

MIWATA Canada. 

MIYAZAKI Mexico. 

MOROKOSI Brazil. 

MOTIZUKI Panama. 

NAGAMINE Argentina. 

NAKAZATO Thailand. 

NANGO French  Indo-China. 

NEGI  (?) Netherlands  East-Indies. 

OGAWA Burma  (?). 

OKAMOTO Malaya. 

OKUMZRA Australia. 

ONIZUKA Union  of  South  Africa  (?). 

ONODERA Enemy  country. 

OTANI ?  (Possibly :  friendly,  or  allied  country?) 

ONISI Year. 

SIMANAKA Day  (?). 

SAKAKIBAEA Tsuki)  Month. 

SIGENOI (KO)  Pargraph. 

SANZYO (Toki)  Time. 

ITIRO 1. 

NISAKU 2. 

SANTARO 3. 

YOITI 4. 

GORO 5. 

MASAROKU 6. 

SIMETARO 7. 

TASOKITI 8. 

HISAMATU 9. 

ATUMI 0. 

JD-l:  6985     SECRET     (Y)  Navy  Trans.     12-2^1     (7) 


From:  Tokyo  (Togo). 
To:  Honolulu. 
November  20,  1941. 
#111.    Strictly  secret. 

Please  investigate  comprehensively  the  fleet — bases  in  the  neighborhood  of  the 
Hawaiian  military  reservation. 

ARMY    25694     JD  7029     Trans.     12-4-41     (S) 


From:  Rio  de  Janeiro  (Ishii). 

To :  Santiago. 

2  December  1941. 

(J19.) 

Circular  #329  (In  3  parts,  complete). 

Tokyo  to  Rio  as  Circular  No.  2482,  on  29  Nov. 

Re  my  Circular  No.  2409*. 

The  following  are  added  this  date  to  my  Circular  No.  2409*,  for  special  use  in 
your  area.  Please  use  them  together  with  the  others,  (after  making  them  up  in 
a  table). 

(Translator' 8  note:  Undellned  values  are  doubtful  due  to  garbles.  Probable  correct 
value  added  below  in  parenthesis.) 

Code  Word  Meaning 

ASAHINA From    -   -    (blank)    -   -    (date),  Japanese  ships  stopping 

here  will  not  be  allowed  to  take  on  fuel. 
DATE Please  telegraph  probable  amount  of    -    -     (blank)     -    - 

that  can  be  imported. 
BLAWAHARA I  estimate  we  can  probably  import  about  (blank) 

tons  of    -    -    (blank)     -    -. 

•JD-l :  6985.  List  of  code  names  to  be  used  In  plain  language  messages,  with  indictor 
STOP  at  end. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  667 

Code  Word  Meaning 

NIWAGUCHI It  is  impossible  to  carry  out    -    -    blank)    -    -. 

(Kawaguchi) 

NAKAMIITA Are  in  the  process  of  arranging  for  importation  of    -    - 

(NakamuraT  (blank)     -    -. 

SATUNAKATA Send  communications  via    -    -    (blank)     -    -    (country). 

(Munakata) 

KAZAMA Communications  will  be  through  office  stationed  in    -    - 

(blank)     -    -     (country). 

TOKUSIMA Japanese  ship  should  arrive  in  -  -  (blank)  -  -  (coun- 
try) on  -  -  (blank)  -  -  (month)  -  -  (blank) 
-    -     (day). 

TAKENOUTI Is  it  possible  for  Japanese  ships  to  come  to  -  -(blank)-  - 

(country)? 

YA — GI It  is  not  possible  to  send  Japanese  ships  to  -  -  (blank)  -  - 

(Yanagi)  (country). 

TONEGI It  is  possible  to  send  Japanese  ship(s)  to  -  -(blank)-  - 

(country). 
(Part  2) 

TAKAGI Minerals. 

SAWAMURA Lead. 

— SUMI Mercury. 

(Kasumi) 

IWASAKI Petroleum. 

HIROHATA Diamonds  for  industrial  use. 

ITAMI Platinum. 

KADA Copper. 

NAKAGAWA Carat. 

MAEHATA Peru. 

MASUKO Chile. 

SENEDA Colombia. 

TAKENAKA Paraguay  or  Uruguay  (?). 

SIMAZU Paraguay  or  Uruguay  (?). 

IMAZAWA Venezuela. 

FUJIKAKE San  QINY.** 

HASIMOTO Cuba. 

SINDO__ Havana. 

TIBA__1 Rio  de  Janeiro. 

TOZAWA Sao  Paulo. 

(Part  S) 

HASEGAWA Riberao  Preto. 

IRIFUNE Santos. 

ENOMOTO BAURU. 

BEPPU Curityba. 

TIKAMATU Belem. 

SUETUGU Buenos  Aires. 

OKIZUMI Santiago. 

YAMATO Lima. 

UMEGAWA Bogota. 

HARA Caracas. 

ISONO Montevideo  (?). 

PUKAMATI Asuncion. 

Relay  from  Rio  de  Janeiro  to  TPT***,  Lima,  Sao  Paulo,  Mexico  City  relay  to 
"Washington,  Panama,  Havana,  Caracas  (?),  Bogota. 

••Code  value  is  QINY,  (probably  Salvador  or  Domingo). 
•••Probably  "Buenos  Aires  and  Santiago". 


668       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 
JD— 1:7122    Secret     (Y)  Navy  Trans,    12-5-41     (7) 

SECEET 

From :  Tokyo  (Togo). 
To :  Honolulu. 
November  18, 1941. 
J-19. 
#113. 

Please  report  on  the  following  areas  as  to  vessels  anchored  therein :  Area  "H", 
Pearl  Harbor,  Manila  Bay,"  and  the  areas  adjacent  thereto.  (Make  your  inves- 
tigation with  great  secrecy. ) 

JD-1 :  7063  ARMY  25773  SECRET  Trans.  12/5/41  (3) 


»  Probably  means  Mamala  Bay. 


From  Honolulu  (Kita). 
To :  Tokyo. 
November  18, 1941. 
J-19. 
#222. 

1.  The  warships  at  anchor  in  the  Harbor  on  the  15th  were  as  I  told  you  in  my 
#219  "  on  that  day. 

Area  A" — A  battleship  of  the  Oklahoma  class  entered  and  one  tanker  left  port. 
Area  O ' — 3  warships  of  the  heavy  cruiser  class  were  at  anchor. 

2.  On  the  17th  the  Saratoga  was  not  in  the  harbor.  The  carrier,  Enterprise, 
or  some  other  vessel  was  in  Area  C.  Two  heavy  cruisers  of  the  Chicago  class, 
one  of  the  Pensacola  class  were  tied  up  at  docks  "XB".  4  merchant  vessels  were 
at  anchor  in  Area  D."^ 

3.  At  10 :  00  a.  m.  on  the  morning  of  the  17th,  8  destroyers  were  observed  enter- 
ing the  Harbor.  Their  course  was  as  follows :  In  a  single  file  at  a  distance  of 
1,000  meters  apart  at  a  speed  of  3  knots  per  hour,  they  moved  into  Pearl  Harbor. 
From  the  entrance  of  the  Harbor  through  Area  B  to  the  buoys  in  Area  C,  to 
which  they  were  moored,  they  changed  course  5  times  each  time  roughly  30 
degrees.  The  elapsed  time  was  one  hour,  however,  one  of  these  destroyers 
entered  Area  A  after  passing  the  water  reservoir  on  the  Eastern  side. 

Relay  to . 

JD-1:  7111.    Middle  Loch.     SECRET    Trans.  12/6/41     (2) 


•  Available  In  WE  code  dated  November  14.     Code  nnder  study. 

•»  Waters  between  Ford  Island  and  the  Arsenal. 

«  Bast  Loch. 

<i  Middle  Loch.  

From:  Tokyo. 

To:  (Circular  telegram). 

7  December  1941. 

(Plain  Japanese  language  using  code  names). 

Circular  #2494. 

Relations  between  Japan  and  England  are  not  in  accordance  with  expectation. 

JD-1:7148    SECRET     (M)  Navy  Trans.  7  December  1941  (STT) 


From :  Tokyo  (Togo) 

To  Honolulu 

November  28,  1941 

J19  (Priority) 

#118. 

Re  your  #232\ 

To  be  handled  in  government  code. 

Anticipating  the  possibility  of  ordinary  telegraphic  communication  being  sev- 
ered when  we  are  about  to  face  the  worst  of  situations,  these  broadcasts  are 
intended  to  serve  as  a  means  of  informing  the  diplomats  in  the  country  concerned 
of  that  situation  without  the  use  of  the  usual  telegraphic  channels.  Do  not  de- 
stroy the  codes  without  regard  to  the  actual  situation  in  your  locality,  but 
retain  them  as  long  as  the  situation  there  permits  and  until  the  final  stage  is 
entered  into. 

JD-1:  7157    ARMY    25859    SECRET    Trans.  12/7/41     (5) 

•  Not  available. 

■•  S.  I.  S.  #25482  in  which  Tokyo  sends  a  circular  giving  hidden-meaning  words  which 
will  be  broadcast  In  the  event  that  code  communication  Is  cut  off. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  669 

From:  Tokyo  (Togo). 

To:  Honolulu. 

November  28,  1941. 

#119    Re  your  message  #243". 

Secret  outside  the  Department. 

Intelligences  of  this  kind  which  are  of  major  importance,  please  transmit  to  us 
in  the  following  manner : 

1.  When  battleships  move  out  of  the  harbor  if  we  report  such  movement  but 
once  a  week  the  vessels,  in  that  interval,  could  not  only  be  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
Hawaiian  Islands,  but  could  also  have  travelled  far.  Use  your  own  judgment  in 
deciding  on  reports  covering  such  movements. 

2,  Report  upon  the  entrance  or  departure  of  capital  ships  and  the  length  of  time 
they  remain  at  anchor,  from  the  time  of  entry  into  the  port  until  the  departure. 

ARMY    25880    JD-7158    Trans.     12/8/41     (S) 


a  Available  in  code  under  study. 


From:  Honolulu. 

To:  Tokyo. 

December  6,  1941. 

#253    Re  the  last  part  of  your  #123', 

1.  On  the  American  Continent  in  October  the  Army  began  training  barrage 
balloon  troops  at  Camp  Davis,  North  Carolina.  Not  only  have  they  ordered  four 
or  five  hundred  balloons,  but  it  is  understood  that  they  are  considering  the  use  of 
these  balloons  in  the  defense  of  Hawaii  and  Panama.  In  so  far  as  Hawaii  is  con- 
cerned, though  investigations  have  been  made  in  the  neighborhood  of  Pearl 
Harbor,  they  have  not  set  up  mooring  equipment,  nor  have  they  selected  the 
troops  to  man  them.  Furthermore,  there  is  no  indication  that  any  training  for 
the  maintenance  of  balloons  is  being  undertaken.  At  the  present  time  there  are 
no  signs  of  barrage  balloon  equipment.  In  addition,  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  that 
they  have  actually  any.  However,  even  tliough  they  have  actually  made  prepara- 
tions, because  they  must  control  the  air  over  the  water  and  land  runways  of 
the  airports  in  the  vicinity  of  Pearl  Harbor,  Hickam,  Fort  and  Ewa",  there  are 
limits  to  the  balloon  defense  of  Pearl  Harbor.  I  imagine  that  in  all  probability 
there  is  considerable  opportunity  left  to  take  advantage  for  a  surprise  attack 
against  these  places. 

2.  In  my  opinion  the  battleships  do  not  have  torpedo  nets.  The  details  are 
not  known.    I  will  report  the  results  of  my  investigation. 

ARMY    25877     JD  7178     Trans.     12/8/41     (2-TT) 


"  Not  available. 
"  Kana  spelling. 


From:  Honolulu. 
To :  Tokyo. 
December  6,  1941. 

#254. 

1.  On  the  evening  of  the  5th,  among  the  battleships  which  entered  port  were  — 
and  one  submarine  tender.  The  following  ships  were  observed  at  anchor  on 
the  6th : 

Nine  battleships,  3  light  cruisers,  3  submarine  tenders,  17  destroyers,  and  in 
addition  there  were  4  light  cruisers,  2  destroyers  lying  at  docks  (the  heavy 
cruisers  and  airplane  carriers  have  all  left. 

2.  It  appears  that  no  air  reconnaisance  is  being  conducted  by  the  fleet  air  arm. 
ARMY    25874    JD-7179   Trans.  12/8/41     (2^TT) 

P'rom :  Honolulu. 
To :  Tokyo. 
November  28,  1941. 
#238. 
Military  report : 

(1)  There  are  eight  "B-17"  planes  at  Midway  and  the  altitude  range  of  their 
anti-aircraft  guns  is  (5,000  feet  ?). 

(2)  Our  observations  at  the  Sand  Island  maneuvers  are:  number  of  shots — 12; 


670       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

interval  of  flight — 13  seconds ;  interval  between  shots — 2  minutes ;  direct  hits — 
none. 

(3)  12,000  men    (mostly  marines)    are  expected  to  reinforce  the  troops  in 
Honolulu  during  December  or  January. 

(4)  There  has  usually  been  one  cruiser  in  the  waters  about  (15,000  feet  ?)  south 
of  Pearl  Harbor  and  one  or  two  destroyers  at  the  entrance  to  the  harbor, 

ARMY    25928    JD-7212    Trans.  12/8/41     (7) 


From :  Tokyo. 
To :   Singapore. 
December  2,  1941. 
,J19-19. 

Circular  #2450.  (5  yards  complete.) 

Re  my  Circular  #2409'. 

We  have  drawn  up  the  following  table  for  the  particular  needs  of  your  localities 
to  supplement  for  the  already  given  list. 

Code  Word  Meaning 

KIKUTI Shipments  on  the  road  whereby  CHIANG  receives  assist- 
ance (the  Burma  road  ?)  are  now  very  lively. 

KAGEYAMA Shipments   along  the  road  whereby  CHIANG   receives 

assistance  (the  Burma  road  ?)  have  now  virtually 
stopped. 

(DE  ?)OUTI (blank (blank) has  been  forced  backward 

at (blank)  — 

AYAOKA The  Bumese  Independents  movement  is  gradually  gaining 

momentum.  The  officers  are  endeavoring  to  quell  this 
with  every  resource,  however,  the  movement  is  grad- 
ually growing  more  fierce. 

ITAOISI On  the the  Burma (blank) was  attacked  by  the 

Independents  wing  with  pistols   (or  dynamite). 

FUKUNISI On  the th  in  the (blank) area  rioting  broke  out. 

MIYAMOTO I  will  continue  the  action  I  described  to  you  until  advised 

by  you  to  do  otherwise,  then  I  will  end  it  immediately. 
PART  II 

KITAMURA Recently (blank) American  military  planes  arrived 

at (blank) 

MTJTO (blank) —  and  pilots  numbering (blank) ar- 
rived at (blank) 

NAGAOKA (blank) divisions  of (blank) troops  arrived 

at (blank) and  left  for (blank) on  the th. 

INABA (blank) divisions  of (blank) troops  are  re- 
portedly concentrated  on  the (blank) border. 

YASIROEW The  Independents  movement  at (blank) and  nego- 
tiations thwarting  England  are  now  progressing  smoothly. 
TUMURA At  present  there  is  a  total  of (blank) enemy  mer- 
chant men  docked  at (blank) 

NINO < Merchant  ships  now  docked  at  — (blank) —  are  as  fol- 
lows: American (blank) ;  British (blank) ; 

Netherlands (blank) 

NAGAY .. an  merchant  ships  left  for (blank) loaded  with 

arms. 

NIOGUTI Our  means  of  communication  witb  Burma  and  the  South 

Seas  is  disrupted  and  we  cannot  receive. 

SEGAWA Our  resident  Nationals  have  been  camped. 

PART  III 

YASUI It  is  reported  that  riots  are  breaking  out. 

MARUSE Progressing  with  preparations  to  bomb  oil  fields. 

KUBOTA Oil  fields  bombed. 

NIRA The  residents  of area  are  preparing  to  flee. 

MOORI Orders  issued  to  residents  of (blank) area  to  fleo. 

SEKYA Morale  wavering. 

TUKAMOTO Netherlanders. 

OCHIAI Japanese  Nitta  Natives. 

KURIBAPA Japanese. 

SISIYAMA 

YAMANOUTI Premier. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  671 

Code  Word  Meaning 

NOSE Specialists'  Commission. 

KURODA High  tide  (?). 

NIRAI Some  officers  and  private  citizens 

INOYAMA Telegraphy. 

ENDOO The  Yamashita  Agency. 

ATUKAX The  Nakamura  Company, 

KOIZUMI India. 

AER Java. 

EDOGUTI Sumatra. 

HIROSE Celebes. 

HUKUI Borneo. 

INOCYE 

FUKA British  India. 

KASAURA Ceylon. 

IKAWA 

PART  IV 

HUJIMURA Hainan  Island. 

IIJIMA  The  Spratleys. 

ARIASA Singapore. 

HORUTA Pinan. 

NIWA Bangkok. 

KAMIYA Chien  mai* Singora. 

ISIDA Saigon. 

NINOMIYA 

HOSOKAWA 

NEZU Tonkin. 

YOKOTA Cambodia. 

NUMATA 

WATAMZAWA Manila. 

NOKAKI 

KERI Batavia. 

SERINE Menado. 

SERISAWA Makassar. 

SOWE 

ANDO Pankaran-Brandau*. 

DOBASI Pankau  Sasu*. 

FUKUSIMA Mandalay. 

BAKAMATSU Palembang. 

PART  V 

ISTUMOTO Jambi. 

NAKINO Tarakan. 

MAKING Pa Pan. 

SAKURAI Sagsirinda*. 

TAKANO Sanga  Sanga*. 

UEDA Paura*. 

YANAGIYA Banka*. 

WATAGI Biriton*. 

FOAWA Runda*. 

AIDA Malacca. 

BANDO Sumaran*. 

FUNARASI Timor. 

TKEDA New  Guinea. 

KATAGIRI Lashie. 

MIXOGUYI The  Periswisa*  region. 

NICK.\DA The  Geta*  region. 

SAWAKARA The  Keta  Eharu  Region. 

TAKESITA East. 

UTSUMONIYA West. 

YAMASE Sooth. 

ARAWAKI North. 

DOOKY Island. 

JD-1:7214    ARMY    25943    SECRET   Trans.  12/9/41    (NR) 


•  See  S.  I.  S.  #25609  in  ■which  Tokyo  sends  out  a  circular  containing  hidden-meaning 
words  to  be  used  as  an  emergency  system  for  dispatches. 
•Kena  spelling. 


672       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

From:  Honolulu  (Kita). 

To:  Tokyo. 

5  December  1841. 

#252. 

(1)  During  Friday  morning,  th,e  5th,  the  three  battleships  mentioned  in  my 
message  #239*  arrived  here.    They  had  been  at  sea  for  eight  days. 

(2)  The  Lexington  and  five  heavy  cruisers  left  port  on  the  same  day. 

(3)  The  following  ships  were  in  port  on  the  afternoon  of  the  5th: 
8  battleships. 

3  light  cruisers. 
16  destroyers. 
Four  ships  of  the  Honolulu  class  and    *    *    *    were  in  dock. 

26029 

JD-1:  7280     (D)     Navy  Trans.  12-10-41     (2) 

♦Available,  dated  29  November. 


From:  Honolulu  (Kita). 

To :  Tokyo. 

1  December  1941. 

#241  (In  2  parts,  complete). 

Re  your  #119.* 

Report  on  ship  maneuvers  in  Pearl  Harbor : 

1.  The  place  where  practice  maneuvers  are  held  is  about  500  nautical  miles 
southeast  of  here. 

Direction  based  on : 

(1)  The  direction  taken  when  the  ships  start  out  is  usually  southeast  by  south 
and  ships  disappear  beyond  the  horizon  in  that  direction. 

(2)  Have  never  seen  the  fleet  go  westward  or  liead  for  the  "KAIUI"  straits 
northwards. 

(3)  The  west  sea  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  has  many  reefs  and  islands  and  is 
not  suitable  as  a  ocean  maneuver  practice  sea. 

(4)  Direction  of  practice  will  avoid  all  merchant  ship  routes  and  official  travel 
routes. 

Distance  based  on : 

(1)  Fuel  is  plentiful  and  long  distance  high  speed  is  possible. 

(2)  Guns  can  not  be  heard  here. 

(3)  In  one  week's  time,  (actually  the  maneuvers  mentioned  in  my  message 
#231**  were  for  the  duration  of  four  full  days  of  144  hours),  a  round  trip  to  a 
distance  of  864  nautical  miles  could  be  reached  (if  speed  is  12  knots),  or  1152 
nautical  miles  (if  speed  is  16  knots),  or  1440  nautical  miles  (if  speed  is  20  miles) 
is  possible,  however,  figuring  on  50  percent  of  the  time  being  used  for  maneuver 
technicalities,  a  guess  that  the  point  at  which  the  maneuvers  are  held  would  be  a 
point  of  about  500  miles  from  Pearl  Harbor. 

(2)  The  usual  schedule  for  departure  and  return  of  the  battleships  is:  leaving 
on  Tuesday  and  returning  on  Friday,  or  leaving  on  Friday  and  returning  on 
Saturday  of  the  following  week.    All  ships  stay  in  port  about  a  period  of  one  week. 

JD-1:  7294   26053    (Y)    Navy  Trans.  12-10-41    (2) 

•  JD-1 :     7158. 

•♦Available,  dated  23  November. 


From:  Rio  de  Janeiro  (Ishii). 
To :  Santiago. 
2  December  1941. 
(J19). 

Circular  #328. 

Tokyo  to  Rio  de  Janeiro  as  Circular  #2431,  29th  November. 
Re  my  Circular  #2409* 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  673 

Additions  to  the  list  already  sent ;  please  use  with  others. 
Code  Word  Mewning. 

KASIMA Have  Japanese  living  there  been  interned? 

K4NO Japanese  living  here  are  all  safe. 

KIKUTI Japanese  living  here  have  all  been  interned. 

KATDNO . Some  of  Japanese  living  here  have  been  interned. 

KAWASIMO The  wave  length  of  General  Information  broadcast  will 

be  changed  to kilocycles  from (day) 

(month) 

KAKAO Reception  of  General  Information  broadcast  bad,  please 

(Kayao) change  wave  length. 

TUJIKITA Please    change   wave   length    of   General    Information 

broadcast  to  a  shorter  wave  length  than  the  present 
"^      wave  length. 

TABUSE Please    change   wave   length    of   General    Information 

(Tabuti) broadcast  to  a  longer  wave  length. 

SAITO The  time  of  General  Information  broadcast  is  to  be 

changed  starting  on (day) from 

(time) to (time) 

HAYASAKI Please  change  time  of  General  Information  broadcast, 

starting  on (day) to,  from (time) 

to (time) 

ISEZAKI 100  (hyaku) 

WANAMI 1,000  (sen) 

YASUNO" 10,000  (man) 

UNO 100,000  (jyii  man) 

ITIOTA 1,000,000  (hyaku  man) 

(perhaps  ITIOKA) 
(probably  UTIOKA) 

JD-1:7360     SECRET     (Y)  Navy  Trans.  12-11-41     (7) 


*JD-1 :  6985.     List  of  code  words  similar  to  above. 


From  :  Tientsin  (7)     Peking 

To:  Tokyo. 

5  December  1941. 

(Purple). 

#625,     (Circular  Number.) 

To  be  handled  in  government  code. 

Re  my  secret  military  communication  #262*  of  November  30th. 

1.  Concurrent  with  opening  war  on  Britain  and  America  we  have  considered 
Holland  as  a  semi-belligerent  and  have  exercised  strict  surveillence  over  her 
consulates  and  prohibited  all  communication  between  them  and  the  enemy 
countries. 

2.  Coincident  with  the  beginning  of  the  war  against  Britain  and  America  we 
have  taken  steps  to  prohibit  the  use  of  code  messages  and  the  use  of  wireless  by 
the  Holland  consulates. 

3.  In  case  war  breaks  out  with  Holland  we  will  take  the  same  steps  toward 
that  country  that  we  havei  taken  in  the  case  of  Britain  and  America. 

JD-1:  7335     SECRET     (H)   Navy  Trans.  12-11-41     (AR) 


♦Not  available. 


79716 — 46— Ex.  149,  vol.  2- 


674       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

From:  Honolulu  (Kita). 

To :  Tokyo. 

3  December  1941. 

#245  (In  2  pai-ts,  complete). 

(Military  secret.) 

From  Ichiro  Fuji  to  the  Chief  of  #3  Section  of  Military  Staff  Headquarters. 

1.  I  wish  to  change  my  method  of  communicating  by  signals  to  the  following; 

1.  Arrange  the  eight  signals  in  three  columns  as  follows : 


Meaning 

Signal 

Battleship  divisions  including  scouts  and  screen 
units. 

Preparing  to  sortie  .      .         -  

1 

Preparing  to  sortie 

2 

All  departed  between  1st  and  3d 

3 

Several  departed  between  1st  and  3d 

4 

6 

All  departed  between  4th  and  6th 

6 

Several  departed  between  4th  and  6th 

7 

All  departed  between  4th  and  6th.-- 

8 

26145. 
JD-1:    7370 


(continued)    (M)  Navy  Trans.  12-11-41  (7) 


2.  Signals. 

I.  Lanikai*  Beach. 


House  will  show  lights  during  the  night  as  follows: 


Signal 

One  light  between  8  and  9  p.  m 1 

One  light  between  9  and  10  p.  m . 2 

One  light  between  10  and  11  p.  m 3 

One  light  between  11  and  12  p.  m 4 

II.— 

Two  lights  between  12  and  1  a.  m 5 

Two  lights  between  1  and  2  a.  m 6 

Two  lights  between  2  and  3  a.  m _ 7 

Two  lights  between  3  and  4  a.  m 8 

(Part  2.) 

III.  Lanikai*  Bay,  during  daylight. 

If  there  is  a  "star"  on  the  head  of  the  sail  of  the  Star  Boat  it  indicates  signals 
1,  2,  3,  or  4. 

If  there  is  a  "star"  and  a  Roman  numeral  III  it  indicates  signal  5,  6,  7,  or  8. 

IV.  Lights  in  the  attic  window  of  Kalama  House**  will  indicate  the  following : 

Times  '  Signal 

1900-2000 -  3 

2000-2100 4 

2100-2200 5 

2200-2300 6 

2300-2400 7 

0000-0100 8 

V.  K.  G.  M.  G.     ***    Want  Ads. 


A.  Chinese  rug  etc.  for  sale,  apply  P.  O.  box  1476  indicates  signal  3  or  6. 

B.  CHIC— CO  farm  etc.  apply  P.  O.  box  1476  indicates  signal  4  or  7. 

C.  Beauty  operator  wanted  etc.  apply  P.  O.  box  1476  indicates  signal  5  or  8. 
3.  If  the  above  listed  signals  and  wireless  messages  cannot  be  made  from 

Oahu,  then  on  Maui  Island,  6  miles  to  the  northward  of  Kula  Sanatorium****  at 
a  point  halfway  between  Lower  Kula  Road  and  Haleakala  Road  (latitude  20° 
40'  N.,  longitude  156°  19'  W.,  visible  from  seaward  to  the  southeast  and  south- 


*  Between  Waimanala  and  Kailua  Beaches  on  east  coast  of  Oahu. 

**A  beach  village  on  east  coast  of  Oahu,  1  mile  northwest  of  Lanikai. 

***A  radio  broadcast  station  in  Honolulu. 

•***At  latitude  20-42-45  N.,  longitude  156-20-20  W- 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  675 

west  of  Maui  Island)  the  following  signal  bonfire  will  be  made  daily  until  your 

EXEX  signal  is  received. 

Time  '  Signal 

From    7-8 3  or  6 

From  8-9 4  or  7 

From   9-10 5  or  8 

JD-1:7370     (M)     Navy  Trans.  12-11-41     (7) 


B.  MESSAGES  TRANSLATED  AFTER  7  DECEMBER  1941 

From:  Honolulu  (Kita). 
To:  Tokyo. 
November  24,  1941. 
#231.     (Part  0  of  2) 

Re  your  #114.'' 

Strictly  Secret. 

1.  According  to  normal  practice,  the  fleet  leaves  Pearl  Harbor,  conducts  ma- 
neuvers and  forthwith  returns. 

2.  Recently  the  fleet  has  not  remained  for  a  long  period  of  time  nor  conducted 
maneuvers  in  the  neighborhood  of  Lahaina  Roads.  Destroyers  and  submarines 
are  the  only  vessels  who  ride  at  anchor  there. 

3.  Battleships  seldom,  if  ever,  enter  the  ports  of  Hilo,  Hanalei,  or  Kaneohe. 
Virtually  no  one  has  observed  battleships  in  maneuver  areas. 

4.  The  manner  in  which  the  fleet  moves : 

Battleships  exercise  in  groups  of  three  or  five,  accompanied  by  lighter  craft. 
They  conduct  maneuvers  for  roughly  one  week  at  sea,  either  to  the  south  of 
Maui  or  to  the  southwest.  Aircraft  carriers  maneuver  by  themselves,  whereas 
sea  plane  tenders  operate  in  concert  with  another  vessel  of  the  same  class.  Air- 
plane firing  and  bombing  practice  is  conducted  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  southern 
extremity  of  the  island  of  Kahoolawe. 

ARMY   26351    (Japanese)    Trans.  12-16-41    (2) 

JD-7511. 

«  Not  available. 


From:  Honolulu. 
To:  Tokyo. 
November  24,  1941. 
#234.     (Part  2  of  2.) 

The  heavy  cruisers  in  groups  of  six  carry  on  their  operations  over  a  period  of 
two  to  three  weeks,  doubtless  going  to  Samoa.  The  length  of  time  that  they 
remain  at  anchor  in  Pearl  Harbor  or  tied  up  at  docks  is  roughly  four  or  five  days 
at  a  stretch. 

The  light  cruisers  in  groups  of  five  spend  one  to  two  weeks  in  operations.  It 
would  seem  that  they  carry  on  their  maneuvers  in  the  vicinity  of  Panama. 

The  submarines  go  out  on  24-hour  trips  Mondays,  Wednesdays,  and  Fridays. 

The  destroyers,  in  addition  to  accompanying  the  principal  units  of  the  fleet, 
carry  on  personnel  training  activities  in  the  waters  adjacent  to  Hawaii. 

Mine  layers  (old-style  destroyers)  in  group  sf ,  have  been  known  to  spend 

more  than  three  weeks  in  operations  in  the  Manila  area. 

Furthermore,  on  the  night  of  the  23rd,  five  mine  layers  conducted  mine  laying 
operations  outside  Manila  harbor. 

ARMY    26352     (Japanese)     Trans.  12/16/41     (2) 

JD-7511. 

From:  Tokyo  (Togo). 
To:  Honolulu. 
December  2,  1941. 
J-19. 

#123,   (Secret  outside  the  department) 

In  view  of  the  present  situation,  the  presence  in  port  of  warships,  airplane 
carriers,  and  cruisers  is  of  utmost  importance.  Hereafter,  to  the  utmost  of  your 
ability,  let  me  know  day  by  day.  Wire  me  in  each  case  whether  or  not  there 
are  any  observation  balloons  above  Pearl  Harbor  or  if  there  are  any  indications 


676       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

that  they  will  be  sent  up.    Also  advise  me  whether  or  not  the  warships  are 
provided  with  anti-mine  nets. 

Note :  This  message  was  received  here  on  December  23. 
JD-1:8007    ARMY    27065     SECRET     (Japanese)     Trans.  12/30/41     (5) 


Hewitt  Inquiry  Exhibit  No.  14 

(Exhibit  No.  14  originally  consisted  of  four  parts:  Exhibits  14A, 
14B,  14C,  and  14D,  being  photostatic  copies  of  a  Japanese  submarine 
chart,  showing  courses  and  locations  of  U.  S.  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor. 
These  photostatic  copies  are  reproduced  as  a  single  chart  and  will  be 
found  as  Item  No.  106,  EXHIBITS-ILLUSTKATIONS,  Hewitt 
Inquiry.) 

Hewitt  Inquiry  Exhibit  No.  15 

From :  Washington. 

To :  Tokyo. 

25  July  1941. 

(Purple). 

#571. 

Apparently  Admiral  Pratt  had  put  in  a  good  word  for  me  to  the  Chief  of 
(Naval)  Operations,  for  ever  since  I  assumed  this  post,  I  have  been  shown 
many  courtesies  by  him.  His  opinions  concerning  U.  S.-Japanese  relations  co- 
incide with  mine;  he  told  me  that  the  only  result  of  a  war  between  the  two 
countries  would  be  mutual  exhaustion. 

Once  while  conversing  with  the  Admiral  (Stark)  I  happened  to  mention  that 
it  seemed  to  me  that  the  higher  officials  in  the  Navy  Department  here  seemed 
to  be  men  of  excellent  character  and  qualifications. 

To  this,  the  Admiral  replied  that  both  the  Assistant  to  the  Chief  of  Naval 
Operations  and  the  Director  of  War  Plans  were  exceedingly  able  men.  The 
same  is  true  of  the  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Aeronautics.  As  for  the  fleets,  he 
continued,  both  Kimmel  and  King  were  recommended  by  him,  and  both  are  of 
the  highest  caliber.  Although  Hart  had  reached  the  age  of  retirement,  he  had 
been  kept  on  in  active  duty  because  of  the  critical  times,  he  added. 

Please  relay  this  information  to  the  Navy. 

JD-1:4063     SECRET     (D)  Navy  Trans.  7-29-41     (7) 


8ECBET 

From:  Washington   (Nomura). 
To:  Tokyo. 
October  14,  1941. 
Purple. 

#943    (Part  1  of  2)"    (To  be  handled  in  Government  Code). 

I  had  an  interview  with  Rear  Admiral  TURNER.  If  I  sum  up  what  he  told 
me,  it  is  this : 

"What  the  United  States  wants  is  not  just  a  pretense  but  a  definite  promise. 
Should  a  conference  of  the  leaders  of  the  two  governments  be  held  without  a 
definite  preliminary  agreement,  and  should,  in  the  meantime,  an  advance  be 
made  into  Siberia,  the  President  would  be  placed  in  a  terrible  predicament. 
Japan  speaks  of  peace  in  the  Pacific  and  talks  as  if  she  can  decide  matters 
independently,  and  so  it  would  seem  to  me  that  Japan  could  set  aside  most 
of  her  obligations  toward  the  Three-Power  Alliance.  As  to  the  question  of 
withdrawing  or  stationing  troops,  since  it  is  impossible  to  withdraw  troops  all 
at  once,  it  would  seem  that  a  detailed  agreement  could  be  arranged  between 
Japan  and  China  for  a  gradual  withdrawal." 


'  For  part  2  see  S.  I.  S.  #  23516. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  677 

He  speculated  on  the  various  difficulties  which  Japan  had  to  face  internally. 
It  seems  that  this  opinion  of  his  has  also  heen  given  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 
Army    5854    23570    SECRET    Trans.  10/16/41  (2) 

SECBET 

From:  Tokyo   (Toyoda). 
To:  Washington. 
October  16,  1941. 
Purple  (CA). 
#671 

Although  I  have  been  requested  by  both  the  German  and  Italian  Ambas- 
sadors in  Tokyo  to  give  them  confidential  information  on  the  Japanese-Ameri- 
can negotiations,  I  have,  in  consideration  of  the  nature  of  the  negotiations, 
been  declining  to  do  so.  However,  early  this  month,  following  the  German 
attacks  on  American  merchant  ships  and  the  consequent  (revival  ?)  of  the 
movement  for  the  revision  of  the  Neutrality  Act,  the  German  authorities  de- 
manded that  the  Japanese  Government  submit  to  the  American  Government 
a  message  to  the  effect  that  the  Japanese  Government  observes  that  if  the 
ROOSEVELT  Administration  continues  to  attack  the  Axis  Powers  increasingly, 
a  belligerent  situation  would  inevitably  arise  between  Germany  and  Italy  on 
the  one  hand  and  the  United  States  on  the  other,  and  this  would  provide  the 
reasons  for  the  convocation  of  the  duties  envisioned  in  the  Three  Power  agree- 
ment and  might  lead  Japan  to  joinn  immediately  the  war  in  opposition  to  the 
United  States.  We  have  not,  as  yet,  submitted  this  message  because,  in  view 
of  the  Japanese-American  negotiations,  we  found  it  necessary  to  consider  care- 
fully the  proper  timing  as  well  as  wording  of  the  message.  The  German  au- 
thorities have  been  repeatedly  making  the  same  request  and  there  are  rea- 
sons which  do  not  permit  this  matter  to  be  postponed. 

ARMY    5901  23631     SECRET 

From :  Berlin. 
To :  Tokyo. 
1  October  1941. 
(Purple). 
#1198. 

On  this  the  occasion  of  the  first  anniversary  of  the  Tripartite  Pact,  Foreign 
Minister  Ribbentrop  has  come  to  Berlin  from  the  Imperial  Headquarters 
especially  and  I  have  had  several  visits  with  him.  Using  this  opportunity  I, 
and  the  other  members  of  the  staff,  have  mingled  with  people  from  all  classes 
of  society  and  visited  with  them.  I  am  endeavoring  to  sum  up  all  these  experi- 
ences and  analyze  the  present  state  of  feeling  toward  Japan  held  by  Germany 
In  this  report  to  you. 

1.  Ribbentrop  said  that  he  had  absolute  proof  that,  while  reports  of  the 
content  of  the  Japanese-American  negotiations  were  withheld  from  Am- 
bassador Ott,  America  was  in  secret  communication  with  England  in  regard  to 
the  Japanese-American  negotiations.  Even  Ribbentrop  who  is  supposed  to  under- 
stand Japan's  position,  expressed  great  dissatisfaction  regarding  Japan's 
attitude. 

2.  That  the  Foreign  Office  staff  from  Weizsacker  down  and  also  everyone  in 
general  were  thoroughly  disgusted  with  Japan  was  very  apparent  from  their 
attitude  toward  myself  and  other  members  of  the  staff.  Everyone  who  feels 
kindly  disposed  toward  Japan  is  deeply  concerned  over  this  state  of  aiTairs. 
Even  those  who  do  not  come  to  the  same  conclusion  that  Ambassador  Ott  did 
in  his  telegram  are  outspoken  in  their  dissatisfaction  and  expression  of  pessi- 
mistic views.  I  am  trying  to  take  the  position  in  interviews  with  newspaper 
correspondents  and  other  concerned  with  the  outside  that  Germany  is  cognizant 
of  the  Japanese-American  negotiations  and  that  they  are  no  indication  of  an 
alienation  between  Japan  and  Germany. 

3.  Foreign  diplomats  and  newspaper  correspondents  of  third  countries  show 
great  interest  in  the  Japanese  attitude  and  seem  to.  consider  it  in  a  certain 
sense  as  a  barometer  by  which  the  course  of  the  European  war  can  be  judged. 
However  we  receive  the  Impression  that  the  greater  number  feel  that  Japan  is 
avoiding  war  because  of  the  impoverishment  resulting  from  the  China  incident 
and  Is  taking  a  pessimistic  attitude  toward  the  course  of  the  European  war. 

4.  Even  though  It  might  be  said  that  Germany  is  prepared  for  these  machina- 


678       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

tions  of  estrangement  by  third  countries  and  that  she  is  keeping  up  the  pretence 
that  there  is  no  change  in  her  feeling  toward  Japan,  the  fact  that  the  feeling 
of  German  leaders  and  the  people  in  general  toward  Japan  is  getting  bad  is  one 
that  cannot  be  covered.  Please  bear  this  fact  in  mind.  If  Japan  takes  a 
wishy-washy  attitude  and  goes  ahead  with  her  negotiations  without  consulting 
Germany  there  is  no  telling  what  step  Germany  may  take  without  consulting 
Japan. 

Relayed  to  Rome. 

JD-1:     SECRET     (H)  Navy  Trans.  10-18-41     (4) 


From:  Washington   (Nomura). 
To:  Tokyo. 
October  22,  1941. 
Purple.  (CA). 

I  have  already  wired  you  something  about  my  present  psychology.  I  am  sure 
that  I,  too,  should  go  out  with  the  former  cabinet.  I  know  that  for  some  time 
the  Secretary  of  State  has  known  how  sincere  your  humble  servant  is,  yet  how 
little  influence  I  have  in  Japan.  I  am  ashamed  to  say  that  it  has  come  to  my 
ears  that  this  is  the  case.  There  are  some  Americans  who  trust  this  poor  novice 
and  who  say  that  things  will  g0t  better  for  me,  but,  alas,  their  encouragement 
is  not  enough.  Among  my  confreres  here  in  the  United  States  there  are  also 
some  who  feel  the  same  way,  but  alas,  they  are  all  poor  deluded  souls.  As  for 
Your  Excellency's  instructions,  WAKASUGI  can  carry  them  out  fully.  Nor  do 
I  image  that  you  all  have  any  objections.  I  don't  want  to  be  the  bones  of  a 
dead  horse.  I  don't  want  to  continue  this  hypocritical  existence,  deceiving  other 
people.  No,  don't  think  I  am  trying  to  flee  from  the  field  of  battle*,  but  as  a 
man  of  honor  this  is  the  only  way  that  is  open  for  me  to  tread.  Please  send 
me  your  permission  to  return  to  Japan.  Most  humbly  do  I  beseech  your  forgive- 
ness if  I  have  injured  your  dignity  and  I  prostrate  myself  before  you  in  the 
depth  of  my  rudeness. 

ARMY     6017     23859     SECRET    Trans.  10-23^1   (7) 


From:  Tokyo. 
To:  Washington. 
23  October  1941. 
(Purple-CA). 

Unnumbered. 

From  you  message (s)  I  am  advised  of  the  various  difficulties  you  are  coping 
with  and  I  wish  to  express  to  you  that  I  appreciate  the  efforts  you  are  making. 
As  you  are  well  aware,  the  outcome  of  those  negotiations  have  a  great  bearing 
upon  the  decision  as  to  which  road  the  Imperial  Government  will  pursue.  As  such, 
it  is  an  exceedingly  important  matter.  We  are  placing  all  of  our  reliance  on  Your 
Excellency's  reports  for  our  information  on  this  matter. 

For  the  above  reason,  we  express  our  hope  that  you  will  see  fit  to  sacrifice  all 
of  your  own  personal  wishes,  and  remain  at  your  post. 

JD-1:  6016    SECRET     (D)   Navy  Trans.  10-23-41   (S-TT) 


From:  Tokyo. 
To:  Washington. 
5  November  1941. 
(Purple-OA). 

#736 

(Of  utmost  secrecy). 

Because  of  various  circumstances,  it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  all  arrange- 
ments for  the  signing  of  this  agreement  be  completed  by  the  25th  of  this  month. 
I  realize  that  this  is  a  difficult  order,  but  under  the  circumstances  it  is  an 
unavoidable  one.  Please  understand  this  thoroughly  and  tackle  the  problem  of 
saving  the  Japanese-U.  S.  relations  from  falling  into  a  chaotic  condition.  Do  so 
with  great  determination  and  with  unstinted  effort,  I  beg  of  you. 

This  information  is  to  be  kept  strictly  to  yourself  only. 

JD-1:  6254     SECRET     (D)  Navy  Trans.  11-5-41  (S-TT) 


PROCEEDINGS  OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  679 

SBCBEIV 

From:  Washington  (Nomura). 
To:  Tokyo. 
November  10,  1941. 
Purple  (CA)    (Urgent). 
#1066.    Part  1  of  2. 

1.  I  sent  MOORE"  to  contact  Senator  THOMAS  of  the  Senate  Foreign  Re- 
lations Committee  and  HULL.   His  report  reads  as  follows : 

"The  United  States  is  not  bluffing.  If  Japan  invades  again,  the  United  States 
will  fight  with  Japan.  Psychologically  the  American  people  are  ready.  The 
Navy  is  prepared  and  ready  for  action." 

2.  Yesterday  evening,  Sunday,  a  certain  Cabinet  member,  discarding  all 
quibbling,  began  by  saying  to  me: 

"You  are  indeed  a  dear  friend  of  mine  and  I  tell  this  to  you  alone."  Then 
he  continued:  "The  American  Government  is  receiving  a  number  of  reliable 
reports  that  Japan  will  be  on  the  move  soon.  The  American  Government  does 
not  believe  that  ydur  visit  on  Monday  to  the  President  or  the  coming  of  Mr. 
KURUSU  will  have  any  effect  on  the  general  situation." 

I  took  pains  to  explain  in  detail  how  impatient  the  Japanese  have  grown 
since  the  freezing ;  how  they  are  eager  for  a  quick  understanding ;  how  both 
the  Government  and  the  people  do  not  desire  a  Japanese- American  war;  and 
how  we  will  hope  for  peace  until  the  end. 

He  replied,  however: 

"Well,  our  boss,  the  President,  believes  those  reports  and  so  does  the  Secretary 
of  State." 

Army    6440    24655     SECRET    Trans.  11/12/41     (2) 

•  Frederick  Moore — Legal  Adviser  to  the  Japanese  Embassy  in  Washington. 


SECBETT 


From:  Washington  (Nomura) 
To:  Tokyo 
November  10,  1941 
Purple  (CA)    (Urgent) 
#106a     (Part  2  of  2.) 

In  the  newspapers  and  magazines,  with  the  exception  of  the  Daily  News 
and  the  Hearst  Papers,  it  is  reported  that  the  Americans  are  much  more 
eager  for  a  war  with  Japan  than  they  are  for  one  with  Germany.  It  is  said 
that  some  of  the  British  are  using  this  inclination  for  their  own  advantage 
and  that  already  parleys  have  been  started  for  joint  Anglo-American  action. 
Suggestions  have  already  been  made  to  the  effect  that  it  is  necessary  for 
some  of  the  British  fleet  to  be  located  in  the  Pacific.  Now  even  if  the  Presi- 
dent and  other  statesmen  do  not  follow  this  trend,  who  can  say  how  it  will 
be?  The  friend  I  just  spoke  of  told  me  that  the  United  States  cannot  stop 
now  because  if  Japan  moves  something  will  have  to  be  done  since  it  is  a 
question  of  the  United  States  saving  its  face. 

3.  Well,  in  any  case,  I  am  going  to  see  the  President  today  and  talk  with 
him  on  the  basis  of  your  instructions.  You  may  be  sure  that  I  will  do  my  very 
best. 

Army    6440    24656     SECRET    Trans.  11/12/41    (2) 


SECEET 

From :  Tokyo. 
To:  Washington. 
November  16,  1941. 
Purple  (Ca)    (Urgent). 

For  your  Honor's  own  information. 

1.  I  have  read  your  #1090,"  and  you  may  be  sure  that  you  have  all  my  gratitude 
for  the  efforts  you  have  put  forth,  but  the  fate  of  our  Empire  hangs  by  the  slender 
thread  of  a  few  days,  so  please  fight  harder  than  you  ever  did  before. 


680       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

2.  What  you  say  in  the  last  paragraph  of  your  message  is,  of  course,  so  and 
I  have  given  it  already  the  fullest  consideration,  but  I  have  only  to  refer  you  to 
the  fundamental  policy  laid  down  in  my  #725."  Will  you  please  try  to  realize 
what  that  means.  In  your  opinion  we  ought  to  wait  and  see  what  turn  the  war 
takes  and  remain  patient.  However,  I  am  awfully  sorry  to  say  that  the  situation 
renders  this  out  of  the  question.  I  set  the  deadline  for  the  solution  of  these 
negotiations  in  my  #786,'  and  there  will  be  no  change.  Please  try  to  understand 
that.  You  see  how  short  the  time  is :  therefore,  do  not  allow  the  United  States 
to  sidetrack  us  and  delay  the  negotiations  any  further.  Press  them  for  a  solution 
on  the  basis  of  our  proposals,  and  do  your  best  to  bring  about  an  immediate 
solution. 

ARMY    24878.     JD-1:6638.     SECRET    Trans.  11/17/41     (S). 


"  S    I    S.  #  24330  in  which  TOGO  says  that  conditions  both  within  and  without  the 
Japanese  Empire  will  not  permit  any  further  delay  in  reaching  a  settlement  with  the  United 

<=  S.  I.  S.  #  24378  in  which  TOGO  says  that  It  is  absolutely  necessary  that  all  arrange- 
ments for  the  signing  of  this  agreement  be  completed  by  the  25th  of  this  month. 


SECRET 

From:  Tokyo. 
To :  Washington. 
November  22,  1941. 
Purple  CA  (Urgent). 

#812. 

To  both  you  Ambassadors. 

It  is  awfully  hard  for  us  to  consider  changing  the  date  we  set  in  my  #736.' 
You  should  know  this,  however,  I  know  you  are  working  hard.  Stick  to  our  fixed 
policy  and  do  your  very  best.  Spare  no  efforts  and  try  to  bring  about  the  solution 
we  desire.  There  are  reasons  beyond  your  ability  to  guess  why  we  wanted  to 
settle  Japanese-American  relations  by  the  25th,  but  if  within  the  next  three  or 
four  days  you  can  finish  your  conversations  with  the  Americans ;  if  the  signing 
can  be  completed  by  the  29th,  (let  me  write  it  out  for  you — twenty  ninth)  ;  if  the 
pertinent  notes  can  be  exchanged;  if  we  can  get  an  understanding  with  Great 
Britain  and  the  Netherlands ;  and  in  short  if  everything  can  be  finished,  we  have 
decided  to  wait  until  that  date.  This  time  we  mean  it,  that  the  deadline  abso- 
lutely cannot  be  changed.  After  that  things  are  automatically  going  to  happen. 
Please  take  this  into  your  careful  consideration  and  work  harder  than  you  ever 
have  before.  This,  for  the  present,  is  for  the  information  of  you  two  Ambassa- 
dors alone. 

ARMY    6710.    25138.     SECRET    Trans.  11/22/41  (S). 


»  See  S.  I.  S.  #  24373.  Tokyo  wires  Washington  that  because  of  the  various  circum- 
stances it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  arrangements  for  the  signing  of  the  agreement  be 
completed  by  the  25th  of  this  month. 


SECEET 

From :  Tokyo. 
To:  Washington. 
November  26,  1941. 
Purple. 

#836.  To  be  handled  in  Government  Code. 

The  situation  is  momentarily  becoming  more  tense  and  telegrams  take 
too  long.  Therefore,  will  you  cut  down  the  substance  of  your  reports  of  nego- 
tiations to  the  minimum  and,  on  occasion,  call  up  Chief  YAMAMOTO  of  the 

«  See  JD  1 :  6553  In  which  NOMURA  gives  his  views  on  the  general  situation.  Part  8 
not  available. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY 


681 


America  Bureau  on  the  telephone  and  make 
we  will  use  the  following  code : 

Japanese 

Sangoku  Joyaku  Mondai 

(Three-Power  Treaty 
question ) 

Musabetsu  Taiguu  Mondai 

(The  question  of  non-dis- 
criminatory treatment) 

Shina  Mondai 

(The  China  question) 

Soori 

(Premier) 

Gaimudaijin 

(Foreign  Minister) 

Rikugun 

(The  Army) 

Kaigun 

(The  Navy) 

Nichi-bei  kooshoo 

(Japan-American  nego- 
tiations) 

Daitooryoo 

( President ) 

Haru 

(Hull) 

Kokunaijoosei 
(Internal  situation) 
Jooho  Suru 
(To  yield) 
Jooho  Sesu 
(Not  to  yield) 
Keisei  Kyuuten  Suru 
(Situation  taking  critical 
turn) 

For  your  information,  telephone  addresses 
as  follows : 

Bureau  Chief  YAMAMOTO : 
Section  Chief  KASE: 
The  Minister's  residence 
The  Vice-Minister's  resi- 
dence 

ARMY     25344    SECRET    Trans.  11-26-41  (S) 

From :  Tokyo. 

To :  Washington. 

19  November  1941.  i 

(J19). 

Circular  #2354. 

When  our  diplomatic  relations  are  becoming  dangerous,  we  will  add  the  fol- 
lowing at  the  beginning  and  end  of  our  general  intelligence  broadcasts : 

(1)  If  it  is  Japan-U.  S.  relations,  "HIGASHI". 

(2)  Japan-Russia  relations,  "KITA". 

(3)  Japan-British  relations,  (including  Thai,  Malaya  and  N.  E.  I.),  "NISHI" 
The  above  will  be  repeated  five  times  and  included  at  beginning  and  end. 
Relay  to  Rio  de  Janeiro,  Buenos  Aires,  Mexico  City,  San  Francisco. 
JD-1:6850    SECRET     (Y)  Navy  Trans.  11-26-41     (S) 


your  report  to  him.     At  that  time 

English 
Nyuu  Yooku 
(New  York) 

Shikago 
(Chicago) 

Sanfuranshisuko 

(San  Francisco) 

Itoo  Kun 

(Mr.  Itoo) 

Date  Kun 

(Mr.  Date) 

Tokugawa  Kun 

(Mr.  Tokugawa) 

Maeda  Kun 

(Mr.  Maeda) 

Endan 

(Marriage  proposal) 

Kimiko  San 
(Miss  Kimiko) 
Fumako  San 
(Miss  Fumako) 
Shoobai 
(Trade) 
Yama  Wo  Uru 
(To  sell  the  mountain) 
Yama  Wo  Urenu 
(Not  to  sell  the  mountain) 
Kodomo  Gaumareru 
(The  child  is  born) 

other  than  our  Home  Office  are 

Setagaya  4617 
Yotsuya  4793 
Ginza  3614 
Ginza  1022 


682       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

From:  Tokyo. 

To:  Nanking. 

15  November  1941. 

(Purple). 

#499. 

Re  your  #818* 

To  Naval  authorities: 

We  are  now  in  the  midst  of  very  serious  negotiations  and  have  not  reached 
an  agreement  as  yet.  As  the  time  limit  is  near  please  have  them  (defer?)  for 
a  while. 

jd-1:    6848    SECRET     (F)  Navy  Trans.  11-27-41  (6-AR) 


♦Not  available. 


From :  Tokyo. 
To :  Washington. 
19  November  1941 
(J19) 
Circular  #2353. 

Regarding  the  broadcast  of  a  special  message  in  an  emergency. 

In  case  of  emergency  (danger  of  cutting  off  our  diplomatic  relations),  and 
the  cutting  off  of  international  communications,  the  following  warning  will  be 
added  in  the  middle  of  the  daily  .Japanese  language  short  wave  news  broadcast. 

(1)  In  case  of  a  Japan-U.  S.  relations  in  danger:  HIGASHI  NO  KAZEAME.* 

(2)  Japan-U.  S:  S.  R.  relations:  KITANOKAZE  KUMORI.** 

(3)  Japan-British  relations  :  NISHI  NO  KAZE  HARE*** 

This  signal  will  be  given  in  the  middle  and  at  the  end  as  a  weather  forecast 
and  each  sentence  will  be  repeated  twice.  When  this  is  heard  please  destroy 
all  code  papers,  etc.    This  is  as  yet  to  be  a  completely  secret  arrangement. 

Forward  as  urgent  intelligence. 

JD-1:     6875     SECRET     (Y)  Navy  Tran.s.  11-28-41  (S-TTi. 

*East  wind  rain. 
**North  wind  cloudy. 
***West  wind  clear. 


From :  Washington. 

To :  Tokyo. 

November  26,  1941. 

Purple.    ( Extremely  urgent) . 

#1180.     (Parti  of  2.) 

From  NOMURA  and  KURUSU. 

As  we  have  wired  you  several  times,  there  is  hardly  any  possibility  of  having 
them  consider  our  "B"  proposal  in  toto.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  let  the  situa- 
tion remain  tense  as  it  is  now,  sorry  as  we  are  to  say  so,  the  negotiations  will 
inevitably  be  ruptured,  if  indeed  they  may  not  already  be  called  so.  Our  failure 
and  humiliation  are  complete.  We  might  suggest  one  thing  for  saving  the  situa- 
tion. Although  we  have  grave  misgivings,  we  might  propose,  first,  that  President 
ROOSEVELT  wire  you  that  for  the  sake  of  iposterity  he  hopes  that  Japan  and 
the  United  States  will  cooperate  for  the  maintenance  of  iieace  in  the  Pacific 
(just  as  soon  as  you  wire  us  what  you  think  of  this,  we  will  negotiate  for  this 
sort  of  an  arrangement  with  all  we  have  in  us),  and  that  you  in  return  reply 
with  a  cordial  message,  thereby  not  only  clearing  the  atmosphere,  but  also 
gaining  a  little  time.  Considering  the  possibility  that  England  and  the  United 
States  are  scheming  to  bring  the  Netherlands  Indies  under  their  protection 
through  military  occupation,  in  order  to  forestall  this,  I  think  we  should  pro- 
nose  the  establishment  of  neutral  nations,  including  French  Indo-China,  Nether- 
lands India  and  Thai.  (As  you  know,  last  September  President  ROOSEVELT 
proposed  the  neutrality  of  French  Indo-China  and  Thai. ) 

ARMY     6891     25435     SECRET     Trans.  11-28-11  (1) 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  683 

From:  Washington. 

To :  Tokyo. 

November  26,  1941. 

Purple.    (Extremely  urgent). 

#1180.     (Part  2  of  2.) 

We  suppose  that  the  rupture  of  the  present  negotiations  does  not  necessarily 
mean  war  between  Japan  and  the  United  States,  but  after  we  break  off,  as  we 
said,  the  military  occupation  of  Netherlands  India  is  to  be  expected  of  England 
and  the  United  States.  Then  we  would  attack  them  and  a  clash  with  them 
would  be  inevitable.  Now,  the  question  is  whether  or  not  Germany  would  feel 
duty  bound  by  the  third  article  of  the  treaty  to  help  us.  We  doubt  if  she  would. 
Again,  you  must  remember  that  the  Sino-Jajxanese  incident  would  have  to  wait 
until  the  end  of  this  world  war  before  it  could  possibly  be  settled. 

In  this  telegram  we  are  expressing  the  last  personal  opinions  we  will  have 
to  express,  so  will  Your  Excellency  please  be  good  enough  at  least  to  show  it 
to  the  Minister  of  the  Navy,  if  only  to  him ;  then  we  hope  that  you  will  wire  us 
back  instantly. 

ARMY    25436     SECRET    Trans.  11-28-41  (1) 


From:  Washington  (Nomura). 

To:  Tokyo. 

November  26, 1941. 

Purple.    (Extremely  urgent.) 

#1189.     (Parti  of  2.) 

At  4 :  45  on  the  afternoon  of  the  26th  I  and  Ambassador  KURUSU  met  with 
Secretary  HULL  and  we  talked  for  about  two  hours. 

HULL  said,  "For  the  last  several  days  the  American  Government  has  been 
getting  the  ideas  of  various  quarters,  as  well  as  conferring  carefully  with  the 
nations  concerned,  on  the  provisional  treaty  proposal  presented  by  Japan  on 
the  20th  of  this  month,  and  I  am  sorry  to  tell  you  that  we  cannot  agree  to  it. 
At  length,  however,  we  feel  compelled  to  propose  a  plan,  tentative  and  without 
commitment,  reconciling  the  points  of  difference  between  our  proposal  of  June 
21st  and  yours  of  September  25th."  So  saying,  he  presented  us  with  the  follow- 
ing two  proposals : 

A.  One  which  seeks  our  recognition  of  his  so-called  "four  principles." 

B.  (1)  The  conclusion  of  a  mutual  non-aggression  treaty  between  Tokyo, 
Washington,  Moscow,  the  Netherlands,  Chungking  and  Bangkok. 

(2)  Agreement  between  .Tapan,  the  United  States,  England,  the  Netherlands, 
China,  and  Thai  on  the  inviolability  of  French  Indo-China  and  equality  of 
economic  treatment  in  French  Indo-China. 

(3)  The  complete  evauation  of  Japanese  forces  from  China  and  all  French 
Indo-China. 

(4)  Japan  and  the  United  States  both  definitely  promise  to  support  no  regime 
in  China  but  that  of  CHIANG  KAI-SHEK. 

(5)  The  abolition  of  extra-territoriality  and  concessions  in  China. 
ARMY     25441     SECRET     Trans.  11-28-41     (1) 


From:  Washington  (Momura). 

To :  Tokyo. 

November  26, 1941. 

Purple.     (Extremely  urgent.) 

#1189.     (Part  2  of  2.) 

(6)  The  conclusion  of  a  reciprocal  trade  treaty  between  Japan  and  the 
United  States  on  the  basis  of  most  favored  nation  treatment. 

(7)  The  mutual  rescinding  of  the  Japanese  and  American  freezing  orders. 

(8)  Stabilization  of  yen-dollar  exchange. 

(9)  No  matter  what  sort  of  treaties  either  Japan  or  the  United  States  has 
contracted  with  third  countries,  they  both  definitely  promise  that  these  treaties 
will  not  be  interpreted  as  hostile  to  the  objectives  of  this  treaty  or  to  the 
maintenance  of  peace  in  the  Pacific.  (This  is,  of  course,  supposed  to  emasculate 
the  Three-Power  Pact.) 


684       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

In  view  of  our  negotiations  all  along,  we  were  both  dumbfounded  and  said  we 
could  not  even  cooperate  to  the  extent  of  reporting  this  to  Toyko.  We  argued 
back  furiously,  but  HULL  remained  solid  as  a  rock.  Why  did  the  United  States 
have  to  propose  such  hard  terms  as  these?  Well,  England,  the  Netherlands  and 
China  doubtless  put  her  up  to  it.  Then,  too,  we  have  been  urging  them  to  quit 
helping  CHIANG,  and  lately  a  number  of  important  Japanese  in  speeches  have 
been  urging  that  we  strike  at  England  and  the  United  States.  Moreover,  there 
have  been  rumors  that  we  are  demanding  of  Thai  that"  she  give  us  complete 
control  over  her  national  defense.  All  that  is  reflected  in  these  two  hard  pro- 
posals, or  we  think  so. 

ARMY    25442     SECRET    Trans.  11-28-41     (1) 


From:  Tokyo. 
To :  Washington. 
November  28,  1941. 
Purple.     (CA.) 

#844. 

Re  your  #1189." 

Well,  you  two  Ambassadors  have  exerted  superhuman  efforts  but,  in  spite  of 
this,  the  United  States  has  gone  ahead  and  presented  this  humiliating  proposal. 
This  was  quite  unexpected  and  extremely  regrettable.  The  Imperial  Government 
can  by  no  means  use  it  as  a  basis  for  negotiations.  Therefore,  with  a  report  of 
the  views  of  the  Imperial  Goveirnment  on  this  American  proposal  which  I  will 
send  you  in  two  or  three  days,  the  negotiations  will  be  de  facto  ruptured. 
This  is  inevitable.  However,  1  do  not  wish  you  to  give  the  impression  that  the 
negotiations  are  broken  off.  Merely  say  to  them  that  you  are  awaiting  instruc- 
tions and  that,  although  the  opinions  of  your  Government  are  not  yet  clear  to 
you,  to  your  own  way  of  thinking  the  Imperial  Government  has  always  made 
just  claims  and  has  borne  great  sacritices  for  the  sake  of  peace  in  the  Pacific. 
Say  that  we  have  always  demonstrated  a  long-suffering  and  conciliatory  attitude, 
but  that,  on  the  other  hand,  the  United  States  has  been  unbending,  making  it 
impossible  for  Japan  to  establish  negotiations.  Since  things  have  come  to  this 
pass,  I  contacted  the  man  you  told  me  to  in  your  #1180 "  and  he  said  that  under 
the  present  circumstances  what  you  suggest  is  entirely  unsuitable.  From  now  on 
do  the  best  you  can. 

ARMY     6S98    25445     SECRET     Trans.  11-28-^1  (S) 


»  S.  I.  S.  #  25441,  #  25442, 
"  S.  I.  S.  #  25435,  #  25436. 

From:  Tokyo. 

To:  Washington. 

29  November  1941.  « 

(Purple-CA.) 

#857. 

Re  my  #844* 

We  wish  you  would  make  one  more  attempt  verbally  along  the  following  lines : 

The  United  States  government  has  (always?)  taken  a  fair  and  judicial 
position  and  has  formulated  its  policies  after  full  consideration  of  the  claims 
of  both  sides. 

However,  the  Imperial  Government  is  at  a  loss  to  understand  why  it  has 
now  taken  the  attitude  that  the  new  proposals  we  have  made  cannot  be  made 
the  basis  of  discussion,  but  instead  has  made  new  proposals  which  ignore 
actual  conditions  in  East  Asia  and  would  greatly  injure  the  prestige  of  the 
Imperial  Government. 

With  such  a  change  of  front  in  their  attitude  toward  the  China  problem, 
what  has  become  of  the  basic  objectives  that  the  U.  S.  government  has  made 
the  basis  of  our  negotiations  during  these  seven  months?     On  these  points 


*JD-1  :  6898  (SIS  25445)  dated  28  Nov.,  in  which  Tokyo's  first  reaction  to  the  new 
U.  S.  proposals  castigates  them  as  humiliating.  When  Japan  sends  a  reply  in  2  or  3  days 
giving  its  views  on  them  the  negotiations  will  be  'de  facto'  ruptured.  However,  do  not 
give  the  impression  that  negotiations  are  broken  off. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  685 

we  would  request  careful  self-reflection  on  the  part  of  the  United  States 
government. 

(In  carrying  out  this  instruction,  please  be  careful  that  this  does  not  lead 
to  anything  like  a  breaking  off  of  negotiations.) 

JD-1:  6921     SECRET     (F)  Navy  trans.    30  Nov.  1941     (S-TT) 


From:  Washington. 

To:  Tokyo. 

30  November  1941  (2230  to  2238  EST). 

Telephone  Code. 

Transpacific  Radio  Telephone. 

(NOTE:  Following  is  a  preliminary,  condensed  version  of  conversation  be- 
tween Ambassador  Kurusu  and  the  Japanese  Foreign  Office  American  Division 
Chief  Yamamoto  on  Sunday  night.) 

Kurusu:  "It  is  all  arranged  for  us  to  meet  Hull  tomorrow.  We  received  a 
short  one  from  you,  didn't  we?  Well,  we  will  meet  him  in  regard  to  that. 
There  is  a  longer  one  coming  isn't  there?  In  any  case  we  are  going  to  see) 
him  about  the  short  one."  (i.  e.  telegram.  The  longer  one  is  probably  Tokyo's 
reply  to  Mr.  Hull's  proposals.) 

Yamamoto:  "Yes.    I  see." 

Kurusu :  "The  President  is  returning  tomorrow.     He  is  hurrying  home." 

Y.  "Is  there  any  special  significance  to  this?" 

K.  "The  newspapers  have  made  much  of  the  Premier's  speech,  and  it  is 
having  strong  repercussions  here." 

Y.  "Is  that  so." 

K.  "Yes.  It  was  a  drastic  statement  he  made.  The  newspapers  carried 
large  headlines  over  it;  and  the  President  seems  to  be  returning  because  of 
it.  There  no  doubt  are  other  reasons,  but  this  is  the  reason  the  up  Tspapers 
are  giving," 

(Pause) 

"Unless  greater  caution  is  exercised  in  speeches  by  the  Premier  and  others, 
it  puts  us  in  a  very  difficult  position.  All  of  you  over  there  must  watch  out 
about  these  ill-advised  statements.    Please  tell  Mr.  Tani." 

Y.  "We  are  being  careful." 

K.  "We  here  are  doing  our  best,  but  these  reports  are  seized  upon  by  the 
correspondents  and  the  worst  features  enlarged  upon.  Please  caution  the 
Premier,  the  Foreign  Minister,  and  others.  Tell  the  Foreign  Minister  that 
we  had  expected  to  hear  something  different,  some  good  word,  but  instead  we 
get  this."  (i.  e.  Premier's  speech) 

JD-1:  6922     SECRET     (M)Navy  trans.     30  Nov.  1941     (R-5) 


(After  a  pause,  Kurusu  continues ;  using  voice  code) 

K.  "What  about  the  internal  situation?"     (In  Japan) 

Y.  "No  particular (one  or  two  words  faded  out) " 

K.  "Are  the  Japanese-American  negotiations  to  continue?" 

Y.  "Yes." 

K.  "You  were  very  urgent  about  them  before,  weren't  you:  hut  now  you 
want  them  to  stretch  out.  We  will  need  your  help.  Both  the  Premier  and 
the  Foreign  Minister  will  need  to  change  the  tone  of  their  speeches ! ! ! !  Do  you 
understand?    Please  all  use  more  discretion." 

Y.  "When  will  you  see  them.     The  2nd?" 

K.  "Let's  see — this  is  Sunday  midnight  here.  Tomorrow  morning  at  ten. 
That  will  be  Monday  morning  here." 

(Pause) 

"Actually  the  real  problem  we  are  up  against  is  the  ejffects  of  happenings 
in  the  South.    You  understand  don't  you?" 

Y.  "Yes.    Yes.     How  long  will   it  be  before  the  President  gets  back?" 

K.  "I  don't  know  exactly.  According  to  news  reports  he  started  at  4:0  this 
afternoon.     He  should  be  here  tomorrow  morning  sometime." 

Y.  "Well  then— Goodbye." 

JD-1:     6922     SECRET     (M)  Navy  trans.     30  Nov.  1941     (R-o) 


686       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

From:  Tokyo. 
To :  Washington. 
1  December  1941. 
(Purple-CA). 

#865. 
Re  my  #857  *. 

1.  The  date  set  in  my  message  #812  **  has  come  and  gone,  and  the  situation 
continues  to  be  increasingly  critical.  However,  to  prevent  the  United  States 
from  becoming  unduly  suspicious  we  have  been  advising  the  press  and  others 
that  though  there  are  some  wide  differences  between  Japan  and  the  United 
States,  the  negotiations  are  continuing.    (The  above  is  for  only  your  information) . 

2.  We  have  decided  to  withhold  submitting  the  note  to  the  U.  S.  Ambassador  to 
Tokyo  as  suggested  by  you  at  the  end  of  your  message  #1124  ***.  Please  make 
the  necessary  representations  at  your  end  only. 

3.  There  are  reports  here  that  the  President's  sudden  return  to  the  capital 
is  an  effect  of  Premier  Tojo's  statement.  We  have  an  idea  that  the  President 
did  so  because  of  his  concern  over  the  critical  Far  Eastern  situation.  Please 
make  investigations  into  this  matter. 

JD-1:     6983     SECRET     (D)  Navy  Trans.     12-1-41     (S-TT) 

♦JD-l  :  6921. 
**JD-1:6710. 
•♦•Not  available. 


SEOBin' 
From :  Tokyo. 
To :  Berlin. 
November  30, 1941. 
Purple. 

#986.   (Strictly  Secret.)    (To  be  handled  in  Government  Code.)     (Part  1  of  2.) 
Secret  outside  the  Department.) 

1.  Japan-American  negotiations  were  commenced  the  middle  of  April  of  this 
year.  Over  a  period  of  half  a  year  they  have  been  continued.  Within  that 
period  the  Imperial  Government  adamantly  stuck  to  the  Tri-Partite  Alliance  as 
the  cornerstone  of  its  national  policy  regardless  of  the  vicissitudes  of  the  inter- 
national situation.  In  the  adjustment  of  diplomatic  relations  between  Japan 
and  the  United  States,  she  has  based  her  hopes  for  a  solution  definitely  within  the 
scope  of  that  alliance.  With  the  intent  of  restraining  the  United  States  from 
participating  in  the  war,  she  boldly  assumed  the  attitude  of  carrying  through 
these  negotiations. 

2.  Therefore,  the  present  cabinet,  in  line  with  your  message,  with  the  view  of 
defending  the  Empire's  existence  and  integrity  on  a  Just  and  equitable  basis,  has 
continued  the  negotiations  carried  on  in  the  past.  However,  their  views  and 
ours  on  the  question  of  the  evacuation  of  troops,  upon  which  the  negotiations 
rested  (they  demanded  the  evacuation  of  Imperial  troops  from  China  and  French 
Indo-China),  were  completely  in  opposition  to  each  other. 

Judging  from  the  course  of  the  negotiations  that  have  been  going  on,  we  first 
came  to  loggerheads  when  the  United  States,  in  keeping  with  its  traditional 
idealogical  tendency  of  managing  international  relations,  re-emphasized  her 
fundamental  reliance  upon  this  traditional  policy  in  the  conversations  carried 
on  between  the  United  States  and  England  in  the  Atlantic  Ocean.  The  mo- 
tive of  the  United  States  in  all  this  was  brought  out  by  her  desire  to  prevent 
the  establishment  of  a  new  order  by  Japan,  Germany,  and  Italy  in  Europe  and 
in  the  Far  East  (that  is  to  say,  the  aims  of  the  Tri-Partite  Alliance).  As  long 
as  the  Empire  of  Japan  was  in  alliance  with  Germany  and  Italy,  there  could 
be  no  maintenance  of  friendly  relations  between  Japan  and  the  United  States 
was  the  stand  they  took.  From  this  point  of  view,  they  began  to  demonstrate 
a  tendency  to  demand  the  divorce  of  the  Imperial  Government  from  the  Tri- 
Partite  Alliance.  This  was  brought  out  at  the  last  meeting.  That  is  to  say 
that  it  has  only  been  in  the  negotiations  of  the  last  few  days  that  it  has  become 
gradually  more  and  more  clear  that  the  Imperial  Government  could  no  longer 
continue  negotiations  with  the  United  States.  It  became  clear,  too,  that  a  con- 
tinuation of  negotiations  would  inevitably  be  detrimental  to  our  cause. 

ARMY    6944    25554    SECRET    Trans.  12/1/41     (MR) 


PROCEEDINGS  OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  687 

BECKETT 

From:  Tokyo. 

To:  Berlin. 

November  30,  1941. 

Purple. 

#986.   (Part  2  of  2.) 

3.  The  proposal  presented  by  the  United  States  on  the  26th  made  this  attitude 
of  theirs  clearer  than  ever.  In  it  there  is  one  insulting  clause  which  says 
that  no  matter  what  treaty  either  party  enters  into  with  a  third  power  it  will 
not  be  interpreted  as  having  any  bearing  upon  the  basic  object  of  this  treaty, 
namely  the  maintenance  of  peace  in  the  Pacific.  This  means  specifically  the 
Three-Power  Pact.  It  means  that  in  case  the  United  States  enters  the  European 
war  at  any  time  the  Japanese  Empire  will  not  be  allowed  to  give  assistance 
to  Germany  and  Italy.  It  is  clearly  a  trick.  This  clause  alone,  let  alone  others, 
makes  it  impossible  to  find  any  basis  in  the  American  proposal  for  negotiations. 
What  is  more,  before  the  United  States  brought  forth  this  plan,  they  conferred 
with  England,  Australia,  the  Netherlands,  and  China — they  did  so  repeatedly. 
Therefore,  it  is  clear  that  the  United  States  is  now  in  collusion  with  those 
nations  and  has  decided  to  regard  Japan,  along  with  Germany  and  Italy,  as 
an  ememy. 

ARMY    6944    25555     SECRET    Trans.     12-1-41     (MR) 


SEXJEET 

From:  Washington  (Nomura). 
To :  Tokyo. 
November  28, 1941. 

Purple. 

#1214. 
To  be  handled  in  Government  Code. 
Re  my  #1190". 

So  far  silence  has  been  maintained  here  concerning  our  talks  with  the  United 
States;  however,  now  the  results  of  our  conference  of  the  26th  are  out  and 
headlines  like  this  are  appearing  in  the  papers:  "Hull  Hands  Peace  Plans  to 
Japanese,"  and  "America  Scorns  a  Second  :\Iunich."  The  papers  say  that  it  is 
up  to  Japan  either  to  accept  the  American  proposal  with  its  four  principles, 
or  face  war,  in  which  latter  case  the  responsibility  would  be  upon  Japan. 

This  we  must  carefully  note. 

ARMY     6971     25548     SECRET     Trans.     12-1^1     (2) 


«  S.  I.  S.  #  25444  and  #  25480  in  which  NOMURA  expresses  the  danger  of  the  responsi- 
bility for  the  rupture  of  negotiations  being  cast  upon  Japan  should  Japan  enter  into  her 
scheduled  operations  during  the  course  of  the  negotiations.  He  suggests  that  the  negotia- 
tions be  irrevocably  concluded  either  through  an  announcement  to  the  American  Embassy 
in  Tokyo  or  by  a  declaration  for  internal  and  external  consumption. 


From:  Tokyo  (Togo). 
To:  Honolulu  (Riyoji). 
15  November  1941. 
(J19). 

#111. 

As  relations  between  Japan  and  the  United  States  are  most  critical,  make 
your  "ships  in  harbor  report"  irregular,  but  at  a  rate  of  twice  a  week.  Although 
you  already  are  no  doubt  aware,  please  take  extra  care  to  maintain  secrecy. 

.TD-1:     6991     SECRET     (Y)     Navy  Trans.     12-3-41     (8) 


688       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

SECEET 

From :  Wasliington. 

To :  Tokyo. 

December  2,  1941.  {Completed  Translation) 

Purple. 

#1232.     (Parti  of  2) 
Re  my  #1231 '. 

Today,  tlie  2nd,  Ambassador  KURUSU  and  I  had  an  interview  with  Under- 
Secretary  of  State  WELLES.  At  that  time,  prefacing  his  statement  by  saying 
that  it  was  at  the  direct  instruction  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  he 
turned  over  to  us  the  substance  of  my  separate  wire  #1233 ".  *  Thereupon  we 
said :  "Since  we  haven't  been  informed  even  to  the  slightest  degree  concerning 
the  troops  in  French  Indo-China,  we  will  transmit  the  gist  of  your  representations 
directly  to  our  Home  Government.  In  all  probability  they  never  considered  that 
such  a  thing  as  this  could  possibly  be  an  upshot  of  their  proposals  of  November 
20th."  The  Under-Secretary  then  said:  "I  want  you  to  know  that  the  stand 
the  United  States  takes  is  that  she  opposes  aggression  in  any  and  all  parts  of 
the  world."  Thereupon  we  replied :  "The  United  States  and'  other  countries  have 
pyramided  economic  pressure  upon  economic  pressure  upon  us  Japanese.  (I 
made  the  statement  that  economic  warfare  was  even  worse  than  forceful  ag- 
gression.) We  haven't  the  time  to  argue  the  pros  and  cons  of  this  question  or 
the  rights  and  wrongs.  The  people  of  Japan  are  faced  with  economic  pressure, 
and  I  want  you  to  know  that  we  have  but  the  choice  between  submission  to  this 
pressure  or  breaking  the  chains  that  it  invokes.  *We  want  you  to  realize  this 
as  well  as  the  situation  in  which  all  Japanese  find  themselves  as  the  result  of 
the  four-year  incident  in  China ;  the  President  recently  expressed  cognizance  of 
the  latter  situation. 


■  Not  available. 

•Original  translation  incomplete  from  this  point  on. 


EECBEV 
From :  Washington. 
To :  Toyko. 
December  2, 1941 
Purpla 
#1232.     (Parti  of  2.) 

Re  my  #1231 ». 

Today,  the  2nd,  Ambassador  KURUSU  and  I  had  an  interview  with  Under- 
Secretary  of  State  WELLES.  At  that  time,  prefacing  his  statement  by  saying 
that  it  was  at  the  direct  instruction  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  he 
turned  over  to  us  the  substance  of  my  separate  wire  #1223'.  Thereupon  we 
said :  "Since  we  haven't  been  informed  even  to  the  slightest  degree  concerning 
the  troops  in  French  Indo-China,  we  will  transmit  the  gist  of  your  representa- 
tions directly  to  our  Home  Government.  In  all  probability  they  never  considered 
that  such  a  thing  as  this  could  possibly  be  an  upshot  of  their  proposals  of  Novem- 
ber 20th."  The  Under-Secretary  then  said :  "I  want  you  to  know  that  the  stand 
the  United  States  takes  is  that  she  opposes  aggression  in  any  and  all  parts  of 
the  world."  Thereupon  we  replied:  "The  United  States  and  other  countries 
have  pyramided  economic  pressure  upon  economic  pressure  upon  us  Japanese. 
(I  made  the  statement  that  economic  warfare  was  even  worse  than  forceful 
aggression.)  We  haven't  the  time  to  argue  the  pros  and  cons  of  this  question 
or  the  rights  and  wrongs.  The  people  of  Japan  are  faced  with  economic  pressure 
and  I  want  you  to  know  that  we  have  but  the  choice  between  submission  to  this 
pressure  or  breaking  the  chains  that  it  invokes.  Recently  the  President,  too, 
the  four  year  incident 

ARMY    7021    25659     SECRET    Trans.    12-3-41     (7) 


•  Not  available. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT   INQUIRY  689 


From :  Washington  ( Nomura  j. 

To:  Tokyo. 

December  2,  1941. 

Purple. 

#1232.      (Part  2  of  2.) 

Furthermore,  I  would  have  you  know  that  in  replying  to  the  recent  American 
proposals,  the  Imperial  Government  is  giving  the  most  profound  consideration 
to  this  important  question  which  has  to  do  with  our  national  destiny."  Under- 
Secretary  of  State  WELLES  said:  "I  am  well  aware  of  that."  I  continued: 
"We  cannot  overemphasize  the  fact  that,  insofar  as  Japan  is  concerned,  it  is 
virtually  impossible  for  her  to  accept  the  new  American  proposals  as  they  now 
stand.  Our  proposals  proffered  on  the  21st  of  June  and  the  proposals  of  September 
25th,  representing  our  greatest  conciliations  based  on  the  pi'evious  proposal,  still 
stand.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  agreement  of  both  sides  was  in  the  ofling, 
it  has  come  to  naught.  At  this  late  juncture  to  give  thoughtful  consideration  to 
the  new  proposals  certainly  will  not  make  for  a  smooth  and  speedy  settlement 
f>f  the  negotiations.  Recently,  we  promised  to  evacuate  our  troops  from 
French  Indo-China  in  the  event  of  a  settlement  of  the  Sino-Japanese  incident 
and  the  establishment  of  a  just  peace  in  the  Far  East.  In  anticipating  the  settle- 
ment of  fimdamental  questions,  the  question  of  the  representations  of  this  date 
would  naturally  dissolve."  The  Under-Secretai-y  assiduously  heard  us  out  and 
then  said:  "The  American  proposals  of  the  26th  were  brought  about  by  the 
necessity  to  clarify  the  position  of  the  United  States  because  of  the  internal 
situation  here."  Then  he  continued:  "In  regard  to  the  opinions  that  you  have 
expressed,  I  will  make  it  a  point  immediately  to  confer  with  the  Secretary." 

I  got  the  impression  from  the  manner  in  which  he  spoke  that  he  hoped  Japan 
in  her  reply  to  the  American  proposals  of  the  26th  would  leave  this  much  room. 

Judging  by  my  interview  with  Secretary  of  State  HULL  on  the  1st  and  my 
conversations  of  today,  it  is  clear  that  the  United  States,  too,  is  anxious  to 
peacefully  conclude  the  current  difficult  situation.  I  am  convinced  that  they 
would  like  to  bring  about  a  speedy  settlement.  Therefore,  please  bear  well  in 
niind  this  fact  in  your  considerations  of  our  reply  to  the  new  American  pro- 
posals and  to  my  separate  wire  #1233." 

AR-SIY  2.")660     SECRET     Trans.     12-3-41     (7) 


Not  available. 


Fi-om :  Tokyo. 
To :  Hsinking. 
1  December  1941. 
(Purple.) 
#893. 

In  the  event  that  Manchuria  participates  in  the  war in  view 

of  various  circumstances  it  is  our  policy  to  cause  Manchuria  to  participate  in 
the  war  in  which  event  Manchuria  will  take  the  same  steps  toward  England  and 
America  that  his  country  will  take  in  case  war  breaks  out. 

A  summary  follows : 

1.  American  and  British  consular  officials  and  offices  will  not  be  recognized 
as  having  special  rights.  Their  business  will  be  stopped  (the  sending  of  code 
telegrams  and  the  use  of  short  wave  radio  will  be  forbidden).  However,  it  is 
desired  that  the  treatment  accorded  them  after  the  suspension  of  business  be 
comparable  to  that  which  Japan  accords  to  consular  officials  of  enemy  countries 
resident  in  Japan. 

2.  The  treatment  accorded  to  British  and  Ani9rican  public  property,  private 
pro]ierty.  and  to  the  citizens  themselves  shall  be  comparable  to  that  accorded 
by  Jfipan. 

3.  British  and  American  requests  to  third  powers  to  look  after  their  consular 
offices  and  interests  will  not  be  recognized. 

However  the  legal  administrative  steps  taken  by  Manchuokuo  shall  be  equitable 
and  shall  correspond  to  the  measures  taken  by  Japan. 

4.  The  treatment  accorded  Russians  resident  in  Manchoukuo  shall  conform 
to  the  provisions  of  the  Japanese-Soviet  neutrality  pact.  Great  care  shall  be 
exercised  not  to  antagonize  Russia. 

JD-1:  7002     SECRET     (H)    Navy    Trans.     12-4-41     (.^)-AR) 


690       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

From :  Washington. 

To:  Tokyo. 

i  December  1941. 

(Purple.) 

#1227. 

Indications  are  that  the  United  States  desires  to  continue  the  negotiations 
even  if  it  is  necessarj'  to  go  beyond  their  stands  on  the  so-called  basic  principles. 
However,  if  we  keep  quibbling  on  the  critical  points,  and  continue  to  get  stuck 
in  the  middle  as  we  have  been  in  the  past,  it  is  impossible  to  expect  any  fur- 
ther developments.  If  it  is  impossible  from  the  broad  political  viewpoint,  to 
conduct  a  leaders'  meeting  at  this  time,  would  it  not  be  possible  to  arrange  a 
conference  between  persons  in  whom  the  leaders  have  complete  confidence,  (for 
example.  Vice  President  Wallace  or  Hopkins  from  the  United  States  and  the 
former  Premier  Konoye,  who  is  on  friendly  terms  with  the  President,  or  Adviser 
to  the  Imperial  Privy  Council  Ishii).  The  meeting  could  be  arranged  for  some 
midway  point,  such  as  Honolulu.  High  army  and  navy  officers  should  accompany 
these  representatives.  Have  them  make  one  final  effort  to  reacli  some  agreement, 
using  as  the  basis  of  their  discussions  the  latest  proposals  submitted  by  each. 

We  feel  that  this  last  effort  may  facilitate  the  final  decision  as  to  war  or 
peace. 

We  realize  of  course  that  an  attempt  to  have  President  Roosevelt  and  former 
Premier  liouoye  meet,  failed.  Bearing  in  mind  the  reaction  to  that  in  our  nation, 
it  may  be  to  our  interest  to  first  ascertain  the  U.  S.  attitude  on  this  possibility. 
Moreover,  since  we  have  no  guarantee  either  of  success  or  failure  of  the  ob- 
jectives even  if  the  meeting  is  held,  careful  consideration  should  first  be  given 
this  matter. 

We  feel,  however,  that  to  surmount  the  crisis  with  which  we  are  face  to  face, 
it  is  not  wasting  our  efforts  to  pursue  every  path  open  to  us.  It  is  our  opinion 
that  it  would  be  most  effective  to  feel  out  and  ascertain  the  U.  S.  attitude  re- 
garding this  matter,  in  the  name  of  the  Japanese  Government.  However,  if  this 
procedure  does  not  seem  practical  to  you  in  view  of  some  internal  condition,  then 
how  would  it  be  if  I  were  to  bring  up  the  subject  as  purely  of  my  own  origin  and 
in  that  manner  feel  out  their  attitude.  Then,  if  they  seem  receptive  to  it  the 
government  could  make  the  official  proposal. 

Please  advise  me  of  your  opinions  on  this  matter. 

JD-1:7055     SECRET     (D)  Navy  Trans.     12-^-41     (1) 


SKCRET 

From :  Tokyo. 
To:  WasliiiigTon. 
December  4,  1941. 
Purple.     (Urgent.) 
#891. 

To  be  handled  in  Government  Code. 

Re  your  #1256." 

What  you  say  in  your  telegram  is,  of  course,  true,  but  at  present  it  would  be 
a  very  delicate  matter  to  give  any  more  explanations  than  set  forth  in  my  #875.'' 
I  would  advise  against  it  because  unfortunate  results  might  follow,  so  please 
replv  in  accordance  with  my  aforementioned  message. 

ARMY     7105     25731     SECRET     Trans.     12-4^1      (S) 


«  Not  available. 
"S.  I.  S.  #25725. 


From :  Tokyo. 
To:  Washington. 
3  December  1941. 
(Purple.) 
#875. 

Chief  of  Office  routing. 

Re  your  #1232.* 

Please  explain  the  matter  to  the  United  States  along  the  following  lines: 

There  seem  to  be  rumors  to  the  effect  that  our  military  garrisons  in  French 
Indo-China  are  being  strengthened.     The  fact  is  that  recently  there  has  been 

♦JD-l  :  7021. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  691 

an  unusual  amount  of  activity  by  the  Chinese  forces  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Sino- 
French  Indo-China  border.  In  view  of  this,  we  have  increased  our  forces  in  parts 
of  northern  French  Indo-China.  There  would  naturally  be  some  movement  of 
troops  in  the  southern  part  as  a  result  of  this.  We  presume  that  the  source  of  the 
nunors  is  in  the  exaggerated  reports  of  these  movements.  In  doing  so,  we  have 
in  no  way  violated  the  limitations  contained  in  the  Japanese-French  joint  defense 
agreement. 
JD-1:7057     SECRET     (D)  Navy  Trans.    12-4-41     (S-TT) 


SECBETT 

From:  Washington  (Nomura). 

To:  Tokyo. 

December  2, 1941. 

Purple.     (Urgent.) 

#1234. 

Strictly  Secret. 

Ee  your  #862  ». 

I  know  that  to  leave  that  error  in  the  publication  of  this  speech  as  it  now 
stands  would  have  a  bad  effect  on  negotiations,  so  on  the  morning  of  the  2nd 
prior  to  my  interview  with  WELLES  I  sent  TERAZAKI  to  visit  BALLANTINE 
at  the  State  Department  to  explain  the  substance  of  your  #862.  BALLANTINE 
said,  "At  this  tense  psychological  moment  in  Japanese-American  negotiations, 
the  fact  that  such  a  strong  statement  as  this  has  been  circulated  has  given  a 
severe  shock  to  the  American  Government  and  people  and  it  is  very  unfortunate 
and  dangerous."  TERAZAKI  replied,  "Well,  as  it  was  the  American  newspapers 
that  made  such  a  clamor  about  it,  I  did  not  come  to  vindicate  ourselves  or  make 
any  explanation.  I  merely  wished  to  state  the  facts."  He  added,  "At  present 
the  newspapers  of  both  countries  ought  both  to  be  cool  and  calm,  so  will  you  please 
advise  them  hereafter  concerning  this  point." 

ARlvrr    7059    25730    SECRET    Trans.     12-4r41     (2) 


■  Not  available. 


From:  Washington. 

To:  Tokyo. 

3  December  1941. 

(Purple.) 

#1243. 

If  we  continue  to  increase  our  forces  in  French  Indo-China,  it  is  expected  that 
the  United  States  will  close  up  our  Consulates,  therefore  consideration  should 
be  given  to  steps  to  be  taken  in  connection  with  the  evacuation  of  the  Consuls. 

JD-1:     7050     SECRET     (F)     Navy  Trans.    12-4-41     (S-TT) 


8BCBBX 

From:  Berlin. 
To:  Tokyo. 
December  4,  1941. 
Purple.  (CA.) 
#14J0. 

In  case  of  evacuation  by  the  members  of  our  Embassy  in  London,  I  would  like 
to  arrange  to  have.  Secretary  MATSUI  of  that  office  and  three  others  (URABE 
and  KOJIMA  and  one  other)  from  among  the  higher  officials  and  two  other 
officials  ( UKHARA  and  TUWASAKI)  stay  here.    Please  do  your  best  to  this  end. 

ARMY    7134    25807     SECRET    Trans.    12-5-41     (W) 


From:  Washington. 

To:  Tokyo. 

3  December  1941. 

(Purple.) 

#1243. 

Judging  from  all  indications,  we  feel  that  some  Joint  military  action  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  with  or  without  a  declaration  of  war,  is 
a  definite  certainty  in  the  event  of  an  occupation  of  Thailand. 

•UD-l:     7098     SECRET     (D)    Navy  Trans.     12-5-41     (7) 

79716 — 46— Ex.  140,  vol.  2 3 


692       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

From :  Washington. 

To:  Tokyo. 

1  December  1941. 

(Purple.) 

#1225  (Part  1  of  3). 

When  I  and  Ambassador  Kurusu  called  on  Secretary  Hull  on  the  1st,  we  con- 
veyed to  him  the  matter  contained  in  your  message  #857*.  Roughly  speaking, 
Hull's  reply  stayed  within  the  bounds  of  his  earlier  explanations.  He  placed  the 
most  emphasis  on  two  points,  namely,  the  tone  and  trend  of  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment's expressions  and  movements  and  that  of  the  general  public  opinion 
organs ;  and,  the  increase  in  strength  of  the  garrisons  in  French  Indo-China. 

From  the  beginning  of  today's  conference,  Secretary  Hull  wore  a  deeply  pained 
expression.  Without  wasting  any  time,  he  brought  up  the  subject  of  the  Pre- 
mier's statement,  (see  my  message  #1222**),  and  said  that  that  was  one  of  the 
reasons  for  the  President's  sudden  return  to  Washington.  (Upon  our  arrival  at 
the  State  Department,  we  found  not  only  newspaper  men,  but  even  some  members 
of  the  Departmental  staff  crowding  the  corridors.  Some  of  these  speculators 
were  of  the  opinion  that  the  issue  of  war  or  peace  was  to  be  immediately  decided 
upon.    In  general,  the  scene  was  highly  dramatic.) 

We,  therefore,  replied  that  we  were  convinced  that  the  Premier's  statement 
had  been  erroneously  and  exaggeratedly  reported  in  the  vernacular.  We  pointed 
out  that  regardless  of  who  the  speaker  may  be  if  only  an  exerpt  from  his  speech 
is  reported,  without  having  the  entire  text  available,  it  is  quite  possible  that  the 
reader  will  get  exactly  the  opposite  meaning  from  that  intended  by  the  speaker. 

We  went  on  to  advise  the  Secretary  that  we  were  at  present  awaiting  the 
delivery  of  the  entire  text. 

During  the  course  of  our  explanations,  the  Secretary  showed  visible  signs  of 
relief. 

He  said:  "Since  our  talks  were  begun  recently,  there  has  not  been  a  single 
indication  of  endorsement  and  support  from  Japan.  I  have  not  heard  of  any 
steps  being  taken  in  Japan  aimed  at  facilitating  these  conversations,  all  of  which 
is  exceedingly  regrettable." 

JD-1:  7(H2    SECRET     (D)  Navy  Trans.    12-5-41     (2) 


•JD-l :  6921. 

•♦Available,  Purple  dated  30  November. 


From:  Washlngton. 

To:  Tokyo. 

1  December  1941. 

(Purple.) 

#1225  (Part  2  of  3)     (Parts  1  and  Snot  available). 

(Message  having  the  indicator  20803*  is  part  one  of  three.) 

For  this  reason  CHA  has  been  the  target  of  considerable  attack  and  dissatis- 
faction. It  was  admitted  that  he  was  in  a  very  tight  spot.  As  the  President 
recently  said,  it  is  clearly  understood  that  the  people  of  Japan,  after  over  four 
years  of  the  Japanese-Chinese  incident,  are  very  tense. 

Japan,  too,  is  highly  desirous  of  having  peace  on  the  Pacific  assured  by  success- 
fully concluding  these  negotiations.  It  is  our  hope  that  he  would  give  his  support 
and  encouragement  to  the  efforts  that  Hull  and  we  are  making  in  this  direction. 

With  regard  to  the  matters  pertaining  to  French  Indo-China  -  -  -  -  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States,  too,  cannot  help  but  feel  concern  since  it  has  been 
receiving  report  after  report  during  the  past  few  days,  from  U.  S.  officials  sta- 
tioned in  that  area,  of  unusual  movements  of  the  Japanese  army  and  navy ;  the 
landing  of  various  types  of  arms ;  and  the  movements  of  transport  vessels.  Con- 
cern is  felt  as  to  the  goal  of  all  these  activities  (the  implication  was  that  they 
feared  that  they  were  going  to  be  used  not  only  against  Thailand  but  in  the 
southwestern  Pacific  area). 

As  to  what  plaps  the  responsible  persons  in  the  Japanese  army  and  navy  are 
planning  are  not  difficult  to  guess  if  one  goes  on  the  assumption  that  the  Japanese 
army  and  navy  joins  forces  with  the  Germans ;  even  if,  in  actuality,  that  is  not 
what  is  taking  place,  preparations  must  be  made  for  this  possible  eventuality,  and 
aU  nations  concerned  must  concentrate  their  fighting  forces  in  that  area. 

JD-1:    7042    SECRET     (D)  Navy  Trans.    12-4-41     (7) 

•Not  available,  probably  Is  Part  1  of  this  message. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  693 

From :  Washington. 

To:  Tokyo. 

1  December  1941. 

(Purple.) 

#1225.     (Part  3  of  3.) 

Hull :  "In  the  final  analysis,  that  means  that  Hitlerism  is  being  given  indirect 
support,  and  for  this  reason  please  exercise  the  utmost  of  caution. 

"In  view  of  the  fact  that  Japan  is  acting  in  the  manner  described  above,  there 
is  absolutely  no  way  of  bringing  about  a  settlement  of  the  situation, 

"Disruptions  in  Japanese-U.  S.  relations  is  exceedingly  unfortunate,  not  only 
for  our  two  countries,  but  to  the  world  in  general.  There  shall  be  nothing  con- 
structive about  a  Japanese-U.  S.  war.  We  fully  realize  that  it  can  be  nothing 
other  than  destructive.  For  this  reason,  we  are  still  highly  desirous  of  bringing 
these  conversations  to  a  successful  conclusion. 

"However,  with  the  existence  of  the  above  described  conditions,  and  because  of 
the  nature  of  this  country,  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  President  are  placed  in 
an  exceedingly  difficult  position." 

I :  "It  seems  mutually  regrettable  that  all  of  our  efforts  which  lead  to  the  21 
June  and  25  September  proposals,  should  have  been  in  vain." 

In  general  he  expressed  his  agreement  to  this. 

Hull:  "The  recent  situation  in  Japan  and  the  U.  S.  public  opinion  made  it 
necessary  for  us  to  return  to  the  most  recent  proposal." 

We  then  said  that  behind  the  problems  at  hand,  there  has  always  been  the 
China  problem. 

"As  I  have  pointed  out  on  several  occasions,"  I  said,  "this  has  been  the  bitterest 
experience  since  the  Washington  Conference.  Peace  between  Japan  and  China 
could  not  be  attained  through  any  such  terms  as  were  contained  in  your  most 
recent  proposal.  We  hear  your  argument  to  the  effect  that  you  cannot  stand  by 
and  do  nothing  while  China  dies.  The  converse  of  that  argument  should  be  even 
stronger.  That  is,  that  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  for  us  to  avoid  standing  by 
and  watching  our  own  respective  countries  die,  just  because  of  the  China  problem.'' 

Hull  indicated  his  agreement  with  this,  but  went  on  to  say : 

"Because  the  situation  is  as  I  have  already  described,  I  hope  that  Japan  will 
take  steps  to  bring  about  order  through  her  public  organs." 

JD-1:7042     SECRET     (D)  Navy  Trans.  12-5-41   (2). 


From:  Washington  (Nomura). 

To:  Tokyo. 

November  30,  1941. 

Purple. 

#1224. 

Re  your  #857.' 

I  at  once  requested  HULL  for  an  interview ;  however,  I  failed  to  be  notified  of 
the  exact  time  for  it  for  the  reason,  among  others,  of  the  President's  expected  ar- 
rival tomorrow  morning.  I  am  afraid  I  shall  miss  a  good  opportunity  and  so  wiD 
you  transmit  yours  message  at  once  to  Ambassador  GREW?     (7 :  30  p.  m.) 

ARMY    7089    25762     SECRET    Trans.  12/5/41  (2). 

■  See  S.  I.  S.  #  25496.  Tokyo  Instructs  Washington  to  make  one  more  attempt  verbally 
to  the  eflfect  that  the  Imperial  Government  i^  at  a  loss  to  understand  -why  the  United  States, 
In  view  of  the  fair  position  it  has  always  taken,  should  have  changedin  their  front  with 
regard  to  the  China  problem. 


From:  Tokyo. 
To:  Honolulu. 
29  November  1941. 
(J19.) 

#122. 

We  have  been  receiving  reports  from  yon  on  ship  movements,  but  In  future  will 
you  also  report  even  when  there  are  no  movements. 
JD-1 :  7086    SECRET     (Y)  Navy  Trans.  12-5-41  (2) 


694       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  A^FTACK 

From:  Tokyo  (Togo.) 
To:  Honolulu. 
November  18,  1941. 
J-19. 
#113. 

Please  report  on  the  following  areas  as  to  vessels  anchored  therein :  Area  "N," 
Pearl  Harbor,  Manila  Bay,"  and  the  areas  adjacent  thereto.  (Make  your  inves- 
tigation with  great  secrecy.) 

ARMY    7063    25773    SECRET    Trans.  12/5/41  (S). 

*  Probably  means  Mamala  Bay. 


From:  Tokyo. 
To:  Washington. 
December  6,  1941. 
Purple. 
#901. 
Re  my  #844". 

1.  The  Government  has  deliberated  deeply  on  the  American  proposal  of  the  26th 
of  November  and  as  a  result  we  have  drawn  up  a  memorandum  for  the  United 
States  contained  in  my  separate  message  #902  (in  English). 

2.  This  separate  message  is  a  very  long  one.  I  will  send  it  in  fourteen  parts 
and  I  imagine  you  will  receive  it  tomorrow.  However,  I  am  not  sure.  The  situa- 
tion is  extremely  delicate,  and  when  you  receive  it  I  want  you  please  to  keep  it 
secret  for  the  time  being. 

3.  Concerning  the  time  of  presenting  this  memorandum  to  the  United  States,  I 
will  wire  you  in  a  separate  message.  However,  I  want  you  in  the  meantime  to 
put  it  in  nicely  drafted  form  and  make  every  preparation  to  present  it  to  the 
Americans  just  as  soon  as  you  receive  instructions. 

ARMY    7149    25838    SECRET    Trans.  12/6/41  (S) 


•  See  S.  I.  S.  #  25445  in  which  Tokyo  wires  Washington  the  Imperial  Government  cannot 
accept  the  United  States  proposal  and,  therefore,  with  a  report  of  the  views  of  the  Imperial 
Government  which  will  be  sent  In  two  or  three  days,  the  negotiations  will  be  de  facto 
ruptured.  Until  then,  however,  Washington  is  not  to  give  the  impression  that  negotiations 
are  brolien  ofC. 


From:  Tokyo. 
To:  Washington. 
December  6,  1941. 
Purple. 

#902.     (Part  1  of  14.) 
Separate  telegram. 

MEMOBAirorrM 

1.  The  Government  of  Japan,  prompted  by  a  genuine  desire  to  come  to  an 
amicable  understanding  with  the  Government  of  the  United  States  in  order  that 
the  two  countries  by  their  joint  efforts  may  secure  the  peace  of  the  Pacific  area 
and  thereby  contribute  toward  the  realization  of  world  peace,  has  continued 
negotiations  with  the  utmost  sincerity  since  April  last  with  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  regarding  the  adjustment  and  advancement  of  Japanese-American 
relations  and  the  stabilization  of  the  Pacific  area. 

The  Japanese  Government  has  the  honor  to  state  frankly  its  views  concerning 
the  claims  the  American  Government  has  persistently  maintained  as  well  as  the 
measures  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  have  taken  toward  Japan  during 
these  eight  months. 

2.  It  is  the  immutable  policy  of  the  Japanese  Gove^'nment  to  insure  the  stabil- 
ity of  East  Asia  and  to  promote  world  peace,  and  thereby  to  enable  all  nations  to 
find  each  BOAMPYQBR  place  in  the  world. 

Ever  since  the  China  Affair  broke  out  owing  to  the  failure  on  the  part  of  China 
to  comprehend  Japan's  true  intentions,  the  Japanese  Government  has  striven  for 
the  restoration  of  peace  and  it  has  consistently  exerted  its  best  efforts  to  prevent 
tlie  extention  of  war-like  disturbances.  It  was  also  to  that  end  that  in  September 
last  year  Japan  concluded  the  Tri  Partite  Pact  with  Germany  and  Italy. 

JI>-1:7143     SECRET    Navy  Trans.  12-6^1  (S) 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  695 

From:  Tokyo. 

To:  Washington. 

December  6,  1941. 

Purple. 

#902.     (Part  2  of  14.) 

However,  both  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  have  resorted  to  every 
possible  measure  to  assist  the  Chungking  regime  so  as  to  obstruct  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  general  peace  between  Japan  and  China,  interfering  with  Japan's 
constructive  endeavours  toward  the  stabilization  of  East  Asia,  exerting  pres- 
sure on  The  Netherlands  East  Indies,  or  menacing  French  Indo-China,  they 
have  attempted  to  frustrate  Japan's  aspiration  to  realize  the  ideal  of  common 
prosperity  in  cooperation  with  these  regions.  Furthermore,  when  Japan  in 
accordance  with  its  protocol  with  France  took  measures  of  joint  defense  of 
French  Indo-China,  both  American  and  British  governments,  wilfully  misinter- 
preted it  as  a  threat  to  their  own  possession  and  inducing  the  Netherlands 
government  to  follow  suit,  they  enforced  the  assets  freezing  order,  thus  severing 
economic  relations  with  Japan.  While  manifesting  thus  an  obviously  hostile 
attitude,  these  countries  have  strengthened  their  military  preparations  per- 
fecting an  encirclement  of  Japan,  and  have  brought  about  a  situation  which 
endangers  the  very  existence  of  the  empire. 

JD-1:7143     SECRET    Navy  Trans.  12-6-41     (S) 


From:  Tokyo. 

To:  Washington. 

December  6,  1941. 

Purple. 

#902.     (Part  3  of  14.) 

Nevertheless,  facilitate  a  speedy  settlement,  the  Premier  of  Japan  proposed, 
in  August  last,  to  meet  the  President  of  the  United  States  for  a  discussion  of 
important  problems  between  the  two  countries  covering  the  entire  Pacific  area. 
However,  while  accepting  in  principle  the  Japanese  proposal,  insisted  that 
the  meeting  should  take  place  after  an  agreement  of  view  had  been  reached 
on  fundamental — (75  letters  garbled) — The  Japanese  government  submitted 
a  proposal  based  on  the  formula  proposed  by  the  American  government,  taking 
fully  into  consideration  past  American  claims  and  also  incorporating'  Japanese 
views.  Repeated  discussions  proved  of  no  avail  in  producing  readily  an  agree- 
ment of  view.  The  present  cabinet,  therefore,  submitted  a  revised  proposal, 
moderating  still  further  the  Japanese  claims  regarding  the  principal  points  of 
difiiculty  in  the  negotiation  and  endeavoured  strenuously  to  reach  a  settle- 
ment. But  the  American  government,  adhering  steadfastly  to  its  original  pro- 
posal, failed  to  display  in  the  slightest  degree  a  spirit  of  conciliation.  The 
negotiation  made  no  progress. 

JD-1:7143    SECRET    Navy  Trans.  12-6-41     (S) 


Fi'om:  Tokyo. 

To:  Washington. 

December  6, 1941. 

Purple. 

#902.     (Part  4  of  14.) 

Thereupon,  the  Japanese  Government,  with  a  view  to  doing  its  utmost  for 
averting  a  crisis  in  Japanese-American  relations,  submitted  on  November  20th 
still  another  proposal  in  order  to  arrive  at  an  equitable  solution  of  the  more 
essential  and  urgent  questions  which,  simplifying  its  previous  proposal,  stipu- 
lated the  following  points : 

(1)  The  Governments  of  Japan  and  the  United  States  undertake  not  to  dis- 
patch armed  forces  into  any  of  the  regions,  excepting  French  Indo-China,  in  the 
Southeastern  Asia  and  the  Southern  Pacific  area. 

(2)  Both  Governments  shall  cooperate  with  a  view  to  securing  the  acquisi- 
tion in  the  Netherlands  East  Indies  of  those  goods  and  commodities  of  which 
the  two  countries  are  in  need. 

(3)  Both  Governments  mutually  undertake  to  restore  commercial  relations 
to  those  prevailing  prior  to  the  freezing  of  assets. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  shall  supply  Japan  the  required  quantity 
of  oil. 


696       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(4)  The  Government  of  the  United  States  undertakes  not  to  resort  to  measures 
and  actions  prejudicial  to  the  endeavours  for  the  restoration  of  general  peace 
between  Japan  and  China. 

(5)  The  Japanese  Government  undertakes  to  withdraw  troops  now  stationed 
in  French  Indo-China  upon  either  the  restoration  of  peace  between  Japan  and 
China  or  the  establishment  of  an  equitable  peace  in  the  Pacific  area ;  and  it  is 
prepared  to  remove  the  Japanese  troops  in  the  southern  part  of  French  Indo- 
China  to  the  northern  part  upon  the  conclusion  of  the  present  agreement. 

JD-1:  7143     SECRET    Navy  Trans.  12-6-41     (S) 


From:  Tokyo. 

To :  Washington, 

December  6, 1941. 

Purple. 

#902.     (Part  5  of  14.) 

As  regards  China,  the  Japanese  Government,  while  expressing  its  readiness 
to  accept  the  offer  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  to  act  as  "Introducer"  of 
peace  between  Japan  and  China  as  was  previously  suggested,  asked  for  an  un- 
dertaking on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to  do  nothing  prejudicial  to  the  resto- 
ration of  Sino-Japanese  peace  when  the  two  parties  have  commenced  direct 
negotiations. 

The  American  government  not  only  rejected  the  above-mentioned  new  pro- 
posal, but  made  known  its  intention  to  continue  its  aid  to  Chiang  Kai-Shek ;  and 
in  spite  of  its  suggestion  mentioned  above,  withdrew  the  offer  of  the  President 
to  act  as  the  so-caUed  "Introducer"  of  peace  between  Japan  and  China,  pleading 
that  time  was  not  yet  ripe  for  it.  Finally,  on  November  26th,  in  an  attitude  to 
impose  upon  the  Japanese  government  those  principles  it  has  persistently  main- 
tained, the  American  government  made  a  proposal  totally  ignoring  Japanese 
claims,  which  is  a  source  of  profound  regret  to  the  Japanese  Government. 

JD:1     7143     SECRET     Navy  Trans.  12-6-41     (S) 


From:  Tokyo. 

To:  Washington. 

December  6,  1941. 

Purple. 

#902.     (Part  6  of  14.) 

4.  From  the  beginning  of  the  present  negotiation  the  Japanese  Government 
has  always  maintained  an  attitude  of  fairness  and  moderation,  and  did  its 
best  to  reach  a  settlement,  for  which  it  made  all  possible  concessions  often  in 
spite  of  great  difficulties. 

As  for  the  China  question  which  constituted  an  important  subject  of  the 
negotiation,  the  Japanese  Government  showed  a  most  conciliatory  attitude. 

As  for  the  principle  of  Non-Discrimination  in  International  Commerce,  ad- 
vocated by  the  American  Government,  the  Japanese  Government  expressed  its 
desire  to  see  the  said  principle  applied  throughout  the  world,  and  declared  that 
along  with  the  actual  practice  of  this  principle  in  the  world,  the  Japanese 
Government  would  endeavour  to  apply  the  same  in  the  Pacific  area,  including 
China,  and  made  it  clear  that  Japan  had  no  intention  of  excluding  from  China 
economic  activities  of  third  powers  pursued  on  an  equitable  basis. 

Furthermore,  as  regards  the  question  of  withdrawing  troops  from  French 
Indo-China,  the  Japanese  government  even  volunteered,  as  mentioned  above,  to 
carry  out  an  immediate  evacuation  of  troops  from  Southern  French  Indo-China 
as  a  measure  of  easing  the  situation. 

JD:1     7143     SECRET     Navy  Trans.  12-6-41     (S) 


From :  Tokyo. 

To :  Washington. 

December  4,  1941. 

Purple. 

#902.     (Part  7  of  14.) 

It  is  presumed  that  the  spirit  of  conciliation  exhibited  to  the  utmost  degree 
by  the  Japanese  Government  in  all  these  matters  is  fully  appreciated  by  the 
Aiperican  government. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  American  government,  always  holding  fast  to  theories 


PROCEEDINGS  OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  697 

in  disregard  to  realities,  and  refusing  to  yield  an  inch  on  its  impractical  prin- 
ciples, caused  undue  delays  in  the  negotiation.  It  is  difficult  to  understand 
this  attitude  of  the  American  government  and  the  Japanese  government  desires 
to  call  the  attention  of  the  American  government  especially  to  the  following 
points : 

1.  The  American  government  advocates  in  the  name  of  world  peace  those 
principles  favorable  to  it  and  urges  upon  the  Japanese  government  the  accep- 
tance thereof.  The  peace  of  the  world  may  be  brought  about  only  by  discovering 
a  mutually  acceptable  formula  through  recognition  of  the  reality  of  the  situation 
and  mutual  appreciation  of  one  another's  position.  An  attitude  such  as  ignores 
realities  and  imposes  one's  selfish  views  upon  others  will  scarcely  serve  the 
purpose  of  facilitating  the  consummation  of  negotiations. 

7143     SECRET 

From :  Tokyo. 

To :  Washington. 

December  6,  1941. 

Purple. 

#902.     (Part  8  of  14.) 

Of  the  various  principles  put  forward  by  the  American  government  as  a  basis 
of  the  Japanese-American  agreement,  there  are  some  which  the  Japanese  govern- 
ment is  ready  to  accept  in  principle,  but  in  view  of  the  world's  actual  conditions, 
it  seems  only  a  Utopian  ideal,  on  the  part  of  the  American  government,  to  at- 
tempt to  force  their  immediate  adoption. 

Again,  the  proposal  to  conclude  a  multilateral  non-aggression  pact  between 
Japan,  the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  China,  the  Soviet  Union,  The  Nether- 
lands, and  Thailand,  which  is  patterned  after  the  old  concept  of  collective  se- 
curity, is  far  removed  from  the  realities  of  East  Asia. 

The  American  proposal  contains  a  stipulation  which  states :  "Both  governments 
will  agree  that  no  agreement,  which  either  has  concluded  with  any  third  powers, 
shall  be  interpreted  by  it  in  such  a  way  as  to  conflict  with  the  fundamental  pur- 
pose of  this  agreement,  the  establishment  and  preservation  of  peace  throughout 
the  Pacific  area."  It  is  presumed  that  the  above  provision  has  been  proposed 
with  a  view  to  restrain  Japan  from  fulfilling  its  obligations  under  the  Tripartite 
Pact  when  the  United  States  participates  in  the  war  in  Europe,  and,  as  such,  it 
cannot  be  accepted  by  the  Japanese  Government. 

JD:1    7143    SECRET    Army  Trans.  12-6-41     (S) 


From :  Tokyo. 

To :  Washington. 

December  6,  1941. 

Purple. 

#902.     (Part  9  of  14.) 

The  American  Government,  obsessed  with  its  own  views  and  opinions,  may  be 
said  to  be  scheming  for  the  extension  of  the  war.  While  it  seeks,  on  the  one 
hand,  to  secure  its  rear  by  stabilizing  the  Pacific  area,  it  is  engaged,  on  the  other 
hand  in  aiding  Great  Britain  and  preparing  to  attack,  in  the  name  of  self-de- 
fense, Germany  and  Italy  two  powers  that  are  striving  to  establish  a  new  order 
in  Europe.  Such  a  policy  is  totally  at  variance  with  the  many  principles  upon 
which  the  American  Government  proposes  to  found  the  stability  of  the  Pacific 
area  through  peaceful  means. 

3.  Where  as  the  American  Government,  under  the  principles  it  rigidly  upholds, 
objects  to  settling  international  issues  through  military  pressure,  it  is  exercising 
in  conjunction  with  Great  Britain  and  other  nations  pressure  by  economic  power. 
Recourse  to  such  pressure  as  a  means  of  dealing  with  international  relations 
should  be  condemned  as  it  is  at  times  more  inhuman  than  military  pressure. 

JD-1:  7143    Army  Trans.  12-6-41  (S) 


698       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

From :  Tokyo. 

To :  Washington. 

December  6, 1941. 

Purple. 

#902.     (Part  10  of  14.) 

4.  It  is  impossible  not  to  reach  the  conclusion  that  the  American  Government 
desires  to  maintain  and  strengthen,  in  collusion  with  Great  Britain  and  other 
powers,  its  dominant  position  it  has  hitherto  occupied  not  only  in  China  but  in 

other  areas  of  East  Asia.     It  is  a  fact  of  history  that  one  countr (45  letters 

garbled  or  missing) been  compelled  to  observe  the  satus  quo  under  the  An- 
glo-American policy  of  imperialistic  exploitation  and  to  sacrifice"  the es  to 

the  prosperity  of  the  two  nations.  The  Japanese  Government  cannot  tolerate 
the  perpetuation  of  such  a  situation  since  it  directly  runs  counter  to  Japan's 
fundamental  policy  to  enable  all  nations  to  enjoy  each  its  proper  place  in  the 
world. 

JD-1:  7143    Navy  Trans.  12-6-41  (S) 


From:  Tokyo. 

To :  Washington. 

December  6,  1941. 

Purple. 

#902.     (Part  11  of  14) 

The  stipulation  proposed  by  the  American  Government  relative  to  French 
Indo-China  is  a  good  exemplification  of  the  above-mentioned  American  policy. 
That  the  six  countries — Japan,  the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  The  Nether- 
lands, China  and  Thailand — excepting  France,  should  undertake  among  them- 
selves to  respect  the  territorial  integrity  and  sovereignty  of  French  Indo-China 
and  equality  of  treatment  in  trade  and  commerce  would  be  tantamount  to 
placing  that  territory  under  the  joint  garantee  of  the  governments  of  those  six 
countries.  Apart  from  the  fact  that  such  a  proposal  totally  ignores  the  position 
of  France,  it  is  unacceptable  to  the  Japanese  government  in  that  such  an  arrange- 
ment cannot  but  be  considered  as  an  extension  to  French  Indo-China  of  a 

system  similar  to  the  n__(50  letters  missed) sible  for  the  present  predicament 

of  East  Asia. 

JD:1    7143    SECRET    Navy  Trans.  12-6-^1  (S) 


From:  Tokyo. 

To:  Washington. 

December  6,  1941. 

Purple. 

#902.     (Part  12  of  14) 

5.  All  the  items  demanded  of  Japan  by  the  American  government  regarding 
China  such  as  wholesale  evacuation  of  troops  or  unconditional  application  of  the 
principle  of  Non-Discrimination  in  International  Commerce  ignore  the  actual 
conditions  of  China,  and  are  calculated  to  destroy  Japan's  position  as  the 
stabilizing  factor  of  East  Asia.  The  attitude  of  the  American  government  in 
demanding  Japan  not  to  support  militarily,  politically  or  economically  any 
regime  other  than  the  regime  at  Chungking,  disregarding  thereby  the  existence 
of  the  Nanking  government,  shatters  the  very  basis  of  the  present  negotiation. 
This  demand  of  the  American  government  falling,  as  it  does,  in  line  with  its 
above-mentioned  refusal  to  cease  from  aiding  the  Chungking  regime,  demon- 
strates clearly  the  intention  of  the  American  government  to  obstruct  the 
restoration  of  normal  relations  between  Japan  and  China  and  the  return  of 
peace  to  East  Asia. 

JD:1    7143     SECRET    Navy  Trans.  12-&-41  (S) 


From:  Tokyo. 

To :  Washington, 

December  6,  1941. 

Purple. 

#902.     (Part  13  of  14) 

5.  In  brief,  the  American  proposal  contains  certain  acceptable  items  such 
as  those  concerning  commerce,  including  the  conclusion  of  a  trade  agreement, 
mutual  removal  of  the  freezing  restrictions,  and  stabilization  of  the  Yen  and 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  699 

Dollar  exchange,  or  the  abolition  of  extra-territorial  rights  in  China.  On  the 
other  hand,  however,  the  proposal  in  question  ignores  Japan's  sacrifices  in  the 
four  years  of  the  China  Affair,  menaces  the  empire's  existence  itself  and 
disparages  its  honour  and  prestige.  Therefore,  viewed  in  its  entirety,  the 
Japanese  government  regrets  that  it  cannot  accept  the  proposal  as  a  basis  of 
negotiation. 

6.  The  Japanese  government,  in  its  desire  for  an  early  conclusion  of  the 
negotiation,  proposed  that  simultaneously  with  the  conclusion  of  the  Japanese- 
American  negotiation,  agreements  be  signed  with  Great  Britain  and  other  inter- 
ested countries.  The  proposal  was  accepted  by  the  American  government. 
However,  since  the  American  government  has  made  the  proposal  of  November 
26th  as  a  result  of  frequent  consultations  with  Great  Britain,  Australia,  The 
Netherlands  and  Chunking,  ANDND*  presummably  by  catering  to  the  wishes 
of  the  Chungking  regime  on  the  questions  of  CHTUAL  YLOKMMTT**  be  con- 
cluded that  all  these  countries  are  at  one  with  the  United  States  in  ignoring 
Japan's  position. 

JD:1:     7143     SECRET    Navy  Trans.  12-6-41  (S) 

•Probably  "and  as" 
•♦Probably  "China,  can  but" 


From :  Tokyo 
To:  Washington 
7  December  1941 
(Purple-Eng) 
#902.     Part  14  of  14 

(Note:  In  the  forwarding  instructions  to  the  radio  station  handling  this  part, 
appeared  the  plain  English  phrase  "VERY  IMPORTANT") 

7.  Obviously  it  is  the  intention  of  the  American  Government  to  conspire  with 
Great  Britain  and  other  countries  to  obstruct  Japan's  eiforts  toward  tiie  estab- 
lishment of  peace  through  the  creation  of  a  New  Order  in  East  Asia,  and  espe- 
cially to  preserve  Anglo-American  rights  and  interests  by  keeping  Japan  and 
China  at  war.  This  intention  has  been  revealed  clearly  during  the  course  of  the 
present  negotiations.  Thus,  the  earnest  hope  of  the  Japanese  Government  to 
adjust  Japanese-American  relations  and  to  preserve  and  promote  the  peace  of 
the  Pacific  through  cooperation  with  the  American  Government  has  finally  been 
lost. 

The  Japanese  Government  regrets  to  have  to  notify  hereby  the  American  Gov- 
ernment that  in  view  of  the  attitude  of  the  American  Government  it  cannot  but 
consider  that  it  is  impossible  to  reach  an  agreement  through  further  negotiations. 

JD-1:7143     SECRET     (M)  Navy  trans.  7Dec.l941     (S-TT) 


SECRET 

From:  Honolulu  (Kita). 
To:  Tokyo. 
November  18,  1941. 
J-19. 

#222. 

1.  The  warships  at  anchor  in  the  Harbor  on  the  15th  were  as  I  told  you  in  my 
#219'  on  that  day. 

Area  A  " — ^A  battleship  of  the  Oklahoma  class  entered  and  one  tanker  left  port. 
Area  C  ' — 3  warships  of  the  heavy  cruiser  class  were  at  anchor. 

2.  On  the  17th  the  Saratoga  was  not  in  the  harbor.  The  carrier.  Enterprise, 
or  some  other  vessel  was  in  Area  C.  Two  heavy  cruisers  of  the  Chicago  class, 
one  of  the  Pensacola  class  were  tied  up  at  docks  "KS".  4  merchant  vessels  were 
at  anchor  in  Area  D  *. 

3.  At  10 :  00  a.  m.  on  the  morning  of  the  17th,  8  destroyers  were  observed  en- 
tering the  Harbor.  Their  course  was  as  follows :  In  a  single  file  at  a  distance 
of  1,000  meters  apart  at  a  speed  of  3  knots  per  hour,  they  moved  into  Pearl 
Harbor.  From  the  entrance  of  the  Harbor  through  Area  B  to  the  buoys  in  Area 
C,  to  which  they  were  moored,  they  changed  course  5  times  each  time  roughly  30 

" — Available  in  ME  code  dated  November  14.     Code  under  study. 
•> — Waters  between  Ford  Island  and  the  Arsenal. 
* — East  Loch. 
* — Middle  Loch. 


700       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

degrees.    The  elapsed  time  was  one  hour,  however,  one  of  these  destroyers  en- 
tered Area  A  after  passing  the  water  reservoir  on  the  Eastern  side. 

Relayed  to . 

ARMY    7111    25817     SECRET    Trans.  12/6/41  (2) 


SECBET 

From:  Tokyo, 

To:  Washington. 

December  7,  1941. 

Purple  (Urgent — Very  Important). 

#907.    To  be  handled  in  government  code. 

Re  my  #902  \ 

Will  the  Ambassador  please  submit  to  the  United  States  Government  (if  pos- 
sible to  the  Secretary  of  State)  our  x'eply  to  the  United  States  at  1 :  00  p.  m.  on 
the  7th,  your  time. 

ARMY     7145     25850     SECRET    Trans.  12/7/41  (3) 

« — S.  I.  S.  #25843 — text  of  Japanese  reply. 


From:  Budapest. 
To:  Tokyo. 
December  7,  1941. 
LA. 
#104. 

Re  my  #103». 

On  the  6th,  the  American  Minister  presented  to  the  Government  of  this 
country  a  British  Government  communique  to  the  effect  that  a  state  of  war 
would  break  out  on  the  7th. 

Relayed  to  Berlin. 

ARMY    7184    25866     SECRET    Trans.  12/7/41    (2) 


SECBET 

From:  Washington. 
To:  Tokyo. 
December  6,  1941. 
Purple   (Urgent). 
#1272. 

In  addition  to  carrying  on  frontal  negotiations  with  the  President  and 
HULL,  we  also  worked  directly  and  indirectly  through  Cabinet  members  hav- 
ing close  relations  with  the  President  and  through  individuals  equally  influ- 
ential (because  of  its  delicate  bearing  upon  the  State  Department,  please  keep 
this  point  strictly  secret).  Up  until  this  moment  we  have  the  following  to 
report : 

(1)  On  the  4th  those  engaged  in  Plan  "A"  dined  with  the  President  and 
advised  him  against  a  Japanese-American  war  and  urged  him  to  do  the  "intro- 
ducing" at  once  between  Japan  and  China.  However,  the  President  did  not 
make  known  what  he  had  in  mind.  According  to  these  men,  this  attitude  of 
the  President  is  his  usual  attitude.  Recently,  when  the  President  discussed 
matters  with  LEWIS  and  settled  the  strike  question,  I  understand  that  he 
did  so  on  the  advise  of  these  individuals. 

(2)  Tliiose  carrying  on  Plan  "B"  included  all  of  our  proposal  of  November 
20th  into  that  of  September  25th  and  after  incorporating  these  sections  in 
the  United  States'  proposal  of  November  26th  which  are  either  innocuous  or 
advantageous  to  us (MESSAGE  INCOMPLETE) 

ARMY     7176    25846     SECRET    Trans.  12/7/41    2T) 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  701 

SECBET 

From:  Washington   (Nomura). 
To:  Tokyo. 
December  3,  1941. 
Purple  (Urgent). 
#1256.    Re  your  #875«. 

I  received  your  reply  immediately.  I  presume,  of  course,  that  this  reply 
was  a  result  of  consultations  and  profound  consideration.  The  United  States 
Government  is  attaching  a  great  deal  of  importance  on  this  reply.  Especially 
since  the  President  issued  his  statement  yesterday,  it  is  being  rumored  among 
the  journalists  that  this  reply  is  to  be  the  key  deciding  whether  there  will  be 
war  or  peace  between  Japan  and  the  United  States.  There  is  no  saying  but 
what  the  United  States  Government  will  take  a  bold  step  depending  upon  how 
our  reply  is  made.  If  it  is  really  the  intention  of  our  government  to  arrive 
at  a  settlement,  the  explantion  you  give,  I  am  afraid,  would  neither  satisfy 
them  nor  prevent  them  taking  the  bold  step  referred  to — even  if  your  reply 
is  made  for  the  mere  purpose  of  keeping  the  negotiations  going.  Therefore, 
in  view  of  what  has  been  elucidated  in  our  proposal  which  I  submitted  to  the 
President  on  November  10th,  I  would  like  to  get  a  reply  which  gives  a  clearer 
impression  of  our  peaceful  intentions.  Will  you,  therefore,  reconsider  this 
question  with  this  in  mind  and  wire  me  at  once. 

AKMY    7128    25849     SECRET     Trans.  12/7/41  (1) 


»  See  S.  I.  S.  #  25725 — Explanation  of  Japan's  Increase  of  their  forces  in  French  Indo- 
China. 


From:  Tokyo  (Togo). 
To :  Honolulu. 
December  6,  1941. 
PA-KZ. 

#128. 

Please  wire  immediately  re  the  latter  part  of  my  #123*  the  movements  of  the 
fleet  subsequent  to  the  fourth. 

ARMY    7381    26158     (Japanese)     SECRET    Trans.  12/12/41     (5) 

•  Not  available. 


SECBET 
From:  Tokyo  (Togo). 
To:  Honolulu. 
December  2,  1941. 
J-19. 
#123.  (Secret  outside  the  department) 

In  view  of  the  present  situation,  the  presence  in  port  of  warships,  airplane 
carriers,  and  cruisers  is  of  utmost  importance.  Hereafter,  to  the  utmost  of  your 
ability,  let  me  know  day  by  day.  Wire  me  in  each  case  whether  or  not  there  are 
any  observation  balloons  above  Pearl  Harbor  or  if  there  are  any  indications  that 
they  will  be  sent  up.  Also  advise  me  whether  or  not  the  warships  are  provided 
with  anti-mine  nets. 

Note  :  This  message  was  received  here  on  December  23. 

ARMY    8007    27065     (Japanese)     SECRET    Trans.  12/30/41     (5) 


702       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 
Hewitt  Inqxtiey  Exhibit  No.  16 

SECRET 

Naval  message — Navy  Department 


Phone  Extension  Number:  2027 

Addressees 

Message  precedence 

From:  COMSIXTEEN. 

Release'l  by                      .  -      

For  Action: 
CINCPAC. 
OPNAV. 
.  COMFOURTEEN. 

Priority 
Routine 

Date:  28  November  1941. 

Deferred 

TOR  Coderoom                     --- 

Information. 

Priority 

Decoded  by  P.  R.  WHITE. 

Routine 
Deferred 

Indicated  by  asterislf  addressees  for  which  mail  delivery  is  satisfactory. 
[Hand  written:]  Reported  to  ONI  in  Serial  26-11. 

281510 
Unless  otherwise  designated  this  dispatch  will  be  transmitted  with  deferred  precedence. 
Originator  fill  in  date  and  time  for  deferred  and  mail  delivery:  Date  Time  OCT 


Comment  Naval  attache  thai  Astalusha  Sharda  two  seven  zero  eight  three 
zero  X  Isuzu  (cl)  in  Formosa  Straits  Sunday  X  Subtender  and  four  subs 
probably  Subron  Six  plus  Nagoya  Maru  tender  X  Last  sentence  believed  to  be 
sendai  (cl)  plus  two  desdivs  XX  Other  items  no  comment  XX  Additional 
info  from  CN  Nitta  Maru  sailing  Yokosuka  to  Takao  twenty  ninth  with  military 
supplies  XX  Two  senior  construction  officers  and  four  thousand  men  status  not 
known  ordered  mandates  XX  Unidentified  ship  believed  to  be  light  cruiser  has 
apparently  relieved  Kashii  as  flagship  southern  expeditionary  fleet  X  This  ship 
now  in  Camranh  Bay  Saigon  area  XX 

Make  original  only.  Deliver  to  Communication  Watch  Officer  in  person.  See  Art.  76  (4) 
NAV  REGS. 

Note. — Penned  notations  in  italics. 


SECRET 

Naval  message — Navy  Department 


Phone  Extension  Number:  2027 

Addressees 

Message  precedence 

From:  COMSIXTEEN. 

Leased  by _ 

For  Action: 
OPNAV. 

Priority 
Routine 

Date:  1  December  1941. 

Deferred 

TOR  Coderoom 

Information: 
CINCPAC. 
COMFOURTEEN. 
CINCAF. 

Priority 

Decoded  by:  WHITE. 

Routine 
Deferred 

Indicate  by  asterisk  addressees  for  which  mail  delivery  is  satisfactory. 

Reported  to  ONI  in  Serial  25-41  010913 

Unless  otherwise  designated  this  dispatch  will  be  transmitted  with  deferred  precedence. 

Originator  fill  in  date  and  time  for  deferred  and  mail  delivery:  Date  time  OCT 

[Hand  written:]  Reported  to  ONI  in  Serial  25-41. 


'I'H'.x'r 

From  RI  X  Arrivals  in  Takao  area  past  two  days  X  Comdesron  five  in 
Natori  X  Naka  to  join  Desron  four  X  units  of  number  two  base  force  and  Chogei 
X  Last  named  ship  considered  to  be  tender  for  two  divisions  submarines  X 
All  these  units  now  under  command  Cine  third  X  Cine  second  in  Atago  shifted 
from  Kure  to  Sasebo  Comm  Zone  apparently  en  route  South  China  waters 

Make  original  only,  deliver  to  Communication  Watch  Officer  in  person.  See  Art.  76  (4) 
Nav  Regs. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY 


703 


Classified 


U.  S.  Naval  CoMMtrNiCAXioN  Service 

COMMANDEE  IN   CHIEF   U.    S.    PACIFIC   FLEET 


Incoming 


Reassignment  all  orange  calls  occurred  midnight  X    Same  garble  cable  X    No 
change  in  shore  addresses  XX 

3(3  Nov.  41    Crypto-Group  87     CBO  HMC     Serial  No.  12-2 
Originator :  Information : 

COM  16  CINCAF 

Action :  CINPAC 

OPNAV  COM  14 

Authenticated : 

F.   S.   Lockard, 

F.  S.  LocKAED,  Ens.  U8NR. 


Hewitt  iNQtriBT  Exhibit  No.  17 

(Exhibit  No.  17  is  a  photostat  of  a  captured  Japanese  submarine 
chart  used  for  Plan  V  of  "Battle  Report".  This  chart  will  be  found 
reproduced  as  Item  No.  107,  EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, 
Hewitt  Inquiry.) 


Hewitt  Inqutey  Exhibit  No.  18 

RADIO  LOG 

of 

BISHOP'S  POINT  RADIO  STATION 

7  December  1941 

Radio  Log 

Section  Base 

Bishop's  Point,  Oahu,  T.  H. 


Watch 
C,  E.  Gibson,  Supervisor 
R.  B.  Moyle,  Operator 


Receiver  &  Controls  O.  K. 
Freq.:  2670     KCS. 
Date:  7  December  1941  R.  W.  H. 


DN3L  AR 

K 

DN3L  AS  ONE  MOMENT  PLEASE  STAND  BY 

DN3L  AR 

COME  IN 

K 

WHAT  IS  THE  DISTANCE  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  K 

WHAT  WAS  THE  APPROXIMATE  DISTANCE  AND  COURSE 

OF  THE  SUBMARINE  THAT  YOU  SIGHTED  K 
THE  COURSE  WAS  ABOUT  WHAT  WE  WERE  STEERING  AT 

THE  TIME  020  MAGNETIC  AND  ABOUT  1000  YARDS  FROM 

THE   ENTRANCE  APPARENTLY  HEADING  FOR  THE  EN- 

RANCE  K 
R 
BT  DO  YOU  HAVE  ANY  ADDITIONAL  INFORMATION   ON 

THE  SUB  K 
NO  ADDITIONAL  INFORMATION  K 
WHEN  WAS  THE  LAST  TIME  APPROXIMATELY  THAT  YOU 

SAW  THE  SUBMARINE  K 
APPROXIMATE    TIME    0350    AND    HE    WAS    APPARENTLY 

HEADING  FOR  THE  ENTRANCE  K 
R 

AR  PLEASE 
K 
BT  THANK  YOU  FOR  YOUR  INFORMATION  NOTIFY  US  IF 

YOU   HAVE   ANY   MORE   INFORMATION   WE   WILL   CON' 

TINUE  SEARCH  K 


1445 

DZ5Y 
DN3L 
DZ5Y 
DBIL 
DN3L 
DN3L 
DZ5Y 
DZ5Y 

DBIL  V 
VDZ5Y 
DBIL  V 
DZ5Y  V 
VDZ5Y 
VDBIL 
VDN3L 
VDN3L 

1450 

DN3L 

VDZ5Y 

1451 
1456 

DZ5Y 
DZ5Y 

VDN3L 
VDN3L 

DN3L 
DZ5Y 

VDZ5Y 
VDN3L 

DN3L 

V  DZ5Y 

1458 
1505 

VDN3L 
DZ5Y 
DNSL 
DZ5Y 

VDN3L 
VDZ5Y 
VDN3L 

704       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


RADIO  LOG— Continued 
Section  Base,  Bishop's  Point,  Oahu,  T,  H, 


-Continued 


1508 

V  DZ5Y 

R 

1524 

DBIL 

VDZ5Y 

AR 

DZ5Y 

VDBIL 

K 

V  DZ5Y 

WE  ARE  FINISHED  K 

1525 

VDBIL 

R 

1535 

DR7Y 

VDJ8A 

PM  DRBR  EARLY  0450  K 

1538 

VDJ8A 

R 

1539 

DW2X 

VDBIL 

AR 

DBIL 

VDW2X 

K 

DW2X 

VDBIL 

CLEAR  K 

V  DW2X 

R 

1555 

DJ8A 

VDR7Y 

AR 

DR6Y 

VDJ8A 

K 

DJ8A 

VDR7Y 

815  FJIMALE  0525  YOU  GOT  THAT  MESSAGE  BEFORE  DID  YOU 

DR7Y 

VDJ8A 

R  BOTH  MESSAGES  R  LAST  TWO  MESSAGES  K 

1557 

DJ8A 

VDR7Y 

R 

1630 

DE2A 

V  DW2X 

AR 

DW2X 

VDR9Q 

K 

DW2X 

VDN3L 

K 

VDZ5I 

K 

DE2A 

V  DW2X 

Z  RIME  WING  071614    (SEE  FILE)  K 

1641 

V  DN3L 

R 

V  DZ5I 

R 

DW2X 

VDN3L 

AR 

DN3L 

V  DW2X 

K 

1642 

DW2X 

V  DN3L 

ZCD  DZ51  R  AR 

1643 

DN3L 

V  DW2X 

R 

1647 

DW2X 

VDZ5I 

AR 

1650 

D\aF2X 

VDR9Q 

ZCE  DZ5I  K 

DR9Q 

VDZ5I 

ZSF  K 

DZoI 

VDR9Q 

S3  K 

DW2X 

V  DN3L 

ZCE  DZ5I  AR 

DZ5I 

V  DW2X 

K 

DW2X 

V  DZ5I 

ZSF  Ki 

V  DW2X 

85  k:5  K 

165 

VDZ5I 

R 

1714 

DR7Y 

V  DJ8A 

HAVE  YOU  ANYTHING  FOR  ME 

DJ8A 

VDR7Y 

YES  2307  COUNTER  0640  VA 

1715 

DR7Y 

V  DJ8A 

R 

6  June  1945. 
I  hereby  certify  that  this  is  the  radio  log  or  the  exact  copy  of  the  log  that 
was  made  by  the  Section  Base,  Bishop's  Point,  Oahu,  T.  H.,  on  7  December  1941. 

Richard  Wilmot  Humphrey, 


This  copy  was  certified  in  my  presence  : 
Walter  H.  Kozacko, 
Walter  H.  Kozacko, 
Lt.  Comdr.,  VSNR. 


Richard  Wilmot  Humphket, 
S-06-6S,  RMSc,  V-S,  U.  S.  N. 


RADIO  LOG 
Section  Base,  Bishop's  Point,  Oahu,  T.  H. 


Watch 
G/E.  Gibson,  Supervisor 
R.^B.  Moyle,  Operator 


R. 


Receiver  &  Controls  0.  K. 
Freq.  2670     Kcs. 
Date:  December  i943  1941  R.  W.  H. 


1715 
1721 

DW2X 
DN3L 
DW2X 

V  DN3L 

V  DW2X 

V  DN3L 

1723 

DW2X 
DNRL 
DW2X 

VDN3L 
V  DW2X 
VDN3L 

DW2X 
V  DW2X 
VDN3L 

V  DN3L 

TIME  OF  LAST  ENTRY 

AR 

K 

P  BK  WE  HAVE  DROPPED  DEPTH  CHARGES  UPON  SUBS 

OPERATING  IN  DEFENSIVE  SEA  AREA  AR 

STAND  BY  FOR  MORE  MESSAGES 

IMl  YOUR  LAST  PRIORITY  K 

WE  HAVE  ATTACKED  FIRED  UPON  AND  DRIPPED  DEPTH 

CHARGES  UPON  SUBMARINE  OPERATING  IN  DEFENSIVE 

SEA  AREA  AR 

DID  YOU  GET  THAT  LAST  MESSAGE  K 

R 

STAND  BY  FOR  FUTHER  MESSAGES 


PROCEEDINGS  OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY 


705 


RADIO  LOG— Continued 
Section  Base,  Bishop's  Point,  Oahtj,  T.  H. — Continued 


1727    VDW2X 
1749    t)W2X 
DN3L 
DW2X 

V  DW2X 

1755  DW2X 

V  DW2X 
DW2X 

1756  VDW2X 
1803    DJ8A 

DR9Q 

AJ8A 

DW2X 

V  DW2X 
VDN3L 


1805    VDW2X 
VDN3L 
VDJ8A 
VDN3L 


DN3L 

1810    DR7Y 

1813    DJ8A 

DR7Y 

1817    DEIT 
1821    DN3L 
DW2X 
VDW2X 

1826    DW2X 
DR7Y 
DJ8A 
DR7Y 

DJ8A 
1830    DW2X 
DJ8A 


1830 


R 

V  DN3L     AR 
VDW2X    K 

V  DN3L      ZMA  0  BUT  STAND  BY  AR 

R 

V  DN3L      AR 

K 

V  DN3L      ZMA  0  BUT  STAND  BY  FOR  MESSAGE  AT  ANY  TIME  AR 

R 

V  DN3L      P  P  AR  PLEASE 

V  DN3L      ZCQ  DJ8A  AR 

V  DR9Q      AR 

V  DN3L      P  AR 

K 

BT  WE  HAVE  INTERCEPTED  A  SAMPAN  INTO  HONOLULU 

PLEASE  HAVE  COAST  GUARD  SEND  CUTTER  TO  RELIEVE 

US  OF  SAMPAN  AR 

R  P  K 

AS  1  MINUTE 

K 

BT  WE  HAVE  INTERCEPTED  SAMPAN  AND  ESCORTING 

SAMPAN  INTO  HONOLULU  PLEASE  HAVE  CUTTER  RELIEVE 

US  OF  SAMPAN  AR 

V  DW2X    Z  DW2X  071807  DN3L  P  GR  11  BT  HELID  ARUQS  QLUAN  SVDER 

LBVQY  NEXKQ  TPHQX  BMMQH  LBPBV  ARUQS  HELID  K 
VDJ8A       IMIGRl 

V  DR7Y     OR  1  402 

V  DJ8A       R 

MOYLE  AND  GIBSON  OFF  TO  BANKS  AND  HUMPHREY 

VDW2X    AR 
VDW2X    AR 

V  DN3L      K 

Z  DW2X  071820  DEIT  Q  DN3L  P  GR  5  BT  PROCEED  IMMEDIATE- 
LY AND  CONTACT  WARD  AR 

V  DN3L      R 

V  DJ8A       AR 

V  DR7Y     K 

V  DJ8A       HERE  IS  A  MESSAGE  Z  DK:3K  071801  DR7Y  OR  4  BT  PROCEED 

CONTACT  HARBOR  PATROL 

V  DN3L      IMI  THAT  LAST  MESSAGE 

V  DR6K     ZMC  ZGD  DR6K  DR9Q  DUIP 
VDN3L 

RECEIVER  AND  TRANSMITTER  HAVE  GONE  OUT— POWER 

OFF 

AIR  RAID  BY  JAPANESE  PLANES 


6  June  1945. 
I  hereby  certify  that  this  is  the  radio  log  or  the  exact  copy  of  the  log  that 
was  made  by  the  Section  Base,  Bishop's  Point,  Oahu,  T.  H.,  on  7  December  1941. 

Richard  Wilmot  Humphrey, 


This  copy  was  certified  In  my  presence : 
Walter  H.  Kozacko, 
Walter  H.  Kozacko, 
Lt.  Comdr.,  USNR. 


RicHAED  Wilmot  Humphrey, 
438-06-63,  RM3c,  V-3,  U.  S.  N. 


R. 


Hewitt  Inquiry  Exhibit  No.  19 

14  aiAY  1945. 
Received  the  following  secret  material  from  Captain  L.  F.  Safford,  USN,  for 
ofllcial  use  in  the  Pearl  Harbor  Investigation: 

(1)  Three  copies  of  Com  14  Daily  RI  Summaries   (at  Pearl  Harbor)   from 
1  Nov.  1941  to  6  Dec.  1941,  incl. 

(2)  Three  photos  of  Station  "H"  Chronology,  1  Dec.  1941  to  6  Dec.  1941,  incl. 

(3)  Photos  of  the  following  (3  copies)  : 

OpNav  to  CinCAF  242239 
Com  14  to  OpNav  260110 
Com  16  to  OpNav  261331 
OpNav  to  Alusna  Tokyo  040330 


706       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Com  13  031825 

Com  16  to  OpNav  010245 

Foote's  message 

Com  16  to  OpNav  041502 

Hidden  message  of  December  7 

Bainbridge  Island  051830 

Com  14  052200 

(2)  Three  photos  of  Station  "H"  Chronology,  1  Dee.  1941  to  6  Dec.  1941,  Mel. 
(JI>-1  No.  7148). 

John  L.  Sonnett. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summaey 
1  NovEMBEE  1941-6  Decembek  1941 

SECRET 

Communication  Intelligence  Sum/mary — 1  November  1941 

General. — ^Traffic  volume  a  little  less  than  normal.  Receiving  condition  fair, 
traffic  rather  slow.  The  first  day's  yield  of  new  calls  not  very  great.  Fleet 
calls  only  changed,  shore  station  calls  and  shore  addresses  not  changed.  It  is 
believed  that  tactical  calls  also  remain  unchanged,  but  not  enough  intercepted 
traffic  to  so  state  definitely.  The  same  garble  table  for  calls  is  employed  so 
the  change  amounts  to  a  reassignment  of  calls  previously  used.  New  calls  have 
appeared,  but  it  is  thought  that  they  were  formerly  assigned  to  obscure  units 
or  were  in  reserve.  All  of  the  major  Fleet  calls  are  identified  and  a  small 
amount  of  individual  calls  were  recovered  today.  Because  the  new  calls  are 
not  yet  lined  up  save  for  the  major  Fleet  Commanders  and  all  time  today  was 
spent  in  call  recovery,  this  summary  will  deal  only  with  general  impressions. 

Combined  Fleet. — The  FIRST  FLEET  was  not  very  active  today  in  radio 
traffic.  The  CINC  SECOND  FLEET  appears  to  have  originated  quite  a  bit  of 
traffic  to  addresses  placed  in  submarine  and  carrier  category.  No  indications 
of  movement  of  any  of  these  units.  COMBINED  FLEET  tactical  circuits  were 
heard  but  little  tactical  traffic  copied  due  to  interference  by  NPM. 

Carriers. — The  COMMANDER  CARDIVS  was  mentioned  in  despatches  from 
Tokyo  and  he  took  a  fair  amount  of  traffic  on  the  Fleet  Broadcast. 

Submarines. — Nothing  to  report.  Calls  of  the  Submarine  Fleet  not  well  lined 
up  yet. 

Third  Fleet.— This  Fleet  very  active  as  before.  The  SECOND  and  FIRST 
BASE  FORCES  are  stUl  marshalling  their  MARUs  and  the  CINC,  is  very 
busy  with  Tokyo. 

China.— The  activity  of  HAINAN  BASE  continues.  The  KASHII  sent  several 
messages  from  Saigon. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary — 2  November  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal  for  Sunday.  Receiving  conditions  were  fair, 
but  bulk  of  traffic  derived  from  the  major  shore  circuits.  Solution  of  new  call 
system  progressing  satisfactorily  but  volume  of  accumulated  traffic  in  new 
system  not  yet  large  enough  to  permit  more  than  casual  identification  of  individ- 
ual calls.  The  number  of  alternate  calls  for  major  commands  is  increased 
over  last  system.  So  far  there  are  seven  alternate  calls  for  the  Combined 
Fleet. 

Third  Fleet  traffic  is  still  on  a  very  high  level.  The  combined  air  force  traffic 
is  also  very  high  with  the  Commander  of  the  Combined  Air  Forces  originating 
many  despatches.  It  appears  that  he  is  now  in  Taiwan.  Traffic  to  SAMA 
and  BAKO  is  on  a  very  high  level.  Tokyo  and  The  China  Fleet  Intelligence 
bureaus  are  originating  many  dispatches,  these  from  Tokyo  being  prefixed 
WIWI.  There  were  several  high  precedence  dispatches  from  Tokyo  with  the 
major  fleet  commanders  as  addressees. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary — S  November  1941 

Oeneral. — Traffic  volume  slightly  under  normal  although  fair  for  Monday.  Re- 
ceiving conditions  good  but  all  circuits  slow.  General  messages  continue  to  emln- 
ate  from  TOYKO  communications.  Such  an  amount  is  unprecedented  and  the 
import  is  not  understood.    A  mere  call  change  does  not  account  for  activities  of 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  707 

this  nature.  The  impression  is  strong  that  these  messages  are  periodic  reports 
to  the  Major  Commander  of  a  certain  nature.  Dummy  traflBc  is  again  being  sent 
on  the  TOKYO  broadcasts.  Naval  Intelligence  TOKYO  addressed  two  WIWI 
messages  to  Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet  and  to  KUMI  8  (unidentified). 

Combined  Fiee*.— Commander  in  Chief  Combined  Fleet  sent  an  urgent  message 
to  BUMIL  information  all  Major  Commanders,  Combined  Fleet,  Naval  Intelli- 
gence Tokyo,  the  Chief  of  Naval  General  Staff,  and  Bureau  of  Personnel. 
Commander  in  Chief  Combined  Fleet  also  was  associated  in  traffic  with  offices 
in  the  mandates,  principally  RNO  PALAO.  The  Commander  in  Chief,  Combined 
continues  to  be  associated  with  the  Carriers  and  Submarines. 

Third  Fleet. — Third  Fleet  trafBc  continues  at  a  high  level.  A  movement  re- 
port by  It  ATI  G6  (unidentified)  was  addressed  to  Commander  in  Chief  Third 
Fleet  for  information. 

Air.— J.  WE  address,  today  broke  down  as  "ITIKOUKUU  KANTAI".  The 
literal  reading  of  this  as  "1st  Air  Fleet"  Is  correct;  it  indicates  an  entirely  new 
organiza»ion  of  the  Naval  Air  Forces.  There  are  other  points  which  indicated 
that  this  may  be  the  case.  An  old  call  (Y0ME7)  while  never  identified  seemed 
to  be  in  n  high  position  with  respect  to  the  Carriers  and  the  Air  Coi-ps.  Upon 
movemeit  of  air  units  to  TAIWAN  the  association  of  CarDiv  4  and  CarDiv  3 
with  uni  :s  of  the  Combined  Air  Force  was  apparent.  Their  association  in  a  com- 
mand se  ise  between  shore  based  air  and  fleet  air  had  never  occurred  before,  but 
under  the  concept  of  an  AIR  FLEET  can  be  easily  accepted.  Traffic  in  the  Air 
Force  continues  at  a  high  level. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary — 4  'November  1941 

General. — ^Traffic  volume  normal  with  all  circuits  easily  readable.  More  tac- 
tical traffic  copied  than  for  past  few  days.  Combined  Fleet  and  Carriers  heard 
on  tactical  circuits.  TOKYO  Naval  Intelligence  sent  four  messages  to  Major 
Commanders.  One  of  these  was  for  information  Chief  of  Staff  China  Fleet  and 
one  other  for  information  of  Chief  of  Staff  Second  Fleet. 

Air. — High  traffic  level  of  air  activities  continues.  Most  significant  of  the 
aid  dispatches  were  some  in  which  various  air  corps  were  addressed  and  BAKO 
included  for  information.  One  from  Yokosuka  Air  was  addressed  to  SANCHOW 
Island  Radio  for  information  TAKAO  Air  Corps.  BAKO  was  also  noted  as  an 
addressee  in  several  messages  ftrom  SASEBO  and  originated  two  mesages  to 
SASEBO  and  TOKYO.  Commander  Carriers  also  addressed  a  message  to  two 
unidentified  calls  for  Information  of  Commander  Combined  Air  Force,  Com- 
mander in  Chief,  Combined  Fleet,  CarDivs  collective,  BAKO  and  others.  The 
Commander  Combined  Air  Force  addressed  a  message  to  Commander  in  Chief 
Third  Fleet. 

Mandates. — The  RNO  PALAO  was  active  today,  being  addressed  by  Com- 
mander in  Chief,  Fourth  Fleet  and  sent  several  messages  to  TOKYO  and  YOKO- 
SUKA. The  PALAO  weather  station  sent  a  long  code  message  addressed  to 
nearly  all  the  Islands  of  the  Mandates.  MARCUS  island  appears  as  an  origin- 
ator.   No  change  in  the  location  of  Fourth  Fleet  units  noted. 

Submarines. — No  activity  noted. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary — 5  November  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  above  normal.  All  circuits  heard  and  receiving  con- 
ditions were  fair  to  good.  TOKTTO  very  active  as  an  originator,  sending  out 
many  messages  of  general  address.  Two  WIWI  messages  in  Kana  Code  sent 
by  NGS  to  Chief  of  Staff  Car  Divs  and  TIYA  44  (Unidentified)  respectively.  The 
Intelligence  Offices  of  China  Fleet  and  TOKYO  continue  active  with  many 
dispatches  passing  between  the  two. 

Third  Fleet. — Two  units  of  the  Third  Fleet  appear  today  in  TAKIAO  area. 
Since  these  calls  are  as  yet  unidentified  (RISI4  and  Y0A2)  it  isnot  known  how 
much  of  this  fleet  they  represent.  It  is  certain  that  the  Commander  in  Chief, 
Third  Fleet  has  not  yet  left  the  Sasebo  area  although  it  is  expected  he  will 
before  long.  One  message  which  may  be  a  movement  report  from  him  was  re- 
ceived late  on  the  5th.  The  present  state  of  call  recovery  on  the  Third  Fleet  does 
not  permit  of  an  estimate  of  the  movement  involved. 

A  unit  of  the  First  Fleet,  identified  today  as  CARDIV  4  appeared  at  BAKO. 
This  Carrier  Division  was  addressed  as  "less  FUTA  SHOTAI"  (2nd  Section?) 
Whether  or  not  these  are  other  units  at  BAKO  is  not  known.  The  Commander 
CARDIVS  has  been  associated  with  SAMA  and  BAKO  in  several  dispatches  today. 

79716 — 46— Ex.  149,  vol.  2—4 


708       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

The  following  were  also  associated,  SANCHOW  ISLAND  TAKAO  AIRCORPS, 
CANTON  (China)  and  YOKOHAMA  Air.  The  RNO  TAIHOKU  originated  many 
dispatches  to  TOKYO  and  the  French  Indo  China  Forces.  A  TAIWAN  origin- 
ator sent  one  to  Lieut.  Comdr.  SHIBA  at  the  Embassy  THAILAND  for  informa- 
tion to  HANOI  and  the  Commander  French  Indo  China  Forces. 

BAKO  originated  numerous  dispatches  to  the  Empire  and  to  the  Major  Fleet 
Comanders. 

The  South  China  Fleet  was  also  the  recipient  of  many  despatches  from  TOKYO. 

Despite  the  uncertainty  due  to  the  Change  of  Calls  it  is  believed  that  there 
is  now  being  effected  a  concentration  of  naval  forces  in  the  BAKO  area  which 
will  comprise  the  Third  Fleet  as  organized  in  SASEBO  for  the  past  month  and 
will  be  augmented  by  heavy  air  forces  and  Combined  Fleet  units  to  an  un- 
known extent 

OoMmunication  Intelligence  Summary — 6  November  19^1 

General. — Traffic  volume  slightly  above  normal.  Receiving  conditions  were 
fair,  regular  strong  but  heavy  static  on  night  watches  interferred  somewhat. 
Today  the  specific  call-up  on  the  Tokyo  broadcast  was  eliminated.  Formerly 
Tokyo  radio  called  the  unit  concerned  when  the  dispatch  was  addressed  to  a 
member  of  that  unit.  Beginning  yesterday  afternoon,  all  broadcast  messages 
are  addressed  to  a  single  call  without  regard  to  the  addressee  of  the  message. 
The  recovery  of  the  radio  organization  will  be  hampered  by  this  new  advance 
in  Communication  Security.  Moreover  there  were  nine  messages  today  on  this 
broadcast  from  which  the  address  and  originator  were  missing.  This  may  be  the 
start  of  complete  elimination  of  headings  on  broadcast  circuits.  Tokyo  ad- 
dressed a  WIWI  message  to  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  of  the  Combined  Fleet  and 
Submarine  Force. 

TaJcao-Bako  Area. — It  is  now  certain  that  there  is  a  very  heavy  air  con- 
centration on  Taiwan.  This  comprised  practically  the  entire  Combined  Air 
Force  including  the  Commander  and  his  staff  plus  at  least  one  carrier  division 
and  an  unknown  amount  of  the  fleet  air  arm.  No  additional  units  of  the  Third 
Fleet  were  located  there  today  but  it  is  believed  that  CinC  Third  Fleet  is  now 
enroute  BAKO  from  SASEBO.  From  traffic  association  it  is  believed  that  some 
Second  Fleet  units  are  in  Takao  area  but  this  has  not  yet  been  proven.  The 
South  China  Fleet  Command  has  been  active  in  dispatches  to  Taiwan  addresses. 

Combined  Fleet. — A  large  amount  of  Combined  Fleet  traffic  is  now  appearing 
with  secret  (tactical)  calls  in  use. 

Mandates. — The  Mandates  traffic  has  dropped  off  somewhat.  The  Sixth  De- 
fense Force  at  Truk  and  the  RNO  Paloa  continue  to  be  the  most  active  units. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary — 7  Novemier  19^1 

General. — Volume  of  intercepted  traffic  larger  than  usual.  Due  to  the  use  of 
the  general  call  "All  Major  Force  Flags"  on  the  UTU  for  delivery  to  all  Com- 
bined Fleet  units,  affiliation  of  unidentified  calls  with  forces  to  which  attached 
is  very  difficult.  Use  of  large  number  of  alternate  calls  for  major  fleet  forces, 
many  of  which  have  not  yet  been  definitely  identified  or  associated  with  known 
calls,  renders  the  picture  more  confusing.  Appearance  of  the  prefix  "JITSU" 
(authenticator  for  bonafide  traffic)  in  several  messages  indicates  that  a  com- 
munication drill  is  being  held  but  without  indication  as  to  what  units  are  par- 
ticipating and  therefore  much  of  the  traffic  is  suspected  of  being  "drill".  Jaluit 
Radio  is  handling  traffic  direct  with  Yokosuka  Radio  probably  due  to  congestion 
of  Mandate  circuits  from  the  Marshalls  caused  by  heavy  concentration  in  that 
area. 

Air. — Continued  high  traffic  level  for  all  classes  of  air  activities,  mainly 
centered  in  the  Taiwan  area,  but  also  with  all  air  activities  in  the  Mandates 
included  in  headings  of  messages.  Despatches  originated  by  Fourth  Fleet 
Command  included  Air  Forces,  Base  Forces,  Air  Stations,  and  all  types  of  Man- 
date activities  in  long  headings. 

Fleet. — Fourth  Fleet  Command  remains  in  Truk  area.  There  are  indications 
that  portions  of  the  First  Fleet  may  be  moving  to  the  Takao  area  but  identifica- 
tions are  not  sufficiently  certain  to  confirm  this. 

Greatest  effort  is  being  made  to  increase  the  number  of  identified  calls  to 
facilitate  analysis  of  the  traffic  but  Orange  changes  in  methods  of  handling 
fleet  traffic  renders  this  more  difficult  than  had  been  hoped. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  709 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary — 8  November  19^1 

General. — Normal  volume  of  intercepted  traffic  with  no  "dummies"  appearing 
on  the  UTU.  All  UTU  traffic  was  broadcast  to  the  general  call  only.  The 
Staff  Communication  Officer  of  the  French  Indo  China  Force  (So.  Exp.  For.) 
sent  a  dispatch  action  to  S.  C.  O.  Combined  INFO  S.  C.  O.  Second  Fleet,  Com- 
bined Air  Force,  unidentified  fleet  unit,  Radio  stations  at  Tokyo,  Palao  and 
Takao.  This  may  indicate  a  contemplated  coordination  of  communications  be- 
tween the  Indo-China-South  China  areas  and  the  Palao  Island-Taiwan  area. 
Secret  calls  were  used  very  little  as  compared  to  the  past  few  days  and  only 
three  circuits  were  heard  using  them,  including  the  Combined  Fleet  Com- 
manders circuit  and  Air  Station  Net.  North  Japan-Ominato  circuits  were  quiet. 
All  mandate  circuits  were  active,  with  heavy  interchange  of  traffic  involving  all 
classes  of  Mandate  addressees  in  all  areas,  but  with  continued  emphasis  on  the 
Palao  area  at  one  end  and  the  Jaluit-Marshall  area  on  the  other.  Chichi jima 
Air  Station  was  included  in  much  of  the  traffic  between  Empire  Offices  and  Saipan 
Air  with  Jaluit  Base  Force  included  for  information.  Inclusion  of  Chichijima 
usually  presages  an  air  movement  between  Mandates  and  Empire  but  the  Units 
involved  are  unidentified.  Commander  of  unidentified  shore  activity  (NEO  66) 
previously  associated  with  the  Fifth  Fleet,  was  addressed  at  Chichijima  Air 
which  tentatively  identifies  him  as  an  air  activity.  Previous  association  of  the 
Fifth  Fleet  traffic  with  Fourth  Fleet  and  Yokosuka  tends  to  confirm  the  belief 
that  Fifth  Fleet  operations  are,  or  will  be,  in  the  area  adjacent  to  Chichijima- 
Marcus,  supplementing  the  Fourth  Fleet  in  the  lower  island  areas. 

Fleet. — Chief  of  Staff  First  Fleet  originated  a  despatch  through  Kure  Radio. 
Batdiv  Three  of  the  First  Fleet  appears  to  be  operating  separately  from  the 
main  force,  possibly  in  connection  with  the  Cardivs  TTiree  and  Four  in  the 
Taiwan-Naha  area.  An  apparent  movement  report  from  Cardiv  Four  was  ad- 
dressed to  CinC  Combined  Fleet,  First  Fleet,  CarDiv  Commander,  Combined 
Air  Force  Commander  and  to  movement  offices  at  Tokyo,  Yokosuka,  Kure,  Mai- 
zuru,  and  Sasebo.  Traffic  from  the  Commander  Indo  China  Force  is  handled 
from  the  Japanese  radio  station  at  Saigon  rather  than  from  the  KASHII,  in- 
dicating that  the  staff  is  based  ashore  at  present.  No  identifiable  submarine 
activity  was  noted. 

Air. — Takao  and  Mandates  continue  to  be  the  center  of  air  activities.  The 
area  between  Chichijima,  Naha,  Takao,  Palao  and  Jaluit  appears  to  be  particu- 
larly concerned  with  movement  of  air  forces  and  auxiliaries,  while  the  formation 
of  a  force  under  Combined  Air  Commander  in  the  Takao-Bako  area  appears  to 
be  nearly  completed  as  indicated  by  reports  addressed  to  CinC,  Combined  Naval 
Minister,  Commanders  of  Cardivs,  Combined  Air  Force,  First  Fleet  and  shore 
addresses  generally  associated  with  movements  or  organization  changes.  This 
force  is  believed  to  include  CarDiv  Four,  and  possibly  CarDiv  Three,  with  a 
number  of  auxiliaries  and  units  of  the  Combined  Air  Force,  also  possibly  some 
units  from  the  First  Fleet.  Lack  of  identification  renders  composition  of  the 
force  highly  speculative  and  area  of  operations  obscure.  Prior  to  change  of 
calls,  much  traffic  was  exchanged  between  China,  South  China  and  Indo-China 
while  at  present  most  traffic  includes  Palao. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary — 9  November  1941 

General. — Traffic  column  heavy  for  Sunday.  Receiving  conditions  fair  but 
heavy  static  caused  numerous  garbles  fragmentary  messages.  Navy  Minister 
sent  several  messages  of  general  address  including  one  to  all  First  and  Second 
class  Naval  stations.  Practically  all  of  the  general  messages  carried  SAMA  as 
an  information  address.  Carrier  Division  Three  arrived  at  Takao  and  there  are 
indications  that  Carrier  Division  Four  will  return  to  Sasebo  from  Takao.  The 
Flagship  of  Carrier  Divisions  is  AKAGI  and  is  in  Sasebo  area.  Some  tactical 
traffic  today  shows  units  of  Combined  Fleet  still  operating.  The  association  of 
Batdiv  Three  and  Mandate  addresses,  especially  Saipan  may  indicate  operations 
of  that  unit  in  the  Mariannas.  The  JINGEI  was  communicating  with  SAMA, 
HAINAN  today.    The  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  French  Indo  China  Force  is  in  Tokyo. 

One  message  today  addressed  to  CinC.  Combined  Fleet  was  routed  to 
MAIZURU  for  delivery  but  this  is  believed  a  communication  error.  The  Third 
Fleet  appears  to  be  still  in  Sasebo  area,  but  it  was  noted  that  considerable  traffic 
passed  between  Hainan,  Taiwan  addresses  and  the  Third  Fleet.  The  Fifth  Fleet 
is  still  being  organized  with  no  indications  yet  that  it  has  assembled.  The 
Eighteenth  Air  Corps  at  Saipan  originated  much  traffic  to  Yokosuka  Air  Corps. 


710       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary — 10  NovemT)er  19 ^1 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal,  receiving  conditions  good.  There  were  fewer 
general  messages  sent  today  than  for  the  past  few  weeks.  Tokyo  Intelligence 
still  active  and  addressing  dispatches  to  all  Major  Commanders.  The  Mandates 
construction  traffic  has  decreased  considerably.  Call  recovery  is  progressing  but 
has  been  slowed  down  by  the  general  call-up  used  on  Fleet  broadcast. 

ComUned  Fleet. — Believed  to  be  mostly  in  Kure  area.  A  Staff  officer  of  BatDiv 
Three  was  addressed  there  today  and  it  is  likely  that  this  whole  division  is  there 
also.  The  Cine,  Second  Fleet  was  located  at  Kure  today  as  well  as  two  cruiser 
divisions. 

Thirci  Fleet. — ^The  greater  portions  of  this  fleet  still  in  Sasebo  area.  Several 
movement  reports  have  been  noted  by  units  of  this  fleet  but  none  have  been  noted 
other  than  individual  ships.  At  least  two  units  of  this  fleet  still  at  Takao.  CinC 
Three  originated  one  movement  report  for  information  of  CinC  Fourth  Fleet. 

Fourth  Fleet. — Little  activity.  CinC.  Fourth  remains  in  vicinity  of  Truk  with 
major  portion  of  his  command.  The  Staff  Communication  Officer  of  Submarine 
Force  sent  a  message  to  the  CinC  Fourth  for  information  of  Jaluit. 

Fitth  Fleet. — One  unit  of  this  fleet  located  at  Chichijima. 

Air. — The  Combined  Air  Force  Command  is  still  talking  to  Sama  and  the 
South  China  Fleet.  From  one  address  it  appears  that  the  Commander  of  Car- 
rier Division  Three  is  with  the  Combined  Fleet.  Several  units  of  the  Carrier 
Divisions  are  in  port  at  Kure  and  Sasebo.  CinC  Combined  Air  Force  is  still  in 
Takao. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summarj/ — 12  November  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal  for  past  two  days  with  receiving  condition 
about  average.  The  general  character  of  the  traffic  has  been  administrative  with 
most  of  it  being  between  shore  logistic  and  technical  activities.  The  D.  F.  net  was 
active  today  with  very  little  activity  shown  yesterday.  Intercept  operators  have 
commented  adversely  on  the  major  shore  network  which  comprises  all  of  the 
major  naval  activities,  in  the  EMPIRE.  Traffic  has  been  moving  slowly  over  this 
circuit.  The  reason  is  the  non-cooperation  of  the  operators  and  the  definite  lack 
of  control  exercised  by  TOKYO  radio  stations.  TOKYO  Intelligence  is  still  send- 
ing messages  to  the  major  commands  but  the  remainder  of  TOKYO  traffic  has 
been  mostly  from  the  technical  bureaus. 

Combined  Fleet. — The  Fleets  remain  relatively  inactive  in  the  KURE  area. 
The  association  of  BATDIV  3  with  the  Fourth  Fleet  and  several  Mandates  stations 
is  borne  out  by  a  D.  F.  position  on  the  flagship  of  BATDIV  3  which  places  him 
about  halfway  between  CHICHIJIMA  and  MARCUS  Island.  Their  position  was 
obtained  on  the  4th  when  this  unit  was  not  yet  identified.  No  subsequent  bear- 
ings have  been  obtained.  Also  associated  with  the  BATDIV  are  a  Submarine 
Squadron  and  possibly  CARDIV  4  although  the  association  of  this  CARDIV 
(Lately  returned  from  TAKAO)  is  not  positive.  The  Third  Fleet  remains  at 
SASEBO  with  the  only  activity  exhibited  in  the  Base  Forces. 

J.ir.— CARDIV  3  returned  to  KURE  from  TAKAO  as  reported  by  CAVITE. 
Most  of  air  activity  confined  to  dispatches  between  carrier  and  shore  establish- 
ments. 

Fifth  Fleet. — The  Defense  Forces  of  the  Mandates  fairly  active.  The  volume 
of  construction  traffic  has  definitely  fallen  off.  The  Commander  Submarine  Force 
is  still  adding  JALUIT  and  today  COMSUBRON  2  addressed  a  message  there. 
AIRRON  24  sent  a  movement  report  but  no  indication  of  the  direction.  Com- 
munication exercises  were  held  by  JALUIT  and  several  stations  in  that  area. 
YOKOHAMA  Air  Corps  was  addressed  at  RUOTTO. 

China. — The  previous  activity  of  SAIVIA  and  the  French  Indo  China  Forces 
and  bases  continues. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  IS  November  19 U 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal  with  receiving  conditions  good.  Several 
messages  of  high  precedence  intercepted,  some  of  them  are: 

1.  UNIWIWI  dispatch  in  five  numeral  from  TOKYO  Intelligence  to  Chief 
of  Staff  Combined  Air  Force,  INFO  RNO  TAIHOKU,  BAKO  Naval  Station. 

2.  WIWI  from  N.  G.  S.  to  MAIZURU  INRO  Chief  of  Staff  Fourth  Fleet. 

3.  NIKAWIWI  from  N.  G.  S.  to  Commander  in  Chief  Combined  Fleet, 
INFO  Commander  in  Chief  South  China  Fleet,  Commander  Third  Fleet  and 
SAMA,  HAINAN. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  711 

4.  UNIWIWI  from  N.  G.  S.  to  Secretary  First  Fleet. 

5.  (2  Messages)  WIWI  to  same  address  as  3  above. 

6.  At  3  part  NIKAWIWI  from  N.  G.  S.  to  Commander  in  Chief  Combined 
Fleet,  INFO  Commander  in  Chief  French  Indo  China  Fleet. 

7.  One  UNI  message  from  Commander  in  Chief  China  Fleet  to  SAMA, 
INFO  Commander  in  Chief  Third  Fleet  and  Commander  in  Chief  Combined 
Fleet. 

This  is  the  only  occurrence  in  some  time  of  anyone  save  the  TOKYO  Intelligence 
activity  using  the  WIWI  prefix.  Both  TOKYO  and  the  China  Fleet  Intelligence 
Bureau  were  active  all  day  with  dispatches  to  the  Major  Commanders. 

The  direction  finder  net  was  again  active  all  day  with  CHINKAI,  ORU  7 
(near  CHINKAI),  JALUIT,  SAIPAN,  and  TAIWAN  sending  in  bearing  reports. 

ComUned  Fleet. — The  activity  of  BATDIV  3  is  not  clear.  The  flagship  is 
operating  and  was  located  by  D.  F.  as  reported  yesterday.  The  Commander  of 
BATDIV  3  is  located  in  YOKOSUKA.  The  Division  Communication  Officer  is 
communicating  with  TRUK,  SAIPAN  and  PALAO.  The  other  ships  in  this 
division  remain  unlocated  but  is  assumed,  lacking  evidence  to  the  contrary  that 
they  are  with  the  flagship.  Other  units  of  First  Fleet  seem  inactive.  One 
Cruiser  Division  of  Second  Fleet  is  associated  in  traffic  with  PALAO  and  may 
be  in  that  area. 

Third  Fleet— ?iti\l  located  in  SASEBO,  the  Commander  in  Chief  has  been 
active  in  the  traffic,  being  addressed  by  both  TOKYO  and  Commander  in  Chief 
Combined  Fleet.  The  First  BASE  FORCE  Commander  originated  several 
messages  but  no  indication  of 

Air. — Carriers  remain  relatively  inactive.  The  SETTSU  is  still  with  them 
and  a  few  may  be  engaged  in  target  practice  near  KURE.  The  Combined 
AIRFORCE  is  still  mostly  located  in  TAIWAN  and  the  usual  high  traffic  level 
between  its  component  Air  Corps  still  exists. 

China. — The  Commander  in  Chief  China  Fleet  was  addressed  in  one  of  the 
RNO  TAIHOKU.    His  Chief  of  Staff  is  stUI  in  SHANGHAI. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  14  Noventher  194I 

Oeneral. — Traffic  volume  a  little  under  normal  due  to  poor  air  receiving  con- 
ditions throughout  the  day.  The  Naval  Ministry  originated  several  AlNav 
dispatches.    There  were  three  WIWI  messages  originated  today. 

1.  UNIWIWI  from  N.  G.  S.  and  BUMIL  to  Chief  of  Staff  Fourth  Fleet, 
Information  Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet  and  YOKOSUKA. 

2.  WIWI  from  N.  G.  S.  and  BUMIL  to  Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet, 
Chief  of  Staff  Third  Fleet,  YOKOSUKA  and  SASEBO. 

3.  UNIWIWI  from  N.  G.  S.  to  AN1758  (Chief  of  Staff  of  an  unidentified 
unit).  Information  Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet  and  Chief  of  Staff  Com- 
bined Air  Force. 

Direction  Finder  Net  active  with  SASEBO  station  sending  in  bearings  in  addi- 
tion to  the  others.  Tactical  circuits  heard  during  day  with  a  fair  amount  of 
activity. 

Combined  Fleet. — ^Little  activity  noted.  The  flagship  of  BatDiv  Three  is  still 
operating  but  no  further  information  on  this  division.  Two  Combined  Fleet 
units  appear  active  in  the  traffic.  They  are  DesRon  Three  (normally  in  First 
Fleet  but  has  been  operating  with  Second  Fleet)  and  CruDiv  Seven  of  Second 
Fleet.  Both  of  these  units  have  been  associated  in  traffic  with  the  South  China 
Fleet  and  the  French  Indo  China  Force.  They  may  proceed  to  the  South  China 
Area  in  near  future. 

Third  Fleet. — Still  in  Sasebo  area.  The  CinC.  has  been  addressed  by  Tokyo 
to  a  great  extent  and  is  still  associated  with  South  China  activities  in  traffic. 
It  has  been  noted  that  the  association  between  the  Third  Fleet  and  units  of  the 
Combined  Air  Force  is  growing.  Especially  the  Second  Base  Force  has  been 
talking  with  several  Air  Corps  among  whom  is  the  Kure  Air  Corps.  Will  air 
units  be  embarked  in  ships  of  the  Base  Force? 

Fourth  Fleet. — No  movement  yet  from  the  Truk  area.  It  appears  that  the 
Fourth  Fleet  Staff  is  fairly  well  split  up.  Various  officers  of  the  staff  were  ad- 
dressed at  Tokyo  and  at  unidentified  locations. 

Submarines. — No  particular  activity.  One  unit  evidently  enroute  PALAO 
and  Submarine  Squadron  Two  (now  in  Kure  area)  still  being  addressed  by 
Tokyo  and  Yokosuka  originators. 


712       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Air. — One  Air  Squadron  of  the  Combined  Air  Force  is  at  HOIHOW,  HAINAN. 
The  Commander  of  the  Air  Force  is  still  at  TAKAO  with  a  good  representa- 
tion of  his  command.  The  Carriers  remain  in  home  waters  with  most  of  them 
in  port. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  15  November  19^1 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal,  with  a  number  of  general  address  messages 
originated  by  Communication  Division,  Tokyo,  to  Radio  Officers,  Ominato,  U  #9 
(D.  F.  Station  in  Marshalls),  Jaluit,  Palao,  Truk,  Saipan,  Takao  and  Sama 
Radios  Staff  Communication  Officers  All  Major  Flagships,  Staff  Communication 
Officer  South  Expeditionary  Force  and  two  apparent  collective  shore  addresses. 
Traffic  from  all  stations  mentioned  except  Sama  and  Ominato  to  D.  F.  Control 
and  Plotting  Room  Tokyo  information  to  Staff  Cmmunication  Officer  Combined 
Fleet  was  exchanged.  No  Messages  of  the  D.  F.  type  were  detected  so  it  pre- 
sumed that  the  interchange  had  to  do  with  arrangements  for  drill  or  organization 
of  the  net.  The  Minister  of  the  Navy  originated  one  Alnav  and  one  to  all  Ma.ior 
Commands  and  collective  shore.  Tokyo  Personnel  and  Tokyo  Communication  Di- 
vision originated  several  to  collective  fleet  and  shore.  Significance  is  not  deter- 
mined though  it  is  believed  possible  that  a  further  partial  change  of  shore  and  air 
calls  may  be  in  prospect.  The  Empire  air  station  net  was  normally  active  using 
tactical  calls.  Secretary  First  Fleet  originated  one  Urgent  Code  to  unidentified 
(MINI  55),  Staff  Communication  Officer  Carrier  Division  Four  (at  Sasebo)  and 
Commanding  Officer  of  BatDiv  Three  flagship. 

Combined  Fleet. — Same  as  yesterday,  same  units  (BatDiv  Three,  Desrons  One 
and  Three)  associated  through  traffic  with  South  Expeditionary  Force.  CinC. 
Second  Fleet  was  the  most  active  originator  and  appeared  to  be  arranging  oper- 
ations of  units  involving  First,  Second,  Carrier  and  Air  Units. 

Third  Fleet. — Inactive. 

Fourth  Fleet. — Apparent  movement  of  Fourth  Fleet  units  in  prospect  or  under- 
way, with  continued  emphasis  on  the  Marshalls  Area.  CinC.  Fourth  traffic  still 
being  handled  from  the  Truk  area,  with  Airron  Twenty-four  (Kamoi)  and  asso- 
ciated Yokohama  and  Chitose  air  units  involved  in  some  movement,  direction 
undetermined.  All  Marshall  Island  activities,  including  unidentified  Army  For- 
ces, exchanging  traffic  freely. 

Submarine  Force. — Little  activity  detected.  It  is  believed  that  some  activity 
is  operating  or  preparing  to  operate  in  the  Marshall  area,  from  communication 
arrangements  underway  between  Staff  Communication  Officer  Submarine  Force 
and  same  Fourth  Fleet,  information  to  Jaluit.  Jaluit  has  been  heard  working 
on  various  frequencies,  using  tactical  calls  and  procedure  associated  with  sub- 
marine operations,  but  no  identifications  of  calls  used  have  been  made. 

Air. — Continued  air  traffic  to  and  from  Takao  area,  with  unidentified  Airron 
(formerly  YOME  7)  including  South  Expeditionary  Force  and  Sama  addressees 
in  traffic.  Composition  of  this  force  and  purpose  still  speculative  but  believed  to 
be  preparing  to  move  southward  to  work  with  the  South  Expeditionary  Force. 

The  large  number  of  alternate  calls  used  by  major  forces  renders  analysis  of 
traffic  headings  very  slow  and  difficult,  but  identifications  and  recoveries  of  al- 
ternates are  improving  as  a  greater  volume  of  November  traffic  becomes  avail- 
able for  research. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  16,  'November  19Jfl 

General. — Traffic  volume  approximately  normal  for  week-end  period.  A  new 
form  of  despatch  heading  appeared  in  a  series  of  dispatches  broadcasted  on  the 
regular  UTSU  series.  Only  the  originator  or  the  address  of  the  dispatch  ap- 
peared ;  it  is  assumed  that  the  other  pertinent  call  or  address  may  be  buried  in 
the  text.  These  dispatches  were  with  one  exception  (in  5  numeral  text)  all  in 
the  nine-Kana  period  separator  system  and  the  single  call  in  the  heading  fitted 
In  each  case  Line  seven  of  the  call  garble  table. 

A  dispatch  was  originated  by  the  Navy  Minister  addressed  to  all  Major  Fleets 
and  general  addresses  to  this  effect : 

"Today  the  House  of  Peers  and  House  of  Representatives  by  means  of  a  de- 
cision adopted  the  following  resolution  transmitted  as  follows : 

1.  Resolution  of  House  of  Peers — (Expressed  deepest  thanks  and  emotion 
to  Army  and  Navy  for  their  glorious  service  over  a  long  period  to  the  Empire 
and  expressed  condolences,  etc.,  for  those  fallen  in  battle. 

2.  Resolution  of  House  of  Representatives — Expressed  thanks,  etc.,  to  all 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  713 

officers  and  men  of  Army  Navy  and  Air  Force  for  their  4i^  years  service  (iu 
China  affair)  and  for  their  contribution  to  the  establishment  of  a  permanent 
world  peace.     Gave  prayers  for  well  being  of  all  hands,  etc." 
First  and  Second  Fleets. — Majority  of  First  and  Second  Fleet  Units  remain  in 
the  general  Kure  area.    The  units  of  these  two  fleets  that  have  been  most  active 
from  dispatch  heading  viewpoint  in  the  last  ten  days  appear  to  be : 
Airron  Seven  (3  Chitose  class) 
Carrier  Division  Four 
Destroyer  Squadron  Seven 
Destroyer  Squadron  Three 
Battleship  Division  Three 
Cruiser  Division  Seven 
It  is  rather  singular  that  the  CinO.  Second  Fleet  has  assumed  an  important 
role  in  addressing  for  action  several  first  fleet  and  other  fleet  recently.    In 
some  of  these  dispatches  the  call  identified  as  Southern  Expeditionary  Force  (Indo 
China  Force)   appears.     Associations  of  addresses  in  several  dispatches  have 
thrown  the  Second  and  Third  Fleets  with  the  Combined  Air  Force  and  in  other 
dispatches,  these  appear  to  an  association  between  First  Fleet,  Carrier  Divisions 
and  the  Mandates. 

It  is  apparent  that  Destroyer  Squadron  One  has  been  or  is  operating  with  the 
Carrier  Divisions  and  Battleship  Division  Three  while  Cruiser  Division  Seven 
and  Destroyer  Squadron  Three  have  been  operating  together.  Iwakuin  Air 
sent  short  priority  dispatch  to  the  ATAGO,  Second  Fleet  cruiser  and  submarine 
units  indicating  some  joint  minor  exercises  in  that  ax'ea. 
Third  Fleet. — Believed  inactive  in  Sasebo — Kure  area. 

Fourth  Fleet. — FUATU,  a  Tokyo  address  originated  one  UNI  dispatch  to  an 
unidentified  fleet  unit  (Men  33),  information  to  CinC.  Combined  Fleet,  Com- 
munication Officer,  Fourth  Fleet,  Tokyo  Intelligence,  and  NEO  66,  believed  to  be 
a  shore  based  air  activity  in  Chichijima-Marcus  area. 

Fifth  Fleet. — Prior  to  the  change  of  calls  on  1  November,  the  composition  of 
the  Fifth  Fleet  was  very  indefinite,  but  appeared  to  contain  several  naval  auxil- 
iary type  vessels.  Since  1  November,  little  has  been  recovered  of  the  composition 
of  this  mythical  fleet,  but  is  definite  that  some  units  are  operating  in  the  general 
Yokosuka  Chichijima-Marcus  area. 

Bulmarines. — Little  activity.  Communication  OflScer,  Submarine  Force  origi- 
inated  one  priority  dispatch  to  unidentified  address,  information  to  Combined 
Fleet  Communication  Officer.  Association  of  Submarine  Force  and  Fourth  Fleet 
Commands  continues. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  11  November  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal  with  receiving  conditions  good.  More  traffic 
with  single  call  heading  appeared  on  the  broadcast  circuit.  These  dispatches  num- 
bered serially  and  each  call  different,  but  all  fitting  the  same  line  on  the  call 
garble  table.  Since  these  messages  are  transmitted  each  hour  on  the  hour  and  are 
of  approximately  the  same  length  it  appears  that  they  are  drill  messages.  It  is 
feared  that  they  constitute  a  test  of  straight  broadcasting  without  a  heading. 
Since  none  of  this  traffic  has  been  found  going  into  Tokyo,  it  is  probably  originated 
in  the  Navy  Ministry.  Very  few  messages  of  general  address  were  noted.  Tac- 
tical circuits  in  the  Mandates  were  heard  during  the  day  with  radio  Saipan 
controlling. 

Combined  Fleet. — No  movement  from  the  Kure  area  of  any  major  portion  of 
the  First  or  Second  Fleets.  The  CinC.  Second  Fleet  very  active  as  an  originator 
today.  He  continues  to  address  units  which  are  most  normally  under  his  com- 
mand. He  also  addressed  the  CinC.  Third  Fleet,  Palao  Forces,  and  the  Chief  of 
Staff  Fourth  Fleet. 

Third  Fleet.— Inactive  at  Sasebo.  The  Staff  Communication  Officer  of  Third 
Fleet  was  addressed  by  the  R.  N.  O.  Palao. 

Fourth  Fleet. — The  greater  part  of  the  activity  in  the  Mandate  area  centered 
about  the  Third  Base  Force  at  Palao  and  the  Sixth  Base  Force  at  Jaluit.  Both 
these  activities  originated  traffic. 

Air. — The  Commander  of  the  Combined  Air  Force  remains  in  Takao  and  was 
addressed  frequently  by  SAMA,  HAINAN  and  was  in  two  instances  addressed  by 
the  Fourth  Fleet.  The  carriers  are  mostly  in  the  Kure-Sasebo  area  with  the 
exception  of  a  few  which  are  operating  in  the  Kyushu  area. 

China. — Sama  was  again  active  today  with  dispatches  to  the  Combined  Fleet 
Staff,  Combined  Air  Force,  Third  Fleet  and  Bako.    The  R.  N.  O.  Taimoku  ad- 


714       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

dressed  a  dispatch  to  CinC.  China,  Sanchow  Island,  Sama,  Bako,  CinC,  South 
China,  and  Chief  of  StafE  Combined  Air  Force. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  18  Novem'ber  1941 

Oeneral. — Traffic  volume  a  little  under  normal  with  receiving  conditions  fair 
to  poor.  Tokyo  originators  active  with  several  messages  of  general  address 
emanating  from  the  Communication  section.  The  double  originator  BUMIL  and 
N.  G.  S.  sent  one  NIKAWIWI  to  the  Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet  for  informa- 
tion to  all  First  Class  Naval  Stations.  BUMIL  also  addressed  an  urgent  dispatch 
to  SAJMA,  information  to  R.  N.  O.  TAINOKU,  Chief  of  StafE  South  China  Fleet 
and  Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet.  Another  Tokyo  originator  believed  to  be 
N.  G.  S.,  sent  an  urgent  message  to  Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet,  Chief  of  Staff 
French  Indo  China  Force  and  Chief  of  Staff  Second  Fleet.  MAIZURU  Naval 
Station  also  sent  an  urgent  message  to  Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet,  Second 
Fleet,  Combined  Air  Force,  French  Indo  China  Force  and  for  information  to 
N.  G.  S.  The  Tokyo  Direction  Finder  plotting  section  sent  three  long  dispatches 
to  the  entire  Direction  Finder  Net  which  was  very  active  today  with  many  bear- 
ings reported.  The  Vice  Chief  Naval  General  Staff  sent  one  to  Chief  of  Staff 
Carrier  Divisions  and  Chief  of  Staff  French  Indo  China  Force. 

Combined  Fleet. — CinC.  Combined  Fleet  very  prominent  as  both  an  originator 
and  addressee.  Since  this  officer  is  always  included  in  the  address  of  every 
important  message,  he  will  no  longer  be  mentioned  as  an  addressee  unless  he  is 
the  only  addressee.  The  association  between  the  CinC  Second  Fleet  and  the 
French  Indo  China  Forces  and  Combined  Air  Force  today  in  an  urgent  NIKA 
dispatch.  Several  units  of  the  Combined  Air  Force  also  addressed  several  dis- 
patches to  him.  Battleship  Division  Three,  the  Carrier  Divisions  and  two  de- 
stroyer squadrons  have  been  associated  in  traffic.  Several  dispatches  occurred 
today,  being  addressed  by  N.  G.  S.  and  the  Commander  Carrier  Divisions  in  sev- 
eral instances.  The  CinC.  Third  Fleet  also  addressed  several  dispatches  to  him. 
These  form  the  indication  that  CinC.  Second  Fleet  will  be  in  command  of  a  large 
Task  Force  compromising  the  Third  Fleet,  Combined  Air  Force,  some  carrier 
divisions,  and  Battleship  Division  Three.  No  movement  from  home  waters  has 
been  noted. 

Third  Fleet. — The  Commander  Second  Base  Force  originated  what  appears  to 
be  a  movement  report.  He  also  sent  one  to  R.  N.  O.  TAIHOKU  information  to 
CinC.  Third  Fleet.  There  were  other  units  tentatively  placed  in  Third  Fleet  who 
sent  dispatches  in  which  the  Tokyo  movement  report  office  was  an  addressee.  It 
is  expected  that  the  Third  Fleet  will  move  from  the  Sasebo  area  in  the  near 
future.  This  Second  Base  Force  was  having  quite  a  bit  of  traffic  with  several 
Air  Corps  awhile  ago  and  may  be  transporting  air  units  for  equipment. 

Fourth  Fleet. — Not  much  activity  in  tliis  fleet.  The  amount  of  traffic  still 
interested  in  Jaluit. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary  19  November  19^1 

General. — ^Traffic  volume  normal.  Traffic  from  Fourth  Fleet  and  Mandates 
was  noticeably  less  than  usual.  Traffic  on  the  northern  circuits  also  very  light 
Some  technical  traffic  received  from  Combined  Fleet  units.  There  has  been  a 
noticeable  increase  in  the  afloat  traffic  over  the  normal  amount  usually  seen. 
Fleet  units  seem  to  have  a  great  deal  of  business  with  other  Fleet  units  both 
within  and  outside  of  their  own  organization.  Staff  Officers  are  frequently 
addressed  at  other  than  their  normal  locations.  The  activity  at  Tokyo  has  sub- 
sided somewhat  in  that  there  were  fewer  general  massages  tlian  for  the  past 
few  days.  Tokyo  Intelligence  sent  out  several  messages  addressed  to  Second 
Fleet,  Submarine  Force  and  Carrier  Divisions.  One  was  sent  to  SAMA  for 
information  to  French  Indo  China  Forces  and  South  China  Fleet.  The  Navy 
Minister  sent  out  two  AlNavs.  The  Direction  Finder  net  is  still  active  with  all 
stations  sending  in  reports  and  Tokyo  plotting  station  making  reports  to  major 
commanders. 

Combined  Fleet. — The  flagship  of  Battleship  Division  Three  appears  today  at 
Sasebo,  its  southern  jaunt  apparently  having  been  completed.  Destroyer  Squad- 
ron Four  and  Two  appear  associated  with  the  Third  Fleet.  CinC  Second  Fleet 
continues  his  activity,  being  still  associated  with  Combined  Air  Force,  French 
Indo  Chna  Force,  Third  Fleet,  and  today  with  Carrier  Division  Three.  Carrier 
Division  Three  was  in  Takao  and  returned  to  the  Empire  a  week  ago  and  has 
been  associated  with  Third  Fleet  since.    A  Bako  activity  addressed  the  Chief  of 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY 


715 


staff  Second  Fleet,  Third  Fleet  and  Combined  Air  Force.  The  Chief  of  Staff 
Second  Fleet  addressed  an  urgent  dispatch  to  CinC.  French  Indo  China  Fleet 
information  to  Third  Fleet  and  Commander  Cruiser  Division  Five. 

Third  Fleet. — Active  as  noted  above.  Several  more  units  of  this  fleet  and  of 
the  Base  Forces  originated  movement  reports  but  no  indication  of  direction. 
CinC.    Third  Fleet  is  still  in  Sasebo. 

Fourth  Fleet. — Activity  in  Mandates  still  centers  about  the  Third  Base  De- 
fense Force  at  Palao.  Traffic  between  this  force,  Tokyo  and  the  Second  Fleet 
was  considerable.  One  call  (SITI  4)  appears  at  Jaluit  today.  This  call  has 
been  identified  as  Carrier  Division  Four  and  if  the  one  message  is  correct  it 
appears  that  this  Carrier  Division  (ZUIKAKU)  is  in  the  Jaluit  area.  This  is 
not  confirmed  as  no  other  indications  have  been  found  and  its  presence  at  Jaluit 
is  doubted,  attributing  the  message  to  be  a  communication  error. 

Fifth  Fleet — Flagship  located  Yokosuka.  The  CinC.  Fifth  Fleet  appeared  in 
a  few  dispatches  from  Tokyo  but  no  other  activity  seen. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary — 20-21  Novemier  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  for  past  two  days  has  been  higher  than  normal. 
Tokyo  originators  active  with  messages  addressed  to  all  major  commanders. 
N.  G.  S.  sent  a  UNIWIWI  to  Commandant  BAKO  for  information  to  Chief  of 
Staff  South  China  Fleet  and  Canton.  The  Personnel  Bureau  at  Tokyo  became 
very  active  on  the  21st  sending  out  a  series  of  long  personnel  messages.  The 
activity  at  Tokyo  identified  as  R.D.F.  plotting  stations  increased  his  recent  high 
volume  of  messages  with  a  long  four  part  message  addressed  to  all  major  com- 
manders. He  also  addressed  several  dispatches  to  the  Direction  Finder  Net, 
indicating  the  employment  and  results  being  obtained  by  this  activity.  The 
traffic  load  on  the  Tokyo-Takao  circuit  was  very  heavy  on  the  21st,  so  heavy 
that  the  circuit  was  n  duplex  operation  most  of  the  mid-watch. 

Combined  Fleet. — Flags  of  both  First  and  Second  Fleets  are  in  Kure  area  and 
most  of  both  fleets  remain  in  the  Kure-Sasebo  area.  Battleship  Division  Three 
still  in  Yokosuka  area.  Traffic  to  and  from  the  CinC.  Second  Fleet  continues 
abnormally  high.  A  list  of  units  addressed  by  him  or  who  sent  traffic  to  him  and 
CinC.  Third  Fleet  over  the  past  two  days  follows : 

MIRA  9  (Carrier  Division  Three)  END  7  (Unidentified) 

TAB  1  (Airron  7)  AKU  8  (Air  Unit) 

KAME   5  (Airron  6)  KUSU  7  (Unidentified) 

YAWI  1  (Crudiv  5)  SATU  88  (Unidentified) 

KENU  3  (Crudiv  7)  KUNI  88  (Unidentified) 

EESE  4  (Desron  3)  OYU  9  (Unidentified) 

AKI  0  (Desron  4)  KOA  0  (Unidentified) 

TIYA  7  (Comdr.  1st  Base  For)  NOTU  6  (Unidentified) 

SASE  3  (Comdr.  2nd  Base  For)  NETE  5  (Unidentified) 

YOMO  9  (Desro  5)  NSI  3  (Unidentified) 

REA  2  (Shiogama  Air  Corps)  SUTE  1  (Unidentified) 

KUNO  9  (Erimo)  YAYU  1  (Unidentifled) 

MIMO  3  (Air  Unit)  MARE  5  (Unidentified) 

TUE  7  (Unidentified)  Plus     11  Marus 

This  list  is  not  the  complete  estimate  of  forces  being  assembled  by  him  but  only 
the  ones  occurrng  in  the  past  two  days.  Each  one  appeared  not  only  with  the 
CinC.  Second  Fleet  but  with  the  Third  Fleet  and  with  one  of  the  units  now  in 
South  China  or  a  Taiwan-South  China  Address.  A  complete  list  is  being  made 
up  but  was  not  finished  at  this  writing.  Assuming  that  the  entire  Second  Fleet 
will  be  included  in  this  organization  and  that  each  unit  addressed  will  either 
participate  or  contribute  somewhat  to  the  Task  Force  it  appears  that  it  will  com- 
prise a  good  portion  of  the  navy.  One  item  stands  out — so  far  there  has  been 
practically  no  submarine  units  mentioned  by  the  Second  or  Third  Fleets  in  con- 
nection with  South  China  activities.  Commander  Submarine  Force  has  not  been 
included  in  traffic.    He  does  appear  in  Tokyo  Fourth  Fleet  and  Mandates  traffic. 

Communications  Intelligence  Summary — 20-21   November  1941 

Mandates  and  Fourth  Fleet. — The  R.  N.  O.  Palao  and  Palao  radio  stations  have 
remained  active  with  the  Fourth  Fleet  and  Yokosuka  for  days.  This  is  taken 
to  indicate  a  coming  concentration  of  forces  in  Palao  which  would  include 
the  Fourth  Fleet  and  some  of  the  Second  Fleet  who  has  also  been  active  witli 


716       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

the  R.  N.  O.  Since  the  activity  of  the  Second  Fleet  Commander  has  been  so 
great  it  may  be  that  he  will  assign  some  non-Second  Fleet  units  to  that  area 
but  just  which  ones  is  not  yet  known.  From  information  from  radio  sources 
there  is  no  indication  of  any  concentration  now  at  Palao  beyond  the  Third  Base 
Force  which  is  based  there.  There  has  been  no  traffic  for  other  fleet  units 
i-outed  there  and  the  Maru  traffic  to  Palao  is  far  less  than  the  normal  flow  to 
that  area.  With  the  arrival  of  Siti  4  (yesterday  reported  as  either  a  carrier 
unit  or  submarine  unit  and  now  identified  as  a  submarine  squadron  of  the 
Submarine  Fleet)  the  concentration  of  naval  forces  in  the  Marshalls  is  far 
greater  than  that  existing  at  Palao. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary — 22  Novemler  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  somewhat  greater  than  normal.  Only  one  tactical 
circuit  heard  today,  indicating  that  Combined  Fleet  tactical  exercises  are  now 
completed.  The  Navy  Minister  originated  several  AlNavs  and  sent  two  other 
messages,  one  to  CinC  Fourth  Fleet  and  one  to  Yokosuka  and  Commander  Sub- 
marine Squadron  Five.  Tokyo  Intelligence  sent  out  the  usual  long  messages 
to  CinC  Combined  Fleet,  CinC  Second  Fleet  and  CinC  Third  Fleet.  BuMil 
addressed  Fourth  Fleet,  Truk,  Pagan  Civil  Engineering  Section  at  Peleliu  and 
Yokosuka.  Another  imidentified  Tokyo  originator  sent  a  priority  message  to 
all  major  flags  and  China  Fleet,  information  to  ANOS  at  Taihoku  and  Palao. 
Sasebo  addressed  one  to  Chief  of  Staff  French  Indo  China  Force,  information 
Chief  of  Stafe  Second  Fleet,  Bako,  Sama,  Chief  of  StafC  South  China,  Chief 
of  StafC  Third  Fleet,  Commander  Cruiser  Division  Seven  and  Commander  De- 
stroyer Squadron  Three.  Cruiser  Division  Seven  and  Destroyer  Squadron  Three 
to  South  China  Area  soon?  While  the  Direction  Finder  Net  is  still  active,  the 
station  at  Palao  sent  in  more  bearings  than  usual  for  that  station. 

ComMned  Fleet. — CinC.  Combined  originated  only  one  dispatch  to  two  un- 
identified calls,  one  a  Maru,  for  information  to  CinC.  Third  Fleet.  CinC  Second 
Fleet  was  again  prolific  with  many  messages  addressed  to  Third  Fleet  and 
Combined  Air  Force.  The  amount  of  traffic  interchanged  between  these  three 
commanders  was  very  great.     One  message  addressed  many  units  as  follows : 

CinC.  Second  Fleet.  To:  NETES  (Crudiv?),  K002  (SubronS)  TIYU  66 
(CinC.  Third  Fleet),  SUYO  44  (CinC.  Comb.  Air  Force)  MIRA  9  (CarDivS), 
RESB  4  (Desron  3),  KORE  4  (Second  Fleet)  (Collection),  less  Crudiv  8  and 
unidentified  2nd  Fleet  unit),  SUTI  2  (BatDiv  3)  (at  Kure  and  Sasebo),  Airron 
7  (at  Kure),  SUTI  1  (?)  (atKure),  SATU  8  (?)  (atKm*e)  META  0/  (AKASHI) 
(at  KURE)  META  2  (ASHI  MARU),  TUFU  2  (?)  NARI  33  (CinC.  China 
Fleet),  KAKE  66  (CinC.  South  China  Fleet),  MISI  66  (CinC.  Comb.  Fleet). 

Third  Fleet. — CinC.  Third  Fleet  received  a  dispatch  from  "RIKUGUN 
SANBOUTEU  ISIABDATI  SEUZEU  (at  Tainoku).  This  is  translated  as  "Army 
Chief  of  Staff  General  MAEDATI"  and  indicates  the  linking  of  the  Taiwan 
Army  Forces  with  Third  Fleet,  The  CinO  Third  Fleet  continues  his  association 
with  Combined  Air  Forces. 

Fourth  Fleet. — CinC  Fourth  Fleet  was  mostly  occupied  with  the  Sixth  Base 
Force  at  Jaluit  and  AirRon  24  now  in  Jaluit  area.  Third  Base  Force  at  Palao 
and  the  RNO  Palao  are  still  addressing  the  CinC  Fourth  and  Yokosuka.  He 
also  received  one  from  Commander  Submarine  Force. 

China. — The  Commander  French  Indo  China  Force  sent  one  message  to  CinC. 
Combined  Fleet  for  information  to  CinC.  Second  Fleet.  Bako  sent  one  to 
Secretary  Fourth  Fleet  and  Secretary  Submarine  Fleet,  Secretary  Carrier 
Divisions,  Secretary  Fifth  Fleet,  Sama  and  French  Indo  China  Fleet. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary — 23  November  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal.  High  precedence  traffic  has  increased. 
Some  of  the  high  precedence  dispatch  headings  are  listed : 

1.  MAYURU    (Tokyo  Address)    to  HORONO  MUSEKU   (Collective   Shore 

Precedence  Information    Chiefs    of    Staff    Com- 

NIKA-WIWI  bined,    1st,   2nd,   3rd,   4th,   5th,   and 

Southern  Expeditionary  Force. 

2.  Third  Fleet  Chief  of  StafC  to  Second  Fleet  Chief  of  Staff  Information 

VIKA  Combined     and     Southern     Expeditionary 

Force  Chief  of  Staff. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  717 

3.  KESANA  EONO  (Tokyo)  to  Chiefs  of  Staff  Third  Fleet  and  Southern 

WIWI  Expeditionary  Force.     Information  "SAN- 

KUYUTI"  at  Sama  Hainan. 

4.  SUTE  1    (Unidentified  Fleet  unit)    to  Eadio  Takao,  Hainan,  Flagship 

NIKA  NWA  2,  information  Tadio  Tokyo 

and  Second  Fleet  flagship. 
6.  Imakuni    Air    to    Iwakuni    Air    Detachment    at    NAHA    information 
KIU  Kure,    Bako,    and 

MINO  3  in  Takao. 

Personnel  Tokyo  also  originated  several  priority  dispatches  to  First  Fleet, 
Third  Fleet,  and  others.  The  following  WE  address  was  followed  by  Sasebo 
Radio  in  the  delivery  of  a  personnel  Bureau  dispatch  "SAHOTI.  RENGO.  RI. 
SI." 

An  unidentified  fleet  unit  (SUITE  1)  listed  recently  in  KURE  appeared  on 
radio  circuit  with  Takao  Radio.    Also  on  this  circuit  were  the  following: 

KENU  3— CruDiv  7  Flagship? 

HOWI  2— Fleet  unit  associated  with  Second  Fleet. 
EKE  8 — Fleet  unit  associated  with  Second  Fleet. 
MUSE  4 — ^Naval  Auxiliary  associated  with  Second  Fleet. 

The  above  units  received  delivery  of  the  long  NIKA  dispatch  originated  by 
CinC  Second  Fleet  on  the  21st  of  November  and  which  appeared  to  outline  the 
forces  expected  to  operate  in  the  Indo-China  general  area. 

Combined  Fleet. — CinC  Combined  was  included,  as  always,  in  all  exchange 
of  fleet  commander  trafiic,  but  not  important  messages  originated  by  him  were 
intercepted.  First  Fleet  was  very  quiet.  Second  Fleet  messages  mentioned 
in  summaries  of  22nd  were  still  being  circulated,  but  Third  Fleet  appeared  as 
the  most  active  unit  in  today's  traffic.  Indications  are  that  Third  Fleet  units 
are  underway  in  a  movement  coordinated  with  the  Second  Fleet,  Combined  Air 
Force  and  French  Indo  China  Force.  Commander  French  Indo  China  Force 
(So.  Exp.  Fr)  was  included  in  all  important  traffic  from  Second,  Third  and 
Combined  Air  Commanders,  Hainan  addresses  were  included  in  nearly  all  high 
precedence  messages  concerning  these  forces  and  may  indicate  a  rendezvous 
of  forces  in  that  area.  Palao  appeai'ed  as  an  information  addressee  on  a  por- 
tion of  the  traffic.  Fourth  Fleet  activity  involved  Palao  area  on  one  end  and 
Marshalls  on  the  other.  With  no  means  of  substantiating  the  impression,  it 
is  believed  that  more  submarines  are  operating  in,  or  from,  the  Marshalls  than 
it  has  been  possible  to  definitely  place  from  radio  interceptions.  It  is  recalled 
that  there  was  an  exchange  between  Staff  Communication  Officers  of  the 
Submarine  Force  and  Fourth  Fleet  with  Jaluit  included  as  either  action  or 
information  around  November  1st  and  that  Jaluit  opened  a  direct  circuit,  to 
Yokosuka  early  this  month,  apparently  to  relieve  traffic  congestion  from  that 
area.  Jaluit  Radio  has  been  heard  on  various  frequencies  using  and  working 
with  units  using  tactical  or  secret  type  calls,  while  the  main  submarine  fre- 
quency of  6385/12770  has  been  relatively  inactive. 

AIR. — Combined  Air  Traffic  remains  associated  with  Taiwan  area,  while  the 
Mandate  Air  units  continue  high  level  of  activity,  covering  the  whole  Mandate 
area.  Carrier  Divisions  were  relatively  quiet,  but  with  Carrier  Division  Three 
definitely  associated  with  Second  Fleet  operations. 

CHINA. — CinC.  China  and  South  China  not  included  with  the  Second,  Third 
Air  Force  and  Southern  Expeditionary  Force  traffic  were  quiet.  Bearings  from 
Cavite  and  Guam  place  CinC.  South  China  east  of  Taiwan,  but  this  is  believed 
questionable. 

Nothing  was  seen  to  contradict  impressions  gathered  during  the  past  few 
days  and  summarized  previously,  that  movement  of  forces  is  either  imminent 
or  actually  underway,  at  least  in  part,  to  the  southward  with  covering  forces 
operating  from  the  Mandates,  and  possibility  of  a  striking  force  assembled 
or  gathering  in  the  Palao  area. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary — 24  November  1941 

GENERAL. — Traffic  volume  normal.  High  precedence  traffic  above  normal 
Traffic  analysis  impressions  are  unchanged  from  yesterday's  report.  The  diffi- 
culties of  identifications  have  prevented  more  definite  information  of  vessels  (and 
fleets  to  which  attached)  that  appear  to  be  moving  south  from  Kure-Sasebo  area. 
If  the  poor  reception  prevailing  here  the  last  two  days  can  be  disregarded  and 


718       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

the  assumption  made  that  Radio  Heeia  intercepted  their  "Share"  of  the  total 
traffic,  the  following  impresisons  are  worth  something : 

(a)  The  falling  off  of  traffic  to  China  addresses. 

(b)  The  increased  activity  among  third  fleet  addressees  with  a  high 
percentage  of  what  appears  to  be  movement  reports. 

(c)  The  above  normal  activity  in  the  Mandates  both  ashore  and  afloat 
addresses. 

The  association  of  Second  Fleet,  Third  Fleet  and  Southern  Expeditionary 
Force  continues  as  usual.  Palao  and  Jaluit  appear  prominently  in  despatch 
traffic,  the  Second  Fleet  Commander  with  the  former,  and  the  Submarine  Force 
Commander  with  the  latter. 

First  and  Second  Fleets. — "Very  little  activity  in  First  Fleet.  The  radio  call 
believed  to  represent  the  flagship  of  Cruiser  Division  Seven  originated  a  dispatch 
to  Comamnder  Cruiser  Division  Seven,  CinC.  Second  Fleet,  Commander  Southern 
Expeditionary  Force,  and  Radio  Sama,  Takao,  Sasebo,  and  Tokyo.  The  CinC. 
Second  Fleet  continues  to  appear  as  the  Task  Force  Commander  of  a  large  number 
of  units  fi'om  First  and  Second  Fleet  plus  Carrier  Division  Three  and  Combined 
Air  Force  units. 

Third  Fleet. — Large  number  of  dispatches  involving  Third  Fleet  units,  some 
of  which  apepar  to  be  movement  reports.  The  fact  that  CinC  Third  Fleet  appears 
as  information  addressee  on  many  dispatches  to  and  from  Second  Fleet  units 
indicates  that  these  two  fleets  will  be  closely  associated  in  any  future  operations. 
Yesterday,  a  large  number  of  dispatches  asosciating  Carrier  Division  Three  with 
CinC.  Third  Fleet. 

Fourth  Fleet  and  Mandates. — Fourth  Fleet  appears  to  be  concentrated  in  Truk 
area  since  all  of  the  recent  definite  reports  from  Fourth  Fleet  vessels  have  come 
from  Truff.  Aid  Squadron  Twenty-Four  and  perhaps  a  large  number  of  sub- 
marines from  the  Submarine  Force  are  in  the  Marshall  Area. 

Submarines — Comparatively  little  activity. 

Comparatively  quiet. 

Carriers — No  definite  indications  of  location. 

Combined  Air  Force — Commander  Kanoya  Air  appears  in  the  Takao  area. 
Otherwise  no  change. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary — 25  November  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal.  Receiving  conditions  much  unproved  over 
last  two  days.  Tokyo  personnel  bureau  active  with  messages  to  various  units. 
Tokyo  originated  one  UNI  WIWI  to  CinC.  Combined  Fleet,  CinC.  Second  Fleet, 
CinC.  Third  Fleet,  CinC.  Fourth  Fleet,  and  CinC,  French,  Indo  China  Force 
plus  Yokosuka,  Kure  and  Maizuru.  The  Navy  Minister  originated  several 
AlNavs.  A  Direction  Finder  Net,  controlled  by  Tokyo  radio  was  active  with  secret 
calls  being  sent  by  the  five  stations.  The  entire  fleet  traffic  level  is  still  high 
which  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  organizational  arrangements  or  other  prepara- 
tions are  not  yet  complete. 

Combined  Fleet. — Little  activity  by  CinO.  First  Fleet.  CinC.  Second  Fleet  re- 
mains highly  active  as  an  origination,  addressing  Third  Fleet,  Air  Force  and 
South  China  units.  A  second  Fleet  unit  and  a  submarine  division  or  squadron 
arrived  in  Takao  communication  zone  today.  Crudivision  Seven  which  previously 
arrived  there  has  been  associated  with  Destroyer  Squadron  Three  which  indicated 
the  presence  of  that  unit  in  Takao  vicinity.  Palao  and  Second  Fleet  still  ex- 
changing messages.  Two  new  units  to  be  associated  with  CinC  Second  Fleet  and 
the  Task  Force  now  forming  are  the  North  China  Fleet  and  Defense  Division  One. 

Air. — Through  the  identification  of  a  call  made  today  Genzan  Air  Corps  has 
been  in  Saigon  since  the  eighteenth.  We  believe  that  other  units  of  the  Com- 
bined Air  Force  have  moved  from  Taiwan  to  the  French  Indo  China  Area  al- 
though this  is  not  yet  verified.  One  or  more  of  the  Carrier  Divisions  are  present 
in  the  Mandates. 

Fourth  Fleet — CinC.  Fourth  Fleet  is  still  holding  extensive  communications 
with  the  Commander  Submarine  Fleet,  the  forces  at  Jaluit  and  Commander 
Carriers.  His  other  communications  are  with  the  Third,  Fourth  and  Fifth 
Base  Forces. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  26  November  19^1 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal.  All  circuits  heard  well  except  for  Tokyo- 
Takao  circuit  which  faded  early.    Traffic  jjicture  about  the  same  as  for  the  past 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  719 

week.  Intra-Fleet  traffic  still  very  heavy  and  Tokyo  Bureaus  still  dispatching 
AlNavs.  The  Tokyo  Intelligence  and  Direction  Finder  plotting  units  addressed 
a  succession  of  urgent  dispatches  to  the  major  commands  and  to  the  CinC.  Sec- 
ond and  Third  Fleets  in  particular.  The  only  MAM  schedule  was  NR  15  which 
was  first  broadcast  on  the  twenty-fifth.  Takao  and  Bako  originated  more  traffic 
today  than  usual,  it  was  addressed  to  Third  Fleet  mostly  but  the  Cine.  Second 
Fleet  and  the  China  Fleets  came  in  for  their  share.  Tokyo  radio  is  working 
the  ISUZU  (flagship  South  China)  SAMA  and  CAMRANH  Bay  radio  stations 
directly.    Takao  is  also  working  ITSUBA  (Spratleys). 

ComJjined  Fleet. — Cruiser  Division  Seven  today  began  receiving  traffic  via 
SAMA,  indicating  the  arrival  of  that  unit  in  HAINAN  waters.  While  no  indi- 
cations were  seen  that  Destroyer  Squadron  Three  also  arrived  it  is  probable 
that  this  unit  is  still  In  company  with  Cruiser  Division  Seven  and  is  also  present 
at  Hainan.  The  Takao,  former  flagship  of  the  Second  Fleet  became  active  in 
the  traffic  today  being  associated  with  the  Second  and  Third  Fleets,  The  tanker 
HAYATONO  appeared  In  several  of  CinC  second  Fleet's  dispatches  today  as 
well  as  the  SOYO  MARU.  No  movement  is  evident  yet  of  any  of  the  flags  of 
the  newly  formed  force.  The  traffic  between  Second,  Third,  Fourth  Fleets  and 
the  Combined  Air  Force  still  continues  at  it's  high  level. 

Fourth  Fleet. — No  change  in  Truk  location.  CinC.  held  extensive  communica- 
tion with  Hainan  forces  as  well  as  Palao  forces.  The  KATORI  and  Cine.  Sub- 
marine Fleet  appear  to  be  at  or  near  Chichijima. 

Fifth  Fleet. — The  CinC.  Fifth  Fleet  was  included  in  some  of  the  dispatches  of 
the  Second  Fleet  and  is  associated  with  the  new  Task  Force. 

Submarines. — As  noted  above,  Commander  Submarine  Force  is  in  Chichijima 
area.  The  Submarine  Squadron  NETE5's  location  is  somewhat  uncertain  today 
due  to  one  dispatch  being  routed  to  MAIZURU.  The  routing  of  this  dispatch 
being  doubted  because  of  the  indication  of  theer  arrival  at  Takao  yesterday  and 
her  previous  association  with  Cruiser  Division  Seven. 

China. — Two  Marus  of  the  Third  Fleet  left  Bako  for  Sama  today. 

Third  Fleet. — ^Active  as  above  but  no  indication  of  large  scale  movement  from 
the  Sasebo  area. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  27  November  1941 

General. — ^Traffic  volume  a  little  below  normal  due  to  poor  signals  on  the  fre- 
quencies above  7000  kcs.  Tokyo-Tako  circuit  unreadable  on  midwatch.  Some 
tactical  traffic  intercepted  from  carriers.  Bako,  Sana,  and  Saigon  active  as  orig- 
inators, addressing  traffic  to  each  other  and  to  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  of  Second, 
Third  Fleets  and  Combined  Air  Force.  Bako  addressed  the  Chief  of  Staff  Third 
Fleet  information  Destroyer  Squadrons  Four  and  Five  and  Chief  of  Staff  Second 
Fleet.  The  main  Tokyo  originator  today  was  the  Intelligence  activity  who 
send  five  dispatches  to  the  major  commanders.  The  Direction  Finder  activity 
was  very  high  with  all  stations  sending  in  bearings  including  the  Marshall 
Islands  Stations  which  has  been  silent  for  the  past  four  days. 

Combined  Fleet. — No  further  information  as  to  whether  or  not  Destroyer 
Squadron  Three  is  in  Hainan  area  but  is  believed  to  still  be  with  Cruiser  Division 
Seven  in  that  area.  There  is  still  no  evidence  of  any  further  movement  from  the 
Kure-Sasebo  area.  The  Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet  originated  several  mes- 
sages of  general  address.  He  has  been  fairly  inactive  as  an  originator  lately. 
Cine.  Second  Fleet  originated  many  messages  to  Third  Fleet,  Combined  Air 
Force,  and  Bako. 

Third  Fleet. — Still  holding  extensive  communication  with  Bako,  Sama,  South 
China  Fleet  and  French  Indo  China  Force.  The  use  of  WE  addresses  is  increas- 
ing, those  occurring  today  were : 

"DAIHATIFUTABUTAISANBOTEU"  (in  Taihoku) 
"KOROKUKITISIKI" 

"KIZUKEYAMASITABUTAI"  (in  cate  of  RYU  JO) 
"URIZEUBAIGUNDAIGONREUSEU" 

There  is  nothing  to  indicate  any  movement  of  the  Third  Fleet  as  yet. 

Fourth  Fleet.— CinC.  Fourth  Fleet  frequently  addressed  dispatches  to  the  de- 
fense forces  in  the  Mandates.  Jaluit  addressed  messages  to  the  Commander 
Submarine  Force  and  several  submarine  units.  The  Saipan  Air  Corps  held  com- 
munication with  Jaluit  and  Cine  Fourth  Fleet.  The  Civil  Engineering  Units  at 
IMIEJI  and  ENIWETOK  were  heard  from  after  being  silent  for  weeks.  Chitose 
Air  Corps  is  in  Saipan  and  Air  Squadron  Twenty-four  is  still  operating  in  the 


720       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Marshalls.  No  further  information  on  the  presence  of  Carrier  Division  Five  in 
the  Mandates, 

Air. — An  air  unit  in  the  Takao  area  addressed  a  dispatch  to  the  KORYTJ  and 
SEOKAKU.  Carriers  ate  still  located  in  home  waters.  No  information  of  fur- 
ther movement  of  any  combined  air  force  units  to  Hainan. 

/8fw&«iannes.— Commander  Submarine  Force  still  in  Chichijima  Area. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary  28  November  19Jfl 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal.  Communications  to  and  from  South  China 
and  between  Mandates  and  Empire  very  heavy.  No  tactical  traffic  seen.  As  has 
been  previously  reported  the  suspected  Radio  Intelligence  net  is  very  active  and 
is  becoming  more  so.  The  TOKYO  plotting  activity  addressed  more  messages  to 
the  Radio  net  than  previously  and  most  of  these  sent  for  information  to  the 
Major  Commanders.  Much  traffic  also  was  directed  to  WRE0  (The  Tokyo 
D.  F  Command)  from  all  eight  stations  in  the  Mandates  and  OMINATO.  This 
Command  also  originated  messages  of  high  precedence  to  the  Major  Fleet  Com- 
manders. This  activity  is  interpreted  to  indicate  that  the  R.  I.  net  is  operating 
at  full  strength  upon  U.  S.  Naval  Communications  and  18  GETTING  RESULTS. 

TOKYO  originators  were  active  with  messages  of  high  precedence  to  the  Com- 
mander in  Chief's  of  the  Second  and  Third  Fleets  and  Combined  Air  Force.  The 
Navy  Minister  sent  two  Alnavs.  The  Chief  of  the  Naval  General  StafE  sent  one 
to  the  Chief  of  Staffs  of  Combined  Air  Force,  Combined  Fleet,  Fourth  Fleet,  Third 
Fleet,  French  Indo-China  Force,  Second  fleet  and  RNO  PALAO.  The  BUAERO 
sent  one  to  Chief  of  Staff  Fourth  Fleet  info  IMIESI  and  11th  Air  Corps  at 
SAIPAN. 

ComMned  Fleet. — No  indication  of  movement  of  any  Combined  Fleet  units. 
Commander  in  Chief  Second  Fleet  originated  his  usual  number  of  despatches  to 
Third  Fleet  and  Combined  Air  Force.  The  units  paid  particular  attention  to  by 
the  Commander  in  Chief  Second  Fleet  were  CARDIVS  Five  and  Seven  and 
DESRONS  two  and  Four  and  SUBRON  Five.  No  traffic  today  from  the  TAKAO, 
(CA). 

Third  Fleet. — Little  activity  from  Third  Fleet  units  save  for  the  Commander 
in  Chief.  The  impression  is  growing  that  the  First  Base  Force  is  not  present 
with  the  bulk  of  the  Third  Fleet  in  SASEBO  but  it  is  not  yet  located  elsewhere. 
The  Army  Commander  in  TAIHOKU  is  still  holding  communications  with  the 
Commander  in  Chief  Third  Fleet.  Two  Third  Fleet  units  arrived  at  BAKO  and 
are  apparently  returning  to  KURE  from  BAKO. 

Fourth  Fleet.— BnYk  of  Fourth  Fleet  still  at  TRUK.  The  Commander  in  Chief 
Fourth  Fleet  addressed  message  to  the  Sixth  Base  Force  at  JALUIT  and  the 
Fourth  Base  Force  at  TRUK.  Yokohama  Air  Corps  is  at  TUOTO  and  WOTJE 
and  held  communications  with  AIRRON  Twenty-foui-  and  KAMOI. 

South  China. — SAMA  sent  several  messages  to  shore  addresses  in  the  Empire. 
SAMA  also  addressed  the  OMURA  AIR  CORPS  in  several  messages  which  went 
for  information  to  SAIGON  and  TOKYO.  TAKAO  radio  station  addressed  the 
Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet,  Second  Fleet,  and  the  French  Indo-China  and  Com- 
bined air  force.  TAKAO  Air  Corps  addressed  SUKUGAWA  Air  Corps  and 
YOKOSUKA  Air  Corps.  A  representative  of  a  HAINAN  office  now  at  SAIGON 
originated  several  messages  to  the  Naval  Bases  at  SASEBRO  and  KURE.  The 
Commander  in  Chief  Second  and  Commander  in  Chief  Third  Fleets. 

Submarines. — Except  for  the  mention  of  Subrons  Five  and  Six  in  two  dis- 
patches there  was  no  submarine  activity  today. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary  29  November  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  above  normal.  The  traffic  to  South  China  still  very 
high.  Automatic  transmissions  was  attempted  on  the  Tokyo-Takao  circuit  but 
was  a  failure  and  traffic  sent  by  hand.  A  good  share  of  today's  traffic  is  made 
up  of  messages  of  an  intelligence  nature.  Tokyo  Intelligence  sent  eleven  mes- 
sages during  the  day  to  Major  Commander  both  ashore  and  afloat,  while  the  radio 
intelligence  activity  at  Tokyo  sent  four  long  messages  to  the  Major  Commanders. 
In  addition  to  the  stations  normally  reporting  to  Tokyo,  radio  Yokosuka  sent  in 
reports.  This  station  had  not  previously  been  seen  to  submit  reports.  The 
Direction  Finder  Net  controlled  directly  by  T'okyo  was  up  during  the  night  with 
much  activity.  One  message  from  Jaluit  Radio  Direction  Finder  Station  in- 
cluded Commander  Submarines  for  information.  The  Navy  Minister  originated 
his  usual  two  AJNavs  and  the  Naval  General  Staff  addressed  Commanders  Sec- 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  721 

ond  Fleet,  Third  Fleet,  Combined  Air  Force  and  the  South  China  Units.  The 
unit  which  has  been  addressed  as  the  "103rd  Air  Group"  originated  one  dispatch 
today  whose  address  was  composed  entirely  of  enciphered  calls.  It  is  apparent 
that  he  has  no  Navy  call  list.  On  address  was  "juitikoukuukantai"  11th  AIR 
FLEET".  Since  this  has  appeared  before  it  is  evident  that  the  use  of  KANTAI 
is  intentional  making  the  existence  of  an  air  fleet  positive.  Its  composition  is 
unknown. 

Comhmed  Fleet. — The  arrival  of  Air-Squadron  Seven  in  Takao  area  is  con- 
firmed. The  presence  of  Cruiser  Division  Four  in  that  area  is  not  confimed  nor 
denied.  The  dispatches  today  indicate  that  the  following  units  are  under  the 
immediate  command  of  Cin  C.  Second  Fleet : 

CARDIV  THREE 

SUBRON  FIVE 

SUBRON  SIX 

CRUDIV  FIVE 

CRUDIV  SEVEN 

DESRON  TWO 

DESRON  FOUR 

THIRD  FLEET 

FRENCH  INDO  CHINA  FORCE 
Associated  with  Third  Fleet  are  two  Battleships'  but  their  assignment  is  not  yet 
definite.  Aside  from  messages  which  were  addressed  to  Third  Fleet,  China  and 
South  China  Fleets,  Combined  Air  Force  and  the  Naval  General  Staff ;  Commander 
in  Chief  Second  Fleet  was  mainly  occupied  with  the  units  listed  above.  Only  one 
message  from  Commander  in  Chief  Combined  Fleet  was  seen.  This  was  ad- 
dressed to  YOKOSUKA,  Combined  Air  Force,  CRUDIV  Four  and  BUMILAFF. 
The  HIYEI  sent  one  message  to  Chief  of  Staff  Third  Fleet. 

Third  Fleet. — Commander  in  Chief  Third  Fleet  sent  one  message  to  Comdesron 
Five,  Number  Two  Base  Force,  Number  One  Base  Force,  Defense  Division  One 
and  Comdesron  Two  and  Four.  He  held  extensive  communications  with  the 
Commander  in  Chief  Second  Fleet  and  BAKO.  Two  more  units  of  Third  Fleet 
made  movement  reports. 

Fourth  Fleet. — Relatively  inactive  today.  Sent  one  message  to  Commander  in 
Chief  Second  Fleet,  Commander  in  Chief  Third  Fleet  and  Combined  Air  Force. 
He  is  still  in  TRUK  area. 

Submarines. — Traffic  for  Commander  Submarine  Force  was  routed  through 
SAIPAN  today.     He  was  at  CHICHIJIMA  yesterday. 

South  China. — CRUDIV  Seven  now  in  SAMA  made  a  movement  report  but 
direction  was  not  indicated.  The  French  Indo  China  Force  Commander  ad- 
dressed several  messages  to  Second  and  Third  Fleets  as  well  as  TOKYO.  The 
Commander  in  Chief  China  Fleet  was  active  in  addressing  the  South  China  Naval 
Bases  and  the  South  China  Fleets,  all  for  information  to  Commander  in  Chief 
Second  Fleet. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  SO  November  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  less  than  for  past  few  days.  Today's  traffic  consisted 
largely  of  despatches  bearing  old  dates,  some  as  far  back  as  26  November.  No 
reason  can  be  given  for  the  retransmission  of  these  messages  unless  the  high  vol- 
ume of  traffic  for  past  few  days  has  prevented  the  repetition  of  despatches.  The 
number  of  despatches  originated  on  the  30th  is  very  small.  The  only  tactical  cir- 
cuit heard  today  was  one  with  AKAGI  and  several  MARU'S.  The  TOKYO 
Intelligence  activity  originated  two  WIWI  despatches  to  Major  Fleet  Com- 
manders. One  urgent  despatch  was  sent  by  NGS  to  Chief  of  Staff,  Combined, 
Second,  Third,  Fourth  and  Fifth  Feets,  Combined  Air  Force;  Submarine  Force 
and  China  Fleets. 

Combined  Fleet. — The  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Combined  Fleet  and  First  Fleet  are 
in  KURE,  In  the  Same  message  the  Chief  of  Staff  Second  Fleet  was  not  at  any 
location.  Other  traffic  indications  are  that  he  is  at  sea.  Commander  in  Chief 
Second  Fleet  sent  one  to  his  usual  addressees  of  the  Third  Fleet  and  Combined 
Air  Foi'ce,  but  also  included  KONGO  and  HIYEI,  which  places  them  as  members 
of  his  Task  Force.  The  Commander  in  Chief  Second  Fleet  is  no  longer  adding 
PALAO  activities  and  has  not  for  past  two  days.  The  RNO  PALAO  today  ad- 
dressed two  messages  to  TAIWAN  GUNSIREIBU  (Taiwan  Army  Headquarters). 

Third  Fleet. — Commander  in  Chief  Third  Fleet  addressed  two  messages  to 
COMDESRON  two,  Four  and  Five,  COMCRUDIV  five;  First  and  Second  Base 
Forces  and  Defense  Division  One  for  information  to  Commander  in  Chief  Second 


722       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Fleet.  No  information  obtained  as  to  the  location  of  the  Commander  in  Chief 
Third  Fleet,  which  gives  the  strong  impression  that  he  is  underway. 

Fourth  Fleet. — Believed  to  be  still  in  TRUK  area.  D.  F.  activity  in  Marshalls 
a  little  greater  day  than  normal.  JALUIT  addressed  Commander  Submarine 
Force  and  A  IRRON  24  in  one  despatch.  The  continued  association  of  JALUIT 
and  Commander  Submarine  Force  plus  his  known  progress  from  the  Empire  to 
CHICHIJIMA  to  SAIPAN  makes  his  destination  obviously  the  Marshalls.  Since 
one  of  his  large  units  (SITI4)  arrived  in  the  Marshalls  some  time  ago  this  unit 
cannot  agree  with  Com  16  that  there  is  not  a  submarine  concentration  in  that 
area.  Every  evidence  points  to  a  concentration  of  not  only  the  small  Fourth 
Fleet  submarines  there  but  also  a  good  portion  of  the  Fleet  Submarines  of  the 
Submarine  Force.  AIRRON  24  plus  YOKOHAMA  AIR  CORPS  presence  in  that 
area  points  to  intended  air-submarine  operations  from  the  Marshalls.  Also  the 
presence  of  a  unit  of  plane  guard  destroyers  indicates  the  presence  of  at  least 
one  carrier  in  the  Mandates  although  this  has  not  been  confirmed. 

BAKO  Active  with  despatches  to  Second  and  Third  Fleets,  Combined  Air  Force 
and  SAMA.  Commander  in  Chief  China  Fleet  becoming  more  and  more  active 
as  an  originator  with  despatches  to  the  Task  Force.  He  made  a  movement  report 
with  the  South  China  Fleet  as  an  information  addressee.  The  StafCommunica- 
tion  Officer  of  the  South  China  Fleet  was  addressed  at  Shanghai  today. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  1  December  I941 

Oeneral. — All  service  radio  calls  of  forces  afloat  changed  promptly  at  0000,  1 
December.  Previously,  service  calls  changed  after  a  period  of  six  'months  or 
more.  Calls  were  last  changed  on  1  November  WJ^l.  The  fact  that  service  calls 
lasted  only  one  month  indicate  an  additional  progressive  step  in  preparing  for 
active  operations  on  a  large  scale.  For  a  period  of  two  to  three  days  prior  to 
the  change  of  calls,  the  bulk  of  the  radio  traffic  consisted  of  dispatches  from  one 
to  four  or  five  days  old.  It  appears  that  the  Japanese  Navy  is  adopting  more 
and  more  security  provisions.  A  study  of  traffic  to  deliver  all  dispatches  using 
old  calls  so  that  promptly  with  the  change  of  calls,  there  would  be  a  minimum 
of  undelivered  dispatches  and  consequent  confusion  and  compromises.  Either 
that  or  the  large  number  of  old  messages  may  have  been  used  to  pay  the  total  vol- 
ume and  make  it  apepar  as  if  nothing  unusual  was  pending. 

First  fleet. — Nothing  to  indicate  that  this  fleet  as  a  fleet  is  operating  outside 
of  Empire  waters.  It  is  believed  that  such  a  large  percentage  of  the  First 
Fleet  is  operating  with  the  Second  Fleet  Task  Force  that  this  fleet  has  ceased 
to  operate  in  a  prominent  role. 

Second  Fleet. — This  fleet  is  believed  proceeding  from  the  Kure-Sasebo  area 
in  the  direction  of  South  China  and  Indo-China.  Takao  does  not  appear  to 
play  an  important  role  in  today's  traffic;  consequently,  the  assumption  is  made 
that  this  fleet  is  passing  up  Takao.  Certain  units  of  the  Second  Fleet  Task 
Force  are  definitely  in  the  Indo-China  area  (Cruiser  Division  Seven  and  De- 
stroyer Squadron  Three  most  prominent). 

Third  Fleet. — Nothing  to  report  except  that  the  same  association  of  Second, 
Third  Fleets  and  Combined  Air  Force  with  South  China  and  Indo-China  Forces 
continues. 

Fourth  fleet. — No  change  in  the  Fourth  Fleet  or  Mandates  area. 

Fifth  Fleet. — Nothing  to  report. 

Submarines. — Large  number  of  the  Submarine  Force  believed  to  be  in  the 
area  to  the  eastward  of  Yokosuka-Chichijima  and  Saipan  Flagship  somewhere  in 
this  general  area. 

Carriers. — No  change. 

Combined  Air  Force. — No  change ; 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  2  December  19^1 

Oeneral. — The  most  promenent  factor  in  today's  traffic  is  the  apparent  con- 
fusion in  the  routing  of  traffic  for  certain  major  parts  of  the  Japanese  Fleet. 
There  were  instances  where  the  same  dispatch  was  repeated  several  times  after 
it  appeared  on  the  Tokyo  broadcast  and  also  where  Takao  Radio  received  the 
same  dispatch  that  it  has  previously  sent.  ComSixteen  reported  Second  and 
Third  Fleets  in  Takao  area  and  that  Takao  Radio  was  broadcasting  traffic  to 
these  fleets.  This  broadcast  was  not  uncovered  here  and  contrary  to  location 
report,  there  was  one  indication  that  these  two  fleets  were  not  close  to  Takao, 
In  several  instances  Takao  Radio  forwarded  traffic  to  Tokyo  for  these  fleets. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  723 

Summing  up  0II  reports  and  indications,  it  is  believed  that  the  large  fleet  made 
up  of  Second,  Third  and  First  Fleet  units  has  left  Empire  waters  hut  is  either 
not  close  enough  to  Takao  for  good  communication  or  is  proceeding  on  a  course 
not  close  to  Takao.  Tlie  change  of  calls  on  December  1st  has  prevented  this 
office  from  making  definite  statements  at  this  date  of  the  units  now  in  the  South- 
ern area.  To  further  complicate  the  situation,  Shanghai  Radio  handled  a 
considerable  amount  of  traffic  which  obviously  was  originated  by  and  destined 
for  units  in  the  Takao  area.  The  Chief  of  Staff,  South  China  area  continues 
to  appear  in  Shanghai.  Comsixteen  reported  nine  submarines  proceeding  south 
by  Camranh  Bay.  This  group  is  believed  to  comprise  both  Submarine  Squadrons 
five  and  six,  which  units  normally  operate  with  the  First  Fleet  but  have  been 
Included  repeatedly  in  the  Second  Fleet  Task  Force  for  Southern  operations. 

There  vxis  a  very  high  percentage  of  high  precedence  traffic  originated  both 
by  major  forces  afloat  and  Tokyo.  Hainan  continues  a  a  prominent  address. 
Palao  and  Third  Base  Force  is  holding  the  same  relative  importance. 

First  Fleet. — Dispite  the  lack  of  positive  identifications,  the  First  Fleet  ap- 
pears relatively  quiet.  From  inconclusive  evidence  it  a*ppcars  as  if  there  may  be 
been  a  split  in  the  original  or  normal  Combined  Fleet  Staff  that  these  may 
be  two  supreme  commanders  toith  staffs.  As  an  example,  traffic  routing  indicates 
one  Combined  Fleet  Call  associated  with  Second  and  Third  Fleets  and  ap- 
parently in  company  while  another  Combined  Fleet  calls  appears  not  associated 
with  the  second  and  Third  Fleets. 

Second  Fleet. — No  units  have  stood  out  prominently  the  last  two  or  three  days. 
This  is  partly  due  to  lack  of  nevj  identifications  but  contributes  somewhcpt  to  the 
belief  that  a  large  part  of  the  Second  Fleet  is  underway  in  company.  Cruiser 
Division  Seven  and  Destroyer  Squadron  Three  are  unlocated  and  unobserved 
since  change  of  calls. 

Third  Fleet. — Nothing  to  report.  Shanghai  appeared  in  an  indirect  way  in 
some  of  the  Third  Fleet  traffic. 

Mandates. — Association  of  Submarine  Force  and  Fourth  Fleet  continues.  Some 
traffic  for  Fourth  Fleet  units  still  going  through  Truk. 

Carriers. — Almost  a  complete  blank  of  information  on  the  Carriers  today. 
Lack  of  identifications  has  some'wha<t  promoted  this  lack  of  i7iformation.  Hoto- 
ever,  since  over  two  hundred  service  calls  have  been  partially  identified  since 
the  change  on  the  first  of  December,  and  not  otie  carrier  call  is  at  a  low  ebb. 

Combined  Air  Force. — This  force  continues  to  be  associated  closely  with  Sec- 
ond, Third  and  Indo-China  Fleets.  Some  units  of  the  Combined  Air  Force  have 
undoubtedly  left  the  Takao  area. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  3  December  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal  with  receiving  conditions  good.  Present 
state  of  call  recovery  does  not  permit  much  detailed  information  to  be  obtained. 
The  extensive  use  of  alternate  calls  by  the  Major  Commands  slows  up  identifica- 
tion of  even  these  Units.  Very  few  units  have  been  positively  identified  so  far. 
The  Chief  of  the  Naval  General  Staff  originated  three  long  despatches  to  the 
CINC  COMBINED,  SECOND  and  THIRD  FLEETS.  The  Tokyo  Intelligence 
originated  nine  despatches  to  the  same  address. 

The  presence  of  the  CINC  SECOND  FLEET  in  Taiwan  waters  is  not  revealed 
by  radio  traffic.  In  some  traffic  from  Takao  the  CINC  SECOND  FLEET  is  indi- 
cated as  having  previously  received  the  messages  while  in  others  to  Tokyo  he  is 
indicated  for  delivery  by  that  Station.  It  is  the  impression  that  both  SECOND 
and  THIRD  FLEETS  are  underway  but  are  not  verified  by  Radio  Intelligence 
means. 

There  are  some  FOURTH  FLEET  Unites  in  the  Marshall  Island  area  includ- 
ing some  of  the  FOURTH  FLEET  Staff.  The  identity  of  these  units  is  not 
known.  The  SIXTH  BASE  FORCE  at  Jaluit  addressed  several  messages  to 
CINC  FOURTH. 

Some  Swatow  Unites  were  addressed  at  Saigon  today  indicating  a  movement 
of  some  South  China  Units  to  Saigon.  Bako  originated  many  despatches  to  the 
BNO  Taihoku  and  the  Task  Force  Commander. 

No  information  on  Submarines  or  Carriers. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  4  December  1941 

General. — Traffic  volimie  normal  with  fair  receiving  conditions.  Takao  Radio 
today  instituted  a  fleet  broadcast  system  using  the  prefix  UTU  in  heading  so 

79716— 46— Ex.  149,  vol.  2 5 


724       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

that  there  are  now  two  fleet  broadcasts  in  operation.  So  far  only  a  few  mes- 
sages have  been  placed  on  the  Takao  broadcast.  There  were  a  large  number 
of  urgent  messages  today,  most  of  these  from  Tokyo  to  the  major  commanders. 
Among  other  Tokyo  Intelligence  originated  a  seven  part  message  to  Chiefs  of  Staff 
China  Fleet,  Combined  Fleet,  Third  Fleet,  South  China  Fleet,  French  Indo-China 
Force  and  Saka.  In  all.  This  activity  sent  twelve  messages  to  the  major  com- 
manders. 

Combined  Fleet. — The  outstanding  item  of  today's  traffic  is  the  lack  of  mes- 
sages from  the  CinC.  Second  Fleet  and  Cine.  Third  Fleet.  These  previously 
very  talkative  commanders  are  now  very  quiet.  While  the  Fleet  calls  are  not 
yet  well  identified,  the  lack  of  traffic  from  these  commands  cannot  be  ascribed 
to  that.  These  two  commands  are  still  prominent  as  addressees.  It  is  now 
believed  that  the  CinC.  Second  Fleet  is  in  the  vicinity  of  Takao  and  that  ap- 
parently conflicting  evidence  is  due  to  traffic  destined  for  the  Tokyo  UTU  broad- 
castcast  which  Cine.  Second  Fleet  is  still  Copying.  The  CinC.  Combined  Fleet 
sent  one  message  to  an  unidentified  unit  for  information  to  Third  Base  Force 
Palao,  CinC.  Second  Fleet  and  CincC.  Third  Fleet. 

Fourth  Fleet. — The  CinC.  Fourth  Fleet  sent  a  message  to  Chief  of  Staff  Com- 
bined Air  Force,  information  to  Eleventh  Air  corps,  Chitose  Air,  Air  Squadron 
Twenty-Four,  Third  Base  Force  at  Palao  and  Fourth  Base  Force  at  Truk.  No 
further  check  could  be  made  today  on  the  presence  of  Fourth  Fleet  units  in  the 
Marshalls.  Jaluit  appeared  many  times  in  today's  traffic  being  associated  with 
Commander  Submarine  Force,  Tokyo  Radio  and  MUSI  88  (Which  is  believed  to 
be  an  oil  tanker). 

Soiith  China. — Bako  continues  as  an  active  originator  addressing  many  mes- 
sages to  Sama  and  Saigon.  Except  for  traffic  between  South  China  Commanders, 
all  units  in  that  area  quiet. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  5  December  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  heavy.  All  circuits  overloaded  with  Tokyo  broad- 
cast going  over  full  24  hours.  Tokyo-Mandates  circuit  in  duplex  operation. 
There  were  several  new  intercept  schedules  heard.  OMINATO  radio  working 
SAMA  and  BAKo  sending  fleet  traffic.  The  Takao  broadcast  handing  traffic 
to  Second  and  Third  Fleet  while  the  Tokyo  broadcast  is  still  handling  traffic 
for  these  units  also.  It  is  noted  that  some  traffic  being  broadcast  is  several 
days  old  which  indicates  the  uncertainty  of  delivery  existing  in  the  radio 
organization. 

There  were  many  messages  of  high  precedence  which  appears  to  be  caused 
by  the  jammed  conditions  of  all  circuits. 

A  plain  language  message  was  sent  by  the  Captain,  OKAWA  from  Tokyo  to 
Takao  probably  for  further  relay  addressed  to  FUJIHARA,  Chief  of  the  Political 
Affairs  Bureau,  saying  that  "in  reference  to  the  Far  Eastern  Crisis,  what  you  said 
is  considered  important  at  this  end  but  proceed  with  what  you  are  doing,  specific 
orders  will  be  issued  soon". 

Combined  Fleet. — Neither  the  Second  or  Third  Fleet  Commanders  have  orig- 
inated any  traffic  today.  They  are  still  frequently  addressed  but  are  receiving 
their  traffic  over  broadcast.  They  are  undoubtedly  in  Takao  area  or  farther 
south  since  the  Takao  broadcast  handles  nearly  all  their  traffic.  No  traffic  from 
the  Commander  Carriers  or  Submarines  Force  has  been  seen  either. 

TJxird  Fleet. — In  one  WE  address  a  "Chief  of  Staff"  sent  a  message  to  "Com- 
mander Fourteenth  Army  aboard  RYUJOMARU  in  Third  Fleet." 

HITOYONGUN  SATI  (IRO  1  REUZEU  MARU).  A  number  of  MARUs 
have  been  addressing  the  CinC.  Third  Fleet. 

Fourth  Fleet. — The  Secretary,  Fourth  Fleet  and  Staff  Communication  Officer 
of  the  Fourth  Fleet  were  addressed  at  Jaluit  today  strengthening  the  impres- 
sion that  the  CinC.  Fourth  Fleet  is  in  the  Marshalls.  The  Commander  of  the 
South  China  Fleet  has  been  addressing  the  Palao  radio  and  the  RNO  TAI- 
HOKU  and  the  Commander  Second  Fleet. 

South  China. — SAMA  addressed  much  traffic  to  CinC.  Second  Fleet.  BAKO 
continues  as  an  active  originator  with  many  dispatches  to  Second  and  Third 
Fleet.  The  Commander  Combined  Air  Force  api)ears  to  be  busy  with  the  move- 
ment of  Air  Corps.  SHIOGAMA  air  and  at  least  two  unidentified  corps  are 
moving,  probably  to  Indo-China. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT   INQUIRY  725 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary  6  December  19^1 

Oeneral. — Traffic  volume  very  heavy  with  a  great  deal  of  old  traffic  being 
transmitted.  Messages  as  far  back  as  1  December  were  seen  in  the  traffic. 
This  is  not  believed  an  attempt  to  maintain  a  high  traffic  level,  but  is  the  result 
of  confusion  in  traffic  routing  with  uncertainty  of  delivery.  The  stations  now 
•holding  broadcasts  are  TOKYO  (with  3  distinct  and  separate  broadcasts), 
SAIPAN,  OIMAUTO  and  TAKAO. 

Yesterday's  high  level  of  traffic  from  TOKYO  originators  was  maintained  with 
the  Intelligence  activity  still  sending  periodic  messages.  Practically  all  of 
TOKYO'S  messages  carry  prefixes  of  high  priority. 

Combined  Fleet. — Still  no  traffic  from  the  Second  and  Third  Fleet  Commanders. 
These  units  are  sending  their  traffic  via  the  TAKAO  and  TOKYO  broadcasts.  The 
Commander  in  Chief  Combined  Fleet  originated  several  messages  to  the  Carriers, 
Fourth  Fleet  and  the  Major  Commanders. 

Fourth  Fleet. — The  Conunander  in  Chief  Fourth  Fleet  is  again  in  the  TRUK 
area.  It  is  doubtfull  that  he  ever  went  to  JALUIT  although  it  is  certain  that 
some  members  of  his  staff  were  there  over  the  past  few  days.  There  is  a  definite 
close  association  between  the  Third  Base  Force  at  PALAO  and  the  forces  in 
South  China.  This  unit  is  constantly  sending  messages  to  the  Chief  of  Staff  of 
the  Second  Fleet,  Third  Fleet,  Indo-China  Forces  and  BAKO.  It  is  being  almost 
entirely  neglected  by  Commander  in  Chief  Fourth  Fleet  under  whose  command 
it  normall  operates.    RONGELAB  radio  addressed  the  PALAO  weather  observer. 

Fifth  Fleet.— Th\&  fleet  appears  dispersed  about  the  JAPAN  sea  with  OMINATO 
broadcasting  traffic  for  this  unit. 

Submarines. — The  Commander  Submarine  Force  originated  two  messages  to 
his  command.  These  are  the  first  two  originated  since  1  December.  He  is 
definitely  in  the  MARSHALLS. 

South  China. — Nothing  new  to  report.  BAKO,  SAMA  and  TAKAO  still  sending 
many  messages  to  the  Task  force. 

SECRET 

Station  H,  1  December,  1941. 

Chronology 

South  China  Area :  No  change  in  location  of  flagships  assigned  to  the  China 
area  was  observed.  Subron  6  is  at  Takao  and  is  probably  going  South.  Airron  7 
is  in  the  vicinity  of  Hainan  Isand.    Comdr.  Combined  Air  Force  is  still  at  Takao, 

Sheet  #95431.  RMO  Tuihoku  originated  a  message  with  prefix,  MIN — highest 
priority,  action  Bako,  information  Sama,  Takao  and  Chiefs  of  Staff  of  five  un- 
identified calls.  Sheet  #95451  CinC  South  China  Fleet  originated  a  despatch 
with  prefix,  KIU  NIELA  WIWI — Urgent-special  cipher,  action  three  imidentified 
calls. 

Combined  Fleet:  CinO's  Combined,  First  and  Second  Fleets  are  all  believed 
to  be  in  the  Kure  area.  CinC  Second  Fleet  sent  a  code  movement  report  it  is 
po.ssible  that  this  Command  will  go  to  South  China  or  Indo-China. 

Very  little  activity  was  observed  in  the  Kure  or  Casebo  area.  Most  of  the 
activity  seamed  to  be  in  South  China,  but  this  might  have  been  caused  by  more 
thorough  coverage  of  South  China  circuits,  with  less  coverage  of  Empire  circuits. 

Submarines :  No  activity  noted  in  Subforce.  Comdr.  Subforce  is  in  the  Man- 
dates, probably  with  a  number  of  submarines.  Some  submarine  units  are  still 
based  at  Yokosuka  and  Kure. 

Fourth  Fleet :  CinC  Fourth  Fleet  is  still  at  Truk. 

No  unusual  activity  noted  in  the  Mandates,  except  that  Comdr.  Subforce  is  in 
the  vicinity  of  Saipan  and  will  probably  go  to  Truk  to  join  CinC  Forth  Fleet. 

General :  Service  calls  for  units  afloat  were  changed  on  1  December.  The  flrst 
new  calls  were  noticed  about  1100.  Old  calls  were  used  by  some  units  until 
evening.  The  "WE"  (enciphered)  addresses  were  also  changed.  The  only  shore 
call  observed  to  be  changed  was  0ASI4  (Sama,  Hainan)  to  YUIl. 

Three  kana  authenticators  were  used  after  the  message  NRs  on  several  des- 
patches but  were  not  used  on  others.    This  was  begun  after  the  change  of  calls. 

A  large  number  of  DF  despatches,  originated  by  MENUl  (Jaluit),  were  sent 
on  the  UTU  broadcast,  information  IKAl  (unidentified).  These  messages  were 
originated  several  days  ago.  Several  messages,  originated  by  Comsubforce,  were 
also  sent  on  the  UTU  broadcast  for  action  of  Subforce.  These  were  also  several 
days  old. 

Saipan,  using  the  call  HOKO,  called  FUHO  (Tokyo)  and  NUKU  (Takao)  on 


726       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATl.^OK 

13013  Kcs  during  the  day.     On  14310A  Kcs  (Takao  to  ships)   NUKU  (Takao) 
called  RIKU  once  and  then  secured. 

A  considerable  number  of  messages  that  had  been  originated  several  days  ago 
were  noted  in  traffic  intercepted.  This  might  have  been  done  to  keep  the  volume 
of  traffic  up  to  cover-up  for  a  decrease  in  the  amount  of  traffic  originated. 

Station  H,  2  December,  1941. 

South  China  Area:  CinC  China  Fleet  (aboard  Idzumo)  is  at  Shanghai;  CinO 
South  China  Fleet  (aboard  Isuzu)  is  in  Canton  area  ;  Comdr.  Indo-China  Force  is 
at  Saigon ;  CinC  Central  China  Fleet  is  at  Shanghai. 

Takao  continues  to  accept  traffic  for  delivery  to  Comdr.  Combined  Air  Force 
and  Commanding  Officer  Kanoya  Air  Station.  Desrons  4  and  5  and  Chogei  (flag- 
ship Subron  — )  are  in  Takao  area  and  are  probably  going  South, 

Several  high  precedence  despatches  were  originated  by  South  China  units, 
indicating  increased  activity  in  that  area. 

The  following  units  normally  based  in  Japan  have  gone  South  to  Hainan  or 
Indo-China  areas:  Desrons  2,  4  and  5,  Subrons  5  and  6,  Airron  7  and  Crudiv  7. 

Combined  Fleet :  CinC's  Combined  and  First  Fleets  are  believed  to  have  re- 
mained at  Kure  with  the  First  Fleet  and  most  of  the  Second  Fleet.  CinC  Second 
Fleet  has  shifted  to  Sasebo  and  is  probably  going  to  South  China  to  direct 
operations  of  units  sent  to  this  area  from  the  Empire. 

No  signs  of  movement  of  the  Third  Fleet  or  Carriers  were  given  in  today's 
traffic.  It  is  believed  that  they  remain  in  the  vicinity  of  Kyushu.  Cardiv  4  is 
believed  to  still  be  at  Sasebo.  Cardiv  3  has  not  shown  any  activity  during  the 
last  few  days,  and  it  is  possible  that  this  unit  has  gone  South. 

Submarines :  No  activity  in  the  Subforce  has  been  observed.  Comdr.  Subforce  is 
in  the  Mandates.  Several  submarine  units  are  still  at  Yokosuka  and  Kure. 
Several  despatches  originated  by  Mandate  units  were  given  to  Comsubforce  for 
information. 

Fourth  Fleet :  CinC  Fourth  Fleet  remains  at  Truk. 

Several  high  precedence  despatches  yrere  originated  by  Fourth  Fleet  units, 
indicating  activity  of  some  sort  is  taking  place  in  the  Mandates. 

General:  Takao  Air  Station  (MER06)  was  heard  sending  traffic  (broadcast), 
formerly  sent  on  the  UTU  broadcast,  to  REHES  (Combined  Air  Force)  on 
11500M  Kcs  during  the  evening  watch. 

Addition  to  "WE"  table :  YO=A. 

Station  H,  3  December,  1941. 

South  China  Area :  No  change  in  location  of  major  flagships  assigned  to  South 
China  waters  was  observed. 

Takao  was  acting  as  radio  guard  for  CinC  Second  Fleet,  Comdr  CAF  and 
Comdg.  Officer  Kanoya  Air  Corps.  Bako  was  much  more  active  than  usual  and 
was  probably  acting  as  relay  station  for  vessels  going  South.  Bako  was  heard 
vcorking  Takao  on  3705A  Kcs  during  the  evening ;  this  station  stopped  working 
Tako  on  the  hour  to  hold  schedule  with  ships. 

Takao,  using  call  NUKU,  was  heard  broadcasting  traffic  on  7155A  Kcs  (night) 
and  14310A  Kcs  (day).  This  broadcast  was  similar  to  the  Tokyo  UTU  broad- 
cast. Traffic  was  broadcast  to  CinC's  Combined,  Second  and  Third  Fleets, 
Comdr.  Combined  Air  Force,  Comdr.  Indo-hina  Force  and  several  unidentified 
afloat  calls. 

NUKU  (Takao)  and  MAYA  were  heard  working  each  other  on  6762  Kcs  dur- 
ing the  evening. 

Considerable  high  precedence  traffic  was  originated  by  South  China  or  Indo- 
China  units  indicating  unusual  activity  in  this  area. 

Combined  neet:  CinC's  Combined  and  First  Fleets  are  believed  to  be  in  the 
Kure  area.  CinC  Second  Fleet  is  in  the  vicinity  of  Takao  and  is  probably  going 
South. 

There  were  no  indications  that  CinC  Third  Fleet  had  moved  South,  except  that 
Takao  was  heard  broadcasting  traffic  for  that  command.  It  is  believed  that  the 
Carriers  are  still  based  at  or  near  Sasebo. 

Very  little  activity  was  observed  in  the  Empire. 

Submarines :  No  activity  in  the  Subforce  was  noted.  Comdr.  Subforce  is  be- 
lieved to  still  be  in  the  Mandates.  Submarine  units  are  believed  to  be  in  port  at 
Yokosuka  and  Kure. 

Fourth  Fleet :  Very  little  activity  observed  in  the  Fourth  Fleet.  CinC  Fourth 
Fleet  is  still  at  Truk.  Normal  activity  was  indicated  in  traffic  intercepted  in  this 
area.  Several  ships  were  in  the  Truk  and  Jaluit  areas.  No  activity  of  any  kind 
was  noticed  in  the  Palao  area. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  727 

General:  Tokyo  (FUHO),  Takao  (NUKU)  and  Saipan  (HOKO)  were  heard 
working  each  other  on  13000A  Kcs  during  the  day  and  early  evening.  Takao 
relayed  trafBc  from  Saipan  to  Tokyo. 

Station  H,  4  December,  19^1. 

South  China  Ai-ea:  CinC  China  Fleet  is  at  Shanghai;  CinC  South  China 
is  in  the  vicinity  of  Amoy ;    Comdr  Indo-China  Force  is  at  Saigon. 

Takao  continues  to  broadcast  traflBc  on  7155A  (night)  and  14310A  Kcs  (day) 
to  ships  in  that  vicinity.  A  regular  series  of  UTU  numbers  are  being  used  by 
Takao  and  the  broadcast  is  similar  to  Tokyo's.  Takao  uses  the  call,  NUKU 
and  calls  RIKU  (All  ships  in  my  vicinity?). 

NUKU  (Takao),  TAI  (Sama)  and  TANU  (Saigon?)  were  heard  working 
each  other  on  7008N  Kcs  during  the  evening.  TANU  sent  traffic  to  Takao, 
originated  by  KORU0  (Kanoya  Air  Corps),  indicating  this  unit  is  at  Saigon. 

Note  sheet  #96819  sent  by  TANU  (Saigon?)  to  TAI  (Sama)  for  delivery 
to  "WE"  address,  (TONUSIUDANSANJIUTEU— Army?).  The  text  of  the 
message  consisted  of  3  numeral  groups.  Sheet  #96829  was  similar,  except  that 
the  text  consisted  of  4  numeral  groups. 

Combined  Fleet :  CinC's  Combined  and  First  Fleets  are  believed  to  have 
remained  in' the  Kure  area.  CinC's  Second  and  Third  Fleets  are  probably  in 
the  vicinity  of  Takao  and  might  be  going  South.  Takao  broadcasted  traffic  ad- 
dressed to  CinC's  Second  and  Third  Fleets. 

Very  little  activity  was  observed  in  the  Sasabo  or  Kure  areas.  The  Carriers 
are  believed  to  have  remained  in  the  vicinity  of  Kyushu. 

Submarines :  No  activity  among  the  submarines  was  observed.  Comdr. 
Subforce  is  still  in  the  Mandates.  Several  submarine  units  remain  at  Tokosuka 
and  Kure. 

Fourtn  Fleet:  CinC  Fourth  Fleet  is  believed  to  have  remained  at  Truk. 
CinC  Fifth  Fleeth  is  probably  at  Chichijima. 

Very  little  activity  was  noted  in  the  Mandates.  Several  messages  were  ex- 
changed between  CinC  Fourth  Fleet  and  Commanders  in  South  China  waters. 

General:  KUNIWI  (Tokyo  Naval  Intelligence)  sent  a  7  part  SUU  WIWI 
despatch  to  Chiefs  of  Staff  Combined,  Second,  Third,  China,  South  China,  Indo- 
China  Fleets  and  to  Sama.  A  number  of  high  precedence  messages  were  also 
sent  to  the  above  addresses,  to  general  collective  calls  and  to  KANKA  (All 
ships  and  stations)  by  Naval  Intelligence  and  Communication  Division,  Tokyo. 
The  large  number  of  high  precedence  messages  and  general  distribution  might 
indicate  that  the  entire  Navy  is  being  instructed  to  be  prepared  for  drastic  action. 

Station  H,  5  December,  19Ifl. 

South  China  Area :  No  change  in  location  of  major  units  in  South  China  has 
been  observed. 

Increased  activity  in  South  China  and  Indo-China  indicates  that  a  move  of 
some  sort  in  that  area  is  imminent. 
Takao  continues  the  use  of  the  UTU  broadcast  on  7155  Kcs  to  units  in  that 
area.     From  all  indications  CinC's  Second  and  Third  Fleets  are  in  the  Takao 
area  or  have  moved  even  farther  South  from  Takao. 

■  Tokyo  Naval  Intelligence  and  Communication  Division  continue  sending  high 
precedence  messages  for  general  distribution  and  especially  to  CinC's  Combined, 
Second,  Third,  South  China  Fleets  and  Comdrs  Indo-China  and  Combined  Air 
Forces.  From  all  indications  CinC  Second  Fleet  is  in  command  of  operations 
in  Indo-China  and  South  China  areas. 

Combined  Fleet:  It  is  believed  that  CinC's  Combined  and  First  Fleets  remain 
at  Kure.     Very  little  activity  was  observed  in  the  Empire. 

CinC's  Second  and  Third  Fleets  are  probably  in  the  Takao  area  or  in  South 
China.  No  indication  as  to  location  of  the  Carriers  was  noted  in  today's 
traffic,  although  it  is  believed  they  remain  in  the  vicinity  of  Kyushu. 

Submarines:  No  activity  in  the  Subforce  was  observed.  Comdr.  Subforce  is 
in  the  Mandates.  It  is  believed  that  one  Subron  is  at  Yokosuka  and  another  at 
Kure. 

Fourth  Fleet:  Very  little  activity  was  observed  in  the  Mandated  Islands. 
CinC  Fourth  Fleet  seems  to  have  moved  from  Truk  to  the  Jaluit  area. 
Comsubfor  is  probably  in  company  with  CinC  Fourth  Fleet. 

There  has  been  quite  an  exchange  of  messages  between  units  in  the  Fourth 
Fleet  and  in  the  South  China  or  Indo-China  areas.  This  indicates  closer  cooper- 
ation between  the  Mandate  and  South  China  forces. 


728       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

General :  Saipan,  Ominato  and  Takao  were  heard  broadcasting  traffic  to  vessels 
in  their  vicinity.  Tokyo  broadcasted  traffic  on  12330  Kcs  in  addition  to  his 
regular  UTU  broadcast.  At  a430/6th  Tokyo  was  observed  using  32  Kcs  for  an 
UTU  broadcast.  This  frequency  was  used  dual  with  12330  Kcs.  Signals  were 
very  strong  during  the  day.  The  use  of  this  low  frequency  indicates  traffic  sent 
on  this  broadcast  is  for  ships  at  a  great  distance  from  Tokyo. 
— ? — 4  (Saigon?),  LU3  (Palao)  and  HAKU6  (Tokyo)  were  heard  working  each 
other  on  4746M  Kcs  at  midnight. 

Ominato,  Chichijima  and  Tokyo  were  heard  on  6020  and  4010  Kcs  during  the 
evening  watch.  Chichijima  called  Yokosuka,  but  that  station  was  not  heard. 
Kanoyu  Air,  Yokosuka  Air  and  9NUU  (Plane  ?)  were  also  on  this  frequency. 

Ominato  was  heard  sending  traffic  to  UFUl  (5th  fleet)  on  4010  Kcs.  This 
command  has  probably  split,  with  part  of  it  at  Chichijima  and  the  rest  at 
Ominato. 

Station  E  6  December,  1941. 

South  China  area:  CinC  China  Fleet  (aboard  Idzumo)  is  at  Shanghai.  CinC 
South  China  Fleet  (aboard  Isuzu)  is  in  the  vicinity  of  Amoy.  Comdr.  Indo-China 
Force  (aboard  Kashi)  is  at  Saigon.  CinC  Central  China  Fleet  is  at  or  near 
Hankow  and  CinC  North  China  Fleet  is  in  vicinity  of  Tsingtao. 

Considerable  activity  in  the  South  China  and  Indo-China  areas  was  indicated 
by  the  large  amount  of  high  precedence  traffic  originated  by  and  sent  to  units  in 
these  areas.  Most  of  the  traffic  sent  to  units  in  Southern  waters  was  originated 
by  Tokyo. 

CinC's  2nd  and  3rd  Fleets  are  still  in  the  vicinity  of  Takao  or  farther  south. 
Comdr.  Combined  Air  Force  is  at  Takao  Air.  Traffic  for  Kanova  Air  Corps, 
Shiogama  Air  Corps,  Genzan  Air  Corps,  11th  Air  Corps,  Takao  Air  Corps  and  other 
units  believed  to  be  Air  Corps  or  squadrons  was  handled  by  Takao,  indicating 
they  are  in  the  South  China  or  Indo-China  area. 

Takao  continues  to  broadcast  traffic  for  ships  in  that  vicinity  on  7155  Kcs  (A) 
(night)  and  on  14310  Kcs  (A)  (day). 

Combined  Fleet :  CinC's  Combined  and  1st  Fleets  are  believed  to  still  be  in  the 
Kure  area. 

Very  little  activity  in  the  Empire  was  observed.  Most  of  the  traffic  addressed 
to  CinC's  2nd  and  3rd  Fleets  and  Comdrs.  Combined  Air  Force  and  Indo-China 
Force  is  also  given  to  CinC  Combined  Fleet — probably  to  keep  that  command 
informed  of  operations  being  carried  out  in  Indo-China. 

Submarines :  No  activity  of  importance  was  observed  in  the  SubForce.  Com- 
SubForce  originated  several  messages  addressed  to  the  entire  Submarine  force. 
This  command  is  in  the  Mandates,  but  it  is  not  known  whether  he  is  at  Jaluit 
or  Truk.    Several  indications  lead  to  the  belief  that  ComSubForce  is  at  Jaluit. 

At  least  two  Subrons  are  believed  to  have  remained  in  home  waters,  with  one 
at  Yokosnka  and  the  other  at  Kure. 

Fourth  Fleet :  It  has  been  definitely  established  by  traffic  study  that  CinC  4th 
Fleet  is  in  the  Truk  area.  Several  times  traffic  routing  indicated  that  part  of  the 
Staff  of  CinC  4th  Fleet  was  at  Jaluit.  It  is  i>ossible  that  this  command  has  been 
split-up  for  better  administration  of  all  operations  in  the  South  Seas.  The 
Kamoi  (with  Commanding  Officer,  Chitose  Air  Corps  aboard)  is  in  the  Jaluit 
area. 

Traffic  continues  to  be  exchanged  between  several  4th  Fleet  units  and  Com- 
mands in  the  Indo-China  area. 

Fifth  Fleet:  Ominato  has  been  heard  working  the  flagship  and  at  least  one 
other  unit  of  the  5th  Fleet  for  the  last  few  days.  This  fleet  has  been  based  at 
Chichijima  for  some  time.  It  is  probable  that  part  of  this  force  has  remained  at 
Chichijima ;  it  is  known  that  KE06  (Airron  attached  to  5th  Fleet)  is  there. 

General :  At  0430,  Tokyo  was  heard  using  32  Kcs,  dual  with  12330  Kcs,  for  UTU 
broadcast  of  traffic.  This  broadcast  was  discontinued  at  1800,  but  7285  Kcs  (M) 
was  immediately  brought  up  and  used  until  1900,  when  it  was  secured.  This 
broadcast  was  used  in  addition  to  Tokyo's  regular  UTU.  Tokyo  also  broadcasted 
traffic  on  6665  Kcs  (A)  during  the  evening. 

Saipan,  Takao  and  Ominato  were  also  heard  broadcasting  traffic  to  units  in 
their  vicinities.  The  use  of  this  method  of  delivering  messages  tends  to  keep 
unknown  the  positions  of  vessels  afloat,  and  is  probably  one  of  the  first  steps 
toward  placing  the  operations  of  the  Navy  on  a  war-time  basis. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  729 

Hewitt  Inquiry  Exhibit  No.  20 

top  secbet 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
Washington  25,  D.  C,  2Jf  May  1945. 
0P-2(>-4-mp 
Serial  0002720 
(SC)A17-24(1) 

From :  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

To :  John  F.  Sonnett,  Special  Assistant. 

Subj :   Testimony  and  documentary  evidence  to  be  presented  to  Admiral  H. 

Kent  Hewitt,  USN,  concerning  further  Pearl  Harbor  Investigation. 
Ref :   (a)   Precept,  dated  2  May  1945,  to  Admiral  H.  Kent  Hewitt,  USN,  con- 
cerning further  Pearl  Harbor  investigation. 

1.  Forwarded  herewith  are  the  following,  certified  in  jacket  form  NJA  24,  to 
be  used  in  the  proceedings  directed  by  reference  (a)  : 

(a)  Photostatic  copy  of  station  "S"  intercept  sheets  5651,  5652  and  5653 
(Tokyo  Circular  #  2492,  7  December  1941)  ;  and 

(b)  Photographic  print  of  JD-1 :  7148,  Circular  #2494,  7  December  1941. 

2.  Your  attention  is  directed  to  the  fact  that  these  documents  are  classified 
TOP  SECRET.  When  used  in  accordance  with  reference  (a),  the  return  of 
these  documents  to  this  office  is  directed. 

James  Forrestal. 
James    Forrestal. 

SF  DE  JAH  S  7  DEC  41 

621  S  TOKYO  19  7  8508     JG 
KOSHI  PANAMA 

Urgent  92494  KOYANAGI  RIJIYORI  SEIRINOTUGOO  ARUNITUKI  HAT- 
TORI  MINAMI  KINENBUNKO  SETURITU  KIKINO  KYOKAINGAKU  SIKYUU 
DENPOO  ARITASI  STOP— TOGO 

1208   S  JP 
7630 
S.  387/7  850S  GR23 
Obese  ovals  RPWMO  RFNMO  RTJMO  RWFMO  gnome 


SF  DE  JAH  S  7  DEC  41 

622  S  TOKYO  19  7  850S  JG  KOSHI  HAVANA 

623  S  TOKYO  19  7  850S  JG  RIYOJI  HONOLULU 

624  S  TOKYO  19  7  850  JG  RIYOJI  NEW  YORK 

625  S  TOKYO  22  7  850S  JG  JAPANESE  CONSUL  VANCOUVER 

626  S  TOKYO  22  7  850  JG  JAPANESE  MINISTER  OTTAWA  ONT 
(Same  text  and  sign  as  our  NR5651) 

1220    JP 
7630 


SF  DE  JAH  S  7  DEC  41 

627  S  TOKYO  19  7  850S  JG  RIYOJI  S.\N  FRANCISCO 

628  S  TOKYO  19  7  850S  JG  RIYOJI  PORTLAND  ORE 

629  S  TOKYO  19  7  850S  JG  RIYOJI  SEATTLE 

680  S  TOKYO  19  7  850  S  JG  RIYOJI  NEW  ORLEANS  LA 

631  S  TOKYO  19  7  850S  JG  RIYOJI  CHICAGO  ILL 

632  S  TOKYO  19  7  850S  JG  RIYOJI  LOS  ANGELES  CAL 
(Same  text  and  sign  as  our  NR5651) 

1243     JP 
7630 

From:  Tokyo. 
To:   (Circular  telegram). 
7  December  1941. 

(Plain  Japanese  language  using  code  names.) 
Circular  #2494. 
Relations  between  Japan  and  England  are  not  in  accordance  with  expectation. 


730       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Hewitt  Inquiry  Exhibit  No.  21 
PACIFIC  FLEET  INTELLIGENCE  BULLETIN  #45-41,  27  NOVEMBER  1941 

United  States  Pacific  Fleet 
U.  S.  S.  Pennsylvania,  Flagship  HRK 

Cincpac  File  No. 

A8/FFl/(25)  Pearl  Haebor,  T.  H., 

Serial  01954  November  27,  IHl. 

Confidential 

From :  Commander-in-Cliief,  United  States  Pacific  Fleet. 

To :  PACIFIC  FLEET. 

Subject :  Pacific  Fleet  Intelligence  Bulletin  No.  45-41. 

Enclosure:  (A)  Subject  Bulletin. 

1.  Enclosure  (A)  is  forwarded  herewith  for  information. 

2.  BECAUSE  OF  THE  CONFIDENTIAL  NATURE  OF  BOTH  THE  SOVRCB 
AND  INFORMATION  CONTAINED  HEREIN,  IT  IS  OF  THE  HIGHEST  IM- 
PORTANCE THAT  THE  CONFIDENTIAL  CHARACTER  OF  THIS  BE 
CAREFULLY  PRESERVED. 

3.  This  information  obtained  from  Naval  Intelligence  sources  has  been  re- 
produced by  the  Commander-in-Chief,  United  States  Pacific  Fleet.  Any  request 
for  additional  copies  of  this  document  will  be  made  to  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
and  not  to  the  Division  of  Naval  Intelligence. 

4.  Additional  copies  shall  not  be  made.  This  bulletin  should  be  retained  for 
study  and  reference  (plus  subsequent  additions  or  correction)  during  the  present 
National  Emergency. 

P.  C.  Crosley, 
P.  C.  Crosley, 

By  direction. 
DISTRIBUTION:  (7CM-41) 
List  I,  Case  3 ;  P,  X. 
Atlantic  Fleet  Al ; 
Asiatic  Fleet  Al ; 
One  copy  each  to : 

FATU,  NTS,  NC4,  ND11-ND14, 
NB49,  Rdo.  &  Snd.  Lab. 

CONTENTS 

(A)  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  JAPANESE  FLEETS      Pages  1  to  12  inclusive. 

Major  Fleet  Commands __.  Page  1. 

Combined  Fleet  and  First  Fleet "     2. 

Combined  Fleet  and  Second  Fleet "     3. 

Third  Fleet "     4. 

Fourth  Fleet •'     5  and  6. 

Fifth  Fleet "     7. 

Sixth  Fleet — (Submarine  Fleet) "     7. 

Carrier  Fleet "     8. 

Combined  Air  Force "     9. 

Train  for  Combined  Fleet "  10. 

Japanese  Naval  Forces  in  China "  11  and  12. 

(B)  JAPANESE  FORCES  AND  INSTALLATIONS  IN 

THE  MANDATED  ISLANDS Pages  13  and  14. 

General  Situation. 

Air  Distribution. 

Table  "A"  showing  distribution  of  material  and  personnel  forces  in 

Mandates  (2  pages  to  be  pasted  together). 
Sketh  of  PALAO  (PELEW). 
Sketch  of  MALAKAI  Harbor,  etc. 
Sketch  of  JALUIT  Harbor,  etc. 


PROCEEDINGS  OP   HEWITT  INQUIRY 


731 


[1] 


(A)   Organization  of  the  Japanese  Fleet.     Octobeb  30,  1941.     (10574) 


The  following  revision  of  Op-16-F-2,  O.  N.  I.  Serial  #27-41  supersedes  and 
replaces  the  former  report  on  this  subject. 

The  principal  change  consists  of  a  further  increase  in  the  number  of  fleet  coni- 
mands.  This  has  arisen  from  the  regrouping  of  aircraft  carriers  and  seaplane 
tenders  into  separate  forces,  and  from  the  creation  of  special  task  forces  in 
connection  with  the  southward  advance  into  Indo-China.  The  regrouping  has 
resulted  in  a  notable  specialization  within  the  various  commands,  as  shown 
below. 


MAJOR  FLEET  COMMANDS 

(Battle  Force)  3    Batdivs,    1    Crudiv,    2 

(Scouting  Force)  Desrons. 

(Blockade    &    Transport4  Crudivs,  2  Desrons,  etc. 

Force)  Small  craft. 

(Mandate  Defense  Force)    1  Desron,  1  Subron  and 

many  small  units. 


I.  Combined  Fleet 

1.  First  Fleet 

2.  Second  Fleet 

3.  Third  Fleet 

4.  Fourth  Fleet 

5.  Fifth  Fleet 

6.  Sixth  Fleet 

7.  Carrier  Fleet 

8.  Combined  Air 
Force 

II.  Japanese  Naval 
Forces  in  China. 

1.  First  China  Exped. 
Fleet. 

2.  Second   China  Ex- 
ped.  Fleet. 

3.  Third    China    Ex- 
ped: Fleet. 

4.  Southern      Exped. 

Fleet. 

[2]  The  Japanese  Navy  now  includes  more  vessels  in  active  service  than 
ever  before.  More  merchant  ships  have  been  taken  over  by  the  Navy,  and  the 
line  between  merchant  ship  and  naval  auxiliary  grows  fainter  all  the  time.  The 
base  forces  and  guard  divisions  in  the  Mandated  Islands  have  also  greatly  in- 
creased the  strength  of  the  Navy,  which  is  on  full-wartime  footing. 

COMBINED  FLEET  AND  FIRST  FLEET 

YAMAMOTO  Isoroku,  CinO  (Admiral) 
NAGATO,  Flagship 


(Submarine  Fleet) 
(Aircraft  Carriers) 
(Seaplane  tenders,  etc.) 

(Staff  Headquarters) 

(Central  China) 

(South  China) 

(North  China) 

( Saigon ) 


6  Subrons. 
5  Cardivs. 
4  Airrons,  &  shore  based 

planes. 
1  PG  and  3  DD's 

Gunboats 

1    CA,    1    CL   and   small 

craft. 
Torpedo  Boats,  etc. 

1  .  CL,     transports     and 
mine  craft. 


FIRST  FLEET 


Batdiv  One 

NAGATO  (F) 

MUTSU 

YAMASHIRO 
Batdiv  Tico 

FUSO  (F) 

ISE 

HYUGA 
Batdiv  Three 

HIYEI  (F) 

KONGO 

KIRISHIMA 
*HARUNA 
Crudiv  Six 

KAKO  (F) 

FURUTAKA 

AOBA 

KINUGASA 


Desron  One 

ABUKUMA  (F) 
Desdiv  6 

IKAZUCHI (F) 
INAZUMA 
SAZANAMI 
HIBIKI 

Desdiv  21 

NENOHI (F) 

HATSUHARU 

HATSUSHIMO 

WAKABA 
Desdiv  21 

SHIRATSUYU  (F) 

ARIAKE 

YUGURE 

SHIGURE 


*NOTB 

repairs. 


The  HARUNA  has  been  inactive  during  1941,  and  is  probably  undergoing  major 


732       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


COMBINED  FLEET  AND  FIRST  FLEET— Continued 


Desron  Three 

SENDAI (F) 

Desdiv  11 

FUBUKI (F) 
SHIRAYUKI 
HATSUYUKI 

Desdiv  12 

SHIRAKUMO  (F) 
SHINONOME 
USUGOMO 
MURAKUMO 


Desron  Three — Continued 
Desdiv  19 

ISONAMI  (F) 
SHIKINAMI 
AYANAMI 
URANAMI 
Desdiv  20 

AMAGIRI  (F) 
ASAGIRI 
YUGIRI 
SAGIRI 
Total :   10  BB,  4  CA,  2CL,  27  DD. 


[S] 


COMBINED  FLEET 
SECOND  FLEET 


TAKAO,  Flagship 


Crudiv  F'jur 

TAKAO   (F) 

ATAGO 

CHOKAI 

MAYA 
Crudiv  Five* 

MYOKO   (F) 

NACHI 

HAGURO 
Crudiv  Seven 

KUMANO  (F) 

MOGAMI 

MIKUMA 

SUZUYA 
Crudiv  Ei(j}it 

TONE  (F) 

CHIKUMA 
Desron  Two 

JINTSU   (F) 

Desdiv  8 

ASASHIO  (F) 
ARASHIO 
OSHIO 
MICHISHIO 

Desdiv  15 

KUROSHIO 
OYASHIO 
NATSUSHIO 
HAYASHIO 


Desron  Two  (Cont'd) 

Desdiv  16 

HATSUKAZE 
YUKIKAZE 
AMATSUKAZE 
TOKITSUKAZE 

Desdiv  18 

KASUMI 
ARARE 
KAGERO 
SHIRANUHI 
Desron  Four 

NAKA  (F) 

Desdiv  2 

YUDACHI  (F) 
MURASAME 
HARUSAME 
SAMIDARE 

Desdiv  9 

ASAGUMO 
YAMAGUMO 
MINEGUMO 
NATSUGUMO 

Desdiv  24 

KAWAKAZE  (F) 
YAMAKAZE 
SUZUKAZE 
UMIKAZE 


Total:  13  CA,  2  CL,  28  DD. 


♦Note  :  There  is  a  possibility  that  a  new  cruiser  has  been  added  to  Crudiv  5. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY 


733 


U] 


THIRD   FLEET 
TAKAHASHI  Ibo— Vice  Admiral 


«  NAGARA,  Flagship 

NORTHERN  BLOCKADE   FORCE  Minelayer  Division 

-      CHOGEI  (F)  ITSUKUSHIMA  (F) 

Subdiv AOTAKA 

HATSUTAKA 

Mine  Sweeper  Division  1  and  21 

AM-1                AM-7 

Subdiv AM-2                AM-8 

AM-3                AM-9 

_  AM-4                AM-10 

AM-5                AM-11 

2nd  BLOCKADE  FORCE  AM-6                AM-12 

Desron  Five  Gunboat  Division  1 

NATORI  (F)  ~                 6  Gunboats    (Converted  Fish- 

Desdiv  5  in"  Vessels) 

ASAKAZE  SUBCHASER   SQUADRON 

HAKUKAZE  . (F) 

MATSUKAZE  Suoctiaser  Division  1  and  11 

HATAKAZE  PC-1                 PC-7 

r»     ^-     ^o  PC-2                PC-8 

Desdiv  12  pp  o                pp  Q 

^TfArTrroTTCT  Subcliaser  Division  21  and  31 

■c  Uiuli-bUivl  pp_4                  PP  in 

MINATSUKI  pp:t                 ^^-f*/ 

NAGATSUKI  ^^_^                ^gfj^ 

Desdiv  34  21  AP— Names  Unknoimi 

HAKAZB  2nd   BASE   FORCE 

AKIKAZE  Maru,  (F) 

YUKAZE  Minelayer  Division  11 

TACHIKAZB  SHIRATAKA 

1st  BASE  FORCE  YAEYAMA    - 

Maru  (F)  KUNAJIRI 

At  least  5  other  men  of  war,  and  17 
merchant  ships. 

Total,  1  CL,  12  DD,  1  AS,  6  SS,  6  CM, 
12  AM,  6  XPG,  12  PC,  46  AP. 


[5] 


Crudiv  Eighteen 
TENRYU   (F) 
TATSUTA 
KASHIMA 

Desron  Six 

YUBARI (F) 

Desdiv  29 
01 TE 
HAYATE 
ASANAGI 
YUNAGI 

Desdiv  SO 

MITSUKI  (F) 
KISARAGI 
YAYOI 
MOCHITSUKI 


FOURTH  FLEET 

HIRATA— Vice  Admiral 

KASHIMA,  Flagship 

Subron  Seven 
JINGEI 
Subdiv  26 
RO-60 
RO-61 
RO-62 
Subdiv  21 
RO-65 
RO-66 
RO-67 
Subdiv  33 
RO-63 
RO-64 
RO-68 
Subdiv 

8  XPG 


734       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


FOURTHTFLEET— Continued 


Survey  and  Patrol  Division 
KOSHU 

KATSURIKI  (CM) 
KOMABASHI    (AS) 

Repair  and  Salvage  Division 
MATSUEI  ]MARU 
NAGAURA  (MARU) 
3rd  BASE  FORCE 

Palao,  Headquarters 

Maru  (F) 

Chiard  Division  S 
Maru 


Subdiv  6 

RO-56 

RO-57 

RO-58 

RO-59 
Subchaser  Division  55 

Maru  (F) 


(?) 
(?) 
(?) 
(?) 


XPG  551 
XPG  552 
XPG  553 
XPG  554 
9  AP  or  AK 
THIRD      DEFENCE 
PALAO) 
Miscellaneous    Forces    Ashore,    in- 
cluding Air  Group  #16  and  TOBI 
detachment  of  4th  Defence  Force 
Detach.  4th  Def.  Force 


FORCE       (HQ 


[6] 


(Estimate  these  unknown  loca- 
tions   to    be     SOROL,    HELEN 
REEF,      ULITHI,      YAP      and 
ANGUAR). 
4th  BASE  FORCE 
Truk,  Headquarters 

Maru  (F) 

Guard  Division  4 

Maru  (F) 


4  AP  or  AK 
FOURTH    DEFENCE    FORCE     (HQ- 
TRUK 

Miscellaneous  Forces  Ashore,  in- 
cluding Air  Group  #17  and 
Ponape  Detachment  of  4th  Def. 
Force,  Kusaie  Detachment  of  4th 
Def.  Force,  Olol  Detachment  of 
4th  Def.  Force,  Greenwich  De- 
tachment of  4th  Def.  Force,  Mort- 
lock  Detachment  of  4th  Def. 
Force,  Pingelap  Detachment  of 
4th  Def.  Force,  Puluwat  Detach- 
ment of  4th  Def.  Force,  Lamotrek 
Detachment   of  4th   Def.   Force, 

(Hall  ?)  Detachment  of 

4th  Def.  Force. 


5th  BASE  FORCE 

Saipan,  Headquarters 
SHOEI  MARU   ^) 
Guard  Division  o 

Composition  unknown 
Minelayer  Division  19 
OKINOSHIMA   (F) 
TOKIWA 
Stihchaser  Division  56 
KASHI (F) 
XPG   561     (?) 
XPG  562     (?) 
XPG   563     (?) 
Gunhoat  Division  8 

Composition  unknown 
9  AP  or  AK 
FIFTH     DEFENCE     FORCE     (HQ— 
SAIPAN) 
Miscellaneous    Forces   Ashore,    in- 
cluding Air  Group  #18 
T^enian    Detachment,    5th   Defence 
Force  PAGAN 
6th  BASE  FORCE 

Jaluit,  Headquarters 
TAKUHAN  MARU  (F) 
Mine  Siveeper  Division  16 
NAGATA  MARU  (F) 
CHOKAI  MARU 
DAIDO  MARU 
IKUTA  MARU 

'This  may 
?  be  the 

l"_"I~l'_"r_"Maru J  SALVAGE 

Maru  1  Unit  known 

Maru   to  be  in  6th 

iBase  Force 
SuTjcJiaser  Division  5 
PC-51 
PC5-52 
PC-53 
SIXTH     DEFENCE     FORCE      (HQ- 
JALUIT) 

KAIKEI  Maru 
#5  FUKU  Maru 

Maru 

Miscellaneous  Forces  ashore  in- 
cluding AIR  GROUP  #19  at 
IMIBJI,  Jaluit  Atoll  and 
probable  Air  Groups  at 
WOT.JE  and  KWAJALEIN 
and  RUOTTO  Is.  (Kwajaleiu 
Atoll)— Detachment  6th  De- 
fence Force  KWAJALEIN 
Is.  (Kwajalein  Atoll), 
TARO A  Is.  ( Maloelap  Atoll ) , 
ENIV7ET0K  Is  (Eniwetok 
Atoll),  UJELANG  Atoll, 
ENYBOR  Is.  (Jaluit  Atoll), 
IMIEJI  Is.  (Jaluit  Atoll), 
WOTJE  Atol— Detach,  of  6th 
Def.  Force,  UTIRIK  Atoll- 
Detach,  of  6th  Def.  Force 

Total :  4  CL,  9  DD,  2  AS,  16  SS,  1  Sur- 
vey Ship,  3  CM,  15  XPG,  3  PC,  4  XAM, 
41  AP  or  AK. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY 


735 


[7] 


FIFTH  FLEET 
CL (F) 


The  composition  of  a  new  Fifth  Fleet  is  still  unknown. 
The  Flagship  has  been  reported  at  Maisuru. 

SIXTH  FLEET 

(Subarine  Fleet) 

KATORL  Flagship 


Subron  One 

TAIGEI  (F) 
Subdiv  1 

1-9 

1-15 

1-16 

1-17 
SuMiv  2 

1-18 

1-19 

1-20 
Subron  Two 

KITAGAMI  (F) 
Subdiv  7 

I-l 

1-2 

1-3 

1-7 
Subdiv  8 

1-4 

1-5 

1-6 
Subron  Three 

NAGOYA  MARU  (F) 
Subdiv  11 

1-74 

1-75 
Subdiv  12 

1-8 

1-68 

1-69 

1-70 
Subdiv  20 

1-71 

1-72 

1-73 


Subron  Five 
YURA  (F) 
Subdiv  28 

1-59 

I-€0 
Subdiv  29 

1-61  (Sauk  10-2-41) 

1-62 

1-64 
Subdiv  30 

1-65 

1-66 

Subron  Six 
KINU  (F) 
Subdiv  9 

1-123 

1-124 

Subdiv  13 
1-121 
1-122 

Subron  Ten 

KARASAKI (F) * 
Subdiv  18 

1-53 

1-54 

1-55 
Subdiv  19 

1-56 

1-57 

1-58 
Subdiv  21 

RO-33 

RO-34 


TOTAL :  3  CL,  2  AS,  1  AP,  42  SS. 

•NOTE  :  The  old  sub-tender  KARASAKI  appears  to  have  been  recommissioned. 


[8] 


Cardiv  1 

AKAGI 
KAGA  (F) 
Desdiv  7 

OBORO  (F) 
USHIO 
AKEBONO 
AKATSUKI 


CARRIER  FLEET  (Cardivs) 
CV  KAGA,  Flagship 

Cardiv  2 


SORYU  (F) 
HIRYU 
Desdiv  23 
UZUKI 
KTKUTSUKI 
MIKATSUKI 
YUZUKI 


736       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEAEL  HARBOR  ATTACK 
CARRIER  FLEET   (Cardivs)— Continued 


Cardiv  3 

RYUJO  (F) 
HOSHO 
Desdiv  17 

ISOKAZE 

URAKAZE 

HAMAKAZE 

Cardiv  Jf 

ZUIKAKU 
SHOKAJMU 

TOTAL :  10  OV,  16  DD. 


Cardiv  4 — Continued 
Desdiv  3 

HOKAZE 
SHIOKAZE 
KAMIKAZE 
NU]VIAKAZE 
Cardiv 

CV     KORYU 

CV     KASUGA  (MARU) 


[9] 


COMBINED  AIR  FORCE 


Kanoya  Naval  Air  Station,  Hdqtrs. 

Shore-basecl  land  planes  and  seaplanes.  The  organization  provides  for  great 
mobility.  Air  units  are  ordered  to  work  with  other  forces,  and  return  to  the 
Combined  Air  Force  pool  when  their  mission  is  fulfilled.  The  named  Air  Groups 
(e.  g.  the  Takao  Air  Group)  are  not  tied  down  to  their  stations,  but  are  sent 
freely  wherever  they  are  needed.  Furthermore,  the  various  air  squadrons  and 
air  groups  frequently  split  into  smaller  units,  and  are  scatered  over  wide  areas. 

Because  of  this  extreme  mobility,  tlie  picture  is  constantly  changing.  Accord- 
ingly, the  following  list  makes  no  attempt  to  indicate  all  the  temporary  group- 
ings into  which  the  various  units  may  be  combined. 


Ship-Based  Squadrons 


Shoeb-Based  Gkoups 


Air  Ron  6 

8th  Air  Group 

KAMIKAWA  MARU  (F) 

10th  Air  Group 

FUJIKAWA  MARU 

11th  Air  Group 

KEN.TO  MARU 

12th  Air  Group 

(Has    been    working    with 

the 

3rd 

14th  Air  Group 

Fleet) 

16th  Air  Group 

Air  Ro?i  7 

17th  Air  Group 

CHITOSE  (F) 

18th  Air  Group 

CHIYODA 

19th  Air  Group 

MIZUHO 

23rd  Air  Group 

(Has    been    working    with 

the 

1st 

Chichijima 

Fleet) 

Chinkai 

Air  Ron  24 

Genzan 

KAMOI  (F) 

Hyakurihara  (or 

Moriibara) 

IXAV 

Iwakuni 

Yokohama  Air  Group 

Kanoya  (Hdqtrs.) 

Chitose  Air  Group 

Kashima 

(Has    been    working    with 

the 

4th 

Kasumigaura 

Sasebo 

Fleet) 

Kisarazu 

Suzuka 

Patrol  Squadron  2 

Kure 

Takao 

NOTORO 

Maizuru 

Tateyama 

(Formerly  with  Air  Ron  6) 

Oita 

Ominato 

Omura 

Saeki 

Tsukuba 
Usa 
Yatabe 
Yokosuka 

Total :  5  AV,  3  XAV,  85  Air  Groups. 


UO] 

SHIRETOKO 

SATA 

TSURUMI 

SHIRIYA 

IRO 


TRAIN  FOR  COMBINED  FLEET 


ONDO 

HAYATOMO 

NARUTO 

MAMIYA 

ASAHI 


AKASHI 
MUROTO 
OTOMARU 
SETTSU 


Total :  8  AO,  1  AF,  2  AR,  1  AC,  1  Ice  Breaker,  1  Target  Ship. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT   INQUIRY 


737 


IW 


JAPANESE  NAVAL  FORCES  IN  CHINA 

KOGA,  Mineichi — Vice  Admiral 

IZUMO,  Flagship 


Shanghai  Base  Force 

ASUGA         KURI 
TSUGA         HASU 

Shanghai  Hartor  Affairs  Section 
Special  Naval  Landing  Force,  Shanghai 
Nanking  Base  Force 
Special  Naval  Landing  Force,  Nanking 

TOTAL :  1  OCA,  1  PG,  3  DD. 

Centeal  China  Fleet,  or  First  Expedi- 
tionary Fleet 

•KOMATSU,  Teruhisa— Vice  Admiral 
UJI,  Flagship 

Partol  Division  11 


ATAMI 

FUTAMI 

FUSHIMI 

SUMIDA 

HASHIDATE 


(F) 


ATAKA 

SETA 

KATADA 

HIRA 

HOZU 

TOBA 
Air  Group  10 
Hankow  Base  Force 
Kiukiang  Base  Force 
Gunboat  Division    t   f 

SHINFUKU  MARU 

HITONOSE 

CHIKUBU 

TOTAL :  4  PG,  10  PR,  1  AP. 

South  China  Fleet,  or  Second  Expedi- 
tionary FLEErr 

NIIMI,  Masaichi,  Vice  Admiral 
ISUZU,  Flagship 
Crudiv  15 

ISUZU  (F) 

ASHIGARA 
Patrol  Division  14 

SAGA 

AM-17 

AM-18 

TOTAL:  1  OCA,  IDD,  8-TB,  1  AP. 


South  China  Fleet,  or  Second  Expe- 
ditionary Fleet — Continued 

Torpedo  Boat  Division  1 

OTORI 

HAYABUSA 

HIYODORI 

KASASAGI 
Guard  Division  15 
Guard  Division  16 
Canton  Base  Force 
Amoy  Base  Force 
Hainan  Is.  Base  Force 
13  Special  Service  Ships 

TOTAL:  1  CA,  1  CL,  4  TB,  1  PG, 
2  AM,  13  Misc. 
[12] 

North  China  Fleet,  or  Third  Expedi- 
tionary Fleet 

SUGIYAMA,  Rokozo,  Vice  Admiral 
IWATE,  Flagship 
Patrol  Division  12 

IWATE  (F) 

MANRI  MARU 
Torpedo  Boat  Division  11 

HATO  KARI 

SAGI  KIJI 

Torpedo  Boat  Division  21 

CHIDORI 

MANAZURU 

TOMOZURU 

HATSUKARI 

KARUKAYA 
Gunioat  Division  1 
Gunboat  Division  2 
Gunboat  Division  13 
Gunboat  Division  14 
Tsingtao  Base  Force 

Southern  Expeditionary  Fleet 

KASHII    (F)    (CL) 

SHIMUSHU    (CM) 
AP 


[13] 


(B    Japanese   Forces   and   Installations   in   the   Mandated    Islads 


1.  FOURTH  FLEET,  which  may  be  termed  the  MANDATE  FLEET,  appar- 
ently administers  the  Naval  activities,  afloat  and  ashore  and  also  the  Army 
Garrisons  units  in  the  Mandated  Islands.  While  the  forces  afloat  exercise  ad- 
ministrative jurisdiction  over  the  Mandate  area,  the  Yokosuka  Naval  District 
is  directly  responsible  for  the  supply  of  stores,  material  and  provisions.  Truk 
is  the  headquarters  for  supply  and  munitions  and  has  been  principle  Fourth  Fleet 
operating  base. 

2.  Up  to  the  present  the  entire  Mandate  Islands  have  been  lightly  garrisoned, 
the  majority  of  the  garrison  units  being  Naval  Defence  Foi'ces  ("special  Landing 
Forces"  corresponding  to  our  Marine  Corps)  but  some  Army  troops  are  believed 
to  be  on  SAIPAN,  PALAO,  PONAPE,  TRUK  and  JALUIT.  The  total  garrison 
force  has  been  estimated  at  fifteen  thousand.  In  addition,  there  are  Civil  Engi- 
neering Units  engaged  in  development  work  on  various  islands.     Working  in 


738       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

conjunction  with  these  are  naval  engineering  units,  naval  ordnance  specialists, 
navy  yard  units  with  civilian  navy  yard  workers  and  technicians.  The  network 
of  naval  radio  stations  has  been  greatly  expanded,  meteorological  stations  and 
high  frequency  direction  finders  installed  at  strategic  locations,  aviation  facilities 
increased  both  in  scope  and  number,  and  shore-batteries  emplaced  on  strategic 
islands  of  key  Atolls. 

3.  I  tis  apparent  that  a  decision  to  expedite  the  fortification,  expansion  of 
facilities  and  militarization  of  the  Mandated  Islands,  was  made  late  in  1940, 
probably  concurrently  with  the  signing  of  the  Tripartite  Pact.  The  movement 
of  naval  auxiliaries,  small  and  medium  cargo,  freight-passenger  vessels  (ex- 
merchant  marine)  to  the  Mandates  began  in  December,  1940,  and  has  increased 
in  scope  and  number  until  some  seventy  odd  vessels  are  engaged  in  this  traffic, 
the  average  number  present  in  the  Mandate  area  at  any  one  time  being  some 
forty  odd  vessels. 

4.  The  function  of  supply  of  munitions,  supplies,  material  and  provisions  to 
the  Mandates  is  under  the  YOKOSUKA  Naval  District  with  a  Headquarters  for 
Civil  Engineering,  Munitions,  Military  Stores  and  Supplies  for  the  Mandates 
centered  at  Truk,  although  this  function  is  normally  under  the  jurisdiction  of 
Yokosuka  as  the  Mandates  are  in  the  First  (HQ— YOKOSUKA)  Naval  District. 

5.  The  Commanders  of  the  3rd,  4th,  5th,  and  6th  Base  Forces  are  subordinate 
commanders  under  Commander-in-Chief,  4th  Fleet ;  they  have  a  designated  Flag- 
ship and  a  Headquarters  or  Administrative  Section,  the  latter  remaining  ashore 
at  the  home  base  regardless  of  the  movements  of  the  command  or  the  Flagship. 
Each  Base  Force  contains  a  DEFENCE  FORCE,  detachments  of  which  are  sta- 
tioned on  outlying  islands  of  that  general  area.  Four  Ro  Class  submarines  have 
been  reported  to  be  attached  to  the  PALAO  BASE  FORCE. 

[i^]  6.  Considerable  air  activity  has  been  in  evidence  in  the  SAIPAN, 
PALAO-PELELIU,  TRUK,  PONAPE  and  JALUIT-KWAJALEIN  areas.  Close 
cooperation  has  been  noted  between  the  Defence  Forces  and  the  Aircraft  activi- 
ties at  their  home  bases.  Foreign  steamers  nearing  the  SAIPAN  area  have  been 
subject  to  aircraft  observation  and  close  scrutiny  by  Patrol  planes,  Bombers,  and 
Kghters.  Heavy  laud  plane  bombers  and  patrol  planes,  undoubtedly  ORANGE, 
have  made  reconnaissance  flights  over  the  Gilbert  Islands  (TARAWA,  BUTARI- 
TARI,  andBERU). 

7.  The  distribution  of  material,  personnel,  and  installations  in  the  Mandated 
Islands  is  indicated  in  table  "A".  While  this  is  admittedly  incomplete  and  may 
be  subject  to  inaccuracies,  it  represents  the  latest  and  best  intelligence  on  this 
subject.  In  addition  to  those  listed  in  Table  A,  there  are  a  number  of  potential 
bases,  principally  in  the  lagoons  of  the  naturally  protected  atolls,  which  may  be 
used  as  emergency  basis  or  may  be  earmarked  for  "priority  two"  development. 

8.  The  latest  information  (up  to  25  November  1941)  indicates  that  the  present 
distribution  of  the  Air  forces  (believed  to  be  a  temporary  strategical  disposition 
rather  than  a  permanent  assignment)   in  the  Mandates  is: 

Identification  Location  Includes 

Airron  24  Marshall  Area  (AV)  KAMOI 

(AV?) Maru 

ex-CHITOSE  Air  Group 
ex- YOKOHAMA  Air  Group 

11th  Air  Group  PALAO  Area: 

16th  Air  Group  PALAO  Area 

17th  Air  Group  TRUK 

18th  Air  Group  SAIPAN 

19th  Air  Group  IMIEJI  Is.  (Jaluit  Atoll) 

Air  Station  (and  Air  Group?)  WOTJE 
Air  Station  (and  Air  Group?)  KWAJALEIN 
?      AIR  GROUP  TRUK 

The  exact  composition  of  these  Air  Groups  is  unknown  and  the  estimates  of 
total  plane  strength  in  the  Mandates  vary  widely:  62-268  planes. 

(Table  A,  referred  to  in  the  foregoing  paragraphs,  consisting  of 
pages  1  and  2  reflecting  the  distribution  of  Japanese  material,  per- 
sonnel, and  installations  in  the  Mandated  Islands,  will  be  found  re- 
produced as  Items  Nos.  108  and  109,  EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, 
Hewitt  Inquiry.) 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  739 

Last  Page  of  Intelligence  Bulletin  No.  45-41 

(At  this  point  in  Exhibit  No.  21  there  appear  two  sketch  maps  of 
Palao  Islands  and  of  Malakal  Harbor  and  approaches.  These  maps 
will  be  found  reproduced  as  Items  Nos.  110  and  111,  respectively, 
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTEATIONS,  Hewitt  Inquiry.) 

Notes  to  Accompany  Sketch  of  Jalvtt 

1.  Aviation  Facilities — Two  landing  fields,  each  with  a  hangar  capable  of  hous- 
ing twenty  medium  sized  planes.  Engineering  Shop  (camouflaged)  situated 
between  the  two  fields.  Adjacent  storehouses  (galv.  iron)  camouflaged.  Diesel 
fuel  and  gasoline  storage  in  camouflaged,  above-ground  tanks  adjacent  to  air 
fields.  Diesel  power  plant  (June-1940).  Eighty  planes  reported  based  here 
(November,  1940). 

On  beach  opposite  southern  air  field  is  Naval  Air  Station  having  small  ramp 
and  one  hangar  for  seaplanes  (June  1940).  This  may  be  an  auxiliary  as  present 
indications  jvDint  to  naval  air  Base  on  Imieji  (EMIDJ)  Is. 

2.  Headquarters — Two  story  concrete  building.  Large  building  to  SE  of  Head- 
quarters is  Post  Office  and  Telephone  central.  Flagstaff  adjacent  to  Post  Office 
is  also  used  as  signal  tower.  In  town  are  many  one  story  concrete  stores.  Good 
bitumen  and  powdered  coral  roads. 

3.  Rarlio  towers — Two  steel  combination  radio  and  lookout  towers  40O  feet 
high.     Diesel  engine  power  plant  near  southern  tower  (1940). 

4.  Shore  Batteries — Bases  and  trunnions  along  the  three  quarter  mile  water- 
front street  called  the  Marine  Parade  (1940)  (guns  not  mounted  in  June,  1940 
but  are  now).  Also  three  6"  guns  and  a  battei-y  of  four  4.7"  field  pieces.  Bar- 
racks for  regular  garrison  of  500  soldiers  (1940)    (probably  enlarged  now). 

Mobile  Batteries — Machine  guns  and  AA  guns  mounted  on  Diesel-tractor  towed 
trailers.     10"  searchlights  on  pneumatic  tired  truck  assemblies   (1940). 

5.  Oovernment  Pier — 600  feet  long,  75  feet  wide  (18'-25'  alongside)  equipped 
with  two  railroad  tracks  and  three  10  ton  mobile  cranes.  Storehouse  on  end  of 
pier  (1940). 

6.  Mole — 1.50'  concrete  mole  constructed  parallel  to  shore  line  along  NW  corner 
of  JABOR  (1933). 

7.  Conspicous  red  building  (may  be  red-roofed  building)    (1936). 

8.  South  Seas  Trading  Co.  PIER  (N.  B.  K.  or  "NAMBO")  also  called  "SYDNEY 
Pier".    Two  water  tanks  and  warehouses.     Coal  and  briquette  storage  (1938). 

9.  Two  buildings  (resembling  hangars)  with  tracks  leading  down  to  water  from 
one  of  them  (beaching  gear? — small  marine  railway?).  A  gasoline  storage 
located  near  the  two  buildings  (1936). 

(The  sketch  of  Jaluit,  to  which  the  foregoing  notes  apply,  will  be 
found  reproduced  as  Item  No.  112,  EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, 
Hewitt  Inquiry.) 


Hewitt  Inquiry  Exhibit  No.  22 
Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  14  October  1941 

D  F  Bearings — 

30  Naval  Auxiliaries  in  Mandates. 
lOsiiioTis^^ 

FUI  5  (M)  Communication— Sama  (SASI  4)  to  Takao  (FUWI  4) 

KURU  8  (M)  do  — Ponape  (RESU  0)  to  Truk  (YUMI  0) 

WINI  5  (M)  do  —Sama  (SASI  4)  to  MENU  3  (Maru) 

KONA  9  (M)  34.  7  139.  5 

SIKA  4  (M)  14.  1  156.  6 

TEE  .5  (M)  21.  2  141.  5 

TEFU  0  (M)  17.  1  136.  2 

MESU  4  (M)  19.  0  144.  2 

YOHA  6  (M)  08.  8  165.  0 

SUWI  4  (M)  11.  3  139.  3 

SAYU  5  (M)  14.  3  162.  0 

79716 — 46— Ex.  149,  vol.  2 0 


740       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Vessels  in  Mandates  October  14-16 


October  15,  1941. 


Call 


Type 


Location 


E  ME  5.- 
EKO0.-. 
HAKI3.. 
HI  I  5-... 
HIKO  9.. 
HOME  1. 
FUNE9. 
IKI3.... 
KARI3.. 
KA  0  7.. 
KEBO  8. 
KENO  2. 


KINI  5-... 
K0NA9.. 
KAMA  6- 
KURU8.. 
MESA0.. 
MENE  5_. 
MESU4.. 
MENA  6.. 
MIN0  2_. 
MITA  5... 
MURU3.. 
MUTUl.. 
NAU5.-.. 
NINO  0.08- 
NOSA  2... 
NUR0  4-. 
0S0  8.... 
O  YO  8.— 
RARU5.- 
RASE0... 
RATU5.. 
RIR0  5... 

RISI6 

RISA  2.... 
RIYU6... 
SAYU  5_.. 
SIKA  4.... 
SEWA4.. 
SETO  1... 
SUWI4... 
S0Y0  9... 
TE  E  5... 
TETU  7.. 
TETU  2.. 
TEFU  0.. 
TOHI  1... 
TOWA  2__ 
TOYA  3.. 
TUHO  33- 
TUYU  00. 
WINI  5... 
YAYI  6— 
YOHA  6- 
YOKU  5.. 
YUHO  8_. 
YUMO  3.. 
MOTO  6- 
SEWI  7... 


M  under  CNO 

SubDiv  in  4th  Fit. 

Mara 

DesRon  in  4th  Flt. 

Maru 

Maru 

Maru 

In  4th  Fit 

Maru - 

Maru 

KATSURIKI 

KOSHU 


Maru 

Maru 

Maru 

Maru 

Maru 

TAMA,  4th  Fit 

Maru 

Maru 

Minesweep  Div,  4th  Fit. 

Air  Tender,  4th  Fit 

Maru. 

DcsDivin4th  Fit 

Maru . 

CofS.,  4thFlt 

Maru 

JINGEI,  4th  Fit/ 

SubRon,  4th  Fit 

KAMOI,  4th  Fit 

Maru 

Maru 

Maru.. 

Maru 

Maru,  Air  Tender,  CAF. 
HAYAT0M0,4th  Fit.. 

MUROTO,  4th  Fit 

Maru 

Maru 

Maru 

Maru 

Maru 

4th  Fit 

Maru 

Fit  Unit,  4th  Fit 

Unidentified 

Maru 

KOMOBASHI 

4th  Fit  Vessel 


CinC  4th  Fit... 

Maru 

Maru 

Maru 

SHIRETOKO- 

Maru 

Maru 

Maru 

Maru 


In  Mandates 

In  Mandates 

In  Mandates  (Comdr  MINO  2  onboard) 

In  Mandates 

Jaluit— Chichijima  area? 

In  Mandates 

In  Mandates 

In  Mandates 

In  Mandates 

In  Mandates 

In  Mandates 

In  radio  company  with  RIYU  6  who  contacts 

RDO  YOKOSUKA 
Posit— 163-29,  11-34N 

139-31,  34-45 
In  Mandates 

(14th)  Between  Ponape  (going  to)  Truk. 
Posit— 157-47,  07-58 
In  Mandates 

Enroute  Saipan  ?  144-11,  19-00 
In  Mandates 
In  Mandates 

Not  in  Jaluit  area  (where  generally). 
Posit— 164-47,  09-40 
In  Mandates 
In  Mandates 
In  Truk  area. 
.Taluit  area. 
In  Mandates 
In  Mandates 
In  Mandates. 

In  Mandates  (Call  doubtful) 
In  Mandates 
In  Mandates 
In  Mandates 
In  Mandates 
In  Mandates 
In  Mandates 

Yokosuka  to  Truk  or  Ponape,  162-00  14-30 
Saipan  to  .Taluit,  153-36,  1406 
In  isiandates 
In  Mandates 
Near  Yap,  1,39-18  11-16 
In  Mandates 
Posit— 141-32    21-09 
In  Mandates. 
In  Truk  area. 
Posit— 136-13    17-05 
Jaluit  area. 
In  Mandates. 
In  Mandates. 

In  Jaluit— Chichijima  area. 
In  Mandates. 

Hainan  to  MENU  3  (In  Mandates)? 
In  Mandates. 
Posit— 164-58    08-47. 
In  Mandates. 
Saipan  area. 
In  Mandates. 

Japan  or  outside  Mandates. 
In  Yokosuka  zone— may  be  going  Mandates. 


Communication  intelligence  summary,  15  Octoher  lOJfl 


General. — TraflSc  above  normal.  Several  more  new  radio  calls  representing 
shore  stations  and  Naval  auxiliaries  appeared  lately.  Bureau  of  Personnel  traflBc 
again  reached  a  high  peak.  Many  general  despatches  (addressed  to  "all  hands" 
or  large  collective  addresses)  appeared.  It  is  worthy  of  note  to  list  the  radio 
stations  called  by  Radio  TOKYO  to  deliver  general  despatches  originated  by 
Toliio  Personnel,  Tokio  Naval  Minister,  Tokio  Communication  and  Tokio  Bureau 
Military  Affairs. 

Radio  Yokosuka  and        Flagships  S.  China  Fleets 
Radio  Kure  "     "      1st  Fleet 

Radio  Sasebo  "     "      2ud  Fleet 

Radio  Maizuru  "     "      3rd  Fleet 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  741 

Radio  Ominato  "     "      4th  Fleet 

Radio  Takao  "     "       Subforce 

Radio  Shanghai  "     "      CarDivs. 

Radio  Saipan  "     "      Combined  Fleet. 

Radio  Palao 

Radio  Kanoya 

Radio  Spratley  Island 

Tokyo  Communications  also  originated  a  despatch  addressed  to  "all  hands" 
information  to  a  Naval  auxiliary  (SITU  1)  indicating  possible  future  operations 
of  this  vessel.  A  large  number  of  vessels  appear  to  be  in  Saseho  area.  However, 
the  Commander  First  Base  Force,  Third  Fleet  at  Saseho  addressed  units  of  his 
command  at  Kure  and  Yokosuka.  Some  maneuvering  traffic  observed  on  7024 
(using  3  kano  calls)  and  5897  kcs. 

First  and  Second  Fleets. — 2nd  Fleet  units  observed  at  Kure.  A  New  Naval 
auxiliary  (NIRA  8)  reported  to  the  1st  Fleet  Secretary.  Relatively  little  activity 
among  1st  and  2nd  Fleet  vessels  indicated  in  radio  traffic.  A  vessel  identified  as 
YAMASHIRO  (BB)  originated  one  dispatch  to  the  KOMOBASHI  in  Jaluit  Area. 

Suhmarines. — Continued  activity  on  submarine  frequency  (6385)  by  vessels 
using  secret  calls.  DF  bearings  indicate  they  are  approximately  in  the  Chichi- 
jima  Yokosuka-Kagoshima  area. 

Air  Activities. — Kaga  continues  as  flagship  of  Cardivs.  The  SHOKAKU  and 
Commander  of  the  Cardiv  are  in  the  NAHA-Takao  area.  Also  it  is  believed  one 
of  the  large  airons  in  Combined  Air  Force  (TOME  2)  is  also  in  same  vicinity  and 
that  Commander  Cardiv  3  (NUYA  88)  and  the  HOSHO  are  connected  with  these 
vessels  in  some  maneuver  going  on  or  planned  as  all  were  associated  in  despatch 
headings.  Indications  are  that  two  or  three  large  groups  of  Combined  Air 
Force  are  in  the  Genzan-Chiukai  Area.  (YUMO  8,  YOME  7,  MOO  0?).  Ashigara 
originated  dispatch  to  11th  Air  Base  which  was  forwarded  to  Maizuru  for 
delivery. 

Fourth  Fleet. — Traffic  above  normal.  Many  new  calls  observed,  some  of  which 
are  undoubtedly  garbled. 

Fifth  Fleet f — The  new  fleet  or  force  which  has  been  mentioned  at  various 
times  in  the  past  (NARE  (6)  appeared  in  dispatch  headings  frequently  today. 
The  call  was  associated  with  4th  fleet  units  and  some  Naval  auxiliaries  which 
appear-to  be  new  or  newly  commissioned.  One  dispatch  originated  by  Commimi- 
cation  Officer  5th  Fleet  was  addressed  for  action  to  the  5th  Fleet,  a  new  fleet 
unit  in  parenthesis  (TOYU  5)  and  for  information  to  Radio  Takao,  Tokyo, 
Saipan,  Palao,  Truk,  Jaluit  and  to  Communication  Officers  2nd,  4th  Fleets,  Sub- 
Force,  Cardivs  and  Combined  Air  Force. 

D  F  Bearings.— 21^  Naval  Auxiliaries  in  Mandates. 

Pos/ito?!*.— NESU  5  (M)  Comm-Kure  #4  SLF  (SIKA  8)  to  Shanghai 
(KAMO  0) 

YOKE  7  (M)  06.4         155.1 

KIMO  5  (KASHI)  20.9        112.0 

KENO  2   (KOSHU   ?) 

Communication  Inteixigence  Summaby,  16  October  1941 

General. — Average  amount  of  traffic  intercepted,  with  complete  absence  of 
"dummy"  traffic  for  the  first  time  since  early  October.  All  forces  active  in  origi- 
nated and  addressed  traffic  except  South  China.  A  considerable  number  of  WE 
addresses  appeared,  usually  associated  with  air  activities.  One  broke  as 
"Chinkai  Defense  Force"  indicating  newly  organized  activity  at  that  location. 
Ominato  transmitted  a  despatch  with  three  WE  addresses,  which  broke  as  Chief 
A  Area,  Chief  B  Area  and  Chief  C  Area.  Stations  addressed  in  this  despatch  fit 
the  call  table  line  designated  tentatively  as  "Temporary  Shore"  or  "Advanced 
Base"  stations,  which  were  most  commonly  associated  with  the  South  China 
activities  up  to  and  including  the  Indo  China  campaign.  Stations  fitting  this 
classification  are  increasing  in  the  Chinkai-Chosen  area,  one  unidentified  unit 
(TAWI  7)  which  was  formerly  connected  with  So  China  Forces,  has  reappeared 
in  the  Chosen  area,  with  line  of  bearing  from  Oahu  D/F  pa.ssing  thru  the  Rashin, 
Seisin  area.  Units  of  12th  Air  Corps  are  apparently  embarked  on  two  unidenti- 
fied Marus  and  probably  proceeding  to  join  the  12  A.  C.  Commander  at  Genzan 
Air. 

Combined  Fleet. — CinC  Combined,  possibly  back  on  NAGATO,  appears  to  be 
acting  as  radio  guard  for  an  increasing  number  of  units  from  1st.  2nd-  CarrierSi 


742       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

and  Subfor.  The  tentatively  identified  5th  Fleet  appeared  as  action  and  infor- 
mation addressee  in  several  despatches  concerning  addressees  in  the  Mandates, 
Chichijima,  and  major  force  commanders.  The  2nd  Fleet  was  a  heavier  origi- 
nator -with  traflic  addressed  to  major  units  of  the  Combined.  No  indication  of 
change  of  location  of  1st  or  2nd  fleets.  Third  fleet  continued  actively  originat- 
ing and  receiving  traffic  from  Sasebo  area.  Flagship  of  #2  Base  Force,  3rd  Fleet, 
with  commander  aboard  at  Sasebo. 

Carriers. — Active  in  exchange  of  traffic  as  yesterday.  No  indicated  change 
of  location.  Planes  from  Kasanoliara  Air  are  operating  aboard  or  with  the 
HIRYU.  Commander  Carriers  still  aboard  KAGA  in  area  between  Sasebo  and 
Taiwan.    AKAGI  and  SORYU  at  Yokosuka. 

Air  Force. — Chitose  Air  enroute  to  Mandates,  probably  to  Marshall  area,  with 
Yokohama  Air  at  or  near  Truk.  Indications  that  Yokosuka  Air  is,  or  will  be, 
moving  to  the  Mandates,  possibly  to  the  Palau  area. 

)S'm6  Force. — Same  activity  on  Subfor  frequencies  as  previously  reported,  bear- 
ings remaining  the  same. 

China. — Activity  appears  confined  Takao,  and  North  China  areas,  with 
Shanghai  continuing  normal.  A  despatch  addressed  to  China  Fleet  collective 
exempted  the  North  China  Force  from  delivery,  thus  placing  N.  China  Force  as 
part  of  CINC  CHINA  FLEET  (on  Idzumo)  Command. 

Miscellaneous. — Many  new  calls  appearing,  including  MARUS,  which  have 
been  very  recently  taken  over,  as  they  are  not  equipped  with  call  books  and  use 
WE  addresses  for  activities  which  have  assigned  calls.  One  new  unit  apparently 
containing  both  Marus  and  Combatau  vessels  appeared  today  without  indication 
of  which  Force  he  is  attached. 

D  F  Bearings. — 31  Naval  Auxiliaries  in  Mandates. 
Positions. — 

KINE  9  ( ?)  Comm.  KURE  RETJ  3  to  YOKOSUKA  HOMI  3. 

ERO  6  ( V)  Comm.  Takao  FUWI  4  to  Bako  NOTI  7. 

YUKO  9  ( •?)  Comm.  Canton  RUYO  6  to  Bako  NOTI  7. 

MURU  3  (M)  Comm.  Remain  with  Ponape  and  establish  with  Truk  RESU 

0  to  YUMI  0 
MISE  5  (Fleet  Unit)— Comm.  Sasebo  KIMU  9  to  KINU  7  (Maru) 
KARO  9  (ERIMO)— Comm.  Sasebo  KIMU  9  to  Kure  RETI 3 
NIRI  0  (M)  Comm.  Yokosuka  HOMI  3  to  Saipan  OSI  0 
RETI  5   (M)    Comm.  Remain  with  Shanghai    (KAMO/0)    establish  with 

SIKA  8. 
KUNA  1  (M)  10.7  166.7 
TEFU  0  (M)  23.0  137.4 
TIWI  1  (M)  28.5  140.9 

JAPANESE  NAVY — OCT  16TH 

1st.  Fleet: 
BB's  believed  in  INLAND  SEA-SASEBO  area. 
AIRRON  7  and  a  CARDIV  in  NAHA-TAKAO  area. 
KONGO  and  HIYE  had  busy  traffic  with  SAEKI  AIR. 

2nd.  Fleet: 

Some  units  are  definiately  at  KURE. 
8rd.  Fleet: 

Concentrated  with  few  exceptions  in  general  SASEBO  area. 

ASHIGARA  is  mentioned  in  3rd.     Fleet  traffic  with  major  units  of  that  Fleet. 

CHOGEI  (Flag  of  NORTHERN  BLOCKADE  FORCE)  appears  with  NAGARA 
(3rd.  Fleet  Flag). 

4th.  Fleet: 

Definitely  in  TRUK  area.    Large  air  concentration  in  the  MARSHALLS. 
5th.  Fleet: 

Still  in  process  of  organizing.  CHICHIJIMA  RADIO,  4th  FLEET  and  CINC 
COMBINED  are  interested  parties  in  traffic  which  includes  this  hypothetical 
fleet. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  743 

SUBMARINES: 

Many  units  definitely  in  KURE  area.  Perhaps  a  dozen  are  operating  in 
exercizes  in  the  general  CHICHIJIMA-TOKOSUKA  area.  With  a  few  as  far 
south  as  the  MANDATES. 

From  one  indication  it  appears  that  COMSUBFORCE  is  at  SASEBO. 

A  large  part  of  COMBINED  AIR  FORCE  appears  to  be  in  CHINKAI-SASEBO- 
GENZAN  area.     One  section  of  CAF  operating  with  a  CARDIV  of  1st.  FLEET 
in  TAKAO  area.     CARRIER  LOCATIONS:  AKAGI  and  ZUIKAKU  in  YOK- 
SUKA  area.    KORYU  at  KURE.     KAGA  at  SASEBO. 
Oeneral: 

Several  fleet  auxiliaries  (tankers  etc.)  appear  to  be  in  SASEBO  area.  KASHII 
near  SAIGON.  ISUZU  (Acting  Flag  South  China)  in  HAINAN-SOUTH  CHINA 
area. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  17  October,  lOJfl 

General. — Traffic  volume  about  normal.  (Traffic  flow  now  being  analyzed 
by  statistical  machinery  and  normals  are  established  for  all  major  and  secondary 
stations).  Dummy  traffic  again  absent  from  TOKYO — Fleet  broadcast.  Sprat- 
ley  Islands  radio  sent  a  message  to  TAKAO.  This  message  must  have  been 
relayed  to  TOKYO  because  TOKYO  repeated  the  message  under  a  priority  pro- 
cedure sign  to  Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet,  Comcardiv  4  (SUTU  7)  ESARO 
(believed  to  be  their  Radio  Intelligence  unit)  BAKO,  Chief  of  Staff  South 
China  Fleet,  Chief  of  Staff  French  Indo  China  Forces,  RNO  TAIHOKU,  Com- 
mander 11th  Air  Corps  and  Chief  of  Staff  of  South  China  Air  Forces.  It  seems 
that  the  Spratley  report  caused  considerable  excitement.  The  resignation  of  the 
Cabinet  was  reported  to  the  fleet  by  plain  language  today. 

Combined  Fleet. — The  impressions  grow  that  there  is  underway  a  concen- 
tration of  units  upon  the  Combined  Fleet  Flagships.  Subrons  5  and  6  appear 
with  him  today. 

The  following  is  what  is  believed  to  be  the  circumstances  surrounding  the 
relief  of  the  Combined  Fleet  Flags.  On  September  23  the  MUTSU  was  in  Kure 
Navy  Yard.  On  September  27th  or  28th  she  joined  the  Second  Fleet.  On 
October  1  CinC  2nd  Fleet  relieved  as  CinC  Combined  Fleet  and  hoisted  Flag 
in  MUTSU.  He  was  active  today  in  addressing  messages  to  general  calls.  The 
CinC  Second  Fleet  also  originated  many  dispatches.  One  message,  originated  on 
the  14th  of  October  was  repeated  again  today.     It  was  addressed  as  follows  : 

2nd  Fleet  Collective 

3rd  Fleet  Collective 

Combined  Air  Force 

Subron  5 

Subron  6 

Airron  7 

BatDiv  3 

Information  to 

Comcardivs. 

C  in  C  Combined  Fleet 

Radio  Takao 

Radio  Palao 

Radio  Tokyo. 

South  China. — Traffic  to  this  area  with  si)ecial  reference  to  TAKAO  was 
higher  today  than  usual.  The  movement  of  the  ZUIKAKU  to  Taiwan  as  reported 
by  Com.  16  today  is  only  partially  confirmed  here.  A  call  (SIHA  5)  identified 
here  as  the  SHOKAKU  of  Cardiv  4  appeared  today  in  care  of  the  Combined 
Air  Force  at  TAKAO  and  was  routed  to  that  station  for  delivery.  No  indication 
of  any  other  units  in  her  company.  Direction  Finder  bearings  place  some  Car- 
riers together  in  the  area  east  of  TAIWAN  and  south  of  KYUSHU.  These  units 
could  and  probably  will  establish  radio  Communication  with  TAKAO.  While 
they  may  move  to  TAKAO  it  is  expected  that  they  will  not  but  will  remain  in 
the  area  east  of  TAIWAN.  Some  slight  indications  exist  that  the  Flagship  of 
the  Combined  Fleet  is  with  these  carriers  but  is  not  confirmed. 

Suhmarines. — KATORI  and  submarines  are  still  in  area  southward  and  east 
of  KYUSHU. 


07.5  N 

165  E 

26 

153 

18 

155 

18 

148.5 

06 

170.5 

30.5 

134.5 

05.5 

165 

05.5 

164.  5 

11.5 

163.  5 

16.5 

140 

12.5 

165 

08. 

154 

11.5  N 

102.  0 

E 

24.  7  N 

142.4 

E 

33.  2  N 

142-3 

E 

16.  2  N 

144.  4 

E 

3.  5  N 

160.4 

E 

32.  3  N 

140.9 

E 

TRUK  to  SAIPAN 

CZ 

18.8  N 

145.  1 

E 

22.0  N 

116.0 

E 

26.  7  N 

123.3 

E 

Estab.  Comm.  with  YOKOSUKA 

AMOY  to  TAKAO. 

CZ 

19.  8  N 

159.4 

E 

Saipan  to  Chichijima.     CZ 

Jaluit  to  Saipan. 

CZ 

744       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Fourth  Fleet. — Very  little  fourth  Fleet  activity. 

D/F  Bearings. — 38  Naval  auxiliaries  in  Mandates  including: 

HAKI  3 

KENO  2 

KERO  8 

MESU  4 

MEMU  7 

NIRI  0 

NOTA  4 

OYO  8 

ORU  6 

TEE  5 

TOHI  1 

KIME  3 
Positions. — 

NORU  6 

TIWI  1 

TUU  5 

MAO  5 

YOHA  6 

SEWI  7 

MURU  3 

OMI  MARU 

SINI  2 

FURI  6 

KUSU  9 

TIKA  9 

RIRO  5 

KURU  8 

YOHA  6 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  18  October  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  about  normal.  Traffic  consisted  largely  of  adminis- 
trative traffic.  There  was  one  WIWI  message  from  TOKYO  to  CinC  •Combined 
Fleet  for  information  of  CinC  China  Fleet,  CinC  South  China  Fleet  and  an  uni- 
dentified unit  in  the  French  Indo  China  Force.  Naval  Communications  TOKYO 
has  originated  several  messages  of  general  address.  These  may  indicate  a  com- 
ing change  of  call  or  cipher  systems.  The  Secretary  to  the  Navy  Minister  sent 
out  a  plain  language  message  announcing  the  appointment  of  Admiral  Shimada 
Shigetaro  in  Tojo's  Cabinet.  •Tfeis  moosagc  was  give-a  a  ge»ei=a4  distribution  as 
is  uaual  witfe  mcooagco ef  ^tfeis efearactcf  fe«* aise ieehided  was  '-'ZAIGAITAIKO^S- 
IKANTUKIBUKAN".  Wbiie  i*  is  nndcrotood  that-  t^ie  Attaehe  *e  Tbailftftd 
we«}4  fee  intGrootcd,  ye*  the  ifteluaion  el  feifti  as  as  addrcoacc  e»  ft»  ethe-pwise 

OTriC  tiy  litlVQjT  QGQpftt'Cfi  "Wirx  til  ft  KG  1%  ftOpCfti*  rilftr  xfiCFO  "WftS  9'0'fJlG  S0Ft  Or  ft  miilL'flFy 

tie-up  between  Japaa  a»4  Thailaadr  Another  plain  language  despatch  from  the 
Secretary  China  Fleet  to  INOUE,  Head  of  the  Military  Mens  Association,  thanks 
him  for  message  to  newly  appointed  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  China  Seas  Fleet. 
This  is  the  first  intelligence  of  the  relief  of  the  China  Command. 

Combined  Fleet. — No  information  received  today  to  check  location  of  First  Fleet 
The  flagship  is  still  acting  as  guard  for  units  previously  reported  as  being  in 
company.  One  Cardiv  (UYU  3)  had  its  traffic  accepted  by  the  MUTSU  today. 
The  CHITOSE  also  joined  the  flagship.  Desron  3  is  in  SASEHO  area.  HAGURO 
is  in  KURE  area.    2nd  Fleet  traffic  is  being  routed  thru  KURE. 

Third  Fleet. — Still  in  SASEHO  area,  little  activity  except  for  the  Commander 
2nd  Base  Force  who  addressed  several  MARUS  of  his  unit. 

Fourth  Fleet. — Mandates  traffic  largely  concerns  air  activities.  The  impression 
is  that  there  is  a  considerable  amount  of  air  movement  between  the  Mandates 
and  the  Empire.  CHITOSE  air  is  very  active  in  the  MARSHALS.  KATSURIKI 
is  at  JALUIT. 

Subm.arine% — The  Chief  of  Staff  of  SubForce  is  receiving  his  traffic  via 
SASEHO.  There  were  fewer  submarine  calls  on  tactical  circuits  than  for  the 
past  few  days.    It  is  believed  that  all  submarines  are  nearing  SASEHO. 

Carriers. — AKAGI  and  SORYU  are  at  Yokosuka.  From  traffic  it  appears  that 
SORYU  is  finished  with  whatever  she  was  doing  at  SASEHO  and  is  about  to 
join  her  division  which  is  in  company  with  CinC  Combined.  Cardiv  4  is  definitely 
in  TAKAO  area. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  745 

China. — Little  activity  save  for  tlie  Spratley  Islands  Radio  Station  which 
originated  several  messages  today. 

D/F  Bearings. — None. 
Pobitions. — 

SIHI  2  22.0  N                          115.0  E 

TUYA  2  From  RETI  3  to  SUKA  2  C.  Z. 

HIRE  4  20.4  N                          114.4  E 

YOHA  6  15.7  N                          158.4  E 

TIWI  1  21.7  N                          145.2  E 

RUTI  2  22.8  N                         146.1  E 

NOSA  2  11.6  N                         169.0  E 

TEFU  0  Chichijima  (EME  6)  to  Yokosuka  (HOMI  3) 

TIWI  1  18.7  N                          145.2  E 

TUU  5  29.1  N                         147.1  E 

Cormnunication  Intelligence  Summary,  19  Octoher  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  below  normal.  Less  traflBc  was  copied  at  Heeia  due 
to  poor  receiving  conditions  but  since  there  were  numerous  dummy  messages 
among  those  intercepted,  the  traffic  volume  is  considered  below  the  daily  average 
attained  in  the  last  two  months.  There  has  been  a  perceptible  increase  in  the 
use  of  secret  (or  tactical)  calls  and  addresses  with  not  only  drill  and  maneuvering 
traffic  but  in  administrative  despatches  as  well.  Todays  traffic  included  some 
maneuvering  type  (4  kana  uigori)  traffic  with  HE  one  and  two  letter  calls  being 
broadcasted  by  Tokyo  Radio  to  presumably  submarine  units.  Kanoya  Air  was 
also  employing  tactical  calls  on  8915  kcs  with  a  call  1  MIYA.  Tokyo  Radio  in 
delivering  an  "all  hands"  despatch  called  all  Major  Fleet  Flagships  less  the  call 
identified  as  FIFTH  FLEET.  Tokyo  Radio  originated  one  despatch  for  action 
to  Radio  Sasebo,  Kure,  Takao,  Maizuru,  Chichijima,  Palao,  Truk,  Saipan,  Jaluit, 
FUMU  44  (may  be  new  Chinkai  Station),  Ominato,  TAU  77,  KUMO  66,  Indo-China 
and  "HOROMUSIRO  Air  Corps  Base.  This  list  just  above  covers  all  outlying 
stations.  KUMO  66  is  believed  to  be  Shanghai  and  TAU  77  definitely  is  in  the 
far  North  (Kuriles).  The  WE  addresses  included  the  No.  2  and  No.  61  Air 
Corps  Commanders  associated  with  Kanoya  Air. 

First  d  Second  Fleets. — Very  little  activity  among  1st  Fleet  Units  as  far  as 
traffic  is  concerned.  Some  traflic  for  second  Fleet  units  was  handled  by  Kure 
Radio.  Combined  Fleet  Flagship  was  guard  for  Suzuya,  Midzuho  and  SUBRON  5 
among  others.     Combined  Fleet  frequency  (6775kcs)  was  active  with  secret  calls. 

Submarines. — Radio  Saipan  accepted  a  despatch  for  SUBDIV  29  (UFU  11). 
While  this  one  instance  may  represent  a  garble,  it  matches  fairly  well  the  past 
reports  that  some  of  the  units  using  secret  calls  on  6385  kcs  lately  were  submarines 
in  the  general  Mandate  area.  Some  of  the  Submarine  service  calls  were  associ- 
ated in  despatch  headings  with  CARDIV  and  COMBINED  AIR  FORCE  Units. 

Air. — Continued  indications  that  a  large  part  of  the  Combined  Air  Force  is 
spread  from  Takao  area  to  Genzan.  Shokaku  ("C"  calls  him  Zuikaku.)  definitely 
associated  with  this  concentration  in  the  Takao  area  with  at  least  one  additional 
unit  SUYO  8  (probably  DesDiv  plane  guards).  Also  RYU  JO  appears  to  be 
associated  with  same  operation  but  may  be  as  far  North  as  the  Sasebo  area. 
Chinkai  radio  guard  for  a  few  additional  fleet  vessels  associated  with  China  Air 
activities  formerly.  AKAGI  and  SORYU  definitely  in  Yokosuka  area.  All  other 
Carriers  appear  to  be  in  the  general  Sasebo  area  except  for  SHOKAKU. 

Third  Fleet.— SUsiht  decrease  in  THIRD  FLEET  traffic  observed. 

Fourth  Fleet  &  Mandates. — Very  few  4th  Fleet  Units  appear  outside  of  Man- 
dates. Bearings  of  the  KOMABASHI  place  this  unit  between  Ellice  and  Gilbert 
Islands  but  one  bearing  was  labeled  poor  so  that  it  is  believed  this  vessel  still 
in  Jaluit  vicinity.  Thirteen  new  Naval  auxiliaries  reported  by  GUAM  in  Man- 
dates ;  some  of  these  verified  by  C0M^14  reports. 

Positions.— TVJJ     5   (M)        '     27.8  150.3 

YOHA  6   (M)  18.0  155.7 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary  20  October  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  far  below  normal.  Receiving  conditions  good  but 
traffic  light  on  all  circuits.  In  the  early  evening  the  major  circuits  were  quite 
active  but  all  traffic  was  cleared  by  midnight.  The  TOKYO  broadcast  carried  a 
good  percentage   of  dummy  traffic.     Maneuvering  traffic  intercepted  on  13560 


746       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Kcs.  and  8710  Kcs.  That  intercepted  on  8710  Kcs.  indicates  that  a  tactical 
problem  is  being  worlied  out.  The  traffic  usually  carries  an  EN  in  the  heading, 
has  an  additional  number  at  the  beginning  of  the  text,  and  all  originator  numbers 
are  fairly  close  together.  Numbers  being  in  proximity  indicate  that  all  series 
were  started  at  the  same  time,  i.  e.  the  beginning  of  the  exercise.  The  secret 
calls  used  are  mostly  unidentified  but  MUTSU  (9  HEFU),  a  submarine-unit 
(3  TEI),  and  TOKYO  RADIO  (7  MARI)  were  among  those  heard.  The  type 
traffic  which  is  believed  to  be  Direction  Finder  or  Radio  Intelligence  has  been 
received  from  CHINKAI  and  an  unidentified  station  in  the  CHOSEN  or  MAN- 
CHUKUO  area.  Other  identified  stations  sending  it  are  TAKAO  TAIWAN), 
JALUIT,  and  three  other  stations  in  the  MANDATES.  JALUIT  sends  these 
messages  singly  but  CHINKAI  combines  several  at  a  time  in  one  transmission. 
The  amount  of  this  traflic  is  increasing. 

Combined  Fleet. — Little  traflic  concerning  the  First  and  Second  Fleets  seen. 
What  traflic  did  appear  was  handled  via  KURE  radio.  A  staff  officer  of  the 
French  Indo  China  Force  is  aboard  NEGATO.  JALUIT  addressed  a  message 
to  Commanding  Officer,  Batdiv  3. 

Submarines. — The  Staff  Communication  Officer  of  Subron  1  addressed  a  message 
to  TRUK.  The  nunsber  of  submarines  operating  with  Combined  Fleet  is  not 
known  but  is  believed  to  comprise  the  greater  part  of  the  Submarine  Force. 

Air. — Air  traffic  in  Mandates  centers  about  CHITOSE  AIR  and  Airron  24. 
No  change  in  status  of  carriers  as  previously  reported. 

Mandates. — Except  for  air  activities  and  civil  engineering  traffic,  4th  Fleet 
and  Mandates  very  quiet. 

China. — No  change  in  dispositions.  The  China  Fleet  Intelligence  Bureau 
addressed  one  of  thgir  members  at  MACAO.  The  Commander  of  the  French 
Indo  China  Forces  originated  several  despatches  to  an  unidentified  unit  which 
was  addressed  by  TOKYO  in  a  WIWI  message  two  days  ago. 

DIF  Bearings. — 27  Naval  Auxiliaries  in  Mandates. 

KINO  5  (KASA  II)     SAIGON— Base  217     . 
TUU  5  (M)  24.  7  153.  5 

RUTI  2  (M)  15. 3  149.  0 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  21  October,  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  returned  to  about  normal  today.  There  was  no 
dummy  messages  in  the  TOKYO  broadcast.  Last  night  this  TOKYO  to  Fleet 
Circuit  was  interf erred  with  by  station  KTK  (Mussel  Rock,  California,  Globe 
Wireless).  This  interference  also  botliered  the  Japanese  for  TOKYO  shifted 
his  frequency  down  10  Kcs.  to  avoid  it.  Statistical  analysis  of  total  navy  traffic 
for  period  15-19  October  shows  a  close  agreement  with  the  normal  established 
for  the  past  3  mouths.  CinC  Combined  Fleet  originated  about  50%  more  traffic 
than  normal  and  CinC  1st  Fleet  originated  far  less  than  his  normal.  These 
were  the  only  variations  noted.  The  major  shore  stations  are  not  now  exi)eri- 
encing  as  many  difficulties  as  before  in  the  routing  of  traffic,  the  whereabouts  of 
all  units  being  apparently  better  known.  Sasebo  radio  today  sent  traffic  identified 
as  direction  finder  bearings.  The  stations  now  sending  this  traffic  are  CHINKAI, 
ORU  4  (in  Manchuko),  FUIMU  4  (in  Chosen  ?),  JALUIT  and  SASEBO.  The 
amount  of  this  traffic  is  still  increasing.  All  High  North  Circuits  checked  but 
little  activity. 

Combined  Fleet. — Little  traffic  concerning  these  fleets.  The  Commander  in 
Chief  appears  as  an  addressee  but  did  not  originate  much  to  his  command.  It  is 
known  that  Subron  5  is  in  company  with  MUTSU  but  the  flagship  of  Subron  5 
(YURA)  is  in  CHINKAI  area.  This  leaves  doubt  as  to  the  location  of  his  com- 
mand. If  with  him  there  MUTSU  must  also  be  in  that  area.  The  Second  Fleet 
has  been  quiet  for  some  time. 

Third  Fleet. — Apparently  inactive  in  Sasebo  area.  Comairron  6  made  a  move- 
ment report  to  CinC  3rd  Fleet.  The  Commander  1st  Base  Force  is  fairly  active 
with  his  Marus. 

Fourth  Fleet. — Inactive  in  Truk  area.  SAIPAN  was  in  communication  with 
KAGOSHIMA  Air  and  Commander  Cardivs. 

Fifth  Fleet. — No  indication  yet  of  any  attempt  to  organize  and  concentrate 
this  vague  unit.  The  Commander  5th  Fleet  sent  a  despatch  to  CinC  Combined 
today. 

Submarines. — Submarines  tactical  circuits  heard  today.     A  Staff  Officer  of 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  747 

Commander  Submarine  Force  addressed  a  message  to  the  SubForce  collective  and 
for  information  to  all  major  Fleet  flags. 

Air. — The  Commander  Combined  Air  Force  addressed  a  message  as  follows  : 
Action  to  :  MINISTER  OF  NAVY. 

CHIEF  OF  NAVAL  GENERAL  STAFF. 

COMBINED  AIRFORCE. 

CINC  COMBINED  FLEET. 

CARDIV  4  less  HOSHO  and  ORU  4  (unidentified). 

CARDIV  3. 

Information  to:  CINC  CHINA  FLEET. 

CINC  SOUTH  CHINA  FLEET. 
ALL  MAJOR  FLEET  FLAGSHIPS. 

It  would  appear  from  this  message  that  whatever  the  combined  Air  Force  in- 
tends to  do  will  interest  the  China  Fleet.  It  is  apparent  that  he  has  all  ready 
located  parts  of  his  command  from  TAIWAN  northward  at  least  as  far  as 
GENZAN.  The  fact  that  he  has  had  Carriers  added  to  his  force  (Carriers  are 
not  normally  part  of  the  Combined  Air  Force)  indicates  a  large  scale  operation 
over  a  long  distance. 

D/F  Bearings. — 33  Naval  Auxiliaries  in  Mandates. 

Positions. — 

9  (M)  Comm— Takao  (FUWI  4)  to  SAMA  (SASI  4) 

4  (M)  Comm— Palao  (MISE  8)  to  Yap  (INE  6) 

8  (M)  Comm— Chichijima  (EME  6)  to  Yokosuka  (HOMI  3) 

4  (M)  Comm— Sasebo  (KIMU  9)  to  Bako  (NOTI  7) 

5  (M)  Comm— Sasebo  (KIMU  9)  to  Bako  (NOTI  7) 
2  (M)  Comm— Establish  with  Sasebo  (KIMU  9) 

6  (M)  22.5  151.5 
8  (Katsuriki)  10.0  169.0 
2  (M)                 12.8  150.5 

6  (M)  27.5  124.2 

7  (M)  22.7  149.0 
7  (M)  16.3  147.5 
2  (M)  19.2  159.9 
6  (M)  24.3  122.1 

Commuhication  Intelligence  Summary,  22  Octoler  19Itl 

General — Larger  volume  of  traffic  intercepted  than  normal,  with  no  "dummy" 
traffic  appearing.  The  traffic  was  dominated  by  exchanges  between  Staff  Com- 
munication Officers  of  all  major  forces,  with  highly  significant  increase  in  China 
and  South  China  activities.  UNI  WIWI  from  a  Tokio  originator  was  addressed 
action  to  CinC  Combined,  info  to  CinC's  Com.  Air  Force  China,  South  China  Air 
Command  (at  Sama,  Hainan)  KORYU  (CV)  plus  Yokosuka  and  Bako  addresses. 
The  use  of  tactical  (numeral  two-kana)  calls  is  increasing  with  despatches  coming 
through  on  regular  shore  channels  carrying  NR  and  SMS  of  identified  service 
calls.  Air  activities  ,afloat  and  ashore,  in  all  areas,  were  heavy  traffic  originators, 
with  greatest  emphasis  on  the  Whole  mandate  area,  Takao-China-Hainan.  11 
Marus  yesterday  and  today  were  noted  using  the  suffix  denoting  "C.  O.  Naval 
Detachment  aboard"  without  definite  indication  of  affiliations,  though  most  ap- 
peared connected  with  the  Takao-Hainan  air  movement. 

Combined  Fleet. — Most  traffic  from  CinC  Staff  was  fi-om  Staff  Comm.  Officer, 
V7ith  suffix  "Secretary"  second  in  volume.  Many  general  address  despatches  were 
originated,  embracing  all  areas  in  specific  callups  and  leading  to  believe  that  a 
call  change  may  be  impending  or  that  some  communication  change  is  scheduled. 
The  D/F  net  collective  appeared  with  most  general  address  messages.  No  indi- 
cation of  movement  of  CinC  from  Kure-Sasebo  area. 

First  Fleet. — ^Addressed  frequently  but  little  originated.  No  area  change 
indicated. 

Second  Fleet. — Same  as  First. 

Third  Fleet. — Apparently  still  in  Sasebo  area. 

Fourth  Fleet. — Communications  to  and  from  CinC  continue  through  TRUK. 
Originates  several  collectively  addressed  to  4th  Fleet.  NIKA  WIWI  (Special 
key  URGENT)  from  Naval  Intelligence  Tokio  addressed  for  action  Ch,  of  St.  4th 
Fleet  info  Combined  and  Maizuru  address.  SUU  UNA  WIWI  from  MAYURU 
(Tokio)  to  Ch.  of  St.  4th,  info  all  air  and  base  forces  in  the  Mandates. 


748       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Fifth  Fleet. — This  nebulous  unit  is  very  elusive.  The  tentatively  identified 
Commander  was  exempted  in  a  general  address  message  and  again  appeared  in 
the  proper  order  between  4th  Fleet  and  Subfor  in  an  addi'ess.  Delivery  routing 
and  guard  stations  have  never  been  determined. 

Suhmariyies. — Some  activity  with  tactical  calls  on  Subfor  frequencies  as  re- 
ported all  October.  No  detectable  change  in  operating  areas  previously  reported. 
Carriers. — Cardiv  4  addressed  care  Takao  Radio  and  included  with  China  and 
Hainan  addresses,  indicating  probable  operating  area  South  of  Taiwan.  Cardiv  5 
(UYU  3)  with  the  Koryu  and  Zuikaku  are  operating  with  Yokosuka  and  Omura 
air  stations.  AKAGI  and  SORYU  appear  to  be  preparing  to  leave  Yokosuka  and 
resume  operations.  Carrier  Comdr.  still  aboard  KAGA  in  company  HIRYU  and 
traffic  still  appears  through  Sasebo  routing. 

Combined  Air  Force. — Air  Force  and  communications  most  active  in  todays 
traffic.  The  reshuffling  of  air  units  which  was  underway  in  September  and  the 
first  half  of  October  is  apparently  completed  and  large  scale  operations  in  the 
Mandates,  Chosen-Manchukuo,  and  Taiwan-Hainan-Amoy  areas  are  in  prospect 
or  progressing.  The  Special  Task  Force  or  Southern  Expeditionary  Force  of 
which  the  KASHII  is  Flagship  is  assuming  considerable  importance  in  despatch 
headings  and  is  connected  with  the  Combined  Air  Force  and  CARDIV  4  in  forth- 
coming maneuvers  or  operations.  A  call  tentatively  identified  as  Spratley  Island 
(NRE  0)  is  addressed  in  several  general  collective  despatches  originated  by 
Tokyo  Communication  Division  and  Tokyo  Plotting  and  DF  Sections  and  is  called 
directly  from  Tokyo  for  delivery,  indicating  probable  DF  activity  in  that  area. 

With  nothing  definite  to  point  to,  the  impression  grows  that  a  large  scale 
screening  maneuver  or  operation,  at  least,  is  in  progress,  involving  mainly  air 
units  in  the  Mandates,  Takao-Hainan  Indo-China  area,  the  Kuriles,  and  Sub- 
marines Marcus  and  Chichijima  to  the  Kuriles.  Identification  of  Horomushiro 
as  an  Air  Base  the  otJier  day  places  air  operations  up  to  the  Northern  Kuriles. 
D  F  Bearings. — 33  Naval  Auxiliaries  in  Mandates. 
Positions. — 

HONA  6  (M)     Communication— Chinkai  (SUTI  5)  to  Tsingtao  (UYO  5). 

SAHO  2  (M)     Communication— sasebo  (KIMU  9)  to  TIKU  0  (shore) . 

KIMO  5  (Kashii)— Base  217— Saigon. 

KENO  2  (Koshu?)     09.3     151.1. 

KERO  8  (Katsuriki)     10.0    169.0. 

HAO  7  (M)      13.5     149.4. 

YOHA  6  (M)     25.0    148.7. 

FURI  6  (M)      27.3     124.4. 

SATE  0  (M)     23.1     148.3. 

SEMI  MARU     13.7     144.6. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  23  October  19Jfl 

General. — Traffic  interception  about  normal  volume  with  continuing  absence 
of  dummy  traffic.  The  collective  address  communication  messages  continue, 
either  presaging  a  call  change  or  correcting  communication  publication  to  conform 
with  organization  changes.  There  was  less  exchange  of  traffic  between  Empire 
and  Mandate  areas  due  to  confusion  on  the  Orange  circuits  but  it  was  indicated 
that  the  volume  and  character  was  similar  to  yesterday.  Expansion  of  the  China 
activity  into  the  Indo-Cliina  area  was  indicated  by  increasing  traffic  to  and  from 
the  Southern  Expeditionary  Force,  in  the  Saigon  area,  with  information  ad- 
dressees including  all  forces  attached  to  China  waters  northward  to  Chinkai. 

Fleet. — No  changes  in  locations  previously  reported  except  that  traffic  routing 
places  the  tentative  Fifth  Fleet  as  at  or  near  Yokosuka  and  traffic  headings  with 
information  addressees  may  indicate  that  this  force  is  charged  with  operations 
in  the  area  from  Chichijima  northward.  Tentatively,  this  would  place  task  areas 
for  various  forces  as  below : 

Combined,  1st,  2nd  and  Subforce  nucleus  plus  some  carriers  Yokosuka  to 
Sasebo. 

3rd  Fleet,  Sasebo,  Japan  Sea,  Maizuru. 

4th  Fleet,  Marshalls  to  Palau  to  Chichijima. 

5th  Fleet,  Chichijima  to  Kuriles  (vague). 

Southern  Expeditionary  Force  (KASHII  Flag)   Indo  China,  South  China 
Sea. 

South  China  Force  (ISUZU  Flag)  Hainan-Taiwan. 

Combined  Air  with  Carriers,  Taiwan-Naha,  Chichijima. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  749 

Fourth  Fleet. — Cine  Truk  area  as  before. 

Significant  despatches  included  six  URGENTS  plus  several  routines  as  below : 

UNI— Cine  CombFlt  to  Comdr.  CombAirFor  INFO :  Cine  China,  SoChina, 
Ch.  NavGenSt,  Tokyo,  plus  Yokosuka,  Bako  and  Hainan  addressees. 

NIKA  WIWI— Tokyo  origin  to  CinC  Combined,  CinO  4th. 

UNI— CinC  CombFlt  to  St.  Comm.  Officer  Corab.AirFor  infor  St.  Comm. 
Officers  China  Fit.,  SoChinaForce,  SoChAirFor,  Comm.  Div.  Tokyo,  plus 
Sasebo  and  Bako  addressees. 

UNI— Chief  of  Staff  China  Fleet  to  Naval  Intelligence  Tokyo.  Retrans- 
mitted by  Communication  Division  Tokyo  for  information  to  Staff  Com- 
munication Officer,  Combined  Fleet. 

Routine — Chief  of  Staff  South  China  Force — same  as  above. 

WIWI— Naval  Intelligence  Tokyo  to  Chief  of  Staff  China  Fleet  informa- 
tion Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet,  South  China  Force. 

Routine — Chief  of  Staff  Fourth  Fleet  to  Naval  Intelligence  Tokyo  infor- 
mation Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet,  and  Maizuru  address. 

SUU  WIWI— Chief  Navy  General  Staff  Tokyo  to  Staff  Communication 
Officer  Fourth  Fleet. 

Routine— Chief  of  Staff  Submarine  Force  to   Collective  ALL  FORCES 
COMBINED   FLEET,   Collective   Submarine  Force,   information   DF  head- 
quarters Tokyo  and  new  station  in  South  China  sea  area.     (NRE  0) 

Routine — Long  3  part  despatch  from  DF  headquarters  Tokyo  to  Collective 
ALL  MAJOR  FLAGSHIPS  information  Tokyo  Tracking  Section,  Stations 
of  DF  Net. 

Routine  SUU— Short  5  numeral  despatch  from  joint  origin  Bureau  Military 
Affairs— Navy  General  Staff  Tokyo  to  Chiefs  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet,  First, 
Second,  Third,  Fourth,  Fifth,  Submarine  Force,  Carrier  Divisions,  Combined 
Air  Force,  China  Fleet,  North  China  Fleet,  Southern  Expeditionary  Force, 
Sasebo,  Bako,  Chinkai  addresses— information — unidentified  addresses  plus 
collective  shore.  In  this  it  is  noted  that  CINC  SOUTH  CHINA  FORCE  is 
omitted  but  the  Southern  Expeditionary  Force  is  included.  This  is  similar 
to  operations  in  Indo-China  occupation  vrhen  the  Third  Fleet  assumed  major 
Importance  with  CINC  SOUTH  CHINA  FORCE  apparently  subordinated. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  2-'t  October  19->{1 

General. — Traffic  volume  light  due  to  very  poor  receiving  conditions  obtaining 
here.  Heavy  static  and  fading  ruined  reception  on  the  night  watches  when  most 
traffic  is  copied.  The  TOKYO  broadcast  carried  no  dummy  traffic.  The  number 
of  general  messages  emanating  from  Tokyo  continues  to  be  high.  Most  of  these 
today  came  from  the  Communications  activities  of  the  Ministry.  There  were  a 
few  from  the  double  originator,  Navy  Minister  and  Chief  of  the  General  Staff. 
Especially  prominent  today  was  the  activity  of  the  SUTU  7  and  ESARO  combina- 
tion, thought  by  this  Unit  to  be  radio  intelligence  and  direction  finding  activities. 
ESARO  received  frequent  reports  from  Chinkai  and  ORU  4  (station  in  that  area), 
JALUIT,  and  PALAO.  He  in  turn  originated  messages  to  the  CINC  COMBINED 
and  CINC  SECOND  AND  was,  more  frequently  than  not,  at  lea.st  an  information 
addressee  in  all  messages  between  the  major  commanders.  The  interest  in  the 
South  China  Activities  continues.  There  has  been  much  traffic  directed  to  the 
French  Indo  China  Force,  to  HAINAN  activities  and  to  NRE0  (identified  as 
Spratley  Islands  but  thought  to  be  in  vicinity  of  Camranh  Bay).  This  particular 
wave  of  South  China  interest  seems  to  date  from  the  15th  of  October  when  NRE0 
sent  a  dispatch  to  Takao  which  was  then  reported  to  all  major  commanders. 

First  Fleet. — Little  activity  by  fleet  units  except  as  noted  under  Second  Fleet. 
CinC  Combined  Fleet  received  a  KIU  from  C.  N.  G.  S.  and  from  the  Commander 
of  Direction  Finder  Activities  (SUTU  77).  He  sent  one  to  a  general  collective 
call,  SUTU  7  and  NREO  (Spratley?  Camranh?). 

Second  Fleet. — After  a  long  period  of  comparative  inactivity  ihe  CinC  Second 
Fleet  today  sent  a  message  with  the  following  heading : 

Third     Fleet     (Collective)      (Now     in 

Sasebo  area) 
Combined  Air  Force  (Collective) 
Second  Fleet  (Collective), 
BatDiv  Three, 
Desron  Three, 


750       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Information : 

Palao  Radio  French  Indo  China  Force 

NERO  (Spratley  ?,  Camranh  ?)  Subron  Six 

SUTU  77  (D/F)  Subron  Five 

Toliyo  Radio  Taliao  Radio 

ComsubFor  CinC  Combined  Fleet 

ComCarDiv  Five 

Attention  is  invited  to  the  action  addressees  of  this  message.  They  have 
appeared  separately  in  the  traflSc  for  weeks  and  are  here  grouped  in  one 
message  a  single  commander.  Secondly,  the  units  named  are  not  normally  under 
the  Command  of  the  Second  Fleet.  The  geographic  area  indicated  is  to  the 
south  (Palao,  Takao,  Spratley). 

Third  Fleet. — Same  activity  by  Second  Base  Fleet  but  little  traffic  from  this 
unit. 

Fourth  Fleet. — Comairron  Tvs^enty-four  addresfeed  a  message  to  6  Tokyo 
addressees  and  part  of  his  unit  at  Yokohama  Air  Station,  less  the  Chitose  Air 
Corps.    No  other  activity  in  Fourth  Fleet. 

Air. — The  Communication  Officer  CarDivs  sent  a  message  v^ith  the  following 
heading : 

Com.Off.  SubFor. 
"     "     Desron  One. 
"     "     BatDiv  Three. 
"     "     CruDiv  8. 
Cardivs  less  Cardiv  3. 
Information : 

Tokyo  Radio. 
SUTU  749. 

ComOfiE  Combined  Fleet. 
The  air  activities  of  the  Air  Force  and  the  Cardivs  continues  as  previously 
reported. 

Submarines. — Comsubfor  addressed  a  message  to  Jaluit,  Tokyo  Radio  and 
Communication  Officer  Carrier  Divisions. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  25  October,  19^1 

General. — Traffic  volume  about  normal.  All  circuits  heard  well  except  for  the 
Yokosuka-Saipan  circuit  which  was  poor.  At  0730  Tokyo  radio  began  transmit- 
ting traffic  with  tactical  calls,  from  that  time  until  noon  these  calls  were  of  the 
single  and  doube  KANA  variety.  At  1200  he  worked  apparently  the  same  people 
but  sent  only  the  numeral  kana  hand  variety.  In  aU  cases  these  messages  began 
a  new  numbering  series  for  each  originator.  The  normal  or  administrative  traffic 
continued  on  in  the  old  series.  The  conclusion  is  drawn  that  these  new  number 
series  while  continuing  the  old  indicator  the  beginning  of  tactics  akin  to  a  fleet 
problem  with  that  traffic  to  form  separate  files.  Activity  of  the  direction  Finder 
net  was  indicated  by  transmissions  from  the  Chinkai  and  ORU  4  stations.  None 
was  received  from  the  mandates  Stations  but  this  was  due  to  the  poor  reception 
of  the  Saipan  circuit.  Tokyo  Communication  originated  several  more  messages 
of  general  address.  One  NIKA  WIWI  was  originated  by^okyo  and  sent  to 
Chief  of  StafC  Carrier  Divisions,  Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet  and  Carrier 
Division  Two. 

First  Fleet. — Little  information  relative  this  fleet  but  at  sea  in  the  Kyushu  area. 
Practically  the  only  traffic  concerning  it  was  in  the  tactical  systems  mentioned 
above. 

Second  Fleet. — ^No  activity. 

Third  Fleet. — Commander  Second  Base  Force  originated  a  movement  report 
which  went  for  information  to  Maizuru.  Bumil  sent  one  to  Chief  of  Staff  Third 
Fleet  for  information  of  Commander  First  and  Second  Base  Forces. 

Fourth  Fleet. — Air  Squadron  Twenty-fourth  is  still  very  active  with  Jaluit 
and  Truk. 

China. — Little  activity.  Spratley  Island  addressed  a  message  to  NRE0 
(Camranh)  for  information  of  a  First  Fleet  Unit,  Saipan,  Chichijima,  Hainan 
and  Takao.  The  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  French  Indo  China  Force  sent  one  to  CinO 
Combined  Fleet  for  information  of  all  Combined  Fleet  Commanders. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT   INQUIRY  751 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  26  October,  19^1 

General. — Large  amount  of  tactical  call  traffic  intercepted  on  frequencies  used 
for  communication  between  Tokyo  and  Mandate  Stations.  Identifications  of  calls 
showed  that  Tokyo,  Saipan,  Palau,  Truk,  Jaluit  and  two  or  three  unplaced  shore 
calls  handled  the  bulk  of  the  traffic.  Guards  for  all  forces  of  the  Combined  Fleet 
were  also  present,  using  a  large  number  of  alternate  calls  and  addresses.  Analysis 
of  the  routing  and  handling  of  this  type  of  traffic  leads  to  the  belief  that  the 
activity  is  largely  concerned  with  a  major  communication  drill  or  test,  combined 
with  possible  maneuvers  of  the  Fourth  Fleet  and  air  units  in  the  Mandates. 
Control  of  the  operation  appears  to  rest  with  Tokyo  Radio,  who  transmitted 
several  high  precedence-urgent  despatches  in  abbreviated  procedure  on  the  UTU, 
calling  collective  Combined  Fleet  for  delivery.  The  prefix  "Jitsu"  appeared 
occasionally,  meaning  that  the  despatch  was  bona  fide,  indicating  that  the  bulk 
of  the  ti-afBc  was  drill.  This  is  reverse  of  the  usual  procedure  of  indicating  the 
drill  trafiic  by  the  prefix  "Enshu"  when  normal  traffic  constitutes  the  bulk  of  the 
load.  Possible  active  participation  of  the  Fourth  in  maneuvers  is  indicated  by 
exemption  of  this  force  in  several  messages  under  normal  addresses  and  general 
collectives.  Contradictory  routing  to  tactical  addresses  previously  identified  as 
major  force  flagships  and  commanders  and  the  lack  of  "jigs"  and  repeats  tends 
to  confirm  the  primary  communication  nature  of  the  exercise.  This  may  be 
preliminary  to  a  major  call  change  in  the  near  future.  Normal  administrative 
traffic  intercepted  indicates  that  there  has  been  no  movement  of  major  units  into 
areas  in  which  the  tactical  traffic  would  place  them. 

Combined  Fleet. — Flags  of  Combined,  First,  Second  and  Submarine  Force  ap- 
pear to  still  be  located  in  the  Kyushu  area,  with  Air  Force  commander  and 
Carrier  Division  Four  in  Takao.  Preparations  for  an  unidentified  air  command 
(YOME  7)  to  move  from  Taiwan  to  South  China  appear  to  be  under  way.  It  is 
believed  that  Carrier  Division  Three  (NUYA  8)  is  proceeding  to  join  Carrier 
Division  Four  to  operate  under  Air  Force  Commander.  One  despatch  heading 
indicates  that  the  HOSHO  may  also  be  rejoining  Carrier  Division  Four.  Com- 
manding Officers  of  the  SORYU  and  KORYU  were  aboard  the  KAGA  (Com- 
mander Carriers  Flagship)  yesterday.  The  AKAGI  has  left  Yokosuka  Navy  Yard 
and  will  probably  rejoin  the  KAGA.  The  Fifth  Fleet  is  assuming  a  slightly  more 
tangible  form,  with  an  additional  alternate  recovered  and  a  movement  report, 
involving  a  new  fleet  unit  with  this  force  (?).  Yokosuka  continues  to  accept 
traffic  addressed  to  Fifth  Fleet. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  27  October  IBJfl 

General. — Traffic  volume  below  normal  attributed  to  weekend  and  possible  non 
coverage.  A  few  dispatches  in  tactical  systems  using  new  types  of  calls  observed ; 
these  were  undoubtedly  late  deliveries  of  the  previous  day's  heavy  traffic  in 
tactical  communications.  A  survey  of  the  past  few  days  traffic  and  location 
sheets  reveals  the  definite  association  of  certain  naval  auxiliaries  with  several 
component  parts  of  the  Combined  Fleet.  Some  of  these  naval  auxiliaries  are 
known  to  be  tankers.  Examples  (1)  Commanding  Officer  KYOKUTO  Maru  that 
made  two  or  three  fast  tanker  trips  to  California  last  spring  is  aboard  the  KAGA, 
(2)  the  NARUTO  and  another  new  auxiliary  (YUMAJ3)  appeared  at  least  twice 
with  those  first  fleet  units  most  likely  to  move. 

First  and  Second  Fleets. — COM-16  reports  the  majority  of  First  and  Second 
Fleets  in  the  Inland  Sea-Ariaki  area.  Also  that  the  YAMASHIRO  is  in  Yokosuka 
while  KONGO  is  in  Maizuru.  The  units  of  the  First  Fleet  that  appear  to  be 
involved  in  movements,  present  or  immediate  future,  include: 

SENDAI— CL. 

MIDZUHO— AV. 

HYUGA— BE. 

1  other  BB— (WAFU0)   with  HYUGA. 

BatDiv  3— (Includes  KONGO,  KIRISHIMA,  HARUNA,  HIYEI). 

Desron  1  and  3. 
Submarines. — COM-16  reports  ComSubForce  and  large  part  of  the  Submarine 
Force  in  the  Inland  Sea-Ariaki  area.  One  important  Submarine  Squadron 
(NASU4)  has  appeared  frequently  associated  with  Cruiser  Division  8  in  the  Sec- 
ond Fleet  and  Destroyer  Squadron  1  in  First  Fleet.  There  is  a  slight  indication 
that  a  part  of  Carrier  Divisions  and  these  forces  will  operate  in  the  Mandates. 
Several  dispatches  forwarded  to  ComSubForce  and  ComCarDivs  have  also  in- 


752       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

eluded  JALUIT  and  TRUK  Radio  Stations.  Additionally  Tokio  Radio  originated 
a  despatch  to  Communication  Officer  Cruiser  Division  8  information  to  COMOFFS 
CAF,  Second  Fleet,  BatDiv  3,  CARDIVS  and  JALUIT  Radio.  While  SubForce  is 
exempted  in  this  last  despatch,  there  seems  to  be  a  tie-in  between  these  forces  and 
the  Mandates. 

Air. — The  following  units  appear  to  comprise  all  air  activities  of  Combined 
Fleet  now  operating  in  Takao-South  China  Area : 

MOO0— 11th  Air  Corps. 

NTI4— CAF  (Comdr.,  and  COMOFF). 

OTOfi— KANOYA  Air  Corps. 

REA2— SHIOGAMA  Air  Corps. 

SIHA5— ZnJIKAKU. 

SUY08— Plane  guards  for  ZUIKAKO. 

T0ME2— Large  AIRON  in  CAF. 

YUHI7— KASUGA  MARU  (new  Converted  carrier)? 
Also  CarDiv  3,  HOSHO,  and  RYUJO  appear  to  be  in  Takao  general  area  but 
not  with  the  above  forces. 

Mandates. — A  considerable  concentration  of  air  activities  continues  in  the 
Mandates.  One  Mandate  naval  auxiliary  YUH08  originated  a  dispatch  to  a 
FUSAN  (Korea)  address.  Fourth  Fleet  and  Chitose  Air  Corps  both  appear  at 
TRUK. 

China. — North  and  South  China  appear  relatively  quiet  if  Takao  is  placed 
outside  of  this  category. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  28  October  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal  with  good  reception  on  all  circuits  except 
Tokyo  to  Shanghai  which  was  poor.  The  direction  finder  stations  throughout  the 
Mandates  were  active  indicating  an  exercise  of  this  net.  The  types  of  tactical 
traffic  previously  reported  as  being  very  heavy  has  now  been  reduced  to  very  light. 
It  is  now  apparent  that  such  traffic  was  in  the  nature  of  a  drill  embracing  the 
entire  Communication  System.  A  few  tactical  circuits  heard,  Carriers  were 
heard  on  9606  kcs..  Central  China  Forces  on  4690  kcs.  and  the  Direction  Finder 
Net  on  4955  kcs. 

First  Fleet. — No  indication  of  movement  of  this  fleet.  Today  a  message  ad- 
'dressed  to  Chief  of  Staff  Second  Fleet  and  Battleship  Division  One  was  sent  to 
the  Second  Fleet  for  delivery.  Another  message  originated  by  CinC.  Combined 
Fleet  was  intercepted  on  Jaluit  radio  station  frequency.  This  last  message  is 
discounted  as  being  a  communication  error  of  some  discription.  The  Chief  of 
Staff  of  the  French  Indo  China  Force, is  aboard  the  Combined  Fleet  Flagship 
today.  It  will  be  recalled  that  the  Radio  Officer  of  this  force  was  aboard  the 
Flagship  several  days  ago. 

Second  Fleet. — No  comment. 

Third  Fleet. — Except  for  some  activity  among  units  of  the  First  Base  Force, 
Third  Fleet  very  quiet. 

Fourth  Fleet  and  Mandates. — Indications  are  growing  stronger  that  the  Fourth 
Fleet  is  preparing  for  operations.  The  CinC.  Fourth  Fleet  has  been  originating 
considerable  traffic  for  the  past  two  days  and  this  has  been  addressed  to  the 
Combined  Fleet,  Submarine  Force,  Carrier  Divisions  and  several  Tokyo  addres- 
sees. The  Base  Forces  at  Saipan,  Jaluit,  Truk  and  Imieji  have  become  active 
in  traffic.  The  air  activity  in  the  Marshals  is  increasing  although  there  have  been 
no  reinforcements  of  the  air  units  all  ready  there.  Truk  radio  has  been  active 
in  transmitting  weather  originated  by  stations  at  Mortlock,  Ololo,  Kwajalang,  and 
one  unidentified  station.  His  frequent  communication  with  Commander  Carrier 
Divisions  plus  above  weather  may  indicate  coming  augmentation  of  the  air 
forces  there. 

Submarines. — Little  activity. 

China. — ^Tokyo  originators  are  still  addressing  much  traffic  to  Sama,  Takao, 
Bako,  Saigon  and  the  South  China  Fleet.  The  latter  made  a  movement  report 
today  but  the  movement  is  believed  to  be  a  local  one. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  29  October  19^1 

General. — Less  volume  of  intercepted  traffic  today.  The  heavy  use  of  tactical 
calls  and  addresses  on  the  Tokyo-Mandate  Fleet  general  circuit  which  com- 
menced on  25  October  and  was  tagged  as  a  communication  test-drill,  was  com- 
pleted early  on  the  28th.     Use  of  tactical  calls  with  maneuvering  traffic  on 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  753 

various  Fleet  frequencies,  with  Combined,  First,  Second  Fleet  flagships  and  units 
of  these  Fleets  participating  continues  and  a  revival  of  tactical  trafhc  on  sub- 
marine frequencies  indicates  that  portions  of  these  forces  are  at  sea.  Carriers 
were  also  heard  working.  The  Third  Fleet  was  especially  prominent  as  an 
originator  with  code  movement  reports  from  Comdesron  Five,  Comairron  Six, 
Number  Two  Base  Force,  First  Defense  Division  of  Third  Fleet  indicating  prep- 
arations for  some  activity  on  the  part  of  this  force.  The  Fifth  Fleet  is  daily 
assuming  more  tangible  form  and  it  is  believed  that  it  will  shortly  appear  as  an 
active  unit  of  the  Combined  Fleet. 

Combined  Fleet. — Continued  operations  with  First,  Second  Fleet  Units,  AKAGI, 
SORYU  and  SHOKAKU  apparently  in  same  south  Kyushu  area.  It  is  believed 
the  Commander  Submarine  Force  is  also  operating  in  the  same  area. 

Third  Fleet .—Thi's,  unit  apparently  preparing  to  move  from  Sasebo  area.  The 
CinC  Third  Fleet  is  not  aboard  his  usual  flagship,  NAGARA,  today.  "Various 
Third  Fleet  units  initiated  movement  reports  as  reported  above  under  general 
notes. 

Fourth  Fleet. — Remains  Truk  area,  with  general  air  activity  continuing 
throughout  Mandate  area  but  especially  Siapau-Truk-Jaluit  areas. 

Stihmarine  Force. — Jaluit  Radio  came  up  under  tactical  call  on  Submarine 
Force  frequency  working  three  previously  unheard  sliips  with  D/F  bearings 
running  through  the  Marshalls. 

China. — Carrier  Divisions  Three  and  Four  continue  association  with  Com- 
bined Air  Force  Commander  in  the  Takao  area,  with  HIKUl  (Unidentified 
Sasebo  Office)  apparently  having  cognizance  over  forces  in  Taiwan,  South  China 
and  Hainan  areas,  as  well  as  the  South  Expeditionary  Force  in  Indo  China  area. 

It  is  still  felt  that  the  areas  of  operations  of  the  various  forces  as  outlined  in 
the  summary  of  23  October  is  substantially  correct. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  30  October  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  a  little  above  normal.  TOKYO  Communication  is 
continuing  to  originate  messages  for  general  distribution.  This  activity  has 
covered  a  considerable  period  now  and  is,  I  believe,  unprecedential.  The  subject 
matter  is  unknown  because  of  the  general  address  always  involved.  The  only 
conclusions  are  that  a  major  change  in  the  communication  system  is  imminent 
or  that  regular  reports  are  being  made  to  the  Navy  concerning  communications. 
Very  little  tactical  traffic  intercepted.  The  High  North  circuits  continue  to  be 
quiet.  Base  HO  4  heard  calling  HO  1  and  exchanged  signal  strengths  but  no 
traffic  sent.  Jaluit,  Saipau,  and  Truk  heard  working  each  other.  Direction 
Finder  activities  quiet ;  Jaluit  did  not  send  in  any  bearings,  Saipan  sent  two 
and  Chinkai  sent  four. 

Combined  F/eef.— Little  activity  evidenced  by  either  the  1st  or  2nd  Fleets. 
The  CINC  COMBINED  Fleet  was  prominent  as  an  addressee  but  originated  very 
little  traffic.  The  greater  part  of  these  Fleets  appear  to  be  in  Kure  area  but 
CINC  is  indicated  as  being  in  Sasebo, 

Third  Fleet.- — This  Fleet  very  active  in  radio  traffic.     The  Commander  in  Chief 

originated  much  traffic  as  did  the  Commanders  of  the  1st  and  2nd  Base  Forces. 

Yesterday  the  despatches  seemed  to  be  of  the  movement  report  variety  while 

those  today  appear  to  be  regarding  organizations.     Some  typical  headings  are: 

From:  TIYA  77  (Com.dr  1st  Base  Force) 

To :  CINC  COMBINED  FLEET 

Chief  of  Naval  General  Staff 
Info:  All  Major  Unit  Commanders    (less  4th  Fleet,  French  Indo-China 
Force,  1st  Defense  Division  and  COMAIRRON  6) 
CINC  THIRD  FLEET  sent  one  as  follows : 
Action :  CINC  COMBINED  FLEET 

Chief  of  Naval  General  Staff. 
Info:  MESA  1  (unidentified)  ;  All  Major  Commanders  (less  4th  Fleet)  ; 
AIRRON  6;  NITU  7  (A  Division  in  3rd  Fleet)  ;  Defense  Division  1;  NA- 
GARA ;  Comdr  2nd  Base  Force ;  Comdr  1st  Base  Force. 
There  has  been  no  confirmation  of  movement  of  this  Fleet  by  other  means 
than   traffic  headings.     Normal   delivery   of  traffic   via   Sasebo  continues.    No 
confirmation  by  DF  hearings.     It  is  therefore  believed  that  the  movement  is 
imminent.     The  directive  is  not  evident  but  Cavite  reports  that  the  ASHIGARA 
has  departed  for  South.     BuMil  is  in  active  touch  with  Bako  and  the  UNO 
Taihoku. 


754       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Fourth  Fleet. — One  despatch  today  addresed  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the 
4th  Fleet  in  care  of  Naval  Intelligence  at  Tokyo.  For  the  past  two  days  all  4th 
Fleet  Traffic  has  been  addressed  to  the  Chief  of  StafE  rather  than  the  CINC. 
Most  of  the  activity  in  this  F'leet  still  centers  about  the  4th,  5th  and  6th  Defense 
Divisions.  Today  both  Saipan  and  Truk  sent  messages  to  MOMU/0  (a  new 
Carrier  identified  here  as  KORYU).  The  association  of  the  KORYU,  SAIPAN, 
TRUK  and  YOKOSUKA  Air  Corps  leads  to  the  belief  that  KORYU  and 
YOKOSUKA  Air  will  move  toward  Saipan  soon. 

Subniarines. — Nothing  to  report. 

China. — The  traffic  load  on  the  South  China  circuits  has  greatly  increased. 
SAMA,  HAINAN  is  quite  prominent  as  an  addressee  and  has  originated  far  more 
traffic  recently  than  for  the  past  few  months. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  SI  Octo'ber,  19^1 

General. — at  0000,  31  October,  Japanese  Navy  service  calls  changed  in  all  fleet 
and  air  units,  as  expected.  Shore  station  calls  and  addresses  remain  unchanged. 
Insufficient  data  is  at  hand  at  time  of  writing  to  determine  whether  tactical 
calls  in  the  fleet  were  also  switched ;  however  these  shifted  on  20  September  and 
may  carry  over.  Traffic  intercepted  on  31st  about  normal  volume  with  continua- 
tion of  general  address  messages  from  Communication  Division  Tokyo,  Naval 
Ministry  and  China  Fleet  Intelligence.  Increasing  traffic  involving  the  Fifth 
Fleet  appeared,  including  communication  officers  of  this  force  and  of  the  Fourth, 
probably  indicating  early  activity  of  the  Fifth  Fleet  in  connection  with,  or  in 
areas  adjacent  to,  the  Fourth  Fleet.  Naval  Ministry  originated  a  despatch  to 
CinCs  Fourth,  Fifth,  Yokosuka  addressee.  Information  to  Saipan  Base  Force, 
Jaluit  Base  Force,  Fifth  Defense  Force  (at  Saipan),  Sixth  Defense  Force  (at 
Wotje),  unidentified  activity  associated  with  Fifth  Fleet  organization  (NEO  6), 
and  unidentified  activity  (SETA  6). 

CinC  Second  to  Second  Fleet  (collective  SuflSx  88),  Batdiv  3,  Subrons  Five  and 
Six,  Desrons  One  and  Three,  Unidentified  Maru,  Second  Fleet  (Suffix  29).  In- 
formation to  Commanders  Combined  Fleet,  Cardivs,  Subfor,  and  movement 
offices  at  Tokyo,  Kure,  Yokosuka  and  Sasebo.  Significance  of  this  address  is 
obseure,  possibly  indicating  organization  or  movement. 

Combined  Fleet. — Bearings  place  combined  flagship.  First  fleet  flag,  carriers 
and  subfor  units  previous  mentioned  in  the  same  general  area  Kure  to  south 
and  southeast  of  Kyushu. 

First  Fleet. — Inactive  as  traffic  originator. 

Second  Fleet. — No  indication  of  area  from  traffic,  but  it  is  believed  that  some 
units  of  this  force  in  connection  BatDiv  Three  and  units  mentioned  in  the  heading 
of  the  despatch  quoted  above  are  preparing  to  operate. 

Third  Fl^et. — Continued  movement  reports  from  units  and  individual  ships 
as  noted  past  three  days,  but  no  direction  indicated. 

Fourth  Fleet. — Flagship  remains  in  Truk  area.  Activity  among  air  units  and 
shore  based  forces  continues,  with  increasing  emphasis  on  the  Jaluit  area. 
Jaluit  exchanged  communication  officer  despatches  with  Combined  and  Fourth 
Fleets.    No  D/F  activity  from  this  area  was  noted  today. 

Fifth  Fleet. — As  mentioned  under  general. 

Submarine  Force. — Exchange  of  despatches  by  communication  officers  of  Com- 
mander Carriers  and  Submarine  Force  indicate  arrangements  being  made  for 
coordination  of  operations. 

China. — Taiwan  continues  to  be  the  center  of  Combined  Air  Force  activity 
with  communications  between  Air  units  concentrated  in  that  area  and  bases  in 
Palao  and  Truk  areas  in  one  direction  and  China,  South  China,  Hainan  and 
Indo  China  Southern  Expeditionary  Force  on  the  other.  Commanders  Eleventh 
and  Twelfth  Air  Corps,  Shiogama  Air,  Takao  area.  This  is  a  concentration  of 
practically  the  same  units  which  were  together  at  Hankow  Air  during  latter  July 
and  August.  First  Base  Defense  Force  of  the  China  Fleet  (TIFU  0)  is  included 
as  an  action  addressee  in  practically  all  despatches  originated  by  China  force 
commanders,  including  China  Fleet,  North  China  Foi-ce,  Central  China,  South 
China,  South  China  Air  Force,  China  Fleet  Intelligence  and  South  Expeditionary 
Force.    Carrier  Divisions  Three  and  Four  traffic  still  goes  via  Takao. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  1  November  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  is  a  little  less  than  normal,  receiving  conditions  fair 
but  traffic  rather  slow.  The  first  day's  yield  of  new  calls  not  very  great.  Fleet 
calls  only  changed,  shore  station  calls  and  shore  addresses  not  changed.    It 


PROCEEDINGS  OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  755 

is  believed  that  tactical  calls  also  remain  unchanged  but  not  enough  intercepted 
traffic  to  so  state  definitely.  The  same  garble  table  for  calls  is  employed  so 
the  change  amounts  to  a  reassignment  of  calls  previously  used.  New  calls  have 
appeared  but  it  is  thought  that  they  were  formerly  assigned  to  obscure  units 
or  were  in  reserve.  All  of  the  major  Fleet  calls  are  identified  and  a  small  amount 
of  individual  calls  were  recovered  today.  Because  the  new  calls  are  not  yet 
lined  up  save  for  the  major  Fleet  Commanders  and  all  time  today  was  spent 
in  call  recovery,  this  summary  will  deal  only  with  general  impressions. 

ComUned  Fleet.— The  FIRST  FLEET  was  not  very  active  today  in  radio  traf- 
fic. The  CINC  SECOND  FLEET  appears  to  have  originated  quite  a  bit  of  traffic 
to  addresses  placed  in  submarine  and  carrier  category.  No  indications  of 
movement  of  any  of  these  units.  COMBINED  FLEET  tactical  circuits  were 
heard  but  little  tactical  traffic  copied  due  to  interference  by  NPM. 

Carriers.— The  COMMANDER  CARDIVS  was  mentioned  in  despatches  from 
Tokyo  and  he  took  a  fair  amount  of  traffic  on  the  Fleet  Broadcast. 

Submarines.— Nothing  to  report.  Calls  of  the  Submarine  Fleet  not  well  lined 
up  yet. 

Third  Fleet.— This  Fleet  very  active  as  before  The  SECOND  and  FIRST 
BASE  FORCES  are  still  marshalling  their  MARUs  and  the  CINC  is  very  busy 
with  Tokyo. 

China.— The  activity  of  HAINAN  BASE  continues.  The  KASHII  sent  several 
massages  from  Saigon. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  2  November,  19^1 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal  for  Sunday.  Receiving  conditions  were  fair 
but  bulk  of  traffic  derived  from  the  major  shore  circuits.  Solution  of  new  call 
system  progressing  satisfactorily  but  volume  of  accumulated  traffic  in  new  sys- 
tem not  yet  large  enough  to  permit  more  than  casual  identification  of  individual 
calls.  The  number  of  alternate  calls  for  major  commands  is  increased  over  last 
system.     So  far  there  are  seven  alternate  calls  for  the  Combined  Fleet. 

Third  Fleet  traffic  is  still  on  a  very  high  level.  The  combined  air  Force 
traffic  is  also  very  high  with  the  Commander  of  the  Combined  Air  Force  originat- 
ing many  dispatches.  It  appears  that  he  is  now  in  Taiwan.  Traffic  to  SAMA 
and  BAKO  is  on  a  very  high  level.  Tokyo  and  The  China  Fleet  Intelligence 
bureaus  are  originating  periodic  despatches,  those  from  Tokyo  being  perfixed 
WIWI.  There  were  several  high  precedence  dispatches  from  Toky»  with  the 
major  fleet  commanders  as  addressees. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  3  November  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  slightly  under  normal  although  fair  for  Monday. 
Receiving  conditions  good  but  all  circuits  slow.  General  messages  continue 
to  eminate  from  TOKYO  communications.  Such  an  amount  is  unprecedented 
and  the  import  is  not  understood.  A  mere  call  change  does  not  account  for 
activities  of  this  nature.  The  impression  is  strong  that  these  messages  are 
periodic  reports  to  the  Major  Commander  of  a  certain  nature.  Dummy  traffic 
is  again  being  sent  on  the  TOKYO  broadcasts.  Naval  Intelligence  TOKYO 
addressed  two  WIWI  messages  to  Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet  and  to  KUMI 
8  (unidentified). 

Combined  Fleet. — Commander  in  Chief  Combined  Fleet  sent  an  urgent  message 
to  BUMIL  information  all  Major  Commanders,  Combined  Fleet,  Naval  Intelli- 
gence Tokyo,  the  Chief  of  Naval  General  Staff,  and  Bureau  of  Personnel.  Com- 
mander in  Chief,  Combined  Fleet  also  was  associated  in  traffic  with  offices  in  the 
mandates,  principally  RNO  PALAO.  The  Commander  in  Chief,  Combined  con- 
tinues to  be  associated  with  the  Carriers  and  Submarines. 

Third  Fleet. — Third  Fleet  traffic  continues  at  a  high  level.  A  movement  report 
by  RATI66  (unidentified)  was  addressed  to  Commander  in  Chief  Third  Fleet 
for  information. 

Air.— A  WE  address  today  broke  down  as  "ITIKOUKUU  KANTAI".  The 
literal  reading  of  this  as  "1st  Air  Fleet"  is  correct  it  indicates  an  entirely  new 
organization  of  the  Naval  Air  Forces.  There  are  other  points  which  indicate 
that  this  may  be  the  case.  An  old  call  (Y0ME7)  while  never  identified  seemed 
to  be  in  a  high  position  with  respect  to  the  Carriers  and  the  Air  Corps.  Upon 
movement  of  air  units  to  TAIWAN  the  association  of  CarDiv  4  and  CarDiv  3 
with  units  of  the  Combined  Air  Force  was  apparent.    Their  association  in  a 

79716 — 46 — Ex.  1^9,  vol.  2 7 


756       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

command  sense  between  shore  based  air  and  fleet  air  had  never  occured  before 
but  under  the  concept  of  an  AIR  FLEET  can  easily  be  accepted.  TraflSc  in 
the  Air  Force  continues  at  a  liigh  level. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  4  November  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal  vrith  all  circuits  easily  readable.  More  tac- 
tical traffic  copied  than  for  past  few  days.  Combined  Fleet  and  Carriers  heard 
on  tactical  circuits.  TOKYO  Naval  Intelligence  sent  four  messages  to  Major 
Commanders.  One  of  these  was  for  informa.tion  Chief  of  Staff  China  Fleet 
and  one  other  for  information  of  Chief  of  Staff  Second  Fleet. 

Air.— High  traffic  level  of  air  activities  continues.  Most  significant  of  the  air 
despatches  were  some  in  which  various  air  corps  were  addressed  and  BAKO 
included  for  information.  One  from  Yokosuka  Air  was  addressed  to  SANCHOW 
Island  Radio  for  information  TAKAO  Air  Corps.  BAKO  was  also  nated  as  an 
addressee  in  several  messages  from  SASEBO  and  originated  two  messages  to 
SASEBO  and  TOKYO.  Commander  Carriers  also  addressed  a  message  to  two 
unidentified  calls  for  information  of  Commander  Combined  Air  Force,  Com- 
mander in  Chief,  Combined  Fleet,  CarDivs  Collective,  BAKO  and  others.  The 
Commander  Combined  Air  Force  addressed  a  message  to  Commander  in  Chief 
Third  Fleet. 

Mandates. — -The  RNO  BALAO  was  active  today,  being  addressed  by  Commander 
in  Chief,  Fourth  Fleet  and  sent  several  messages  to  TOKYO  and  YOKOSUKA. 
The  PALAO  weather  station  sent  a  long  code  message  addressed  to  nearly  all 
the  islands  of  the  Mandates.  MARCUS  Island  appears  as  an  originator.  No 
Change  in  the  location  of  Fourth  Fleet  units  noted. 

Submarines. — No  activity  noted. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  5  November  19^1 

General. — Traffic  volume  above  normal.  All  circuits  heard  and  receiving  con- 
ditions were  fair  to  good.  TOKYO  very  active  as  an  originator,  sending  out 
many  messages  of  general  address.  Two  WIWI  messages  in  Kana  Code  sent  by 
NGS  to  Chief  of  Staff  CarDivs  and  TIYA44  (unidentified)  respectively.  The 
Intelligence  Offices  of  China  Fleet  and  TOKYO  continue  active  with  many  des- 
patches passing  between  the  two. 

Third  Fleet. — Two  units  of  the  Third  Fleet  appear  today  in  TAKAO  area. 
Since  these  calls  are  as  yet  unidentified  (RISI4  and  YA02)  it  is  not  known  how 
much  of  this  fleet  they  represent.  It  is  fairly  certain  that  the  Commander  in 
Chief,  Third  Fleet  has  not  yet  left  the  Sasebo  area  although  it  is  expected  that 
he  will  before  long.  One  message  which  may  be  a  movement  report  from  him 
was  received  late  on  the  5th.  The  present  state  of  call  recovery  on  the  Third 
Fleet  does  not. permit  of  an  estimate  of  the  movement  involved. 

A  unit  of  the  First  Fleet,  identified  today  as  CARDIV  4  appeared  today  at 
BAKO.  This  Carrier  Division  was  addressed  as  "less  FUTA  SHOTAI"  (2nd 
Section?)  Whether  or  not  there  are  other  units  at  BAKO  is  not  known.  The 
Commander  CARDIVS  has  been  associated  with  SAMA  and  BAKO  in  several 
dispatches  today.  The  following  were  also  associated,  SANCHOF  ISLAND, 
TAKAO  AIRCORPS,  CANTON  (China)  and  YOKOHAMA  Air.  The  RNO 
TAIHOKU  originated  many  despatches  to  TOKYO  and  the  French  Indo  China 
Forces.  A  TAIWAN  originator  sent  one  to  Lieut.  Comdr.  SHIBA  at  the  Embassy 
THAILAND  for  information  to  HANOI  and  the  Commander  French  Indo  China 
Forces. 

BAKO  originated  numerous  despatches  to  the  Empire  and  to  the  Major  Fleet 
Comnianders. 

The  South  China  Fleet  was  also  the  recipient  of  many  despatches  from 
TOKYO. 

Despite  the  uncertainty  due  to  the  Change  of  Calls  it  is  believed  that  there  is 
now  being  effected  a  concentration  of  naval  forces  in  the  BAKO  area  which  will 
comprise  the  Third  Fleet  as  organized  in  SASEBO  for  the  past  month  and  will 
be  augmented  by  heavy  air  forces  and  Combined  Fleet  units  to  an  unknown 
extent. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  6  November,  19'tl 

General. — Traffic  volume  slightly  above  normal.  Receiving  conditions  were 
fair,  regular  strong  but  heavy  static  on  night  watches  interferred  somewhat. 
Today  the  specific  call-up  on  -the  Tokyo  broadcast  was  eliminated.    Formerly 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT   INQUIRY  757 

Tokyo  radio  called  the  unit  concerned  when  the  dispatch  was  addressed  to  a 
member  of  that  unit.  Beginning  yesterdaj^  afternoon  all  broadcast  messages 
are  addressed  to  a  single  call  without  regard  to  the  addressee  of  the  message. 
The  recovery  of  the  radio  organization  will  be  hampered  by  this  new  advance  in 
Communication  Security.  Moreover  there  were  nine  messages  today  on  this 
broadcast  from  which  the  address  and  originator  were  missing.  This  may  be 
the  start  of  complete  elimination  of  headings  on  broadcast  circuits.  Tokyo 
addressed  a  WIWI  message  to  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  of  the  Combined  Fleet  and 
Submarine  Force. 

Takao-Bako  Area. — It  is  now  certain  that  there  is  a  very  heavy  air  concen- 
tration on  Taiwan.  This  comprises  practically  the  entire  Combined  Air  Force 
including  the  Commander  and  his  staff  plus  at  least  one  carrier  division  and  an 
unknown  amount  of  the  fleet  air  arm.  No  additional  units  of  the  Third  Fleet 
were  located  there  today  but  it  is  believed  that  CinC  Third  Fleet  is  now  enroute 
BAKO  from  SASEBO.  From  traffic  association  it  is  believed  that  some  Second 
Fleet  units  are  in  Takao  area  but  this  has  not  yet  been  proven.  The  South 
China  Fleet  Command  has  been  active  in  dispatches  to  Taiwan  addresses. 

Comhined  Fleet. — A  large  amount  of  Combined  Fleet  traffic  is  now  appearing 
with  secret  (tactical)  calls  in  use. 

Mandates. — The  Mandates  trafllc  has  dropped  off  somewhat.  The  Sixth  De- 
fense Force  at  Truk  and  the  RNO  PALOA  continue  to  be  the  most  active  units. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  7  November  lOJfl 

General. — Volume  of  intercepted  traffic  larger  than  usual.  Due  to  the  use  of 
the  general  call  "All  Major  Force  Flags"  on  the  UTU  for  delivery  to  all  Combined 
Fleet  units,  affiliation  of  unidentified  calls  with  forces  to  which  attached  is  very 
difficult.  Use  of  large  number  of  alternate  calls  for  major  fleet  forces,  many 
of  which  have  not  yet  been  definitely  identified  or  associated  with  known  calls, 
renders  the  picture  more  confusing.  Appearance  of  tlie  prefix  "JITSU"  (authen- 
ticator  for  bonafide  traffic)  in  several  messages  indicates  that  a  communication 
drill  is  being  held  but  without  indication  as  to  what  units  are  participating  and 
therefore  much  of  the  traflic  is  suspected  of  being  "drill".  Jaluit  Radio  is  han- 
dling traffic  direct  with  Yokosuka  Radio  probably  due  to  congestion  of  Mandate 
circuits  from  the  Marshalls  caused  by  heavy  concentrations  in  that  area. 

Air. — Continued  high  traffic  level  for  all  classes  of  air  activities,  mainly  cen- 
tered in  the  Taiwan  area,  but  also  with  all  air  activities  in  the  Mandates  included 
in  headings  of  messages.  Despatches  originated  by  Fourth  Fleet  Command  in- 
cluded Air  Forces,  Base  Forces,  Air  Stations,  and  all  types  of  Mandate  activities 
in  long  headings. 

Fleet. — Fourth  Fleet  Command  remains  in  Truk  area.  There  are  indications 
that  portions  of  the  First  Fleet  may  be  moving  to  the  Takao  area  but  identifica- 
tions are  not  .sufficiently  certain  to  confirm  this. 

.  Greatest  effort  is  being  made  to  increase  the  number  of  identified  calls  to 
facilitate  analysis  of  the  traffic  but  Orange  changes  in  methods  of  handling  fleet 
traffic  renders  this  more  difficult  than  had  been  hoped. 

_   Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  8  November  19^1 

General. — Normal  volume  of  intercepted  traffic  with  no  "dummies"  api)earing 
on  the  UTU.  All  UTU  traffic  was  broadcast  fo  the  general  call  only.  The  Staff 
Communication  Officer  of  the  French  Indo-China  Force  (So.  Exp.  For.)  sent  a 
despatch  action  to  S.  C.  O.  Combined  INFO.  S.  C.  O.  Second  Fleet,  Combined  Air 
Force,  unidentified  fleet  unit.  Radio  stations  at  Tokyo,  Palao  and  Takao.  This 
may  indicate  a  contemplated  coordination  of  communications  between  the  Indo- 
China-South  China  areas  and  the  Palao  Island-Taiwan  area.  Secret  calls  were 
used  very  little  as  compared  to  the  past  few  days  and  only  three  circuits  were 
heard  using  them,  including  the  Combined  Fleet  Commanders  circuit  and  Air 
Station  Net.  North  .Japan-Ominato  circuits  were  quiet.  All  mandate  circuits 
were  active,  with  heavy  interchange  of  traffic  involving  all  classes  of  Mandate 
addressees  in  all  areas,  but  with  continued  emphasis  on  the  Palao  area  at  one 
end  and  the  Jaluit-Marshall  area  on  the  other.  Chichijima  Air  Station  was  in- 
cluded in  much  of  the  traffic  between  Empire  Offices  and  Saipan  Air  with  Jaluit 
Base  Force  included  for  information.  Inclusion  of  Chichijima  usually  presages 
an  air  movement  between  Mandates  and  Empire  but  the  Units  involved  are  un- 
identified. Commander  of  unidentified  shore  activity  (NEO  66)  previously  asso- 
ciated with  the  Fifth  Fleet,  was  addressed  at  Chichijima  Air  which  tentatively 


758       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

identifies  him  as  an  air  activity.  Previous  association  of  the  Fifth  Fleet  traflBc 
with  Fourth  Fleet  and  Yokosuka  tends  to  confirm  the  belief  that  Fifth  Fleet 
operations  are,  or  will  be,  in  the  area  adjacent  to  Chichijima-Marcus,  supple- 
menting the  Fourth  Fleet  in  the  lower  island  areas. 

Fleet. — Chief  of  staff  First  Fleet  originated  a  despatch  through  Kure  Radio. 
Batdiv  Three  of  the  First  Fleet  appears  to  be  operating  separately  from  the  main 
force,  possibly  in  connection  with  Cardivs  Three  and  Four  in  the  Taiwan-Naha 
area.  An  apparent  movement  report  from  Cardiv  Four  was  addressed  to  CinC 
Combined  Fleet,  First  Fleet,  CarDiv  Commander,  Combined  Air  Force  Commander 
and  to  movement  offices  at  Tokyo,  Yokosuka,  Kure,  Maizuru  and  Sasebo.  Traffic 
from  the  Commander  Indo-China  Force  is  handled  from  the  Japanese  radio  sta- 
tion at  Saigon  rather  than  from  the  KASHII,  indicating  that  the  staff  is  based 
ashore  at  present.     No  identifiable  submarine  activity  was  noted. 

Air. — Takao  and  Mandates  continue  to  be  the  center  of  air  activities.  The 
area  between  Chichijima,  Naha,  Takao,  Palao  and  Jaluit  appears  to  be  par- 
ticularly concerned  with  movement  of  air  forces  and  auxiliaries,  while  the  for- 
mation of  a  force  under  Combined  Air  Commander  in  the  Takao-Bako  area  ap- 
pears to  be  nearly  completed  as  indicated  by  reports  addressed  to  CinO.  Combined, 
Naval  Minister,  Commanders  of  Cardivs,  Combined  Air  Force,  First  Fleet  and 
shore  addresses  generally  associated  with  movements  or  organization  changes. 
This  force  is  believed  to  include  CarDiv  Four,  and  possibly  CarDiv  Three,  with 
a  number  of  auxiliaries  and  units  of  the  Combined  Air  Force,  also  possibly  some 
units  from  the  First  Fleet.  Lack  of  identification  renders  composition  of  the 
force  highly  speculative  and  area  of  operations  obscure.  Prior  to  change  of 
calls,  much  traffic  was  exchanged  between  China,  South  China  and  Indo-Chinn 
while  at  present  most  traffic  includes  Palao. 

Communicatioti  Intelligence  Summary,  9  November,  1941 

Oeneral. — Traffic  volume  heavy  for  Sunday.  Receiving  conditions  fair  but 
heavy  static  caused  numerous  garbles  and  fragmentary  messages.  Navy 
Minister  sent  several  messages  of  general  address  including  one  to  all  First  and 
Second  class  Naval  stations.  Practically  all  of  the  general  messages  carried 
SAMA  as  an  information  address.  Carrier  Division  Three  arrived  at  Takao 
and  there  are  indications  that  Carrier  Division  Four  will  return  to  Sasebo 
from  Takao.  The  Flagship  of  Carrier  Divisions  is  AKAGI  and  is  in  Sasebo 
area.  Some  tactical  traffic  today  shows  units  of  Combined  Fleet  still  operating. 
The  association  of  Batdiv  Three  and  Mandate  addresses,  especially  Saipan  may 
indicate  operations  of  that  unit  in  the  Mariannas.  The  JINGEI  was  com- 
municating with  SAMA.  HAINAN  today.  The  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  French- 
Indo  China  Force  is  in  Tokyo. 

One  message  today  addressed  to  CinC.  Combined  Fleet  was  routed  to 
MAIZURU  for  delivery  but  this  is  believed  a  communication  error.  The  Third 
Fleet  appears  to  be  still  in  Sasebo  area  but  it  was  noted  that  considerable 
traffic  passed  between  Hainan,  Taiwan  addresses  and  the  Third  Fleet.  The 
Fifth  Fleet  is  still  being  organized  with  no  indications  yet  that  it  has 
assembled.  The  Eighteenth  Air  Corps  at  Saipan  originated  much  traffic  to 
Yokosuka  Air  Corps. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  10  November,  19^1 

Oeneral. — ^Traffic  volume  normal,  receiving  conditions  good.  There  were 
fewer  general  messages  sent  today  than  for  the  past  few  weeks.  Tokyo  Intel- 
ligence still  active  and  addressing  dispatches  to  all  Major  Commanders.  The 
Mandates  construction  traffic  has  decreased  considerably.  Call  recovery  is 
progressing  but  has  been  slowed  down  by  the  general  call-up  used  on  Fleet 
broadcast. 

Combined  Fleet. — Believed  to  be  mostly  in  Kure  area.  A  staff  officer  of 
BatDiv  Three  was  addressed  there  today  and  it  is  likely  that  this  whole  divi- 
sion is  there  also.  The  CinC,  Second  Fleet  was  located  at  Kure  today  as  well 
as  two  cruiser  divisions. 

Third  Fleet. — The  greater  portions  of  this  fleet  still  in  Sasebo  area.  Several 
movement  reports  have  been  noted  by  units  of  this  fleet  but  none  have  been 
noted  other  than  individual  ships.  At  least  two  units  of  this  fleet  still  at 
Takao.  CinC  Three  originated  one  movement  report  for  information  of  CinO 
Fourth  Fleet. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  759 

Fourth  Fleet. — Little  activity.  CinC.  Fourth  remains  in  vicinity  of  Truk 
with  major  portion  of  his  command.  The  Staff  Communication  Officer  of  Sub- 
marine Force  sent  a  message  to  the  CinC.  Fourth  for  information  of  Jaluit. 

Fifth  Fleet. — One  unit  of  this  fleet  located-  at  Chichijima. 

Air. — The  Combined  Air  Force  Command  is  still  talking  to  Sama  and  the 
South  China  Fleet.  From  one  address  it  appears  that  the  Commander  of  Car- 
rier Division  Three  is  with  the  Combined  Fleet.  Several  units  of  the  Carrier 
Divisions  are  in  port  at  Kure  and  Sasebo.  CinC.  Combined  Air  Force  is  still 
in  Takao. 

Communication  InteUigence  Summarj/,  12  November,  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal  for  past  two  days  with  receiving  condition 
about  average.  The  general  character  of  the  traffic  has  been  administrative 
with  most  of  it  being  between  shore  logistic  and  technical  activities.  The 
D.  F.  net  was  active  today  with  very  little  activity  shown  yesterday.  Inter- 
cept operators  have  commented  adversely  on  the  major  shore  network  which 
comprises  all  of  the  major  naval  activities  in  the  Empire.  Traffic  has  been 
moving  slowly  over  this  circuit.  The  reason  is  the  non-cooperation  of  the 
operators  and  the  definite  lack  of  control  exercised  by  TOKYO  radio  stations. 
TOKYO  Intelligence  is  still  sending  messages  to  the  major  commands  but  the 
remainder  of  TOKYO  traffic  has  been  mostly  from  the  technical  bureaus. 

ConiMned  Fleet. — The  Fleets  remain  relatively  inactive  in  the  KURE  area. 
The  association  of  BATDIV  3  with  the  Fourth  Fleet  and  several  Mandates 
stations  is  born  out  by  a  D.  F.  position  on  the  flagship  of  BATDIV  3  which 
places  him  about  halfway  between  CHICHIJIRIA  and  MARCUS  Island.  Their 
position  was  obtained  on  the  4th  when  this  unit  was  not  yet  identified.  No 
subsequent  bearings  have  been  obtained.  Also  associated  with  this  BATDIV 
are  a  Submarine  Squadron  and  possibly  CARDIV  4  although  the  association  of 
this  CARDIV  (Lately  returned  from  TAKAO)  is  not  positive.  The  Third 
Fleet  remains  at  SASEBO  with  the  only  activity  exhibited  in  the  Base  Forces. 

4tr.— CARDIV  3  returned  to  KURE  from  TAKAO  as  reported  by  CAVITE. 
Most  of  air  activity  confined  to  dispatches  between  carrier  and  shore  estab- 
lishments. 

Fifth  Fleet. — Nothing  to  report. 

Fourth  Fleet. — The  Defense  Forces  of  the  Mandates  fairly  active.  The  vol- 
ume of  construction  traffic  has  definitely  fallen  off.  The  Commander  Sub- 
marine Force  is  still  adding  JALUIT  and  today  COMSUBRON  2  addressed  a 
message  there.  AIRRON  24  sent  a  movement  report  but  no  indication  of  the 
direction.  Communication  exercises  were  held  by  JALUIT  and  several  stations 
in  that  area.     YOKOHAMA  Air  Corps  was  addressed  at  RUOTTO. 

China. — The  previous  activity  of  SAMA  and  the  French  Indo  China  Forces 
and  bases  continues. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  13  November  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal  with  receiving  conditions  good.  Several 
messages  of  high  precedence  intercepted,  some  of  them  are : 

1.  UNIWIWI  despatch  in  five  numeral  from  TOKYO  Intelligence  to  Chief 
of  Staff  Combined  Air  Force,  INFO  RNO  TAIHOKU,  BAKO  Naval  Station. 

2.  WIWI  from  N.  G.  S.  to  MAIZURU  INFO  Chief  of  Staff  Fourth  Fleet. 

3.  NIKAWIWI  from  N.  G.  S.  to  Commander  in  Chief  Combined  Fleet, 
INFO  Commander  in  Chief  South  China  Fleet,  Commander  Third  Fleet  and 
SAMA,  HAINAN. 

4.  UNIWIWI  from  N.  G.  S.  to  Secretary  First  Fleet. 

5.  (2  messages)     WIWI  to  same  address  as  3  above. 

6.  A  3  part  NIKAWIWI  from  N.  G.  S.  to  Commander  in  Chief  Combined 
Fleet,  INFO  Commander  in  Chief  French  Indo  China  Fleet. 

7.  One  UNI  message  from  Commander  in  Chief  China  Fleet  to  SAMA, 
INFO  Commander  in  Chief  Third  Fleet  and  Commander  in  Chief  Combined 
Fleet. 

This  is  the  only  occurence  in  some  time  of  anyone  save  the  TOKYO  intelligence 
activity  using  the  WIWI  prefix.  Both  TOKYO  and  the  China  Fleet  Intelligence 
Bureau  were  active  all  day  with  despatches  to  the  Major  Commanders. 

The  direction  finder  net  was  again  active  all  day  with  CHINKAI,  ORU  7  (near 
CHINKAI),  JALUIT,  SAIPAN,  and  TAIWAN  sending  in  bearing  reports. 

Combined  Fleet. — The  activity  of  BATDIV  3  is  not  clear.  The  flagship  is 
operating  and  was  located  by  D.  F.  as  reported  yesterday.    The  Commander  of 


760        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

BATDIV  3  is  located  in  YOKOSUKA.  Ttie  Division  Communication  Officer  is 
communicating  with  TRUK,  SAIPAN  and  PALAO.  The  other  ships  in  this  divi- 
sion remain  unlocated  but  it  is  assumed,  lacking  evidence  to  the  contrary,  that 
they  are  with  the  flagship.  Other  units  of  First  Fleet  seem  inactive.  One 
Cruiser  Division  of  Second  Fleet  is  associated  in  traffic  with  PALAO  and  may 
be  in  that  area. 

Third  Fleet. — Still  located  in  SASEBO,  the  Commander  in  Chief  has  been  active 
in  the  traffic,  being  addressed  by  botli  TOKYO  and  Commander  in  Chief  Com- 
bined Fleet.  The  First  BASE  FORCE  Commander  originated  several  messages 
but  no  indication  of  change  of  location. 

Fourth  Fleet. — The  Commander  in  Chief  Fourth  Fleet  is  in  communication 
with  the  Sixth  BASE  FORCE  JALUIT.  Several  messages  were  exchanged.  He 
appers  to  be  preparing  for  a  move  from  TRUK  but  no  movement  has  yet  occurred. 
SUBRON  2  is  again  in  communication  with  JALUIT  and  today  originated  a 
movement  report,  but  no  indication  of  direction. 

Air. — Carriers  remain  relatively  inactive.  The  SETTSU  is  still  with  them 
and  a  few  may  be  engaged  in  target  practice  near  KURE.  The  Combined  AIR 
FORCE  is  still  mostly  located  in  TAIWAN  and  the  usual  high  traffic  level  between 
its  component  Air  Corps  still  exists. 

China. — The  Commander  in  Chief  China  Fleet  was  addressed  in  one  of  the 
RNO  TAIHOKU.     His  Chief  of  Staff  is  still  in  SHANGHAI. 

Commutiication  Intelligence  Summary,  l.'f  November  19^1 

General. — Traffic  volume  a  little  under  normal  due  to  poor  to  fair  receiving 
conditions  throughout  the  day.  The  Naval  Ministry  originated  several  AlNav 
dispatches.     There  were  three  WIWI  messages  originated  today.  i 

1.  UNIWIWI  from  N.  G.  S.  and  BUMIL  to  Chief  of  Staff  Fourth  Fleet. 
Information  Chief  of  Staff"  Combined  Fleet  and  YOKOSUKA. 

2.  WIV/I  from  N.  G.  S.  and  BUMIL  to  Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet,  Chief 
of  Staff  Third  Fleet,  YOKOSUKA  and  SASEBO. 

3.  UNIWIWI  from  N.  G.  S.  to  ANI758  (Chief  of  Staff  of  an  unidentified 
unit).  Information  Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet  and  Chief  of  Staff  Com- 
bined Air  Force. 

Direction  Finder  Net  active  with  SASEBO  station  sending  in  bearings  in  addi- 
tion to  the  others.  Tactical  circuits  heard  during  day  with  a  fair  amount  of 
activity. 

Combined  Fleet. — Little  activity  noted.  The  flagship  of  BatDiv  Three  is  still 
operating  but  no  further  information  on  this  division.  Two  Combined  Fleet  units 
appear  active  in  the  traffic.  They  are  DesRon  Three  (normally  in  First  Fleet 
but  has  been  operating  with  Second  Fleet)  and  CruDiv  Seven  of  Second  Fleet. 
Both  of  these  units  have  been  associated  in  traffic  with  the  South  China  Fleet 
and  the  French  ludo  China  Force.  They  may  proceed  to  the  South  China  area 
in  near  future. 

Third  Fleet. — Still  in  Sasebo  area.  The  CinC.  has  been  addressed  by  Tokyo 
to  a  great  extent  and  is  still  associated  with  South  China  activities  in  traffic. 
It  has  been  noted  that  the  association  betvv'een  the  Third  Fleet  and  units  of  the 
Combined  Air  Force  is  growing.  Especially  the  Second  Base  Force  has  been 
talking  with  several  Air  Corps  among  whom  is  the  Kure  Air  Corps.  Will  air 
units  be  embarked  in  ships  of  the  Base  Force? 

Fourth  Fleet. — No  movement  yet  from  the  TRUK  area.  It  appears  that  the 
Fourth  Fleet  Staff  is  fairly  well  split  up.  Various  officers  of  the  staff"  were 
addressed  at  Tokyo  and  at  unidentified  locations. 

Submarines. — No  particular  activity.  One  unit  evidently  enroute  PALAO  and 
Submarine  Squadron  Two  (now  in  Kure  area)  still  being  addressed  by  Tokyo 
and  Yokosuka  originators. 

Air. — One  Air  Squadron  of  the  Combined  Air  Force  is  at  HOIHOW,  HAINAN. 
The  Commander  of  the  Air  Force  is  still  at  TAKAO  with  a  good  representation  of 
his  command.     The  Carriers  remain  in  home  waters  with  most  of  them  in  port 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  15  November  19^1 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal,  with  a  number  of  general  address  messages 
originated  by  Commiunication  Division,  Tokyo,  to  Radio  Officers,  Ominato,  U  E 
9  (D.  F.  Station  in  Marshalls),  Jaluit,  Palao,  Truk,  Saipan.  Takao  and  Sama 
Radios,  Staff  Communication  Officers  All  Major  Flagships,  Staff  Communica- 
tion Officer  South  Expeditionary  Force  and  two  apparent  collective  shore  ad- 
dresses.    Traffic  from   all   stations  mentioned  except   Sama   and   Ominato   to 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT   INQUIRY  761 

D.  F.  Control  and  Plotting  Room  Tokyo  information  to  Staff  Communication 
Officer  Combined  Fleet  was  exchanged.  No  messages  of  the  D.  F.  type  were 
detected  so  it  is  presumed  that  the  interchange  had  to  do  with  arrangements 
for  drill  or  organization  of  the  net.  The  Minister  of  the  Navy  originated  one' 
Alnav  and  one  to  all  Major  Commands  and  collective  shore.  Tokyo  Personnel 
and  Tokyo  Communication  Division  originated  several  to  collective  fleet  and 
shore.  Significance  is  not  determined  though  it  is  believed  possible  that  a 
further  partial  change  of  shore  and  air  calls  may  be  in  prospect.  The  Empire 
air  station  net  was  normally  active  using  tactical  calls.  Secretary  First  Fleet 
originated  one  Urgent  Code  to  unidentified  (MINI  55),  Staff  Communication 
Officer  Carrier  Division  Four  (at  Sasebo)  and  Commanding  Officer  of  Batdiv 
Three  flagship. 

Cotnbined  Fleet. — Same  as  yesterday,  same  units  (Batdiv  Three,  Desrons  One 
and  Three)  associated  through  traffic  with  South  Expeditionary  Force.  CinC 
Second  Fleet  was  the  most  active  originator  and  appeared  to  be  arranging 
operations  of  units  involving  First,  Second,  Carrier  and  Air  Units. 

Third  Fleet. — Inactive. 

Fourth  Fleet. — Apparent  movement  of  Fourth  Fleet  units  in  prospect  or 
underway,  with  continued  emphasis  on  the  Marshalls  Area.  CinC.  Fourth  traf. 
fie  still  being  handled  from  the  Truk  area,  with  Airron  Twenty-four  (Kamoi) 
and  associated  Yokohama  and  Chitose  air  units  involved  in  some  movement, 
direction  undetermined.  All  Marshall  Island  activities,  including  unidentified 
A.rmy  Forces,  exchanging  traffic  freely. 

Suhmarine  Force. — Little  activity  detected.  It  is  believed  that  some  sub- 
marine activity  is  operating  or  preparing  to  operate  in  the  Marshall  area,  from 
communication  arrangements  underway  between  Staff  Communication  Officer 
Submarine  Force  and  same  Fourth  Fleet,  information  to  Jaluit.  Jaluit  has 
been  heard  working  on  various  frequencies,  using  tactical  calls  and  procedure 
associated  with  submarine  operations,  but  no  identifications  of  calls  used  have 
been  made. 

Air. — Continued  air  traffic  to  and  from  Takao  area,  with  unidentified  Airron 
(formerly  YOME  7)  including  South  Expeditionary  Force  and  Sama  addressees 
in  traffic.  Composition  of  this  force  and  purpose  still  speculative  but  believed 
to  be  preparing  to  move  southward  to  work  with  the  South  Expeditionary 
Force. 

The  large  number  of  alternate  calls  used  by  major  forces  renders  analysis 
of  traffic  headings  very  slow  and  difficult,  but  identifications  and  recoveries 
of  alternates  are  improving  as  a  greater  volume  of  November  traffic  becomes 
available  for  research. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  16  November  19Jfl 

General. — Traffic  volume  approximately  normal  for  week-end  period.  A  new 
form  of  despatch  heading  appeared  in  a  series  of  dispatches  broadcasted  on 
the  regular  UTSU  series.  Only  the  originator  or  the  address  of  the  dispatch 
appeared ;  it  is  assumed  that  the  other  pertinent  call  or  address  may  be  buried 
in  the  text.  These  dispatches  were  with  one  exception  (in  5  numeral  text) 
all  in  the  nine-Kana  period  separator  system  and  the  single  call  in  the  heading 
fitted  in  each  case  Line  seven  of  the  call  garble  table. 

A  dispatch  was  originated  by  the  Navy  Minister  addressed  to  all  Major 
Fleets  and  general  addresses  to  this  effect : 

"Today  the  House  of  Peers  and  House  of  Representatives  by  means  of 
a  decision  adopted  the  following  resolution  transmitted  as  follows : 

1.  Resolution  of  House  of  Peers — (Expressed  deepest  thanks  and 
emotion  to  Army  and  Navy  for  their  glorious  service  over  a  long  period 
to  the  Empire  and  expressed  condolences,  etc.,  for  those  fallen  in 
battle. 

2.  Resolution  of  House  of  Representatives — Express«>d  thanks,  etc., 
to  all  officers  and  men  of  Army,  Navy  and  Air  Force  for  their  4i/^  years 
service  (in  China  affair)  and  for  their  contribution  to  the  establish- 
ment of  a  permanent  world  peace.  Gave  prayers  for  well  being  of  all 
hands,  etc." 

First  and  Second  Fleets. — Majority  of  First  and  Second  Fleet  Units  remain 
in  the  general  Kura  area.  The  units  of  these  two  fleets  that  have  been  most 
active  from  dispatch  heading  viewpoint  in  the  last  ten  days  appear  to  be : 

Airon  Seven  (3  Chitose  class) 

Carrier  Division  Four 


762       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Destroyer  Squadron  Seven 

Destroyer  Squadron  Three 

Battleship  Division  Three 

Cruiser  Division  Seven. 
It  is  rather  singular  that  the  CinC.  Second  Fleet  has  assumed  an  important  role 
in  addressing  for  action  several  first  fleet  and  other  fleet  units  recently.  In 
some  of  these  dispatches  the  call  identified  as  Southern  Expeditionary  Force  (In- 
do-China  Force)  appears.  Associations  of  addresses  in  several  dispatches  have 
thrown  the  Second  and  Third  Fleets  vi^ith  the  Combined  Air  Force  and  in  other 
dispatches,  there  appears  to  be  an  association  between  First  Fleet,  Carrier  Di- 
visions and  the  Mandates.  It  is  apparent  that  Destroyer  Squadron  One  has 
been  or  is  operating  with  the  Carrier  Divisions  and  Battleship  Division  Three 
while  Cruiser  Division  Seven  and  Destroyer  Squadron  Three  have  been  oper- 
ating together.  Iwakuin  Air  sent  short  priority  dispatch  to  the  ATAGO,  Sec- 
ond Fleet  cruiser  and  submarine  units  indicating  some  joint  minor  exercises  in 
that  area. 

Third  Fleet. — Believed  inactive  in  Sasebo-Kure  area. 

Fourth  Fleet. — FUATU,  a  Tokyo  address  originated  one  UNI  dispatch  to  an 
unidentified  fleet  unit  (MEN  33),  information  to  CinC.  Combined  Fleet,  Com- 
munication Officer,  Fourth  Fleet,  Saipan  Base  Force,  Kure  Movement  Oflicer,  CinC, 
Fifth  Fleet,  Tokyo  Intelligence,  and  NEO  66,  believed  to  be  a  shore  based  air  activ- 
ity in  Chichijima-Marcus  area. 

Fifth  Fleet.— Prior  to  the  change  of  calls  on  1  November,  the  composition  of 
the  Fifth  Fleet  was  very  indefinite  but  appeared  to  contain  several  naval  aux- 
iliary type  vessels.  Since  1  November,  little  has  been  recovered  of  the  composi- 
tion of  this  mythical  fleet  but  it  is  definite  that  some  units  are  operating  in  the 
general  Yokosuka  Chichijima-Marcus.  , 

Submarines. — ^Little  activity.  Communication  Oificer,  Submarine  Force  orig- 
inated one  priority  dispatch  to  unidentified  address,  information  to  Combined 
Fleet  Communication  OflScer.  Association  of  Submarine  Force  and  Fourth  Fleet 
commands  continues. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  17  November,  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal  with  receiving  conditions  good.  More  traffic 
with  single  call  heading  appeared  on  the  broadcast  circuit.  These  dispatches 
numbered  serially  and  each  call  different  but  all  fitting  the  same  line  in  the  call 
garble  table.  Since  these  messages  are  transmitted  each  hour  on  the  hour  and 
are  of  approximately  the  same  length  it  appears  that  they  are  drill  messages. 
It  is  feared  that  they  constitute  a  test  of  straight  broadcasting  without  a  head- 
ing. Since  none  of  this  traffic  have  been  found  going  into  Tokyo  it  is  probably 
originated  in  the  Navy  Ministry.  Very  few  vessels  of  general  address  were 
noted.  Tactical  circuits  in  the  Mandates  were  heard  during  the  day  with  radio 
Saipan  controlling. 

Combined  Fleet. — No  movement  from  the  Kure  area  of  any  major  portion  of  the 
First  or  Second  Fleets.  The  CinC.  Second  Fleet  very  active  as  an  originator 
today.  He  continues  to  address  units  which  are  normally  under  his  command. 
He  also  addressed  the  CinC.  Third  Fleet,  Palao  Forces,  and  the  Chief  of  Staff 
Fourth  Fleet. 

Third  Fleet. — Inactive  at  Sasebo.  The  Staff  Communication  Officer  of  Third 
Fleet  Avas  addressed  by  the  R.  N.  O.  Palao. 

Fourth  Fleet. — The  greater  part  of  the  activity  in  the  Mandate  area  centered 
about  the  Third  Base  Force  at  Palao  and  the  Sixth  Base  Force  at  Jaluit.  Both 
these  activities  originated  traffic. 

Air. — The  Commander  of  the  Combined  Air  Force  remains  in  Takao  and  was 
addressed  frequently  by  SAMA,  HAINAN  and  was  in  two  instances  addressed  by 
the  Fourth  Fleet.  The  carriers  are  mostly  in  the  Kiire-Sasebo  area  with  the 
exception  of  a  few  which  ai'e  operating  in  the  Kyushu  area. 

China. — Sama  was  again  active  today  with  dispatches  to  the  Combined  Fleet 
Staff,  Combined  Air  Force,  Third  Fleet  and  Bako.  The  R.  N.  O.  Taihoku  ad- 
dressed a  dispatch  to  CinC.  China,  Sanchow  Island,  Sama.  Bako,  CinC.  South 
China,  and  Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Air  Force. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  18  November  19^1 

General. — Traffic  volume  a  little  under  normal  with  receiving  conditions  fair 
to  poor.     Tokyo  originators  active  with  several  messages  of  general  address 


PROCEEDINGS  OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  763 

emanating  from  the  Communication  Section.  The  double  originator  BUMIL  and 
N.  G.  S.  sent  one  NIKAWIWI  to  the  Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet  for  infor- 
mation to  all  First  Class  Naval  Stations.  BUMIL  also  addressed  an  urgent 
dispatch  to  SAMA,  information  to  R.  N.  O.  TAINOKU,  Chief  of  Staff  South  China 
Fleet  and  Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet.  Another  Tokyo  originator,  believed 
to  be  N.  G.  S.,  sent  an  urgent  message  to  Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet,  Chief 
of  Staff  French  Indo  China  Force  and  Chief  of  Staff  Second  Fleet.  MAIZURU 
Naval  Station  also  sent  an  urgent  message  to  Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet, 
Second  Fleet,  Combined  Air  Force,  French  Indo  China  Force  and  for  informa- 
tion to  N.  G.  S.  The  Tokyo  Direction  Finder  plotting  section  sent  three  long 
dispatches  to  the  entire  Direction  Finder  Net  which  was  very  active  today  with 
many  bearings  reported.  The  Vice  Chief  Naval  General  Staff  sent  one  to 
Chief  of  Staff  Carrier  Divisions  and  Chief  of  Staff  French  Indo  China  Force. 

Conibined  Fleet. — CinC.  Combined  Fleet  very  prominent  as  both  an  originator 
and  addressee.  Since  this  officer  is  always  included  in  the  address  of  every  im- 
portant message,  he  will  no  longer  be  mentioned  as  an  addressee  unless  he  is 
the  only  addressee.  The  association  between  the  CinC  Second  Fleet  and  the 
French  Indo  China  Forces  and  Combined  Air  Force  is  very  plain.  He  was  ad- 
dressed by  CinC.  French  Indo  China  Force  today  in  an  urgent  NIKA  dispatch. 
Several  units  of  the  Combined  Air  Force  also  addressed  several  dispatches 
to  him.  Battleship  Division  Three,  the  Carrier  Divisions  and  two  destroyer 
squadrons  have  been  associated  in  traffic.  Several  dispatches  occurred  today, 
being  addressed  by  N.  G.  S.  and  the  Commander  Carrier  Divisions  in  several 
instances.  The  CinC.  Third  Fleet  also  addressed  several  dispatches  to  him. 
These  form  the  indication  that  CinC.  Second  Fleet  will  be  in  command  of  a 
large  Task  Force  comprising  the  Third  Fleet,  Combined  Air  Force,  some  car- 
rier divisions,  and  Battleship  Division  Three.  No  movement  from  home  waters 
has  been  noted. 

Third  Fleet. — The  Commander  Second  Base  Force  originated  what  appears 
to  be  a  movement  report.  He  also  sent  one  to  R.  N.  O.  TAIHOKU,  informa- 
tion to  CinC.  Third  Fleet.  There  were  other  units  tentatively  placed  in  Third 
Fleet  who  sent  dispatches  in  which  the  Tokyo  movement  report  office  was  an 
addressee.  It  is  expected  that  the  Third  Fleet  will  move  from  the  Sasebo  area 
in  the  near  future.  This  Second  Base  Force  was  having  quite  a  bit  of  traffic 
with  several  Air  Corps  a  while  ago  and  may  be  transporting  air  units  or 
equipment. 

Fourth  Fleet. — Not  much  activity  in  this  fleet.  The  amount  of  traffic  between 
this  fleet  and  Palao  is  noticeable  with  the  submarines  still  interested  in  Jaluit. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  19  Novetnher  194I 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal.  Traffic  from  Fourth  Fleet  and  Mandates 
was  noticeably  less  than  usual.  Traffic  on  the  northern  circuits  also  very  light. 
Some  tactical  traffic  received  from  Combined  Fleet  units.  There  has  been  a 
noticeable  increase  in  the  afloat  traffic  over  the  normal  amount  usually  seen. 
Fleet  units  seem  to  ha'Ve  a  great  deal  of  business  with  other  Fleet  units  both 
within  and  outside  of  their  own  organization.  Staff  Officers  are  frequently 
addre,ssed  at  other  than  their  normal  locations.  The  activity  at  Tokyo  has  sub- 
sided somewhat  in  that  there  were  fewer  general  messages  than  for  the  past 
few  days.  Tokyo  Intelligence  sent  out  several  messages  addressed  to  Second 
Fleet,  Submarine  Force  and  Carrier  Divisions.  One  was  sent  to  SAMA  for 
information  to  French  Indo  China  Forces  and  South  China  Fleet.*  The  Navy 
Minister  sent  out  two  AlNavs.  The  Direction  Finder  net  is  still  active  with  all 
stations  sending  in  reports  and  Tokyo  plotting  station  making  reports  to  major 
commanders. 

Combined  Fleet. — ^The  flagship  of  Battleship  Division  Three  appears  today 
at  Sasebo,  its  southern  jaunt  apparently  having  been  completed.  Destroyer 
Squadron  Four  and  Two  appear  associated  with  the  Third  Fleet.  Cine.  Second 
Fleet  continues  his  activity,  being  still  associated  with  Combined  Air  Force, 
French  Indo  China  Force,  Third  Fleet,  and  today  with  Carrier  Division  Three. 
Carrier  Division  Three  was  in  Takao  and  returned  to  the  Empire  a  week  ago 
and  has  been  associated  with  Third  Fleet  since.  A  Bako  activity  addressed  the 
Chief  of  Staff  Second  Fleet,  Third  Fleet  and  Combined  Air  Force.  The  Chief 
of  Staff  Second  Fleet  addressed  an  urgent  dispatch  to  CinC.  French  Indo  China 
Fleet  information  to  Third  Fleet  and  Commander  Cruiser  Division  Five. 

Third  Fleet. — ^Active  as  noted  above.  Several  more  units  of  this  fleet  and 
of  the  Base  Forces  originated  movement  reports  but  no  indication  of  direction. 
CinC.  Third  Fleet  is  still  in  Sasebo. 


764       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Fourth  Fleet. — ^Activity  in  Mandates  still  centers  about  the  Third  Base  De- 
fense Force  at  Palao.  Traffic  between  this  force,  Tokyo  and  the  Second  Fleet 
was  considerable.  One  call  (SITI  4)  appears  at  Jaluit  today.  This  call  has 
been  identified  as  Carrier  Division  Four  and  if  the  one  message  is  correct  it  ap- 
pears that  this  Carrier  Division  (ZUIKAKU)  is  in  the  Jaluit  area.  This  is  not 
confirmed  as  no  other  indications  have  been  found  and  its  presence  at  Jaluit 
is  doubted,  attributing  the  message  to  be  a  communication  error. 

Fifth  Fleet. — Flagship  located  at  Yokosuka.  The  CinC.  Fifth  Fleet  appeared 
in  a  few  dispatches  from  Tokyo  but  no  other  activity  seen. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  20-21  November  19Jfl 

General. — Traffic  volume  for  past  two  days  has  been  higher  than  normal. 
Tokyo  originators  active  with  messages  addressed  to  all  major  commanders. 
N.  G.  S.  sent  a  UNI  WIWI  to  Commandant  BAKO  for  information  to  Chief 
of  Staff  South  China  Fleet  and  Canton.  The  Personnel  Bureau  at  Tokyo  become 
very  active  on  the  21st  sending  out  a  series  of  long  personnel  messages.  The 
activity  at  Tokyo  identified  as  R.  D.  F.  plotting  stations  increased  his  recent 
high  volume  of  messages  with  a  long  four  part  message  addressed  to  all  major 
commanders.  He  also  addressed  several  dispatches  to  the  Direction  Finder  net, 
indicating  the  employment  and  results  being  obtained  by  this  activity.  The 
traffic  load  on  the  Tokyo-Takao  circuit  was  very  heavy  on  the  21st,  so  heavy 
that  the  circuit  was  in  duplex  operation  most  of  the  mid-watch. 

Combined  Fleet. — Flags  of  both  First  and  Second  Fleets  are  in  Kure  area 
and  most  of  both  fleets  remain  in  Eure-Sasebo  area.  Battleship  Division  Three 
still  in  Yokosuka  area.  Traffic  to  and  from  the  CinC.  Second  Fleet  continues 
abnormally  high.  A  list  of  units  addressed  by  him  or  who  sent  traffic  to  him 
and  CinC.  Third  Fleet  over  the  past  two  days  follows : 

MIRA  9   (Carrier  Division  Three) 

TAE  1  (Airron  7)  AKU  8  (Air  Unit) 

KAME  5  (Airron  6)  KUSU  7   (Unidentified) 

YAWI  1   (Crudiv  5)  SATU  88  (Unidentified) 

KENU  3  (Crudiv  7)  KUNI  88   (Unidentified) 

RESE  4  (Desron  3)  OYU  9  (Unidentified) 

AKI  0  (Desron  4)  KONA  0  (Unidentified) 

TIYA  7  (Comdr.  1st  Base  For)  MOTU  6  (Unidentified) 

SASE3  (Comdr.  2nd  Base  For)  NETE  5    (Unidentified) 

YOMO  9  (Desron  5)  NSI  3  (Unidentified) 

REA  2  (Shiogama  Air  Corps)  SUTE  1  (Unidentified) 

KUNO  9  (Erimo)  YAYU  1   (Unidentified) 

MIMO  3  (Air  Unit?)  MARES  (Unidentified) 

TUE  7   (Unidentified)  Plus  11  Marus. 
ENO  7  (Unidentified) 

This  list  is  not  the  complete  estimate  of  forces  being  assembled  by  him  but 
only  the  ones  occurring  in  the  past  two  days.  Each  one  appeared  not  only  with 
the  CinC.  Second  Fleet  but  with  the  Third  Fleet  and  with  one  of  the  units 
now  in  South  China  or  at  Taiwan-South  China  Address.  A  complete  list  is  being 
made  up  but  was  not  finished  at  this  writing.  Assuming  that  the  entire  Second 
Fleet  will  be  included  in  this  organization  and  that  each  unit  addressed  will 
either  participate  or  contribute  somewhat  to  the  Task  Force  it  appears  that 
it  will  comprise  a  good  portion  of  the  navy.  One  item  stands  out — so  far 
there  has  been  practically  no  submarine  units  mentioned  by  the  Second  or 
Third  Fleets  in  connection  with  South  China  activities.  Commander  Subrnarine 
Force  has  not  been  included  in  traffic.  He  does  appear  in  Tokyo  Fourth  Eleet 
and  Mandates  traffic. 

Mandates  and  Fourth  Fleet. — The  R.  N.  O.  Palao  and  Palao  radio  stations 
have  remained  active  with  the  Fourth  Fleet  and  Yokosuka  for  days.  This  is 
taken  to  indicate  a  coming  concentration  of  forces  in  Palao  which  would  include 
the  Fourth  Fleet  and  some  of  the  Second  Fleet  who  has  also  been  active  with 
the  R.  N.  O.  Since  the  activity  of  the  Second  Fleet  Commander  has  been  so 
great  it  may  be  that  he  will  assign  some  non-Second  Fleet  units  to  that  area 
but  just  which  ones  is  not  yet  known.  From  information  fi'om  radio  sources 
there  is  no  indication  of  any  concentration  now  at  Palao  beyond  the  Third 
Base  Force  which  is  based  there.  There  has  been  no  traffic  for  other  fleet 
units  routed  there  and  the  Maru  traffic  to  Palao  is  far  less  than  the  normal 
flow  to  that  area.  With  the  arrival  of  Siti  4  (yesterday  reported  as  either 
a  carrier  unit  or  submarine  unit  and  now  identified  as  a  submarine  squadron 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  765 

of  the  Submarine  Fleet)    the  concentration  of  naval  forces  in  the  Marshalls 
is  far  greater  than  that  existing  at  Palao. 

Communication  Intelligence  Sutnmary,  22  November  I94I 

General. — Traffic  volume  somewhat  greater  than  normal.  Only  one  tactical 
circuit  heard  today,  indicating  that  Combined  Fleet  tactical  exercises  are 
now  completed.  The  Navy  Minister  originated  several  AlNavs  and  sent  two 
other  messages,  one  to  CinC  Fourth  Fleet  and  one  to  Yokosuka  and  Com- 
mander Submarine  Squadron  Five.  Tokyo  Intelligence  sent  out  the  usual  long 
messages  to  CinC  Combined  Fleet,  CinC  Second  Fleet  and  CinC  Third  Fleet. 
BuMil  addressed  Fourth  Fleet,  Truk,  Pagan  Civil  Engineering  Section  at  Peleliu 
and  Yokosuka.  Another  unidentified  Tokyo  originator  sent  a  priority  message  to 
all  major  flags  and  China  Fleet,  information  to  ANOS  at  Taihoku  and  Palao. 
Sasebo  addressed  one  to  Chief  of  Staff  French  Indo  China  Force,  information 
Chief  of  Staff  Second  Fleet,  Bako,  Sama,  Chief  of  Staff  South  China,  Chief  of 
Staff  Third  Fleet,  Commander  Cruiser  Division  Seven  and  Commander  Destroyer 
Squadron  Three.  Cruiser  Division  Seven  and  Destroyer  Squadron  Three  to 
South  China  Area  soon?  While  the  Direction  Finder  Net  is  still  active,  the 
station  at  Palao  sent  in  more  bearings  than  usual  for  that  station. 

Combined  Fleet. — CinC.  Combined  originated  only  one  dispatch  to  two  uniden- 
tified calls,  one  a  Maru,  for  information  to  CinC.  Third  Fleet.  CinC.  Second 
Fleet  was  again  prolific  with  many  messages  addressed  to  Third  Fleet  and  Com- 
bined Air  Force.  The  amount  of  traffic  interchanged  between  these  three  com- 
manders was  very  great.    One  message  addressed  many  units  as  follows  : 

CinC.  Second  Fleet.  To:  NETE  5  (Crudiv  ?),  KOO  2  (Subron  5)  TIYU  66 
(CinC.  Third  Fleet),  SUYO  44  (CinC.  Comb.  Air  Force),  MIRA  9  (CarDiv  3), 
RESE  4  (Desron  3),  KORE  4  (Second  Fleet)  (Collective),  less  Crudiv  8 
and  unidentified  2nd  Fleet  unit),  SUTI  2  (BatDiv  3)  (at  Kure  and  Sasebo), 
Airron  7  (at  Kure),  SUTI  1  (?)  (at  Kure),  SATU  8  (?)  (at  Kure),  META  0 
(AKASHI  (at  Kure)  META  2  (ASAHI  MARU),  TUFU  2  (?),  NARI  33 
(CinC.  China  Fleet),  KAKE  66  (CinC.  South  China  Fleet),  MISI  66  (CinC. 
Comb.  Fleet). 

Third  Fleet.— CinC.  Third  Fleet  received  a  dispatch  from  "RIKUGUN  SAN- 
BOUTEU  MAEDATI  SEUZEU  (at  Tainoku).  This  is  translated  as  "Army  Chief 
of  Staff  General  MAEDATI  and  indicates  the  linking  of  the  Taiwan  Army 
Forces  with  Third  P"'leet.  The  CinC  Third  Fleet  continues  his  association  with 
Combined  Air  Forces. 

Fourth  Fleet. — CinC  Fourth  Fleet  was  mostly  occupied  with  the  Sixth  Base 
Force  at  Jaluit  and  AirRon  24  now  in  Jaluit  area.  The  Third  Base  Force  at 
Palao  and  the  RNO  Palao  are  still  addressing  the  CinC  Fourth  and  Yokosuka. 
He  also  received  one  from  Commander  Submarine  Force. 

China. — The  Commander  French  Indo  China  Force  sent  one  message  to  CinC. 
Combined  Fleet  for  information  to  CinC.  Second  Fleet.  Bako  sent  one  to  Sec- 
retary Fourth  Fleet  and  Secretary  Submarine  Fleet,  Secretary  Carrier  Divisions, 
Secretary  Fifth  Fleet,  Sama  and  French  Indo  China  Fleet. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  23  November,  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal.  High  precedence  traffic  has  increased. 
Some  of  the  high  precedence  dispatch  headings  are  listed : 

1.  MAYURU  (Tokyo  address)  to  HORONO  MUSEKU  (CoUective  Shore 

Precedence  Information  Chiefs  of  Staff  Combined,  1st, 

NIKA-WIWI  2nd,  3rd,  4th,  5th  and  Southern  Expedition- 

ary Force. 

2.  Third  Fleet  Chief  of  Staff  to  Second  Fleet  Chief  of  StaflF  Information 

NIKA  Combined    and     Southern     Expeditionary 

Force  Chief  of  Staff. 

3.  KESANA  EONO  (Tokyo)  to  Chiefs  of  Staff  Third  Fleet  and  Southern 

WIWI  Expeditionary  Force.     Information  "SAN- 

KUYUTI"  at  Sama  Hainan. 

4.  SUTE  1  (Unidentified  Fleet  unit)  to  Radio  Takao,  Hainan,  Flagship 

NIKA  NWA   2,    information    Radio    Tokyo   and 

Second  Fleet  flagship. 

5.  Imakuni  Air  to  Iwakuni  Air  Detachment  at  NAHA     Information  Kure, 

KIU  Bako,  and  MING  3  in  Takao. 


766       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Personnel  Tokyo  also  originated  several  priority  dispatches  to  First  Fleet,  Third 
Fleet,  and  others.  The  following  WE  address  was  followed  by  Sasebo  Radio  in 
the  delivery  of  a  personnel  Bureau  dispatch  "SAHOTI.RENGO.RI.SI". 

An  unidentified  fleet  unit  (SUTE  1)  listed  recently  in  Kure  appeared  on  radio 
circuit  with  Takao  Radio.     Also  on  this  circuit  were  the  following: 

KENU  3— CruDiv  7  Flagship? 
HOWI  2 — Fleet  unit  associated  with  Second  Fleet. 
EKE      8 — Fleet  unit  associated  with  Second  Fleet. 
MUSE  5 — Naval  Auxiliary  associated  with  Second  Fleet. 

The  above  units  received  delivery  of  the  long  NIKA  dispatch  originated  by 
CinC  Second  Fleet  on  the  21st  of  November  and  which  appeared  to  outline  the 
forces  expected  to  operate  in  the  Indo-China  general  area. 

Combined  Fleet. — CinC  Combined  was  included,  as  always,  in  all  exchange  of 
fleet  commander  traffic,  but  no  important  messages  originated  by  him  were  inter- 
cepted. First  Fleet  was  very  quiet.  Second  Fleet  messages  mentioned  in  sum- 
maries of  22nd  were  still  being  circulated  but  Third  Fleet  appeared  as  the  most 
active  unit  in  today's  traffic.  Indications  are  that  Third  Fleet  units  are  under- 
way in  a  movement  coordinated  with  the  Second  Fleet,  Combined  Air  Force  and 
French  Indo  China  Force.  Commander  French  Indo  China  Force  (So.  Exp.  For) 
was  included  in  aU  important  traffic  from  Second,  Third  and  Combined  Air  Com- 
manders, Hainan  addressees  were  included  in  nearly  all  high  precedence  messages 
concerning  these  forces  and  may  indicate  a  rendezvous  of  forces  in  that  area. 
Palao  appeared  as  an  information  addressee  on  a  portion  of  the  traffic.  Fourth 
Fleet  activity  involved  Palao  area  on  one  end  and  Marshalls  on  the  other.  With 
no  means  of  substantiating  the  impression,  it  is  believed  that  more  submarines 
are  operating  in,  or  from,  the  Marshalls  than  it  has  been  possible  to  definitely 
place  from  radio  interceptions.  It  is  recalled  that  there  was  an  exchange  between 
Staff  Communication  Officers  of  the  Submarine  Force  and  Fourth  Fleet  with 
.Taluit  included  as  either  action  or  information  around  November  1st  and  that 
Jaluit  opened  a  direct  circuit  to  Yokosuka  early  this  month,  apparently  to  relieve 
traffic  congestion  from  that  area.  Jaluit  Radio  Has  been  heard  on  various  fre- 
quencies using,  and  working  with  units  using  tactical  or  secret  type  calls,  while 
the  main  submarine  frequency  of  6385/12770  has  been  relatively  inactive. 

Aii'. — Combined  Air  Traffic  remains  associated  with  Taiwan  area,  while  the 
Mandate  Air  units  continue  high  level  of  activity,  covering  the  whole  Mandate 
area.  Carrier  Divisions  were  relatively  quiet,  but  with  Carrier  Division  Three 
definitely  associated  with  Second  Fleet  operations. 

China. — CinC.  China  and  South  China  not  included  with  the  Second,  Third, 
Air  Force  and  Southern  Expeditionary  Force  traffic  and  were  quiet.  Bearings 
from  Cavite  and  Guam  place  CinC.  South  China  east  of  Taiwan,  but  this  is 
believed  questionable. 

Nothing  was  seen  to  contradict  impressions  gathered  during  the  past  few 
days  and  summarized  previously,  that  movement  of  forces  is  either  imminent  or 
actually  underway,  at  least  in  part,  to  the  southward,  with  covering  forces  operat- 
ing from  the  Mandates,  and  possibility  of  a  striking  force  assembled  or  gathering 
in  the  Palao  area. 

Communication  intelligence  summary,  2^  November,  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal.  High  precedence  traffic  above  normal.  Traf- 
fic analysis  impressions  are  unchanged  from  yesterday's  report.  The  difficulties 
of  identifications  have  prevented  more  definite  information  of  vessels  (and  fleets 
to  which  attached)  that  appear  to  be  moving  south  from  Kure-Sasebo  area.  If 
the  poor  reception  prevailing  here  the  last  two  days  can  be  disregarded  and  the 
assumption  made  that  Radio  Heeia  intercepted  their  "share"  of  the  total  traffic, 
the  following  impressions  are  worth  something : 

( a )  The  falling  off  of  traffic  to  China  addresses. 

(b)  The  increased  activity  among  third  fleet  addresses  with  a  high  per- 
centage of  what  appears  to  be  movement  reports. 

(c)  The  above  normal  activity  in  the  Mandates  both  ashore  and  afloat 
addresses. 

The  association  of  Second  Fleet,  Third  Fleet  and  Southern  Expeditionary  Force 
continues  as  usual.  Palao  and  Jaluit  appear  prominently  in  despatch  traffic, 
the  Second  Fleet  Commander  with  the  former,  and  the  Submarine  Force  Com- 
mander with  the  latter. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  767 

First  and  Second  Fleets. — Very  little  activity  in  First  Fleet.  The  radio  call 
believed  to  represent  the  flagship  of  Cruiser  Division  Seven  originated  a  dispatch 
to  Commander  Cruiser  Division  Seven,  CinC.  Second  Fleet,  Commander  South- 
ern Expeditionary  Force,  and  Radio  Sama,  Takao,  Sasebo,  and  Tokyo.  The 
CinC.  Second  Fleet  continues  to  appear  as  the  Task  Force  Commander  of  a  large 
number  of  units  from  First  and  Second  Fleet  plus  Carrier  Division  Three  and 
Combined  Air  Force  units. 

Third  Fleet. — Large  number  of  dispatches  involving  Third  Fleet  units,  some 
of  which  appear  to  be  movement  reports.  The  fact  that  CinC.  Third  Fleet  ap- 
pears as  information  addressee  on  many  dispatches  to  and  from  Second  Fleet 
units  indicates  that  these  two  fleets  will  be  closely  associated  in  any  future 
operations.  Yesterday,  a  large  number  of  dispatches  associating  Carrier  Division 
Three  with  CinC.  Third  Fleet. 

Fotirth  Fleet  and  Mandates. — Fourth  Fleet  appears  to  be  concentrated  in  Truk 
area  since  all  of  the  recent  definite  reports  from  Fourth  Fleet  vessels  have  come 
from  Truk.  Air  Squadron  Twenty-four  and  perhaps  a  large  number  of  sub- 
marines from  the  Submarine  Force  are  in  the  Marshall  Area. 

Submarines. — Comparatively  little  activity. 

China. — Comparatively  quiet. 

Carriers. — No  definite  indications  of  location. 

Combined  Air  Fo7-ce. — Commander  Kanoya  Air  appears  in  the  Takao  area. 
Otherwise  no  change. 

Communication  Intelliffence  Summary  25  Novemher,  I94I 

Genera?.— Trafiic  volume  normal.  Receiving  conditions  much  improved  over 
last  two  days.  Tokyo  personnel  bureau  active  with  messages  to  various  units. 
Tokyo  originated  one  UNI  WIWI  to  CinC.  Combined  Fleet,  CinC.  Second  Fleet, 
CinC.  Third  Fleet,  CinC.  Fourth  Fleet  and  CinC.  French,  Indo  China  Force  plus 
Yolj;osuka,  Kure  and  Maizuru!  The  Navy  Minister  originated  several  AlNavs. 
A  Direction  Finder  Net,  controlled  by  Tokyo  radio  was  active  with  secret  calls 
being  sent  by  the  five  stations.  The  entire  fleet  traffic  level  is  still  high  which 
leads  to  the  conclusion  that  organizational  arrangements  or  other  preparations 
are  not  yet  complete. 

Combined  Fleet. — ^Little  activity  by  CinC.  First  Fleet.  CinC.  Second  Fleet 
remains  highly  active  as  an  originator,  addressing  Third  Fleet,  Air  Forces  and 
South  China  units.  A  Second  Fleet  unit  and  a  submarine  division  or  squadron 
arrived  in  Takao  communication  zone  today.  Crudivision  Seven  which  previously 
arrived  there  has  been  associated  with  Destroyer  Squadron  Three  which  indicates 
the  presence  of  that  unit  in  Takao  vicinity.  Palao  and  Second  Fleet  still  ex- 
changing messages.  Two  new  units  to  be  associated  with  CinC  Second  Fleet  and 
the  Task  Force  now  forming  are  the  North  China  Fleet  and  Defense  Division  One. 

Air. — Through  the  identification  of  a  call  made  today  Genzan  Air  Corps  has 
been  in  Saigon  since  the  eighteenth.  We  believe  that  other  units  of  the  Combinetl 
Air  Force  have  moved  from  Taiwan  to  the  French  Indo  China  Area  although 
this  is  not  yet  verified.  One  or  more  of  the  Carrier  Divisions  are  present  in  the 
Mandates. 

Fourth  Fleet. — CinC.  Fourth  Fleet  is  still  holding  extensive  communications 
with  the  Commander  Submarine  Fleet,  the  forces  at  Jaluit  and  Commander 
Carriers.  His  other  communications  are  with  the  Third,  Fourth  and  Fifth  Base 
Forces. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summanj  26  November,  19Ifl 

Oeneral. — TraflBc  volume  normal.  All  circuits  heard  well  except  for  Tokyo- 
Takao  circuit  which  faded  early.  Traffic  picture  about  the  same  as  for  the  past 
week.  Intra-fleet  traffic  still  very  heavy  and  Tokyo  Bureaus  still  dispatching 
AlNavs.  The  Tokyo  Intelligence  and  Direction  Finder  plotting  units  addressed 
a  succession  of  urgent  dispatches  to  the  major  commands  and  to  the  CinC.  Second 
and  Third  Fleets  in  particular.  The  only  MAM  schedule  was  NR15  which  was 
first  broadcast  on  the  twenty-fifth.  Takao  and  Bako  originated  more  traffic  today 
than  usual,  it  was  addressed  to  Third  Fleet  mostly  but  the  CinC.  Second  Fleet 
and  the  China  Fleets  came  in  for  their  share.  Tokyo  radio  is  working  the  ISUZU 
(flagship  South  China)  SAMA  and  CAMRANH  Bay  radio  stations  directly. 
Takao  is  also  working  ITSUBA  (Spratleys). 

Combined  Fleet. — Cruiser  Division  Seven  today  began  receiving  traffic  via 
SAMA,  indicating  the  arrival  of  that  unit  in  Hainan  waters.     While  no  indica- 


768       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

tions  were  seen  that  Destroyer  Squadron  Three  also  arrived  it  is  probable  that 
this  unit  is  still  in  company  with  Cruiser  Division  Seven  and  is  also  present  at 
Hainan.  The  Takao,  former  flagship  of  the  Second  Fleet  became  active  in  the 
traffic  today  being  associated  with  the  Second  and  Third  Fleets.  The  tanker 
HATATOMO  appeared  in  several  of  CinC.  Second  Fleet's  dispatches  today  as 
well  as  the  SOYO  MARU.  No  movement  is  evident  yet  of  any  of  the  flags  of  the 
newly  formed  force.  The  traffic  between  Second,  Third,  Fourth  Fleets  and  the 
Combined  Air  Force  still  continues  at  it's  high  level. 

Fourth  Fleet. — No  change  in  Truk  location.  CinC.  held  extensive  communi- 
cation with  Saipan  forces  as  \yell  as  Palao  forces.  The  KATORI  and  CinC. 
Submarine  Fleet  appear  to  be  at  or  near  Chichijima. 

Fifth  Fleet. — The  CinC.  Fifth  Fleet  was  included  in  some  of  the  dispatches  of 
the  Second  Fleet  and  is  associated  with  the  new  Task  Force. 

Suhmarines. — As  noted  above  Commander  Submarine  Force  is  in  Chichijima 
area.  The  Submarine  Squadron  NETES's  location  is  somewhat  uncertain  today 
due  to  one  dispatch  being  routed  to  MAIZURU.  The  routing  of  this  dispatch  is 
doubted  because  of  the  indication  of  her  arrival  at  Takao  yesterday  and  her 
previous  association  with  Cruiser  Division  Seven. 

China. — Two  Marus  of  the  Third  Fleet  left  Bako  for  Sama  today. 

Third  Fleet. — Active  as  above  but  no  indication  of  large  scale  movement  from 
the  Sasebo  area. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  21  November  19^1 

.  General. — Traffic  volume  a  little  below  normal  due  to  poor  signals  on  the  fre- 
quencies above  7000  kcs.  Tokyo-Takao  circuit  unreadable  on  mid-watch.  Some 
tactical  traffic  intercepted  from  carriers.  Bako,  Sama,  and  Saigon  active  as 
originators,  addressing  traffic  to  each  other  and  to  the  Chiefs  of  Stafit  of  Second, 
Third  Fleets  and  Combined  Air  Force.  Bako  addressed  the  Chief  of  Staff  Third 
Fleet  information  Destroyer  Squadrons  Four  and  Five  and  Chief  of  Staff  Second 
Fleet.  The  main  Tokyo  originator  today  was  the  Intelligence  activity  who  sent 
five  despatches  to  the  major  commanders.  The  Direction  Finder  activity  was  very 
high  with  all  stations  sending  in  bearings  including  the  Marshall  Islands  Stations 
which  has  been  silent  for  the  past  four  days. 

Combined  Fleet. — No  further  information  as  to  whether  or  not  Destroyer 
Squadron  Three  is  in  Hainan  area  but  is  believed  to  be  still  with  Cruiser  Division 
Seven  in  that  area.  There  is  still  no  evidence  of  any  further  movement  from 
the  Kure-Sasebo  area.  The  Chief  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet  originated  several 
messages  of  general  address.  He  has  been  fairly  inactive  as  an  originator  lately. 
CinC.  Second  Fleet  originated  many  messages  to  Third  Fleet,  Combined  Air  Force, 
and  Bako. 

Third  Fleet. — Still  holding  extensive  communication  with  Baka,  Sama,  South 
China  Fleet  and  French  Indo  China  Force.  The  use  of  WE  addresses  is  increas- 
ing, those  occurring  today  were : 

"DAIHATIEUTABUTAISANBOTEU"  (in  Taihoku) 
"KOROKUKITISIKI" 

"KIZUKEYAMASITABUTAI"  (in  care  of  RYU  JO) 
"HEIZEUKAIGUNDAIGONREUSEU" 
These  is  nothing  to  indicate  any  movement  of  the  Third  Fleet  as  yet. 

Fourth  Fleet. — CinC.  Fourth  Fleet  frequently  addressed  dispatches  to  the  de- 
fense forces  in  the  Mandates.  Jaluit  addressed  messages  to  the  Commander  Sub- 
marine Force  and  several  submarine  units.  The  Saipan  Air  Corps  held  com- 
munication with  Jaluit  and  CinC.  Fourth  Fleet.  The  Civil  Engineering  Units  at 
IMIBJI  and  ENIWETOK  were  heard  from  after  being  silent  for  weeks.  Chitose 
Air  Corps  is  in  Saipan  and  Air  Squadron  Twenty-four  is  still  oijerating  in  the 
Marshalls.  No  further  information  on  the  presence  of  Carrier  Division  Five  in 
the  Mandates. 

Air. — An  air  unit  in  the  Takao  area  addressed  a  dispatch  to  the  KORYU  and 
SHOKAKU.  Carriers  are  still  located  in  home  waters.  No  information  of  fur- 
ther movement  of  any  Combined  Air  Force  units  to  Hainan. 

Submarines. — Commander  Submarine  Force  still  in  Chichijima  Area. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summarif,  November  28,  1941 

General.— Traffic  volume  normal.  Comnmnications  to  and  from  South  China 
and  between  Mandates  and  Empire  very  heavy.  No  tactical  traffic  seen.  As  has 
been  previously  reported  the  suspected  Radio  Intelligence  net  is  very  active  and  is 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  769 

becoming  more  so.  The  TOKYO  plotting  activity  addressed  more  messages  to  the 
Radio  net  than  previously  and  most  of  these  sent  for  information  to  the  Major 
Commanders.  Much  traffic  also  was  directed  to  NRE0  (the  TOKYO  D.  F.  Com- 
mand) from  all  eight  stations  in  the  Mandates  and  OMINATO.  This  Command 
also  originated  messages  of  high  precedence  to  the  Major  Fleet  Commanders. 
This  activity  is  interpreted  to  indicate  that  the  R.  I.  net  is  operating  at  full 
strength  upon  U.  S.  Naval  Communications  and  IS  GETTING  RESULTS. 

TOKYO  originators  vpere  active  with  messages  of  high  precedence  to  the  Com- 
mander in  Chief's  of  the  Second  and  Third  Fleets  and  Combined  Air  Force.  The 
Navy  Minister  sent  to  Alnavs.  The  Chief  of  the  Naval  General  Staff  sent  one  to 
the  Chief  of  Staffs  of  Combined  Air  Force,  Combined  Fleet,  Fourth  Fleet,  Third 
Fleet,  French  Indo-China  Force,  Second  Fleet  and  RNO  PALAO.  The  BUAERO 
sent  one  to  Chief  of  Staff  Fourth  Fleet  info  IMIESI  and  11th  Air  Corps  at 
SAIPAN. 

Combined  Fleet.^-No  indication  of  movement  of  any  Combined  Fleet  units. 
Commander  in  Chief  Second  Fleet  originated  his  usual  number  of  despatches  to 
Third  Fleet  and  Combined  Air  Force.  The  units  paid  particular  attention  to  by 
the  Commanded  in  Chief  Second  Fleet  were  CRUDIVS  Five  and  Seven  and 
DESRONS  Two  and  Four  and  SUBRON  Five.  No  traffic  today  from  the  TAKAO 
(CA). 

Third  Fleet. — Little  activity  from  Third  Fleet  units  save  for  the  Commander 
in  Chief.  The  impression  is  growing  that  the  First  Base  Force  is  not  present 
with  the  bulk  of  the  Third  Fleet  in  SASEBO  but  it  is  not  yet  located  elsewhere. 
The  Army  Commander  in  TAIHOKU  is  still  holding  communications  with  the 
Commander  in  Chief  Third  Fleet.  Two  Third  Fleet  units  arrived  at  BAKO  and 
are  apparently  returning  to  KURE  from  BAKO. 

Fourth  Fleet.— Bulk  of  Fourth  Fleet  still  at  TRUK.  The  Commander  in  Chief 
Fourth  addressed  message  to  the  Sixth  Base  Force  at  JALUIT  and  the  Fourth 
Base  Force  at  TRUK.  Yokohama  Air  Corps  is  at  RUOTTO  and  WOTJE  and 
held  communications  with  AIRRON  Twenty-Four  and  KAMOI. 

South  China. — SAMA  sent  several  messages  to  shore  addresses  in  the  Empire. 
SAMA  also  addressed  the  OMURA  AIR  CORPS  in  several  messages  which  went 
for  information  to  SAIGON  and  TOKYO.  TAKAO  radio  station  addressed  the 
Chiefs  of  Staff  Combined  Fleet,  Second  Fleet,  the  French  Indo  China  Force  and 
Combined  Air  Force.  TAKAO  Air  Corps  addressed  SUKUGAWA  Air  Corps  and 
YOKOSUKA  Air  Corps.  A  representative  of  a  HAINAN  office  now  at  SAIGON 
originated  several  messages  to  the  Naval  Bases  at  SASEBO  and  KURE.  The 
Commander  in  Chief  China  Fleet  originated  more  traffic  than  usual  and  ad- 
dressed his  fleet  collectively  for  information  to  the  Commander  in  Chief  Second 
and  Commander  in  Chief  Third  Fleets. 

Subinarinesl. — Except  for  the  mention  of  SUBRONS  Five  and  Six  in  two 
despatches  there  was  no  submarine  activity  today. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary  29  November  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  above  normal.  The  traffic  to  South  China  still 
very  high.  Automatic  transmissions  was  attempted  on  the  Tokyo-Takao  circuit 
but  was  a  failure  and  traffic  sent  by  hand.  A  good  share  of  today's  traffic  is 
made  up  of  messages  of  an  intelligence  nature.  Tokyo  Intelligence  sent  eleven 
messages  during  the  day  to  Major  Commanders  both  ashore  and  afloat,  while  the 
radio  intelligence  activity  at  Tokyo  sent  four  long  messages  to  the  Major  Com- 
manders. In  addition  to  the  stations  normally  reiwrting  to  Tokyo,  radio  Yoko- 
suka  sent  in  reports.  This  station  had  not  previously  been  seen  to  submit  reports. 
The  Direction  Finder  net  controlled  directly  by  Tokyo  was  up  during  the  night 
with  much  activity.  One  message  for  Jaluit  Radio  Direction  Finder  Station  in- 
cluded Commander  Submarines  for  information.  The  Navy  Minister  originated 
his  usual  two  AlNavs  and  the  Naval  General  Staff  addressed  Commanders  Sec- 
ond Fleet,  Third  Fleet,  Combined  Aid  Force  and  the  South  China  Units.  The 
unit  which  has  been  addressed  as  the  "103rd  Air  Group"  originated  one  dispatch 
today  whose  address  was  composed  entii'elv  of  enciphered  calls.  It  is  apparent 
that  he  has  no  Navy  call  list.  One  address  was  "JUITIKOUKUUKANTAI" 
"11th  AIR  FLEET".  Since  this  has  appeared  before  it  is  evident  that  the  use 
of  KANTAI  is  intentional  making  the  existence  of  an  air  fleet  positive.  Its  com- 
position is  unknown. 

Combined  Fleet. — The  arrival  of  Air  Squadron  Seven  in  Takao  area  is  con- 
firmed.    The  presence  of  Cruiser  Division  Four  in  that  area  is  not  confirmed  nor 


770       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

denied.    The  dispatches  today  indicate  that  the  following  units  are  under  the 
immediate  command  of  CinC.     Second  Fleet : 


CARDIV  THREE  CF  2CV 
SUBRON  FIVE  CL+IOSS 
SUBRON  SIX  CL+4SM 
CRUDIV  FIVE  3CA 
CRUDIV  SEVEN  4CA 


DESRON  TWO-1  CI^12DD 
DESRON  FOUR-1  CL-12DD 
THIRD  FLEET 
FRENCH  INDO  CHlNA  FORCE 


Associated  with  Third  Fleet  are  two  Battleships  but  their  assignment  is  not 
yet  definite.  Aside  from  messages  which  were  addressed  to  Third  Fleet,  China  and 
South  China  Fleets,  Combined  Air  Force  and  the  Naval  General  Staff;  Com- 
mander in  Chief  Second  Fleet  was  mainly  occupied  with  the  units  listed  above. 
Only  one  message  from  Commander  in  Chief  Combined  Fleet  was  seen.  This 
was  addressed  to  YOKOSUKA,  Combined  Air  Forces,  CRUDIV  Four  and  LUMIL- 
AFF.     The  HIYEI  sent  one  message  to  Chief  of  Staff  Third  Fli^et. 

Third  Fleet. — Commander  in  Chief  Third  Fleet  sent  one  iflessage  to  Comdes- 
ron  Five,  Number  Tivo  Base  Force.  Number  One  Base  Force,  Defense  Division 
One  and  Comdesron  Two  and  Four.  He  held  extensive  communications  with 
the  Commander  in  Chief  Second  Fleet  and  BAKO.  Two  more  units  of  Third 
Fleet  made  movement  reports. 

Fourth  Fleet. — Relatively  inactive  today.  Sent  one  message  to  Commander 
in  Chief  Second  Fleet,  Commander  in  Chief  Third  Fleet  and  Combined  Air 
Force.     He  is  still  in  TRUK  area. 

Submarines. — Traffic  for  Commander  Submarine  Force  was  routed  through 
SAIPAN  today.     He  was  at  CHICHIJIMA  yesterday. 

South  China. — CRUDIV  Seven  now  in  SAMA  made  a  movement  report  but 
direction  was  not  indicated.  The  French  Indo  China  Force  Commander  ad- 
dressed several  messages  to  Second  and  Third  Fleets  as  well  as  TOKYO.  The 
Commander  in  Chief  China  Fleet  was  active  in  addressing  the  South  China 
Naval  Bases  and  the  South  China  Fleets,  all  for  information  to  Commander  in 
Chief  Second  Fleet. 


Communication  Intelligence  Summanj  Novem'ber  30,  194i- 

General. — Traffic  volume  less  than  for  past  few  days.  Today's  traffic  consisted 
largely  of  despatches  bearing  old  dates,  some  as  far  back  as  26  November.  No 
reason  can  be  given  for  the  retransmission  of  these  messages  unless  the  high 
volume  of  traffic  for  past  few  days  has  prevented  the  repetition  of  despatches. 
The  number  of  despatches  originated  on  the  30th  is  very  small.  The  only  tac- 
tical circuit  heard  today  was  one  with  AKAGI  and  several  MARXJS.  The 
TOKYO  Intelligence  activity  originated  two  WIWI  despatches  to  Major  Fleet 
Commanders.  One  urgent  despatch  was  sent  by  NGS  to  Chiefs  of  Staff,  Com- 
bined, Second,  Third,  Fourth,  and  Fifth  Fleets,  Combined  Air  Force ;  Submarine 
Force  and  China  Fleets. 

Combined  Fleet.— The  Chiefs  of  Staff  of  the  Combined  Fleet  and  First  Fleet 
are  in  KURE.  In  the  same  message  the  Chief  of  Staff  Second  Fleet  was  not  at 
any  location.  Other  traffic  indications  are  that  he  is  at  sea.  Commander  in 
Chief  Second  Fleet  sent  one  to  his  usual  addressees  of  the  Third  Fleet  and 
Combined  Air  Forces  but  also  included  KONGO  and  HIYEI.  which  places  them 
as  members  of  his  Task  Force.  The  Commander  in  Chief  Second  Fleet  is  no 
longer  adding  PALAO  activities  and  has  not  for  past  two  days.  The  RNO 
PALAO  today  addressed  two  messages  to  TAIWAN  GUNSIREIBU  (TAIWAN 
Army  Headquarters). 

Third  Fleet. — Commander  in  Chief  Third  Fleet  addressed  two  messages  to 
COMDESRON  Two,  Four  and  Five;  COMCRUDIV  Five:  First  and  Second 
Base  Forces  and  Defense  Division  One  for  information  to  Commander  in  Chief 
Second  Fleet.  No  information  obtained  as  to  the  location  of  the  Commander 
in  Chief  Third  Fleet,  which  gives  the  strong  impression  that  he  is  underway. 

Fourth  Fleet. — Believed  to  be  still  in  TRUK  area.  D.  F.  activity  in  INIar- 
shalls  a  little  greater  today  than  normal.  JALUIT  addressed  Conunander  Sub- 
marine Force  and  AIRRON  24  in  one  despatch.  The  continued  association  of 
JALUIT  and  Commander  Submarine  Force  plus  his  known  progress  from  the 
Empire  to  CHICHIJIMA  to  SAIPAN  makes  his  destination  obviously  the  Mar- 
shalls.  Since  one  of  his  large  units  (SITI  4)  arrived  in  the  Marshalls  some 
time  ago  this  unit  cannot  agree  with  Com  16  that  there  is  not  a  submarine 
concentration  in  that  area.  Every  evidence  points  to  a  concentration  of  not  only 
the  small  Fourth  Fleet  submarines  there  but  also  a  good  portion  of  the  Fleet 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  771 

submarines  of  the  Submarine  Force.  AIRRON  24  plus  YOKOHAMA  AIR  CORPS 
presence  in  tbat  area  points  to  intended  air-submarine  operations  from  the  Mar- 
shalls.  Also  the  presence  of  a  unit  of  plane  guard  destroyers  indicates  the  presence 
of  at  least  one  carrier  in  the  Mandates  although  this  has  not.  been  confirmed. 

South  China. — BAKO  active  with  despatches  to  Second  and  Third  Fleets,  Com- 
bined Air  Force  and  SAMA.  Commander  in  Chief,  China  Fleet  becoming  more 
and  more  active  as  an  originator  with  despatches  to  the  Task  Force.  He  made 
a  movement  report  with  the  South  China  Fleet  as  an  information  addressee.  The 
Stafe  Communication  Officer  of  the  South  China  Fleet  was  addressed  at  Shanghai 
today. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  1  December  1941 

General. — All  service  radio  calls  of  forces  afloat  changed  promptly  at  0000,  1 
December.  Previously,  service  calls  changed  after  a  period  of  six  months  or 
more.  Calls  were  last  changed  on  1  November,  1941.  The  fact  that  service  calls 
lasted  only  one  month  indicate  an  additional  progressive  step  in  preparing  for 
active  operations  on  a  large  scale.  For  a  period  of  two  to  three  days  prior  to  the 
change  of  calls,  the  bulk  of  the  radio  traffic  consisted  of  dispatches  from  one  to  four 
or  five  days  old.  It  appears  that  the  Japanese  Navy  is  adopting  more  and  more 
security  provisions.  A  study  of  traffic  prior  to  0000,  1  December  indicates  that 
an  effort  was  made  to  deliver  all  dispatches  using  old  calls  so  that  promptly 
with  the  change  of  calls,  there  would  be  a  minimum  of  undelivered  dispatches 
and  consequent  confusion  and  compromises.  Either  that  or  the  large  number  of 
old  messages  may  have  been  used  to  pad  the  total  volume  and  make  it  appear 
as  if  nothing  unusual  was  pending. 

First  Fleet. — Nothing  to  indicate  that  this  fleet  as  a  fleet  is  operating  outside 
of  Empire  waters. 

Second  Fleet. — This  fleet  is  believed  proceeding  from  the  Kure-Sasebo  area  in 
the  direction  of  South  China  and  Indo-China.  Takao  does  not  appear  to  play  an 
important  role  in  today's  traffic ;  consequently,  the  assumption  is  made  that  this 
fleet  is  passing  up  Takao.  Certain  units  of  the  Second  Fleet  Task  Force  are 
definitely  in  the  Indo-China  area  (Cruiser  Division  Seven  and  Destroyer  Squad- 
ron Three  most  prominent). 

Third  Fleet. — Nothing  to  report  except  that  the  same  association  of  Second, 
Third  Fleets  and  Combined  Air  Force  with  South  China  and  Indo-China  Forces 
continues. 

Fourth  Fleet. — No  change  in  the  Fourth  Fleet  or  Mandates  area. 

Fifth  Fleet. — Nothing  to  report. 

SKhmarines. — Large  number  of  the  Submarine  Force  believed  to  be  in  the  area 
to  the  eastward  of  Yokosuka-Chichijima  and  Saipan.  Elagship  somewhere  in 
this  general  area. 

Carriers. — ^No  change. 

ComMned  Air  Force. — No  change. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  2  December  1941 

General. — The  most  prominent  factor  in  today's  traffic  is  the  apparent  confusion 
in  the  routing  of  traffic  for  certain  major  parts  of  the  Japanese  Fleet.  There 
were  instances  where  the  same  dispatch  was  repeated  several  times  after  it  ap- 
pared  on  the  Tokyo  broadcast  and  also  where  Takao  Radio  received  the  same 
dispatch  that  it  had  previously  sent.  ComSixteen  reported  Second  and  Third 
Fleets  in  Takao  area  and  that  Takao  Radio  was  broadcasting  traffic  to  these 
fleets.  This  broadcast  was  not  uncovered  here  and  contrary  to  location  report, 
there  was  one  indication  that  these  two  fleets  were  not  close  to  Takao.  In 
several  instances  Takao  Radio  forwarded  traffic  to  Tokyo  for  these  fleets.  Sum- 
ming up  all  reports  and  indications,  it  is  believed  that  the  large  fleet  made  up  of 
Second,  Third  and  First  Fleet  units  has  left  Empire  waters  but  is  either  not 
close  enough  to  Takao  for  good  communication  or  is  proceeding  on  a  course 
not  close  to  Takao.  The  change  of  calls  on  December  first  has  prevented  this 
office  from  making  definite  statements  at  this  date  of  the  imits  now  in  the 
Southern  area.  To  further  complicate  the  situation,  Shanghai  Radio  handled  a 
considerable  amount  of  traffic  which  obviously  was  originated  by  and  destined 
for  units  in  the  Takao  area.  The  Chief  of  Staff,  South  China  area  continues  to 
appear  in  Shanghai.  ComSixteen  reported  nine  submarines  proceeding  south  by 
Camranh  Bay.  This  group  is  believed  to  comprise  both  Submarine  Squadrons  Five 
and  Six,  which  units  normally  operate  with  the  First  Ileet  but  have  been  included 
repeatedly  in  the  Second  Fleet  Task  Force  for  Southern  operations. 
79716 — 46— Ex.  149,  vol.  2 8 


772       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

There  was  a  very  high  percentage  of  high  precedence  traffic  originated  both 
by  major  forces  afloat  and  Tokyo.  Hainan  continues  as  a  prominent  address. 
Palao  and  Third  Base  Force  is  holding  tlie  same  relative  importance. 

Fi7'st  Fleet. — Despite  the  lack  of  positive  identifications,  the  First  Fleet  appears 
relatively  quiet.  From  inconclusive  evidence,  it  appears  as  if  there  may  have 
been  a  split  in  the  original  or  normal  Combined  Fleet  Staff  and  that  these  may  be 
two  supreme  commanders  with  staffs.  As  an  example,  traffic  routing  indicates 
one  Combined  Fleet  call  associated  with  the  Second  and  Third  Fleets  and  appar- 
ently in  company  while  another  Combined  Fleet  call  appears  not  associated  with 
the  Second  and  Third  Fleets. 

Second  Fleet. — No  units  have  stood  out  prominently  the  last  two  or  three  days. 
This  is  partly  due  to  lack  of  new  identifications  but  contributes  somewhat  to  the 
belief  that  a  large  part  of  the  Second  Fleet  is  underway  in  company.  Cruiser 
Division  Seven  and  Destroyer  Squadron  Three  are  unlocated  and  unobserved 
since  change  of  calls. 

Communication  Intelligence   Smmnary,   2   December  19^1 

Tlm-d  Fleet. — Nothing  to  report.  Shanghai  appeared  in  an  indirect  way  in 
some  of  the  Third  Fleet  traffic. 

Mandates. — Association  of  Submarine  Force  and  Fourth  Fleet  continues. 
Some  traffic  for  Fourth  Fleet  units  still  going  through  Truk. 

Carriers. — Almost  a  complete  blank  of  information  on  the  Carriers  today.  Lack 
of  identifications  has  somewhat  promoted  this  lack  of  information.  However, 
since  over  two  hundred  service  calls  have  been  partially  identified  since  the 
change  on  the  first  of  December  and  not  one  carrier  call  has  been  recovered,  it 
is  evident  that  carrier  traffic  is  at  a  low  ebb. 

Combined  Air  Force. — This  force  continues  to  be  associated  closely  with  Second, 
Third  and  Indo-China  Fleets.  Some  units  of  the  Combined  Air  Force  have 
undoubtedly  left  the  Takao  area. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  3  December  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal  with  receiving  conditions  good.  Present  state 
of  call  recovery  does  not  permit  much  detailed  information  to  be  obtained.  The 
extensive  use  of  alternate  calls  by  the  major  commands  slows  up  identification  of 
even  these  Units.  Very  few  units  have  been  positively  identified  so  far.  The 
Chief  of  the  Naval  General  Staff  originated  three  long  despatches  to  the  CINC 
COMBINED,  SECOND  and  THIRD  FLEETS.  The  Tokyo  Intelligence  originated 
nine  despatches  to  the  same  addresses. 

The  presence  of  the  CINC  SECOND  FLEET  in  Taiwan  waters  is  not  revealed 
by  radio  traffic.  In  some  traffic  from  Takao  the  CINC  SECOND  FLEET  is  indi- 
cated as  having  previously  received  the  messages  while  in  others  to  Tokyo  he  is 
indicated  for  delivery  by  that  Station.  It  is  the  impression  that  both  SECOND 
and  THIRD  FLEETS  are  underway  but  are  not  verified  by  Radio  Intelligence 
means. 

There  are  some  FOURTH  FLEET  Units  in  the  Mar.'^hall  Islands  area  including 
some  of  the  FOURTH  FLEET  Staff.  The  identity  of  these  units  is  not  known. 
The  SIXTH  BASE  FORCE  at  Jaluit  addressed  several  messages  to  CINC 
FOURTH. 

Some  Swatow  Units  were  addressed  at  Saigon  today  indicating  a  movement 
of  some  South  China  Units  to  Saigon.  Bako  originated  many  despatches  to  the 
RNO  Taihoku  and  the  Task  Force  Commander. 

No  information  on  submarines  or  Carriers. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  4  December  194 i 

General. — Traffic  volume  normal  with  fair  receiving  conditions.  Takao  Radio 
today  instituted  a  fleet  broadcast  system  using  the  prefix  UTU  in  heading  so  that 
there  are  now  two  fleet  broadcasts  in  operation.  So  far  only  a  few  messages 
have  been  placed  on  the  Takao  broadcast.  There  were  a  large  number  of  urgent 
messages  today,  most  of  these  from  Tokyo  to  the  major  commanders.  Among 
others  Tokyo  Intelligence  originated  a  seven  part  message  to  Chiefs  of  Staff 
China  Fleet,  Combined  Fleet,  Third  Fleet,  South  China  Fleet,  French  Indo-China 
Force  and  Sama.  In  all,  this  activity  sent  twelve  messages  to  the  major  com- 
manders. 

Combined  Fleet.— The  outstanding  item  of  today's  traffic  is  the  lack  of  mes- 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT   INQUIRY  773 

sages  from  the  CinO.  Second  Fleet  and  CinC.  Third  Fleet.  These  previously 
very  talkative  commanders  are  now  very  quiet.  While  the  Fleet  calls  are  not 
yet  well  identified,  the  lack  of  traffic  from  these  commands  cannot  be  ascribed  to 
that.  These  two  commands  are  still  prominent  as  addressees.  It  is  now  believed 
that  the  CinC.  Second  Fleet  is  in  the  vicinity  of  Takao  and  that  the  apparently 
conflicting  evidence  is  due  to  traffic  destined  for  the  Tokyo  UTU  broadcast  which 
CinC.  Second  Fleet  is  still  copying.  The  CinC.  Combined  Fleet  sent  one  message 
to  an  unidentified  unit  for  information  to  Third  Base  Force  Falao,  CinC.  Second 
Fleet  and  CinC.  Third  Fleet. 

Fourth  Fleet.- — The  CinC.  Fourth  Fleet  sent  a  message  to  Chief  of  Staff  Com- 
bined Air  Force,  information  to  Eleventh  Air  Corps,  Chitose  Air,  Air  Squadron 
Twenty-four,  Third  Base  Force  at  Palao  and  Fourth  Base  Force  at  Truk.  No 
further  check  could  be  made  today  on  the  presence  of  Fourth  Fleet  units  in  the 
Marshalls.  Jaluit  appeared  many  times  in  today's  traffic  being  associated  with 
Commander  Submarine  Force,  Tokyo  Radio  and  MUSI  88  (which  is  believed 
to  be  an  oil  tanker). 

South  China. — Bako  continues  as  an  active  originator  addressing  many  mes- 
sages to  Sama  and  Saigon.  Except  for  traffic  between  South  China  Com- 
manders, all  units  in  that  area  quiet. 

Communication  intelligence  summanj,  December  5,  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  heavy.  All  circuits  overloaded  with  Tokyo  broad- 
cast going  over  full  24  hours.  Tokyo-Mandates  circuit  in  duplex  operation. 
There  were  several  new  intercept  schedules  heard.  OMINATO  radio  working 
SAMA  and  BAKO  sending  fleet  traffic.  The  Takao  broadcast  handling  traffic 
to  Second  and  Third  Fleet  while  the  Tokyo  broadcast  is  still  handling  traffic 
for  these  units  also.  It  is  noted  that  some  traffic  being  broadcast  is  several 
days  old  which  indicates  the  uncertainty  of  delivery  existing  in  the  radio  or- 
ganization. 

There  were  many  messages  of  high  precedence  which  appears  to  be  caused  by 
the  jammed  condition  of  all  circuits. 

A  plain  language  message  was  sent  by  the  Captain,  OKAWA  from  Tokyo 
to  Takao  probably  for  further  relay  addressed  to  FUJIHARA,  Chief  of  the 
Political  Affairs  Burejau  saying  that  "in  reference  to  the  Far  Eastern  Crisis, 
what  you  said  is  considered  important  at  this  end  but  proceed  with  what  you 
are  doing,  specific  orders  will  be  issued  soon". 

Combined  Fleet. — Neither  the  Second  or  Third  Fleet  Commanders  have  orig- 
inated any  traffic  today.  They  are  still  frequently  addressed  but  are  receiving 
their  traffic  over  broadcast.  They  are  undoubtedly  in  Takao  area  or  farther 
south  since  the  Takao  broadcast  handles  nearly  all  their  traffic.  No  traffic 
from  the  Commander  Carriers  or  Submarine  Force  has  been  seen  either. 

Third  Fleet.— In  one  WE  address  a  "Chief  of  Staff"  sent  a  message  to  "Com- 
mander Fourteenth  Army  aboard  RYUJOMARU  in  Third  Fleet.  HITOYONGUN. 
SATI  (IRQ  1  REUZEU  MARU).  A  number  of  MARUS  have  been  addressing 
the  CinC.  Third  Fleet. 

Fourth  Fleet. — The  Secretary,  Fourth  Fleet  and  Staff  Communication  Officer 
of  the  Fourth  Fleet  were  addressed  at  Jaluit  today  strengthening  the  impression 
that  the  CinC.  Fourth  Fleet  is  in  the  Marshalls.  The  Commander  of  the  South 
China  Fleet  has  been  addressing  Palao  radio,  the  RNO  PALAO  and  the  Com- 
mander Second  Fleet. 

South  China. — SAMA  addressed  much  traffic  to  CinC.  Second  Fleet.  BAKO 
continues  as  an  active  originator  with  many  dispatcher  to  Second  and  Third 
Fleet.  The  Commander  Combined  Air  Force  appears  to  be  busy  with  the  move- 
ment of  Air  Corps.  SHIOGAMA  Air  and  at  least  two  unidentified  corps  are 
moving,  probably  to  Indo-China. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  December  6,  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  very  heavy  with  a  great  deal  of  old  traffic  being 
transmitted.  Messages  as  far  back  as  1  Decembe/r  were  seen  in  the  traffic. 
This  is  not  believed  an  attempt  to  maintain  a  high  traffic  level  but  is  the  result 
of  confusion  in  traffic  routing  with  uncertainty  of  delivery.  The  stations  now 
holding  broadcasts  are  TOKYO  (with  3  distinct  and  separate  broadcasts), 
SAIPAN,  OMINATO  and  TAKAO. 

Yesterday's  high  level  of  traffic  from  TOKYO  originators  was  maintained 
with  the  Intelligence  activity  still  sending  periodic  messages.  Practically  all 
of  TOKYO'S  messages  carry  prefixes  of  high  priority. 


774       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

ComUned  Fleet. — Still  no  traffic  from  the  Second  and  Third  Fleet  Com- 
manders. These  units  are  sending  their  traffic  via  the  TAKAO  and  TOKYO 
broadcasts.  The  Commander  in  Chief  Combined  Fleet  originated  several  mes- 
sages to  the  Carriers,  Fourth  Fleet  and  the  Major  Commanders. 

Fourth  Fleet. — The  Commander  in  Chief  Fourth  Fleet  is  again  in  the  TRUK 
area.  It  is  doubtful  that  he  ever  went  to  JALUIT  although  it  is  certain  that 
some  members  of  his  staff  were  there  .over  the  past  few  days.  There  is  a 
definite  close  association  between  the  Third  Base  Force  at  PALAO  and  the  forces 
in  South  China.  This  unit  is  constantly  sending  messages  to  the  Chief  of  Staff 
of  the  Second  Fleet,  Third  Fleet,  Indo-China  Forces  and  BAKO.  It  is  being 
almost  entirely  neglected  by  Commander  in  Chief  Fourth  Fleet  under  whose 
command  it  normally  operates.  RONGELAB  radio  addressed  the  PALAO  weather 
observer. 

Fifth  Fleet. — This  fleet  appears  dispersed  about  the  JAPAN  Sea  with  OMI- 
NATO  broadcasting  traffic  for  this  unit. 

Suhmarines. — The  Commander  Submbarine  Force  originated  two  messages 
to  his  command.  These  are  the  first  two  originated  since  1  December.  He  is 
definitely  in  the  MARSHALLS. 

South  Chi7ia.— Nothing  new  to  report.  BAKO,  SAMA  and  TAKAO  still  sending 
many  messages  to  the  Task  Force. 

Convmunication  Intelligence  Summary,  9  December  W^i 

Combined  Fleet. — The  Combined  Fleet  Commander-in-Chief  and  Staff  are  be- 
lieved to  be  in  Empire  waters.  There  appeared  to  be  a  split  in  this  command  in 
Mid-November  which  led  to  the  belief  that  the  operations  as  initiated  by  Second 
Fleet  Commander  in  South  East  Asia  occasioned  a  supreme  Commander  in 
Empire  waters  with  a  secondary  Commander-in-Chief  Combined  Fleet  in  South. 
East  Asia  or  elsewhere. 

First  Fleet. — First  Fleet  is  believed  to  be  temporarily  in  the  background  as 
some  first  fleet  units  should  be  operating  with  the  Second  and  Third  Fleets  and 
the  majority  of  the  remainder  is  operating  with  the  Carrier  Dvisions.  Battle 
Ship  Division  One  and  Two  have  disappeared  as  far  as  our  identifications 
are  concerned.  Battleship  Division  Three  is  believed  to  be  operating  with 
Carrier  Divisions  which  outfit  is  in  turn  divided  so  that  HI  YE  I  and  KIRI- 
SHIMA  are  operating  with  Striking  Force  #1  in  the  Blue  Pacific  and  HARUNA 
and  KONGO  are  probably  with  the  or  a  #3  Striking  Force.  Destroyer  Squadron 
One  and  ABUKUMA  are  believed  also  in  the  #1  Striking  Force.  From  one 
dispatch  in  plain  text  and  associations,  it  appears  likelv  that  Striking  Force  #1 
is  still  in  the  Oahu-Midway  area  (Lat.  32  N  Long.  164  W). 

Second  Fleet. — Cruiser  Division  Eight  of  this  Fleet  may  be  operating  with 
Sti-iking  Force  #1.  Other  units  are  probably  with  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
Second  in  Southeast  Asia.  One  indication  is  that  the  bulk  of  the  Second  Fleet 
is  operating  against  Malay  and  Singapore  while  the  Third  Fleet  took  care  of 
Luzon.  The  indications  continue  that  Second  Fleet,  Third  Fleet  and  Combined 
Air  Force  are  under  one  command ;  also  that  Indo-China  Force  and  South  China 
Force  seem  to  have  lost  some  of  the  close  association  with  this  combination, 
probably  because  South  China  and  Indo-China  Force  are  holding  the  South  China 
Coast  and  Indo-China. 

Third  Fleet. — Together  with  some  units  of  the  Combined  Air  Force  is  probably 
operating  against  the  Philippines  and  also  in  Malay.  The  close  connection  of 
Palao  with  Third  Fleet  addresses  and  Palao  prior  to  war  is  the  basis  for  this 
assumption. 

Fourth  Fleet. — Operating  in  the  Mandates.  No  recent  indications  of  opera- 
tions of  this  fleet  outside  of  the  Mandates.  On  one  hand  there  is  a  close  con- 
nection between  Fourth  Fleet  and  Fifth  Fleet  in  the  north ;  on  the  other  hand 
Submarine  Force  and  Fourth  Fleet  must  be  working  together  in  the  defense  of 
the  southern  flank.  Air  Squadron  Twenty-four  figures  prominently  in  the  traffic 
and  is  still  in  the  Marshall  area.  Saipan  Radio  initiated  a  broadcast  similar  ro 
Takao.  Jaluit  appears  to  have  taken  over  some  of  the  promary  duties  of  a 
radio  intelligence  unit  and  is  as.sumed  to  be  headquarters  in  the  "Field". 

Fifth  Fleet. — Definite  information  that  this  fleet  is  in  the  northern  area  con- 
tinues. Ominato  Radio  handles  traffic  to  and  from  the  Fifth  Fleet  units.  This 
fleet  appeared  to  shift  from  Yokosuka  north  to  Ominato  area  shortly  before  war 
opened.  The  composition  of  this  fleet  is  still  somewhat  obscure  but  is  believed 
to  have  very  few  so  called  fleet  vessels.  '  Probably  as  large  percentage  of  fleet 
auxiliaries  and  converted  air  tenders? 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT   INQUIRY  775 

Carriers. — #1  Striking  Force,  operating  in  Blue  Pacific.    Believed  to  comprise 
Carrier  Division  One — AKAGI  (Flagship  Cardivs) 

KAEA 
Carrier  Division  Two— HIRYU 
SORYU 
Carrier  Division 

Four  (or  Five)         — SHOKAKU 
ZUIKAKU 
Cruiser  Division  Eight 
Destroyer  Squadron  One 

KIRISHIMA—  —First  Section  BatDiv  Three. 

HIYEI. 
By  deduction  #2  Striking  Force,  if  such  an  organization  exists,  comprises 
Carrier  Division  Three — ^RYUJO 
HOSHO 
Carrier  Division 

Five   (or four)  — KORYU 

and  probably  other  combatant  units.     Carrier  Division  Three  and  RYUJO  were 
definitely  associated  with  Second  and  Third  Fleet  prior  to  war. 

Submarines. — A  strong  force  of  submarines  believed  to  be  operating  with 
Fourth  Fleet  and  another  force  operating  with  Carrier  Divisions. 
China. — China  Fleet  Commanders  in  normal  bases  or  locations. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  10  December  1941 

General. — Traffic  volume  continues  very  high  with  proportionate  amount  of 
high  precedence  traffic.  The  actual  amount  of  traflic  intercepted  at  Heeia  has 
not  increased  materially  since  the  Eighth  but  this  is  due  to  the  concentration 
of  efforts  on  obtaining  all  transmissions  of  Japanese  vessels  in  the  Hawaiian 
area  somewhat  at  the  expense  of  obtaining  the  maximum  traffic  on  all  Imown 
circuits.  There  were  very  few  signals  identified  as  emanating  from  the  imme- 
diate Hawaiian  area.  A  great  many  bearings  have  been  obtained  the  last  two 
days  in  the  sector  295-300  true  from  Oahu ;  since  most  calls  involved  have  been 
tentatively  identified  as  vessels  in  the  North  China  and  Takao  areas,  increased 
activity  in  that  region  may  be  the  reason  therefor.  The  Navy  Minister  originated 
the  following  dispatch  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Combined  Fleet  which  was  broad; 
casted  from  Takao  Radio : 

"164.  From  the  Cabinet,  Prime  Minister  and  Admiral  Arihama  Takaza  Igo 
received  a  request  for  a  congratulatory  telegram  as  follows  addressed  to  all 
hands  (?). 

"Congratulations  (upon)  there  having  been  attained  manifold  results  (war 
results)  (at)  the  outset  of  the  naval  war.  We  pray  for  the  success  of  the 
fortunes  of  war  for  all  ranks  of  officers  and  enlisted  men". 

Combined  Fleet. — No  change. 

First  Fleet. — No  indications  of  any  change.  The  calls  identified  as  First 
Fleet  have  practically  disappeared  from  the  traffic  lately.  This  is  submitted 
as  a  partial  strengthening  of  the  opinion  that  the  First  Fleet  has  lost  its  identity 
as  such  and  has  been  split  between  Carrier  Divisions  and  the  large  task  force 
operating  in  the  Malay  area.  The  report  of  United  States  bomber  action  on  a 
HARUNA  type  Battleship  in  the  Philippine  area,  if  true,  substantiates  this. 

Second  and  Third  Fleets. — Appear  to  be  "intact"  in  the  Southeastern  Asia  area. 

Fourth  Fleets. — Commander-in-Chief,  Fourth  Fleet  and  some  of  the  Fourth 
Fleet  vessels  definitely  show  in  the  Mandates.  It  is  believed  that  Air  Squadron 
Twenty-four  is  still  in  the  Marshall  area  and  that  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
Fourth  Fleet,  is  in  the  Truk  area.  While  complete  coverage  at  Heeia  is  not 
possible  under  present  conditions,  the  available  traffic  does  not  indicate  the 
previous  association  between  Palao  and  Second-Third  Fleet  combination. 

Fifth  Fleet. — No  apparent  change  in  the  available  information  on  this  fleet. 
Considerable  activity  has  been  noted  in  the  High  North  and  Ominato  area  shore 
stations. 

Submarines. — Commander  Submarine  Force  continues  to  show  in  the  routing 
of  traffic  to  and  from  Mandate  stations,  particularly  the  Marshall  Island  area. 
From  all  the  reports  of  submarine  activity  in  the  Hawaiian  area  and  the  well 
established  fact  that  Submarine  Squadrons  Five  and  Six  went  south  to  Malay 
prior  to  declarations  of  war,  it  appears  that  practically  all  submarines  are 
away  from  Empire  waters  or  that  our  estimates  of  Japanese  submarine  strength 
were  lower  than  actual  numbers. 


776       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Carriers. — Very  little  radio  activity  the  past  twenty-four  hours.  One  possible 
significant  clue  to  Carrier  Divisions  future  operations  was  contained  in  a 
despatch  from  Tokyo  Radio  to  the  Commander  of  First  Air  Fleet  flagship, 
AKAGI,  listing  a  long  string  of  Tokyo  Broadcast  messages  which  it  is  assumed 
provided  a  reminder  or  check  on  those  dispatches  which  should  have  been  received 
for  the  First  Air  Fleet  during  the  period  7-10  December.  To  this  office,  the 
inference  is  that  for  the  past  three  days  (during  radio  silence  in  Hawaiian 
waters),  a  check  up  was  not  practicable  but  now  may  be  done  without  breaking 
radio  silence.     While  this  may  be  far-fetched,   it  still  remains  a  possibility. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  11  December  19-il 

G'eneral. — Intercepted  traffic  volume  lower  than  normal  due  to  employment  of 
receivers  in  search  watch.  The  amount  intercepted  was  however,  indicative  that 
the  traffic  volume  for  the  Fleet  was  high,  Jaluit  and  Saipan  broadcast  overloaded 
and  the  Yokosuka  to  Saipan  was  in  continuous  operation. 

Local  Operations. — Continuous  search  watch  was  maintained  on  all  known  Air 
and  Submarine  frequencies  during  the  day.  No  air  circuits  heard.  It  was  ex- 
pected that  after  dark  the  submarines  circuit  6385  kcs.  would  liven  up  but  there 
was  very  little  activity.  Two  bearings  of  submarines  in  this  vicinity  were  ob- 
tained. HEHIYA  was  heard  and  a  bearing  of  050°  True  was  obtained.  HIMI 
was  heard  on  1$0.2°  True.  Other  submarine  calls  were  faintly  heard  and  bearings 
were  all  to  the  westward. 

First  Fleet. — Nothing  to  report. 

Second  Fleet. — Together  with  Third  Fleet  in  the  Malay  Area. 

Fourth  Fleet. — Commander-in-Chief,  Fourth  Fleet  is  in  the  Mandates  with 
most  of  the  Fourth  Fleet.  He  is  believed  to  be  in  the  Truk  area  but  is  main- 
taining close  liaison  with  the  Marshalls  in  which  is  stationed  Air  Squadron 
Twenty-four  and  KAMOI.  Jaluit  radio  is  handling  all  traffic  for  the  Submarine 
Fleet  which  indicates  this  place  as  the  base  for  the  submarine  operating  in  the 
Hawaiian  area. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  12  December  19-ii 

General. — No  apparent  change  in  traffic  volume  or  high  precedence  traffic.  No 
material  change  in  fleet  locations  has  been  definitely  established.  However,  it  is 
apparent  that  several  minor  units  have  altered  positions  and,  after  combining 
several  British  conflicting  reports,  many  units  are  more  definitely  located  than 
heretofore. 

Combined  Fleet. — Singapore  reported  Commander-in-Chief,  Combined  Fleet  at 
Sama  Bay  in  Hainan.  Both  Corregidor  and  Pearl  Harbor  report  the  Supreme 
Commander  today  in  the  Chichijima-Mandate  area.  If  it  is  assumed  that  there 
is  a  split  in  the  command,  which  possibility  was  brought  up  recently  by  this  office, 
then  both  British  and  our  reports  may  be  correct.  Our  evidence  here  points  to 
Commander-in-Chief,  Combined  Fleet  very  closely  associated  with  Mandate 
addresses  and  possibly  in  the  general  Saipan  area. 

First  Fleet. — First  fleet  calls  showed  again  after  a  period  of  obscurity.  Chief 
of  Staff,  Combined  Fleet  originated  one  despatch  to  Chief  of  Staff,  First  Air 
Fleet  (recently  near  Oahu)  ;  Chief  of  Staff,  First  Fleet;  Yokosuka  Air  Group; 
Chichi jima  Air  Group?  Chief  of  Staff,  Fifth  Fleet ;  Chief  of  Staff,  Fourth  Fleet? 
and  other  commands. 

Second  and  Third  Fleets. — There  appears  to  be  a  difference  of  opinion  as  to 
locations  of  these  forces.  The  only  definite  point  of  agreement  between  British 
and  United  States  reports  is  that  the  entire  Second  and  Third  Fleets  are  in  the 
Luzon-Singapore-Saigon  triangle.    The  best  estimate  of  locations  is  as  follows: 

Saigon-Malay  Area  In  Philadelphia  Area 

CinC,  Second  Fleet  (Singapore?)  CinC,  Third  Fleet 

Second  Fleet   (Singapore  area  ?)  Third  Fleet 

First  Fleet  Units  operating  with  Second  Base  Force  of  Third  Fleet 

Second  Fleet :  2  BB  of  Batdiv  3  AKASHI   (Repair  Ship) 

(less  sunkship),  Desron3,  3CL  (flag-    Possibly  Air  outfits  from  Takao  area. 

ship    Subrons   and   Desron)     (N.    E. 

coast  of  Malaya) 
CinC.  Southern  Exp.  Force  (Saigon) 
Comdr.  Combined  Air  Force   (Saigon) 
CarDiv.     3— HOSHO-RYUJO      (Siam) 
Subrons  Five  and  Six 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT   INQUIRY  777 

Fourth  Fleet. — There  appears  to  be  little  change  in  location  of  Fourth  Fleet 
— still  in  Truk-Saipan-Marshall  area.  Fourth  Fleet  addresses  and  First  Air 
Fleet  appeared  together  in  several  despatch  headings.  This  is  submitted  as 
possible  clue  to  the  present  disposition  of  -the  Striking  Force  against  Oahu. 
Air  Squadron  Twenty-four  normally  in  Marshalls  and  unidentified  Fourth 
Fleet  command  (RATA9)  also  included  in  this  same  association. 

Fifth,  Fleet. — Little  change  or  information. 

Submarines. — During  the  past  twelve  hours,  there  have  been  four  to  five  single 
bearings  of  submarines  in  the  Oahu  area  bearing  302  True  to  49  True  from  Oahu 
Direction  Finder  Stations.  Bearings  were  equally  spread.  One  bearing  of  sub- 
marine unit  from  Dutch  Harbor  provided  a  possible  fix  in  L.  30  N,  146  W.  Ad- 
ditionally six  bearings  of  submarine  units  were  received  from  West  Coast  sta- 
tions— these  were  also  somewhat  spread  over  North  Pacific  area.  Since  west 
coast  stations  are  untrained  to  copy  Japanese,  no  calls  were  given,  consequently 
no  fixes  obtained.  Evidence  is  conclusive  that  majority  of  submarine  units  in 
Eastern  Pacific  are  widely  sprea'd  in  the  Dutch  Harbor-Oahu-San  Diego  area, 
perhaps  several  in  immediate  vicinity  of  Hawaiian  Islands.  Tokyo  Radio  came 
up  on  17  Kcs.  with  a  powerful  broadcast  on  the  11th  December.  This  is  believed 
to  be  an  additional  safeguard  for  widespread  submarine  units  communications  as 
practically  all  addressees  have  been  identified  as  submarine  units.  The  best 
estimate  from  Direction  Finder  bearings  of  the  of  the  number  of  submarines  in 
the  Northeast  Pacific  including  the  immediate  Hawaiian  area-  is  8  to  12  sub- 
marines. There  appears  to  be  a  split  in  serial  numbers  of  Submarine  Force  Com- 
manders despatches.  The  assumption  is  that  perhaps  one  serial  series  is  for 
submarines  in  the  Pacific  and  the  other  for  Submarine  units  in  the  South  Eastern 
Asia  area.  Commander  Submarine  Force  is  believed  to  continue  in  the  Marshall 
area. 

China. — Report  received  of  part  of  South  China  Fleet  in  Jaluit  area.  This  is 
not  believed  to  be  correct.  From  inconclusive  evidence,  China's  depleted  fleet 
and  South  China  Fleets  are  still  spread  between  Shanghai  and  Canton-Haiau 
area. 

The  address  "OKASHUDANSO.SATI"  originated  despatch  to  CinC.  Second 
Fleet  and  Southern  Expeditionary  Force  using  a  four  numeral  code.  The  origina- 
tor appears  to  be  the  OKA  army  division  headquarters-location,  except  as  to  asso- 
ciation addresses,  not  evident. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  13  December  19^fl 

General. — ^Traffic  volume  heavy  with  a  great  number  of  high  precedence  mes- 
sages. Practically  all  traffic  being  handled  by  broadcast.  Large  parts  of  inter- 
cepted traffic  addressed  to  submarine  units  but  this  is  due  to  our  concentration 
on  submarine  frequencies. 

Combined  Fleet. — Commander-in-Chief,  Combined  Fleet  is  still  taking  his  traffic 
from  Saipan.  Tokyo  gives  some  traffic  for  Combined  Fleet  units  to  Chichi jlma 
for  delivery  showing  that  some  units  are  in  that  vicinity.  In  several  dispatches 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  First  Fleet  was  associated  with  Commander  Striking 
Force,  Commander  First  Air  Fleet  and  Commander  Submarine  Fleet.  Tokyo 
Intelligence  addressed  messages  to  this  group  of  commands.  The  Commander  of 
the  Second  and  Third  Fleets  are  still  closely  associated  in  the  traffic.  It  is  not 
possible  to  definitely  separate  them  in  areas  as  yet  but  it  is  still  believed  that 
Commander-in-Chief,  Second  Fleet  is  concerned  with  operations  in  Malaya  while 
Commander-in-Chief,  Third  Fleet  appears  to  be  situated  a  little  farther  north, 
making  him  concerned  in  Philippine  operations.  Since  the  Second  Base  Force 
is  associated  with  Commander-in-Chief,  Third  Fleet  it  is  probable  that  this  unit 
is  in  the  Philippine  area. 

Fourth  Fleet. — The  Commander,  Fourth  Fleet  is  indicated  at  Truk  or  Saipan. 
He  is  not  in  the  Marshalls.  Air  Squadron  24  and  KAMOI  in  Marshalls  with 
Air  Squadron  24  basing  on  the  northern-most  ATOLL  (radio  call  HII5)  and  is 
beyong  a  doubt  the  unit  raiding  Wake.  Yokohama  Air  Corps  has  moved  to  a 
base  established  in  the  Gilberts. 

Fifth  Fleet. — Commander-in-Chief,  Fifth  Fleet  in  communication  with  OMI- 
NATO  radio.  He  has  a  number  of  units  with  him  as  indicated  by  his  radio  ac- 
tivity on  4640  kcs.  These  units  furnished  the  greater  part  of  the  radio  activity 
last  night.    This  force  appears  to  be  guarding  the  northern  approach  to  Japan. 

Suhmarines. — Little  submarine  activity  last  night.  Some  traffic  heard  on  6385 
kcs.  but  no  bearings  outside  of  the  250-300  sector  obtained.    One  unit  (6RI)  fixed 


778       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

by  Direction  Finder  bearings  from  Dutch  Harbor  and  Oahu.  At  a  position  just 
N.  E.  of  wake  Island.  Commander  Submarine  Fleet  at  Jaluit  and  is  continually 
broadcasting. 

Air. — The  Commander,  First  Air  Fleet  has  appeared  in  dispatches  as  mentioned 
above  but  no  other  carrier  traffic  found. 

Communication  Intelligence  Summary,  lit  December  1941 

Oeneral. — High  traffic  volume  continues.  An  increase  in  tactical  traffic  over 
the  past  two  days  was  evident  in  the  Siam-Philippine  area.  Also  radio  activity 
was  on  the  increase  in  the  North  China  Area  and  the  Yokosuka  sector.  Dispatch 
headings  and  radio  activity  on  5350  kcs.  indicated  a  grouping  of  several  Naval 
auxiliaries  (MARU's)  with  a  few  fleet  vessels.  Only  bearings  on  this  group 
placed  them  in  the  Northern  sector — Chinkai  or  Japan  Sea  area?  To  take  one 
case,  Chinkai  Radio  was  very  active  on  6345  kcs.  with  about  16  units.  All  these 
indications  point  to  reinforcements  organizing  or  proceeding  from  the  Japan  area 
to  other  locations.  In  another  area,  a  bearing  of  the  Fourth  Base  Force  Detach- 
ment at  Greenwich  Island  (Y0ME6)  showed  270  degrees  which  is  15  degrees 
above  Greenwich  Island,  and  associated  traffic  indicated  this  force  was  probably 
afloat  in  the  Saipan  area  since  several  Naval  Auxiliaries  were  included  in  the 
traffic.  Another  significant  despatch  heading  which  was  repeated  several  times 
contained  the  action  address  "Communication  Officers  of  Major  Fleet  units  (or 
Forces)  less  Fifth  Fleet,  Submarine  Force,  and  First  Air  Fleet".  These  three 
organizations  seem  to  be  the  ones  on  the  "loose"  at  the  present  date. 

ComUned  and  First  Fleet. — First  Fleet  showed  a  little  in  the  dispatch  headings. 
Chiefs  of  Staff,  Combined  Fleet  and  the  First  Air  Fleet  appeared  to  be  associated 
with  Yokosuka  Radio  and  the  calls  believed  to  represent  Yokosuka  Air,  Tateyama 
Air,  and  Chichi jima  Air. 

Second,  Third  Fleets,  Comtined  Air  Force. — No  indications  of  any  material 
changes  in  locations  these  fleets.  Tactical  traffic  was  particularly  heavy  among 
the  major  units  operating  the  Siam-Philippine  area.  Commandant,  Sixteenth 
Naval  District  reported  an  identity  of  Air  Corps  22  which  has  figured  prominently 
in  the  S.  E.  Asia  sector.  It  is  believed  this  group  may  be  shore  based  in  Hainan 
or  Siam.  Several  air  units  showed  at  Takao  which  have  been  inconspicuous 
lately — Kanoya  Air,  Takao  Air,  Shiogama  Air,  and  Staff  Combined  Air  Force. 
This  may  or  may  not  indicate  change  in  disiwsitions  due  to  the  fact  that  the  traffic 
routing  through  Takao  Radio  has  never  been  clearly  defined  or  understood. 

Fourth  Fleet. — The  17th  Air  Corps,  Air  Squadron  24,  and  possibly  Kisaratsu 
Air  was  represented  at  a  Marshall  Island  Station  (HII5).  This  group  was  very 
busy  with  tactical  traffic  and  apparently  was  operating,  possibly  in  Wake  area. 
Commander-in-Chief  Fourth  Fleet  remains  at  Truk.    Palao  was  not  prominent. 

Fifth  Fleet. — No  indication  of  locations  or  plans. 

Subma7-ines. — Traffic  to  submarine  units  particularly  heavy.  No  bearings  of 
submarine  units  in  the  Hawaiian  area  were  obtained.  Traffic  to  some  submarine 
units  are  repeated  several  times  indicating  difficulties  of  communicating  with 
distant  locations.  The  tactical  call  ITO,  which  from  Direction  Finder  bearings 
passed  from  west  to  east  of  Hawaii  on  the  12th,  13,  appears  to  be  a  Submarine 
Squadron  Commander.     No  bearings  on  ITO  obtained  since  13th. 

Carriers. — Remarks  on  First  Air  Fleet  contained  in  above.  Only  indication  as 
to  present  location  is  the  associations  in  traffic  with  three  air  activities  in  the 
general  Yokosuka  area. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  779 

Hewitt  Inquiry  Exhibit  No.  23 
PACIFIC  FLEET  INTELLIGENCE  MEMORANDUM  OF  1  DECEMBER  1941 

Location  of  Japanese  Fleet  Units 

Cincpac  File  No. 

United  States  Pacific  Fleet 

U.  S.  S.  Pennsylvania,  Flagship 

Peabl  Haeboe,  T.  H.,  December  1, 1941. 
C-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L 

M-E-M-0-R-A-N-D-U-M 

From  :  Fleet  Intelligence  Officer. 

To :  Admiral. 

Subject :  ORANGE  FLEET— Location  of. 

1.  From  best  available  information  units  of  the  ORANGE  fleet  are  thought  to 
be  located  as  listed  below :  — 
Yokosuka  Area 

TAKAO  (CA) 1  CA 

3rd  Fleet  HQ ? 

#1  Patrol  Force ? 

AIRGROUPof  5th  Fleet  (Chichi jima?) 36  planes  ? 

Total— 1  CA  plus  ?  36  planes. 
Kui-e — Sasebo  Area 

CinC  Combined  Fleet 
CinC  First  Fleet 

BatDiv  1  &  2 6  BB  ? 

Crudiv6 — may  head  for  Mandates  (?) 4  CA  ? 

Desron  1 1  CL 

12  DD 
^me^Srdfihet  m  N  AGAR  A "i  ^t 

4  €t i  efe 

©eediv  i3  f?)- i  Gi, 

4©© 
Cruiser  Division  EIGHT 2  CA 

Total— 6  BB— 6  CA— 1  CL— 16  DD. 
Shanghai  Area 

CinC  China  Fleets  in  IZUMO 1-OCA 

Shanghai  Base  Force It-PG 

3-ODD 

plus  miscellaneous  craft 
#10  Air  Group 36  planes  (?) 

Total— 1  OCA— 1  PG — 3  ODD— 36  planes,  etc. 
Bako — Takao  Area 

THIRD  Fleet  Submarine  Squadrons 1  AS 

6  SS  (I) 

Subron-S 1  CL 

6  SS 
8ubron-6 1  CL 

4  SM 
Desron-5  less  Desdiv  22 1  CL 

8  DD 
#2  Base  Force 3  CM 

5  XPG  or  XPO 
17  AP  or  AK 

Desron-Jf 1  CL 

12  DD 


780       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Location  of  Japanese  Fleet  Units — Continued 

Baeo — Takao  Area — Continued 
Comdr.  Combined  Air  Force 

5th  Air  Battalion  (Army  ?) 

11th  Air  Group 36  planes 

Air  Squadron  6 3  XAV 

30  planes 

Air  Squardon  7 3  AV 

48  planes 

23rd  Air  Group 36  planes 

"     Air  Group 36  planes 

"     Air  Group 36  planes 

"     Air  Group 36  planes 

Genzan  Air  Group__^ 36  planes 

Shiogama  Air  Group 36  planes 

Kanoya  Air  Group 36  planes 

Kasuga  Maru 1  XCV 

36  planes 
at 
CinC  2nd  Fleet  with  units  enroute  TAKAO 

plus  Crudiv-5 4  CA  possibly  5  CA 

Desron-2 1  CL 

16  DD 

Cardiv-4 2  CV  &  4  DD 

Cardiv-3 2  CV  &  3  DD 

Batdiv-3  less  HARUNA 3  BE  (maybe  2  BB) 

Total— 3  BB— 4  CV— 7  CL^-47  DD— 4  SIM— 3  AV— 4  XAV— 4  CA- 
3  CM- 17  XAP— 5  XPC— 450  planes. 
Hainan — Canton  Area 

CinC  South  China  (in  ISUZU) 1  CL 

CinC  Sm  Exp  Force 1  CA 

Crudiv-7 4  OA 

Desron-3 1  CL 

15  DD 

1st  Base  Force  (?) 3  CM 

(part  of  this  may  be  in  Formosan  waters) .   12  AM's 

6  XPG 
12  PC 
27  AP 


Total— 5  CA— 2  CL— 15  DD— 3  CINI- 12  AM's— 6  XPG— 12  PC— 
27  AP. 
French  Indo  China 

CinC  S.  Exp.  Fleet  in  CHOKAI 1  CA 

1  CL 

1  CM 

9  Torpedo  Boats 

?  XPG 


Total — 1  CL— 1  CM — 9  Torp.  Boats  &  Miscellaneous. - 
Some  of  1st  &  2nd  Base  Force  are  m»y  fee  here  ( ?) 
OMURA  AIR  GROUP 36  planes 

12  Air  Group  f  [  36    planes  (?) 

13  Air  Group]    Some  may  be  on  Hainan 1    36    planes  (?) 

14  Air  Group  [  I   36    planes  (?) 
Mojtdate  Area 

PALAO 

16th  Air  Group 36  planes 

Srd  Base  Force 10  XPG 

4  SS  (Ro) 


Total— 36  planes— 10  XPG-^  SS.    ' 
Truk 
CinC  4th  Fleet '-  1  CL 

2  OCL 
1  CL 
8  DD 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT   INQUIRY 


781 


Location  of  Japanese  Fleet  Units — ContinuedJ 

Mandate  Area — Continued 

4ih  Base  Force 4  XPG 

4  XAP 

17th  Air  Group 4  XAM's 

36  planes 


Total— 36  planes— 2  CLr-2  OCLr-8  DD— 4  XPG— 4  XAP— 4  XAM. 
Saipan 

CinC  Submarine  Force 1  CL 

plus  subs  (?)  1  Suron  (?) 1  AS 

7  SS 

Chitose  Air  Group 36  planes 

IStli  Air  Group 36  planes 

5th  Base  Force 2CM 

8  XPG 
5  XAP 


Total— 78  planes— 1  CL— 1  AS— 7  SS— 2  CM— 8  XPG— 5  XAP. 
Marshall  Area 

19th  Air  Group 36  planes 

Yokohama  Air  Group 36  planes 

Wotje  Air  Group 34  planes 

Kwajalein  Air  Group 24  planes 

Air  Squadron  24 2  XAV 

KORYU  (?)  plus  plane  guards 30  planes 

1  CV 
4  DD 

Submarine  Squadron  7 1  AS 

9  SS  (Ro) 

Sudiv(?) 4  SS  (I) 

Submarine  Squadron  3 9  SS   (I) 

6th  Base  Force 4  XAM's 

8  XPG 
3  PC 
KATSURIKI 1  AG    (survey) 


Total— 140  planes— 2  XAV— 1  CV— 4  DD— 1  AS— 22  SS— 4  XAM- 
8  XPG— 3  PG— 3  PC— 1  AG. 


Respectfully, 


E.  T.  Layton 
Lieutenant  Comm'ander,  U.  S.  N.. 

Fleet  Intelligence  Officer. 


Hewitt  Inquiry  Exhibit  No.  24 

sealed — secret 

Naval  message — Navy  Department 


'Phone  Ext.  No.  Op-12.    Br.  2992 

Addressees 

Message  Precedence 

R17R 
From'  Chief  of  Naval  Operations 

Action: 

To  CinCaf. 
CinCpao 
Comll. 
Coml2, 
Coml3. 
ComlS. 

Priority. 

Released  by:  Ingersoll               ..              .  

Routine. 

Date:  November  24, 1941       .  

Deferred. 

TOR  Code  Room                ..       

Info: 

Spenavo  London. 
Cinclant. 

Pricrlty. 

Routine. 

Paraphased  by 

Deferred. 

Indicate  by  asterisk  addressees  for  which  mail  delivery  is  satisfactory. 

242OO5CR0443. 
Unless  otherwise  designated  this  dispatch  will  be  transmitted  with  Deferred  precedence. 
Originator  fill  in  date  and  time  for  Deferred  and  Mail  Delivery:  Date  Time  OCT. 

[Hand  written]:  Cincaf  Cincpac,  Coms  Eleven  Twelve,  Thirteen,  and  Fifteen  for  action  spenavo  London 
and  Cinclant  for  infoxx. 


782       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Chances  of  favorable  outcome  of  negotiations  with  Japan  very  doubtful  X. 
This  situation  coupled  with  statements  of  Japanese  Government  and  movements 
their  naval  and  military  forces  indicate  in  our  opinion  that  a  surprise  aggressive 
movement  in  any  direction  including  attack  on  Philippines  or  Guam  is  a  possi- 
bility X    Chief  of  Staff  has  seen  this  dispatch  concurs  and  requests  action  Adees 

to  inform  senior  Army  Officers  ,,^^![,  areas  X     Utmost  secrecy  necessary  in  order 

your 

not  to  complicate  an  already  tense  situation  or  precipitate  Japanese  action  X 

Guam  will  be  informed  separately 

Copy  to  (WPD,  War  Dept.)  and  to  OP-12  but  no  other  distribution. 

[Handwritten:]  plus  3  copies  to  sealed  secret  file. 

Make  original  only.    Deliver  to  Conununication  Watch  Ofiicer  in  person.    (See  Art.  76  (4),  Navy  Regu 
lations.) 

Note.— Linetype  and  italics  denote  change. 


Hewitt  Inquiry  Exhibit  No.  25 

sealed — secret 
Naval  message — Navy  Department 


Phone  extension  number:  Op-12,  Ext.  2992 

Addressees 

Message  precedence 

From:  Chief  of  Naval  Operation. 
Released  by              .             .    . 

For  action: 
CINCAF. 
CINCPAC. 

Priority  X. 
Routine. 

Date:  November  27,  1941. 

Deferred. 

TOR  Coderoom 

Information: 

CINCLANT. 
SPENAVO. 

Priority. 

Decoded  by    ..  .      

Routine. 

Paraphrased  by 

Deferred. 

Indicate  by  asterisk  addressees  for  which  mail  delivery  is  satisfactory. 

GKVJL    BVKLW    2723370921 
Unless  otherwise  designated  this  dispatch  will  be  transmitted  with  deferred  precedence. 
Originator  fill  in  date  and  time  for  deferred  and  mail  delivery:  Date  Time  OCT 


This  despatch  is  to  be  considered  a  war  warning  X  Negotiations  with  Japan 
looking  toward  Stabilization  of  Conditions  in  the  Pacific  have  ceased  and  an 
aggressive  move  by  Japan  is  expected  within  the  next  few  days  X  The  number 
and  equipment  of  Japanese  troops  and  the  organization  of  naval  task  forces 
indicates  an  amphibious  expedition  pfobabty  against  either  the  Philippines 
[Written:  Thai]  or  Kra  Peninsula  or  possibly  Borneo  X  Execute  an  appropriate 
defensive  deployment  preparatory  to  carrying  out  the  tasks  assigned  in  WPL46X 
Inform  district  and  Army  authorities  X  A  similar  warning  is  being  sent  by  War 
Department  X     Spenavo  inform  British  X 

[Handwritten:]  Continental  districts  Guam  Samoa  directed  take  appropriate 
measures  against  sabotage. 

Copy  to  WPD  War  Dept. 

Make  original  only,  deliver  to  Communication  Watch  Officer  ta  person.    See  Art.  76  (4)  Nav.  Regs. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  783 

Hewitt  Inquiry  Exhibit  No.  26 

INTELLIGENCE  REPORTS  BY  PACIFIC  FLEET  INTELLIGENCE  OFFICER 

6  October  1941-2  December  1941 

Confidential 

Secret  Intelligbnqe  Repoet 

Reliability  Rating :  B3.    Serial  No.  82.    Date :  October  6,  1941 

Anchored  in  a  Bay  near  HAKODATE  on  26  September  : 

7  SS 

2  CL 

2  CA 
Underway  headed  South  in  Japan  Sea  night  of  26th :  5  CA. 
29th  departed  YOKOHAMA:  1  CL  (NAKA)  Class. 
29th  Located  South  of  Hong  Kong  (CL)  ISUZI&  (DM)  SHUMUSHU. 
26th  departed  Shanghai  (OCA)  :  IZUMO. 
26th  departed  Shanghai  (PG)  :  TOBA. 
26th  arrived  CHEFOO  :  1  TB. 
Week  ending  27th :  Mouth  Pearl  River — 

12  AP  upstream. 

14  AP  downstream. 

Serial  No.  83 

Air  Groups  are  reported  at :  Takao,  Hoihow,  Taichu  (?)  and  Kagi  (  ?) . 
ASHIGARA  is  reported  to  have  left  Sasebo  with  probable  destination  South 
China. 


Secret  Intelligence  Report 

Reliability  Rating :  A-1.    Serial  No.  85.    Date :  27  October  1941 

Latest  information  of  locations  of  units  of  Orange  Fleet  is : 
Takao  Area : 

GVs  AVs 

RYUJO  NOTORO 

ZUIKAKU  KENJO  MARU 

unidentified  Maru  Type 

Maru  Type 
DD  (Plane  Guards) 
DD 
Takao :  Commander  Combined  Air  Force 

Inland  Sea  &  Ariake  Ba^  Area :  FIRST  &  SECOND  FLEET  plus  SUBFORCB 
except: 

Yokosuka :  YAMASHIRO. 
Maizuru :  KONGO. 
Kanoya-Eastern  Kyushu  Area : 
CVs:  AKAGI         HIRYU 
ICAGA  HOSHO 

Unidentified 
Unidentified 
Unidentified 
Sasebo  Area  :  THIRD  FLEET 

(continued) 


784       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Secret  Intelligence  Report 

Reliability  Rating:  A-1.     Serial  No.  84.     Date:  4  November,  1941 

The  following  information  is  from  a  source  which  has  been  thoroughly  reliable 
in  the  past : 

From  1  Nov.  the  navigation  through  URAGA  CHANNEL  is  restricted  as 
follows.    Seven  fixed  buoys  are  in  the  channel. 

(1)  Lighted  buoy  :  From  ASHIKA  JIMA  lighted  buoy  136  degrees,  6050  meters 
(3.27  miles) .    Lighted  painted  black. 

(2)  Lighted  buoy :  From  ASHIKA  JIMA  lighted  buoy  104  degrees,  6500  meters 
(3.55  miles).    Painted  black. 

(3)  Lighted  buoy :  From  ASHIKA  JIMA  lighted  buoy  104  degrees,  6700  meters 
(3.66  miles).    Painted  red. 

(4)  Flag  buoy :  From  ASHIKA  JIMA"  lighted  buoy  87  degrees,  6600  meters 
(3.61  miles). 

(5)  Flag  buoy:  From  buoy  (4)  190(170?)  degrees,  500  meters  (.27  miles). 

(6)  Flag  buoy:  From  KANNONSAKI  LIGHT  88  degrees,  4900  meters  (2.67 
miles) . 

(7)  Flag  buoy:  From  buoy  (6)  170  degrees,  500  meters  (.27  miles). 

NAVIGATION 

Sail  to  the  east  of  lighted  buoy  (1)  and  between  lighted  buoys  (2)  and  (3). 
Sail  to  the  east  of  the  northern  four  buoys  because  the  sea  area  to  west  of  them 
is  dangerous.    Do  not  enter  (this  area) . 

When  meeting  (another  ship)  going  to  the  entrance  between  buoys  (2)  and  (3), 
the  ship  leaving  port  is  to  wait. 

There  will  probably  be  maintenance  by  naval  patrol  vessels  and  by  the  lookout 
station  on  the  northwest  point  of  NOKOGIRI  YAMA. 

Take  care ! 


Secret  Intellige;nce  Report 

Reliability  Rating :  A-1.     Serial  No.  85.     Date  :  10  November  1941 

Reliable  information  indicates  the  ZUIKAKU,  NOTORO  and  two  Maru  Tenders 
have  returned  to  the  Sasebo-Kure  Area.  RYU  JO  is  still  in  Taiwan.  The  KEN  JO 
MARU  is  in  the  Saigon-Camanh  Bay  Area. 


Secret  -  Intelugence  Report 

Reliability  Rating :  A-1.     Serial  No.  86.     Date  :  12  November  1941 
It  is  reliably  reported  that  the  RYUJO  has  returned  to  Kure. 


Secret  Intelugence  Report 

Reliability  Rating:  (?).     Serial  No.  87.     Date  :  22  Nov.  1941      ' 

Dutch  Authorities  in  the  NEI  have  received  information  that  a  Japanese  ExpCr 
ditionary  Force  which  is  strong  enough  to  constitute  a  threat  against  the  NEI 
or  Portugese  Timor  has  arrived  in  the  vicinity  of  Palau.  If  this  force  moves  past 
a  line  through  Davao-Waigea-Equator  the  Governor  General  of  the  NEI  will 
regard  it  as  an  act  of  hostility  and  will  consider  war  to  have  begun. 


Secret  Intelligence  Report 

Reliability  Rating :  A-1.     Serial  No.  88.     Date :  23  Nov.  1941 

CinCAF  has  no  information  confirming  the  Dutch  report  of  a  Japanese  Expe- 
ditionary Force  near  Palao.     His  information  does  not  indicate  the  presence  of 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT   INQUIRY  785 

units  other  than  the  Fourth  Fleet  in  the  mandates  and  no  unusual  concentration 
of  that  force.  It  is  possible  that  there  may  be  an  increase  in  the  number  of 
transports  and  marus.  There  has  been  a  concentration  of  30-40  marus  in  the 
Saipau  area  since  the  middle  of  October.  CinC  Fourth  is  at  Saipan  as  of  the 
22nd  and  it  is  possible  that  Airon  24  may  also  be  present.  Slight  indications 
are  that  one  battleship  division  and  two  carriers  are  preparing  to  proceed  to  the 
mandates  but  so  far  there  has  been  no  signs  that  the  movement  has  begun. 


Secret  Intelligence  Report 

Reliability  Rating :  A-1.    Serial  No.  89.    Date :  23  Nov.  1941 

CinC  Fourth  Fleet  is  now  reported  to  have  returned  to  Truk  after  a  trip  to 
Saipan  in  the  Kashima.  There  has  been  increased  activity  of  the  cruiser  division 
and  other  units  of  the  Fourth  Fleet  in  the  Truk-Saipan  area.  The  following 
increases  in  Base  Forces  are  estimated:  Third  (Palao),  one  (1)  division  marus; 
Fourth  (Truk),  two  divisions  marus,  two  maru  air  tenders,  special  landing 
force  (?)  ;  Fifth  (Saipan),  two  divisions  marus;  Sixth  (Jaluit),  three  divisions 
marus,  three  unidentified  shore  commands,  two  maru  air  tenders. 

The  activity  of  the  Combined  Air  Force  is  increasing.  The  Eleventh  Air  Corps 
is  believed  to  be  at  Palao  and  Airon  Twenty  four  is  concentrated  in  the  Mar- 
shalls.  The  Fifth  Fleet  is  apparently  at  Chichijima  with  portions  possibly  at 
Marcus.  There  have  been  approximately  seventy  arrivals  or  departures  of 
marus  since  one  November,  mostly  in  the  Truk  and  Jaluit  areas. 


Secret  Intelligence  Repokt 

Reliability  Rating : Serial  No.  90.     Date  :  25  November  1941 

The  U.  S.  N.  Shipping  Adviser  in  Batavia  reports  that  the  Dutch  report  con- 
cerning the  Japanese  Expeditionary  Force  near  Palao  originated  from  the  Dutch 
Army  in  Timor.  Portugese  Timor  was  named  as  the  objective  of  the  Expedition. 
The  information  was  classed  as  doubtful  and  no  further  confirmation  has  been 
obtained. 


Secret  Intelligence  Report 

Reliability  Rating : Serial  No.  91.     Date :  25  Nov.  1941 

The' British  report  that  Germany  is  obtaining  rubber  from  Saigon  in  the  fol- 
lowing shipments.  All  routing  is  from  Saigon  to  Bordeaux  around  Cape  Horn. 
Six  thousand  tons  was  shipped  in  two  Japanese  ships  on  15  October  and  14 
November  respectfully.  Five  thousand  tons  is  to  be  shipped  in  a  German  ship 
on  about  one  December.  The  Jap  ships  may  be  German  vessels  under  Japanese 
charter.     The  ships  have  not  yet  been  identified. 


top  secret 

Secret 

Intelligence  Report 

Reliability  Rating :  A-1.     Serial  No.  12.     Date ;  25  November  1941 

Opnav  reports  that  the  chances  of  any  favorable  result  coriiing  out  of  the 
present  negotiations  with  Japan  are  very  doubtful.  It  is  his  opinion  that  this, 
.coupled  with  the  statements  of  the  Japanese  government,  and  the  movements 
of  their  military  and  naval  forces,  indicates  that  they  may  make  a  surprise 
aggressive  movement  in  any  direction,  including  an  attack  on  the  Philippines 
or  Guam.  The  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Army  concurs  in  this  opinion.  Senior  Army 
Officers  in  the  Far  East,  Pacific  and  West  Coast  areas  (including  Panama)  have 
been  informed.  Utmost  secrecy  is  enjoined  regarding  this  opinion  in  order  to 
not  further  complicate  the  present  tense  situation  or  to  precipitate  Japanese 
action. 


786       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

TOP    SECRET 

tiecret 

Intelligence  Report 

Reliability  Rating :  A-1.     Serial  No.  13.     Date :  25  Nov.  1941 

For  the  past  month  the  Commander  Second  Fleet  has  been  organizing  a  Force 
composed  of  the  following: 

Second  Fleet — Third  Fleet  (including  1st  and  2nd  Base  Forces  and  1st 
Defense  Division) — Combined  Air  Force — Desron  Three — Airron  7 — 
Subron  5 — possibly  units  of  Batdiv  3  (from  First  Fleet). 

These  units  are  linked  vpith  the  South  China  Fleet  and  French  Indo-China 
Force  as  well  as  the  Naval  Stations  at  Sama,  Takao  and  Bako.  Thp  Commander 
Second  Fleet  has  intensely  been  interested  in  operations  at  Palao  and  the  Third 
Base  Force  which  is  at  Palao. 

The  Combined  Air  Force  has  assembled  at  Takao  with  some  indications  that 
certain  units  have  moved  on  to  Hainan. 

The  Third  Fleet  is  believed  moving  in  the  direction  of  Takao  and  Bako. 

The  Second  Base  Force  appears  to  transporting  the  equipment  of  air  forces  to 
Taiwan. 

An  unidentified  Second  Fleet  unit  and  a  submarine  unit  appears  to  be  in  the 
vicinity  of  Takao.  Crudiv  7  and  Desron  3  appear  to  be  an  advance  unit  and 
may  be  en  route  South  China.  A  strong  concentration  of  submarines  and  air- 
craft is  believed  in  the  Marshalls  comprising  Airron  24,  at  least  one  cardiv  and 
one  third  of  the  submarine  force. 

Com  14  believes  the  above  indicates  a  strong  force  is  preparing  to  operate  in 
SoutliEastern  Asia  while  certain  units  operate  from  Palao  and  the  Marshalls. 


top  secret 

Secret 

Inteujgence  Kepokt 

Reliability  Rating :  A.     Serial  No.  94.     Date :  November  26.  1941 

A  reliable  source  of  information  evaluates  the  situation  during  the  past  few 
days  as  follows.     He  considers  it  reliable: 

1.  He  believes  that  various  units  of  the  1st,  2nd,  3rd  and  6th  Fleets  are  being 
directed  by  CinC  2nd  Fit  in  a  loosely-knit  organization.  He  further  states  that 
the  organization  appears  to  be  subdivided  into  two  sections.    And  expects : 

Section  I  to  operate  in  South  China  Area. 
Section  II  to  operate  in  the  Mandates. 

2.  Forces  which  appear  to  be  under  CinC  2nd  Fit. 

« 
section  I 

CruBiv    7    (From    2nd    Fit)     (4    CA's— KUMANO,    MOGAMI,    MIKUMA, 

SUZUYA) 
Airon   6    (From   Combined   Air   Force)    (3   XAV's— ICAMIKAWA   MARU, 

FUJIKAWA  MARU,  KEN  JO  MARU) 
1st  Defense  Division  (From  3rd  Fit) 

Sulron  6  (From  6th  Fit)   (1  CL,  2  Subdivs  (4  ss) )   (note  4  SMs) 
It  is  possible  but  not  known  for  sure  that  Crudiv  6  may  be  included  herein. 
(From  1st  Fit)  (4  CA's— KAKO,  FURUTAKA,  KOBA,  KINUGASA) 

section   II 

Crudiv  5  (From  2nd  Fit)   (3  CA's  (maybe  4)— MYOKO,  NACHI,  HAGURO) 
Cardiv  3  (From  Carrier  Fit)    (2  CV's— RYUJO?,  HOSHO)   RYU  JO  and  1 

MARU 
Desron  2  (From  2nd  Fit)  (1  CL,  3  Desdivs(12  DD's) ) 
Desron 2  (From  2nd  Fit)  (1  CL,  3  Desdivs(12  DD's) ) 
Subron  5  (From  6th  Fit)  (1  CL,  3  Subdivs (6  or  7  SS's) ) 
Desdiv  23  (From  Carrier  Pit)   (4  DD's) 
1st  Base  Force  (From  3rd  Fit) 
3rd  Base  Force  (At  PALAO) 
Sth  Base  Force  (At  SAIPAN) 
Other  lesser  units  (Names  not  known) 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  787 

It  is  possible  but  not  known  for  sure  that  Batdiv  S  may  be  Included  herein. 
(From  1st  Fit)  (4  BBs— HIYEI^  KONGO,  KIRISHIMA,  HARUNA)  (HARUNA 
may  be  undergoing  major  repairs) 

3.  Disposition  of  remainder  of  3rd  Fit  in  doubt  but  it  is  assumed  they  will 
be  stationed  around  the  BAKO-TAKAO  area  or  further  south. 

4.  Indications  are  that  today  (Nov.  26th)  Desron  S  (1st  Fit),  Crudiv  7  (2nd 
Fit)  and  Suiron  6  (6th  Fit)  are  in  the  TAKAO  area.  Units  of  Combined  Air 
Forces  from  the  Empire  are  at  TAKAO,  HOCHOW,  PAKHOI,  SAIGON  and  other 
bases  along  the  CHINA  COAST  and  in  TAIWAN. 

5.  He  cannot  confirm  report  there  being  large  force  of  SS  and  CVs  in  the 
MANDATES.  Thinks  all  known  carriers  of  1st  and  2nd  Fits  are  still  in  the 
KURE-SASEBO  area. 

6.  He  believes  that: 

CinC  Combined  Fit  is  in  NAGATO  (BB) 
1st  "     "    "    EYVGA  (BB) 

2nd         "    "    "    AT  AGO  (CA)   (In  KURE  area) 
3rd         "    "    "    ASHIGARA  (CA)    (In  SASEBO  area) 
.     5th         "     »    "     CHICHIJIMA  area 

6th         "     "    "    £:4firir/i/4  (CL)  (In  YOKOSUKA  area  but  this 

is  unreliable) 

7.  CinC  2nd  Fit,  CinC  3rd  Fit  and  CinC  Southern  Expeditionary  Force  ap- 
parently have  the  major  roles. 

8.  Units  from  North  or  Central  appear  to  have  joined  the  South  China  Fleet 
(probably  torpedo  boats). 

9.  One  Base  Force  unit  apparently  being  used  to  strengthen  Southern  Expedi- 
tionary Force. 


Secret  Intelligence  Repobt 

Reliability  Rating :  A.     Serial  No.  95.    Date :  November  27,  1941 

A  reliable  agent  states  that  there  appears  to  be  ORANGE  Army  activity  in  the 
air  that  envolves  Imperial  Headquarters,  Combined  Army  Forces  and  Com- 
mander OPTION  KING  AFIRM.  Commander  OPTION  KING  AFIRM  and  Com- 
bined Army  Taiwan  and  Combined  Army  Forces  Sama. 


Confidential  Intelligence  Report 

Reliability  Rating :  B-3.    Serial  No.  96.    Date :  27  November  1941 

Information  from  British  Intelligence  (Far  East)  sources  states: 

Japan  will  commence  Military  Operations  on  1  December  against  the  KBA 

Isthmus,  Thailand,  with  the  objective  of  interposing  between  Bankok  and 

Singapore. 
Main  landing  and  center  of  effort  at  SINGORA  (SONGKHLA). 
Japanese  Assault  Forces  to  proceed  direct  from  TAIWAN  (FORMOSA) 

and  HAINAN  Is. 


TOP  8ECBET 

Secret  Intelligence  Repokt 

Reliability  Rating :  A-1.    Serial  No.  97.    Date :  28  Nov.  41 

Absoutely  reliable  reports  from  Singapore  are  that  the  following  procedure 
will  be  carried  out  on  Japanese  news  broadcasts  in  the  event  that  diplomatic 
relations  are  on  the  verge  of  severance : 

On  ordinary  Tokyo  news  broadcasts,  the  following  words  repated  five  times 
at  the  beginning  and  the  end  will  have  this  significance : 
HIGASHI  HIGASHI :  Japanese-American. 
KITA  KITA :  Russia. 

NISHI  NISHI:  England   (including  occupation  of  Thai  or  invasion  of 
Malaya  and  NEI). 

79716 — 46 — Ex.  149,  vol.  1 9 


788       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

On  Japanese  language  foreign  news  broadcasts,  the  following  sentences  repeated 
twice  in  the  middle  and  twice  at  the  end  will  be  used : 
"HIGASHI  NO  KAZE  AME"   (America). 
"KITA  NO  KAZE  KUMORI"  (Russia). 
"NISHI  NO  KAZE  HARE"  (England). 
The  British  and  Com  16  are  monitoring  the  above  broadcasts. 


Secret  Inteixigence  Report 

Reliability  Rating :    A-1.    Serial  No.  98.    Date :  28  Nov.  1941 

Com  16  reports  location  of  following  units : 
In  Formosa  Straits : 
ISUZU 
SubTender 

4  Subs  (probably  Subron  6) 
NAGOYA  aiARU 
NITTA  MARU  sailing  Yogosuka  to  Takao  on  29th  with  military  supplies. 
Two  senior  construction  otficers  and  400O  men  (status  unknown)  order  to 
the  Mandates. 

Unidentified  CL  (?)  has  apparently  relieved  KASHWI  as  flagship  of  the 
Southern  Expeditionary  Fleet  and  is  now  in  the  Camranh  Bay  Saigon  Area. 


Secret  iNTBnxiGENCB  Report 

Reliability  Rating :  A-1.     Serial  No.  99.    Date :  29  Nov.  1941 

Com  16  reports  recent  developments  noted  : 

"COMDR  FIRST  PATROL  FORCE"  has  headquarters  apparently  in  Palao 
or  Yokosuka  along  with  other  forces  of  this  nature. 
"FIFTH  AIR  BATTALION"  is  at  Takao. 
"COMDR  AIR  BORNE  TROOPS"   (location  unknown). 
"FRENCH  INDOCHINA  BILLETING  DETACHMENT"  in  Saigon  Area. 
"THIRD  FLEET  HEADQUARTERS"  probably  at  Yokosuka. 
CinC  Third  has  shifted  flag  from  ASHIGARA  to  NAGARA. 
CinC  Southern  Expeditionary  Force  shifted  flag  from  KASHII  to  CHOKAI. 
New  additions  to  the  First  Section  (Ser.  #  94)  : 
DESRON  4. 
SUBRON  (?). 

AIRRON  7  (CHITOSE  type). 
The  HIYEI  and  KONGO  now  appear  to  be  definitely  in  the  First  Section  but 
no  movement  has  been  noted. 

Completely  reliable  information  indicates  that  CinC  Combined  will  leave  Kure 
Zone  at  0400  today,  leave  Sasebo  Zone  at  midnight  on  the  1st  and  enter  Bako 
Zone  at  midnight  on  the  2nd. 


Secret  iNTEaxiGENCE  Report 

Reliability  Rating :  A-1.  Serial  No.  100.  Date :  1  Dec.  41 
There  have  arrived  in  the  Takao  Area  in  the  past  two  days :  ComDesRon  5 
in  the  NATORI :  NAKA  to  join  DesRon4 ;  Units  of  Number  Two  Base  Force ; 
CHOGEI  (believed  to  be  tender  for  two  subdivs).  All  of  these  units  are  under 
command  of  CinC  Third.  CinC  Second  has  shifted  from  Kure  to  Sasebo  Area 
in  the  ATAGO  apparently  en  route  South  China  Waters. 


Secret  Intelligence  Report 

Reliability  Rating :  A-1.     Serial  No.  101.     Date :  1  Dec  1941 

Absolutely  reliable  agent  in  Bangkok  reports  that  on  the  29th  conferences 
were  in  progress  considering  plans  to  force  the  British  to  attack  Thai  at  Padang 
Bessa  near  Singora  as  counter  move  to  Japanese  landing  at  Kota  Bharu.    Thai, 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  789 

at  present,  intends  to  consider  the  first  invader  as  her  enemy  therefore  Japan 
believes  this  landing  in  Malay  would  force  the  British  to  invade  Thai  at  Padang 
Bessa.  Thai  would  then  declare  war  against  the  British  and  call  on  Japan 
for  help.  This  plan  appears  to  have  the  approval  of  the  Thai  Chief  of  Staff 
Bijitto.  Up  until  25  November  Thai  government  circles  have  been  sharply 
divided  between  pro-British  and  pro-Japanese  but  now  those  favoring  Japan 
seem  to  have  silenced  the  anti-Japan  group  and  intend  to  force  Premier  Pibul 
to  make  a  decision.    They  expect  early  and  favorable  developments. 


Secret  Inteujgenob  Rkpoet 

Reliability  Rating :  A-1.    Serial  No.  102.    Date :  2  December  1941 

CinC  Second  Fleet  [handwritten:  in  ATAGO]  and  the  Cine  Third  Fleet  have 
put  in  their  appearance  in  the  TAKAO  Area.  The  Commander  Southern  Expe- 
ditionary Force  in  the  CHOKAI  has  arrived  at  SAMA,  HAINAN. 

The  U.  S.  Ambassador  at  Bangkok  on  the  30th  requested  permission  to 
destroy  all  but  a  limited  number  of  Codes. 

Three  I-class  submarines  were  sighted  bearing  070  distant  180  miles  from 
SAIGON,  course  180  speed  15. 

Nine  (9)  ORANGE  Submarines  sighted  at  0230  GCT  2nd  Latitude  13-10, 
longitude  110-00  East  course  180  speed  10. 

Reported  at  CAMRANH  Bay  21  ORANGE  transports  with  a  six  plane  patrol 
overhead. 


Hevtitt  Inquiry  Exhibit  No.  27 
U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  U.    S.   PACIFIO  FI>EET 

(Classification:)  Confidential  Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.     Please  return  to  coding  oflBcer 
for  burning  when  of  no  further  use 

In  ^okyo  Yokohama  area  at  present  time,  Kamakura  and  Nitta  Marus  X 
Yokohama  Dock  Yard  finished,  not  long  ago,  2  escort  ships  X  2  transports  left 
Yokohama  last  Thursday  in  November  one  carrying  aircraft,  the  other  Navy 
men 

CBO  HRF    Date  5  December  41    Serial  No.  12-129 
Originator :  NAVATT  TOKYO 
Action :  OPNAV 
Information : 

CINCPAC 

CINCAF 

COM  16 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF    U.     S.    PACIFIC    FLEET 

(Classification:)  Confidential  Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraghrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.     Please  return  to  coding  oflBcer 
for  burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

Nazis  from  Shanghai  who  are  of  military  age  are  being  transferred  to  Japan 
for  training  thought  for  purpose  of  serving  on  German  ships  which  are  now 
in  Japan.  In  this  connection  80  have  departed  in  last  10  days  average  age  of 
these  men  30  years.  A  great  deal  of  pressure  is  being  brought  to  bear  on  French 
Concession  by  9  Shanghai  officials  to  bring  about  the  discharge  of  Anglo  Ameri- 
can civilian  volunteer  members  of  police  reserves  for  the  purpose  of  replacing 
them  with  Italians  and  Germans.    The  following  information  from  British  In- 


790       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

telligence  who  gave  it  a  reliability  classification  of  B2:  Kamakura,  Nitta  and 
Argentina  Maru  carrying  personnel,  oil,  supplies,  and  building  material  have 
visited  Caroline  Islands  since  September ;  Majuro,  Mejit,  and  Katherine  Islands 
are  being  specially  developed;  laborers  numbering  3000  have  been  landed  at 
Jaluit. 

CBO  S    Date  4  Dec  41     Serial  No.  12-102 
Originator : 

ASST  NAVATT  SHANGHAI 
Action : 

OPNAV 
Information : 

CINCPAC 

CINCAF 

COM  16 

NAVATT  CHUNGKING  

U.  S,  Naval  Communication  Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  U.  S.  PACIFIC  FLEET 

(Classification):  Confidential.  Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.     Please  return  to  coding  oflBcer  for 

burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

In  response  to  the  reference  (Cincpac  Serial  No.  given  below).  The  unidentified' 
modern  vessel  was  a  10,000  ton  cargo  ship  which  has  been  converted  into  a  sea- 
plane carrier.  ,     , , 

Characteristics:  Flush  deck,  with  raised  foe  s'l,  with  raked  bow  and  cruiser  stem, 
mounting  14.7"  gun  on  elevated  platiform  foward.  and  14.7  gun  on  poop  deck. 

RAISED  FORE  CASTLE  A^^©  *:t¥S»  DECK. 

Ref:  No.  11-827 

Subref:  No.  11-759 

CBO  MRQ     Date  4  Dec  41     Serial  No.  12-103 

Originator:  Information: 

ASST  NAVATT  SHANGHAI  CINCPAC 

Action:  CINCAF 

OPNAV  COM  16 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  U.  S.  PAOIFTC  FLEET 

(Classification:)  Confidential  Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.    Please  return  to  coding  officer 
for  burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

State  Department  advises : 

Jap  troop  and  supply  ships  commenced  making  Saigon  November  21,  and  have 
disembarked  approximately  20,000  men,  using  all  wharves  possible.  From  Friday 
to  Wednesday,  10,000  further  troops  came  by  train  from  the  north.  Present 
concentration  of  troops  in  South  Indo  China  believed  about  70,000  with  estimates 
as  high  as  128,000  although  latter  figure  discredited  as  being  too  high.  Large 
number  of  trucks  landed,  carrying  materials  and  men  inland,  in  a  large  movement, 
of  such  size  that  it  appears  to  point  to  immediate  action  against  Siam.  All  above 
received  from  Saigon,  following  from  Hanoi,  all  reports  on  November  26  unless 
otherwise  noted. 

On  the  morning  of  November  25,  the  mayor  of  Haiphong  notified  all  affected 
parties  the  Japs  were  going  to  commandeer  all  stores  being  shipped  to  China 
and  to  this  end  ordered  that  they  must  have  all  keys  to  all  bonded  storehouses 
prior  to  noon  that  day,  despite  the  fact  that  protest  was  made  by  the  French. 
He  advised  also  that  those  concerned  should  exercise  their  own  judgment  as  to 
compliance  with  the  order.  Report  from  Hanoi  further  stated  that  recently 
augmented  stores  and  military  gear,  landed  at  Haiphong,  (consisting  principally 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  791 

of  gasoline  and  railway  equipment,  including  rolling  stock)   are  being  further 
shipped  south. 

It  is  said  Nipponese  intend  to  buy  as  many  as  500  native  boats,  and  have,  in 
fact,  acquired  a  great  many  along  the  coast  of  Tongking  Province,  which  they 
have  moved  south.  Tuesday,  the  U.  S.  Consul  at  Hanoi  obtained  report  from 
dependable  sources,  stemming  from  Governor  General's  Office  to  the  effect  that 
the  latter  had  learned  from  an  agent  of  proposed  Japanese  move.  This  movement 
was  said  to  be  contemplated  in  the  form  of  simultaneous  Army-Navy  action,  sea 
forces  to  open  hostilities  on  Isthmus  Kra,  while  land  forces  attacked  Thailand. 
Same  information  was  credited  with  statement  that  the  above  advances  would 
be  made  without  advance  warning  in  form  of  ultimatum  or  declaration  of  war. 

Wednesday  report  from  Hanoi  stated  that  there  has  been  considerably  more 
activity  in  the  way  of  landing  and  movement  south  of  armed  forces,  4000  men 
having  been  disembarked  in  the  last  few  days.  A  special  train  will  carry  about 
1500  south  on  Tuesday  and  Wednesday  of  this  week.  Tongking  is  said  to  contain 
some  25000  (estimated)  Nipponese  troops  with  90  planes  present  at  Gialam. 

CBO  HRF    Date  29  November  41     Serial  No.  11-891 
Originator :  Information : 

OPNAV  CINCPAC 

Action :  COM  16 

CINCAF  COM  14 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Sebvich 

COMMANDBB-IN-OHIEF,  U.  S.  PACIFIO  FLEEH- 

(Classification:)  Confidential  Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.     Please  return  to  coding  oflScer  for 
burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

During  period  mentioned  in  your  182250  United  States  merchant  vessels  were 
in  the  vicinity  of  Ellice  and  Gilbert. 

CBO  FWR    Date  29  Nov  '41     Serial  No.  11-879 
Originator :  Information : 

OPNAV  CINCPAC 

Action : 

NAVOBS  AT  WELDINGTON 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Skbvicb 

OOMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  U.  S.  PACIFIC  FLEET 

(Classification:)  Confidential  Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.     Please  return  to  coding  oflScer  for 
burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

Kamakura  Nitta  and  Argentia  Marus  have  been  engaged  since  September  in 
hauling  materials  in  the  form  of  supplies,  oil,  construction  supplies,  as  well  as 
personnel  to  the  mandate  islands  X  On  one  trip  to  the  Marshall  group,  3000 
workmen  were  carried  and  disembarked  at  Jaluit  X  Two  trips  have  been  made 
to  the  Caroline  Islands  X  Awaiting  transportation,  seemingly,  at  Yokahoma 
Naval  pier,  is  approximately  8000  Wadts  gasoline  in  drums  X  Development  of 
the  Marshall  group  is  proceeding  on  the  following  islands:  Katherine  (Ujae 
Atoll ),  Ma juro  X    Mejit  X    Watt  (Ailuk) 

CBO  HRF    Date  27  November  41     Serial  No.  11-823 
Originator :  Information : 

NAVATT  TOKYO  CINCPAC 

Action :  CINCAF 

OPNAV  COM  16 

CINCPAC  COM  14 


792       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 
U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  U.  S.  PACIFIC  FLEET 

(Classification:)  Confidential  Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.     Please  return  to  coding  officer  for 

burning  -when  of  no  further  use. 

Following  report  received  from  commanding  officer  of  a  foreign  merchant  sMp 
by  the  office  of  the  Naval  attache  at  Shanghai :  Left  Hongkong  for  Shanghai, 
Sunday,  November  23.  While  on  the  way,  saw  numerous  transports.  There 
were  approximately  3  or  4  ships  sighted  during  each  watch  the  first  three  days 
of  this  week.  They  were  travelling  in  a  general  southerly  direction.  Trans- 
ports were  sailing  either  alone  or  in  groups  of  few  ships. 

Following  is  also  noted  by  the  Shanghai  attache's  office :  There  is  an  unusually 
small  amount  of  supplies  on  the  military  docks  in  Shanghai. 

CBO  HRF     Date  27  November  41     Serial  No.  11-834 
Originator :  Information : 

AS  ST  NAVATT  SHANGHAI  CINCPAC 

Action :  CINCAF 

OPNAV  NAVATT  CHUNGKING 

NAVATT  TOKYO 
COM  16 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  U.  S.  PACIFIC  FLEET 

(Classification:)   Confidential  Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.     Please  return  to  coding  officer  for 

burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

Following  Jap  naval  ships  sighted : 

Northeast  Amoy  20th  course  southwest  10,000  ton  modern  ship  fitted  as  sea- 
plane carrier  with  catapult.    On  deck  8  seaplanes  Navy  type  95. 

OfE  Swatow:  19th;  course  South,  light  cruiser  and  destroyer  Soihow  17th: 
20  merchant  type  ships  left  heading  for  Formosa  off  Saigon  15th  :  7  transports. 

CBO  WBM     Date  Nov.  25     Serial  No.  11-759 
Originator :  Information : 

ASST  NAVATT  CINCPAC 

SHANGHAI  NAVATT  TOKYO 

Action :  NAVATT  CHUNGKING 

CINCAF  OPNAV 

COM  16 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  U.  S.  PACIFIC  FLEET 

(Classification:)  Confidential  Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.     Please  return  to  coding  officer  for 

burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

The  following  5  ships,  previously  Japanese  merchant  motor  ships,  arrived  here 
with  names  blocked  out  and  painted  grey — Atutasan,  Mitsui  line.  1  more  same 
type. 

Sato  Nyk. 

2  sister  ships  Tekasii  Maru,  Ockshima  Steamship  Co. 

They  were  armed  with  10  to  16  AA  guns  apiece.  The  ships  with  10  guns  have 
mounts  placed  for  6  more  machine  guns.  They  had  an  average  of  7  3-inch  dual 
purpose  guns  with  the  other  guns  being  automatic  and  seemed  to  be  approximate- 
ly 50  caliber. 

CBO  WBM     Date  Nov.  25     Serial  No.  11-751 
Originator :  Information : 

ASST  NAVATT  CINCPAC 

SHANGHAI  CINCAF 

Action :  NAVATT^  TOKYO 

OPNAV  NAVATT  CHUNGKING 

COM  16 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  793 

U.  S.  Naval  Commttnication  Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  V.  S.  PACIFIC  FLEET 

(Classification:)  Confidential  Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.     Please  return  to  coding  officer  for 

burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

Shipping  here  is  now  normal.  No  large  movements  seen  either  north  or  south 
along  coast  to  date.  About  24,000  troops  with  large  amount  of  military  equip- 
ment sailed  from  Woosung  between  the  15th  and  23rd.  Several  trucks  leaving 
were  seen  to  be  newly  camouflaged,  mostly  green  in  color.  This  type  of  camou- 
flage is  unusual  in  this  locality.  184  landing  boats  besides  others  on  5  vessels 
were  included  in  the  above  equipment.     Could  not  obtain  exact  check. 

CBO  WBM     Date  Nov.  25  41     Serial  No.  11-761 
Originator :  Information  : 

ASST  NAVATT  CINCPAC 

SHANGHAI  CINCAF 

Action :  NAVATT  CHUNGKING 

OPNAV  NAVATT  TOKYO 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Ser\'Ice 

COMMANDEB-IN-CHIEF  IT.   S.  PACIFIC  FLEET 

(Classification : )   Confidential 

Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.    Please  return  to  coding  officer  for 
burning  when  of  no  further  use 

At  2115  November  24  about  1,000  miles  east  of  Guam,  the  ANSAC  clipper 
sighted  4  Japanese  seaplanes  flying  south  at  10,000  feet. 

CBO  WBM    Date  Nov  25  41     Serial  No.  11-766 

Originator  COM  14 

MARDET  WAKE  INFORMATION : 

COM  14  CINCPAC 

Action : 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEP  U.   S.  PACIFIC  FLEETT 

(Classification:)   Confidential 

Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.    Please  return  to  coding  officer  for 
burning  when  of  no  further  use 

Five  transports  departed  Woosung  Saturday  with  undetermined  number  of 
troops  and  small  boats  X  Present  at  Woosung  on  the  same  day  were  eight 
other  transports  of  from  four  to  twelve  thousand  tons  each. 

No  activity  was  noted  between  Shanghai  and  Darien  X  2000  troops  arrived 
Shanghai  from  Nanking  by  rail  Thursday  night. 

Some  observers  believe  that  the  transports  which  left  Woosung  last  week 
were  possibly  going  to  northern  Formosa  avoiding  shipping  lanes.  Upon  leav- 
ing Woosung  these  vessels  did  not  change  course  until  out  of  sight  of  the  pilot 
boat.  No  convoys  were  seen  along  coast  and  foreign  vessels  from  Hong  Kong 
report  only  a  few  scattered  transports  south-bound  with  troops  and  landing  boats. 

One  10,000  ton  ispecial  landing  craft  carrier  which  departed  Shanghai  18th 
was  sighted  20th  off  Wenchow  on  southwesterly  course. 

CBO  WJE    Date  24  Nov  41     Serial  No.  11-725 

Originator :  Information : 

ASST    NAVAL  ATTACHE^    SHANG-  CINCPAC 

HAI  CINCAF 

Action :  NAV  ATT  CHUNGKING  AND 

OPNAV  TOKYO 


794       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 
U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

OOMMANDEB-IN-CHIEF  V.  S.  PACIFIC  FLEET 

( Classification  : )   Confidential 

Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.    Please  return  to  coding  oflScer  for 
burning  when  of  no  further  use 

Reliable  report  at  Singapore  of  monoplane  with  two  engines  and  one  rudder 
making  reconnaissance  flights  over  Gilbert  Islands  on  November  15th  X  Re- 
I)eated  on  the  16th  November  by  single  wing  silver  flying  boat  number  of  engines 
undetermined 

CBO    S    Date  22  Nov  41    Serial  No.  11-686 

Originator :  Information : 

NAVATT  SINGAPORE  CINCPAO 

Action :  CINCAF 

OPNAV 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  XT.  S.  PACIFIC  FUCET 

(Classification:)   Confidential 


Paraphrase 


This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.    Please  return  to  coding  oflacer  for 
burning  when  of  no  further  use 

Transports  with  limited  number  horses  troops  and  roughly  115  landing  boats 
assorted  equipment  trucks  and  anti-aircraft  guns  sailed  from  Shanghai  from 
14th  to  17th  X  7  ships  of  similar  type  are  present  X  Hasidate  sailed  Canton 
14th  Nov  X  1  minelayer  transport  6  destroyers  3  torpedo  boats  departed  Amoy 
X  2  destroyers  1  troop  ship  and  cruiser  of  the  Natori  class  were  anchored  off 
Bias  Bay  15th  Nov  X  2  destroyers  sighted  on  southerly  course  south  of  Hong- 
kong on  16th  Nov  X  Night  of  17th  Italian  escort  vessel  Eritrea  departed  Shang- 
hai with  190  tons  Diesel  oil  bound  Okon  X  14th  observed  12  transports  down- 
stream and  18  upstream  at  mouth  Pearl  River  X  From  10  to  14  Nov  master 
sighted  17  tran^orts  southbound  at  intervals  between  Crown  Colony  and 
Woosung 

CBO     S     Date  21  Nov  41     Serial  No.  11-626 

Originator :  Information : 

ASST  NAVATT  SHANGHAI  CINCPAC 

Action :  OPNAV 

CINCAF  NAVATT  TOKYO 

NAVATT  CHUNGKING 
COM  16 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

COMMANDEB-IN-CHIEP  U.   8.  PACIFIC  FLEEH" 

(Classification:)   Confidential 

Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.    Please  return  to  coding  officer  for 
burning  when  of  no  further  use 

Close  to  14000  Japanese  troops  with  about  80  tanks  and  20  field  pieces  have 
arrived  here  from  Nanking  during  the  past  5  days  by  rail  believed  awaiting  water 
transportation  from  this  point  X  During  the  first  part  of  November  lesser  num- 
ber of  young  recruits  were  sent  inland  from  Shanghai  after  their  arrival  from 
Japan. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT   INQUIRY  795 

CBO     S    Date  21  Nov  41    Serial  No.  11-627 

Originator :  Information : 

ASST  NAVATT  SHANGHAI  CINCPAO 

Action :  CINCAF 

OPNAV  NAVATT  TOKYO 

NAVATT  CHUNGKING 
COM  16 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Sebvice 

COMMANDEE-IN-CHIEF  IT.  S.  PACmo  FLEETT 

(Classification:)  Confidential  Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.    Please  return  to  coding  oflBcer  for 
burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

1000  troops  left  Swatow  15th  Nov  X  Installation  machine  gun  mounts  being 
completed  here  after  arrival  on  several  vessels  vphich  appear  to  have  been  only 
recently  taken  over  X  3  outbound  ships  Shanghai  were  observed  to  carry  sec- 
tions of  trestles  on  deck  sections  were  60  feet  long  by  8  feet  high  by  8  feet  wide 
and  made  of  creosoted  heavy  timbers  X  Woosung  military  base  has  shown  intense 
activity  since  Nov  15th  X  There  are  an  unusual  number  of  ships  present  which 
include  former  merchant  vessels  of  10000  tons  and  up  average  X  10  transports 
departed  19th  8  of  these  were  carrying  troops  32  more  transports  anchored 
lower  WhangiK)o  X    Landing  boats  still  constitute  part  of  outgoing  equipment. 

CBO    S     Date  21  Nov  41     Serial  No.  11-630 

Originator :  Information : 

ASST  NAVATT  SHANGHAI  CINCPAC 

Action :  CINCAF 

OPNAV  COM  16 

NAVATT  TOKYO 
NAVATT  CHUNGEaNG 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Sebvice 

COMMANDEE-IN-CHIEF  U.   8.  PACIFIO  FLEET 

(Classification:)   Confidential  Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.    Please  return  to  coding  officer  for 
burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

On  16  and  17  November,  planes,  apparantly  Japanese,  were  sighted  over  Gilberts. 
On  the  16th  the  plane  was  a  twin  engine  monoplane  and  on  the  17th  a  flying 
boat.  The  flying  boat  was  on  a  generally  north  and  south  course,  speed  125. 
These  flights  indicate  a  daily  patrol  from  Jaluit,  over  Gilberts,  to  an  area  south 
near  shipping  routs. 

Truk  and  Saipan  were  each  recently  reinforced  with  half  a  squadron  of  bombers 
and  half  a  squadron  of  fighters. 

Several  unknown  ships  have  been  reported  near  EUlce  and  Gilbert.  Also,  re- 
ports have  been  received  of  Japanese  liners  carrying  either  troops  or  laborers  to 
Mandates. 

Note. — ^The  source  of  the  above  report  is  the  New  Zealand  Naval  Intelligence. 

CBO  MRQ    Date  19  Nov  41     Serial  No.  11-550 

Originator :  Action : 

ALUSNOB  OPNAV 

WELLINGTON  Information : 

CINCPAO 


796       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 
U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  XT.    S.   PACIFIO  FLEET 

(Classification:)   Confidential  Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.     Please  return  to  coding  oflQcer  for 
burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

Strict  regulations  being  enforced  in  Camranh  Bay  area.  The  following  from  a 
responsible  foreign  traveler  on  an  orange  ship  which  anchored  in  Camranh  Bay 
last  month  while  riding  out  a  typhoon :  Japanese  building  activity  being  rushed. 
Freighters  observed  in  harbor  discharging  cargo.  French  75's  on  surrounding 
hills,  4  long  range  rifles  on  hills  over  looking  outer  bays  with  a  number  if  minor 
caliber  guns.     Island  inner  bay  has  4  small  guns. 

CBO  19  Nov  '41     Date  FWR     Serial  No.  11-564 

Originator :  Information : 

ASST  NAVATT  SHANGHAI  CINCPAC 

Action :  CINCAF 

OPNAV  NAVATT  TOKYO 

NAVATT  CHUNGKING 
COM  16 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  U.    S.   PACIFIO  FLEET 

(Classification:)   Confidential  Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.     Please  return  to  coding  officer  for 
burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

Following  obtained  from  supposedly  accurate  French  military  source  regard- 
ing military  situation  in  Indo-China  as  of  Nov  12  X  Amassing  of  great  amount  of 
gasoline,  ammunition  and  oil  X  Japanese  forces  present  reported  to  be  as  fol- 
lows X  Cambodia-Saigon  area  31,000  X  Tongking  24,700  X  South  part  of 
Annam  2,500  X  It  is  reported  by  reliable  traveller  from  that  vicinity  that  large 
amount  of  heavy  artillery  has  been  landed  at  Saigon  and  Haiphong  during  past 
thirty  days. 

CBO  HRF     Date  17  November  41     Serial  No.  11-498 

Originator :  Information : 

ASST  NAVATT  SHANGHAI  CINCPAC 

Action :  CINCAF 

OPNAV  NAV  ATT  TOKYO 

COM  16 
NAV  ATT  CHUNGKING 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  U.    S.   PACIFIO  FLEET 

(Classification:)   Confidential  Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.     Please  return  to  coding  officer  for 
burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

Mouth  of  Pearl  River  18  cargo  vessels  upstream  29  down  Sunday  to  Thursday  X 
6  transports  present  at  Shanghai  Friday  X  Same  day  Canton  minesweeper  with 
vice  admiral's  flag  departed  gun  boat  Saga  X  Minelayer  Yaeyama  class  sighted 
9th  Canton  outbound  X  Kuma  type  cruiser  and  2  torpedo  boats  Tuesday  Bias 
Bay  X  6  destroyers  X  3  torpedo  boats  X  1  transport  arrived  at  Amoy 
W^ednesday  X    1  Sendia  class  south  of  turnabout  Island  Tuesday. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  797 

CBO     HKF    Date  16  November  41     Serial  No.  11-486 

Originator :  Information : 

ASST  NAVATT  SHANGHAI  CINCPAC 

Action :  OPNAV 

CINCAF  COM  16 

NAVATT  CHUNGKING 
NAVATT  TOKYO 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Sekvicb 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  V.   S.  PACIFIC  FLEBTT 

( Classification  : )    Confidential  Paraphrasa 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.     Please  return  to  coding  officer 
for  burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

Below  Hongliong  Nov  6  13  transports  2  trawlers  28  motor  boats  on  southerly 
course  X  Off  Turnabout  Island  Nov  4  17  sliips  ranging  from  2000  tons  to 
10,000  tons  in  a  convoy  headed  southwesterly  X  Departed  Saturday  Nov  2 
fram  Canton,  Shimushu  X  Following  day  gunboat  Saga  was  seen  at  Pearl 
River  X  Monday  Nov  4,  cruiser  Natori  departed  Amoy  X  In  period  between 
1  and  4  Nov  7  transports  left  Shanghai  X  Loaded  as  follows  X  2  with  rail- 
way trucks  and  coaches  one  each  old  locomotives  X  Tanks  and  trucks  remainder 
with  miscellaneous  military  gear  including  49  landing  boats 

CBO  HRF    DATE  10  November  41     Serial  No.  11-245 

Originator :  Information : 

ASST  NAVATT  SHANGHAI  CINCPAC 

Action:  NAVATT  CHUNGKING 

CINCAF  NAVATT  TOKYO 

OPNAV 
COM  16 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  U.  S.  PACIFIO  FLEHTr 

(Classification:)    Confidential  Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.    Please  return  to  coding  officer 
for  burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

During  the  last  two  weeks  Jap  troop  trains  passing  through  Tehchow  and 
Shihnei  from  North  Pingham  Line  enroute  Tsingtao  total  approximately  40 
or  50  trains  X  Movement  has  now  been  carried  out  X  No  indications  of 
Nip  divisions  being  transported  north  China  to  Manchuria  during  the  month 
of  October  X  Movement  of  20  trains  Taiyuanfu  Shansi  to  Tsingtao  via  Shihnei 
and  Tehchow  just  commencing 

CBO  JMS    Date  9  Nov  41     Serial  No.  11-235 

Originator :  Information : 

ASST  NAVATT  PIEKING  ASST  NAVATT  SHANGHAI 

Action:  i  NAVATT  CHUNGKING 

OPNAV  CINCPAC 

CINCAF 
COM  16 


798       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 
U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Sebvicb 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEP  U.  8.  PACIFIO  FLEET 

(Classification:)   Confidential  Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.    Please  return  to  coding  officer 
for  burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

Supposedly  accurate  report  from  sources  in  Hongkong  X  Left  outward  bound 
Monday  on  Pearl  River,  28  trawlers  and  35  transports  for  undetermined  points  X 
Haiphong,  today,  Japanese  forces  to  the  extent  of  12,000  men  disembarked, 
with  more  ready 

CBO  HRF    Date  8  November  41     Serial  No.  11-194 

Originator :  Information : 

ASST  NAVATT  SHANGHAI  CINCPAO 

Action :  CINCAF 

OPNAV  COM  16 

NAVATT  CHUNGKING 
NAVATT  TOKYO 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Seevicb 

COMMANDEB-IN-CHIEP  V.  S.  PACIFIO  FLEBTT 

(Classification:)   Confidential  Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.    Please  return  to  coding  officer 
for  burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

Please  forward  brief  summary  by  dispatch  ahead  of  full  report  on  information 
requested  below  X  For  your  information,  there  is  now  being  sent  you  by  mail 
14th  N  D  intelligence  report  1027  of  30  October  concerning  Edward  John 
Coquelle,  who  is  confined  in  Honolulu  X  He  was  according  to  his  statment, 
born  French  and  is  a  naturalized  U  S  citizen  (1930)  having  taken  papers  in 
San  Francisco  X  Coquelle's  avowed  nephew,  Alfred  Munson,  now  on  Midway, 
is  involved  in  confession  made  by  the  former  in  which  he  admits  addressing 
secret  plans  to  Mrs.  Alice  Coquelle  at  3229  21st  Ave.,  San  Francisco  X  Plans 
were  intercepted  here,  and  were  contained  in  a  suitcase  sent  by  Coquelle  from 
Midway  in  the  sirius  during  October  X  U  S  attorney  wishes  C  N  O  to  have  in- 
vestigation of  Coquelle's  service  record  made  X  Also  desires  San  Francisco 
authorities  study  records  to  ascertain  whether  or  not  Mrs.  Coquelle  has  been 
naturalized  and  check  on  her  personally  X  Coquelle  avers  he  was  a  member 
of  Army  Intelligence  and  was  with  overseas  armed  forces  in  first  world  war 

CBO  HRF    Date  7  November  41     Serial  No,  11-172 

Originator:  Action:  Information: 

COM  14  OPNAV  COM  12 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

COMMANDEE-IN-CHIEF  U.  S.  PACIFIO  FLEIffr 

(Classification:)   Confidential  Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.    Please  return  to  coding  officer 
for  burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

16  destroyers  and  14  other  naval  vessels,  probably  transports  or  auxiliaries 
were  observed  far  away,  anchored  in  Wakasa  Bay,  Obama  Harbor  area  X  Above 
are  Japanese  and  were  sighted  on  the  thirtieth  of  October. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY 


799 


CBO  HRF    Date  6  November  41    Serial  No.  11-153 


Originator : 

ASST  NAVATT  SHANGHAI 
Action : 

CINCAF 


Information : 
CINCPAC 

NAVATT  CHUNGKING 
OPNAV 
COM  16 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Seevicb 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  U.  S.  PACIFIO  FLEBJT 


( Classification : )   Confidential 


Paraphrase 


This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.    Please  return  to  coding  oflBcer 
for  burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

The  following  Japanese  naval  craft  have  been  observed:  Monday  the  27th 
10  transports  in  ballast  averaging  6000  tons  each  anchored  off  Namow  Island 
Swatow  X  Tuesday  10  small  transports  south  Hongkong  course  southwest 
loaded  with  cargo  X  Sailed  Amoy  1  destroyer  and  cruiser  Kuma  X  A  vessel 
departed  Shanghai  with  600  troops  X  Sighted  at  the  mouth  of  the  Pearl  River 
during  the  past  week  34  transports  have  passed  upstream  and  21  downstream. 

At  Shanghai  the  Italian  escort  vessel  Eritrea  continued  to  load  oil  in  drums 
small  lots  as  obtainable  X 

German  ship  Quito  left  Shanghai  night  of  31st  escorted  by  2  Jap  gunboats  X 
Its  cargo  included  large  quantity  of  Diesel  oil  and  antifouling  paint  X  Its 
destination  is  believed  to  be  Kobe 

CBO  DCG    Date  5  Nov    Serial  No.  11-118 


Originator : 

ASST  NAV  ATT  SHANGHAI 
Action : 

CINCAF 


Information : 
CINCPAC 

NAV  ATT  CHUNGKING 
NAV  ATT  TOKYO 
OPNAV 
COM  16 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

C0MMANDEai-IN-CHIE3'   U.    S.    PACIFIC   FLEET 


(Classification.)    Confidential 


Paraphrase 


This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.    Please  return  to  coding  officer 
for  burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

Following  information  from  Navatt  Chungking  relaying  from  chief  of  SRKO 
intelligence : 

Report  from  private  agent  Hongkong  states  that  Orange  Fleet  has  been 
mobilized  at  Sasebo  since  20  October,  although  he  is  in  doubt  as  to  the  reliabil- 
ity of  the  above  information  X  Probable  origin  British  X  Londin  notified 
local  attache  of  a  general  mobilization  recently,  and  he,  it  is  believed,  repeated 
information  X  He  has  been  asked  to  check  through  the  naval  attache  at 
Hongkong  X  Original  report  from  London  did  not  give  date  or  place  X 
Chinese  claim  of  Japanese  naval  concentration  at  Chainan  or  Gulf  of  Siam  is 
without  confirmation,  although  there  is  the  usual  local  unit  activity  in  those 
places. 

CBO  HRF    Date  27  October  41     Serial  No.  10-734 


Oi^iginator : 

NAVATT  CHUNGKING 
Action : 

CINCAF 


Information : 

ASST  NAVATT  SHANGHAI 

CINCPAC 

OPNAV 

COM  16 

COMSOPAT 


800       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF    U.    S.    PACIFIC    FLEET 


(Classification.)   Confidential 


Paraplirase 


This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.     Please  return  to  coding  ofiicer 
for  burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

Although  the  Chinese  maintain  claims  that  the  Japanese  intend  to  attack 
Siberia  in  the  near  future,  foreign  observers  claim  this  hinges  upon  Russian 
failure  in  the  West  X  Chungking  Russian  Attache  refuses  to  make  statement 
concerning  Russian  strength  in  the  East,  although  suggesting  that  severe 
weather  handicaps  Japanese  action  as  well  as  sufficient  Russian  strength  to 
give  Nipponese  severe  punishment  X  Chinese  also  insist  the  Japs  are  sending 
four  unidentified  divisions  into  Manchuria  and  are  holding  four  more  in  read- 
iness in  Northern  China  X  British  Naval  Attache  doubts  this  latter  since  he 
claims  the  Chinese  obtained  it  via  backdoor,  information  being  originally 
transmitted  by  me  to  the  Soviet  Embassy  in  my  62/4  Oct.  for  checking,  and  by 
the  British  Attache  to  London  also  for  cross  check. 

CBO  HRF    Date  27  October  41     Serial  No.  10-736 


Originator : 

NAVATT  CHUNGKING 

Action : 

CINCAF 


Information : 

ASST  NAVATT  SHANGHAI 

CINCPAC 

COMSOPAT 

OPNAV 

COM  16 

NAVATT  PEIPING 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF    U.    S.    PACIFIC    FLEET 


(Classification.)   Confidential 


Paraphrase 


This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.     Please  return  to  coding  ofiicer 
for  burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

The  following  were  sighted: 

Thursday — 10    trawlers    heading    south,    near    turn    about    island. 

Thursday — Orange  convoy,   course   southwest,   consisting  of  11  cargo   ships 
and  4  tankers  sighted  off  Amoy. 

Monday — 20  trawlers  proceeding  southwest  off  Wenchow  with  destroyer,   1 
transport. 

Saturday — 2  transports  loading  small  boats  at  Woosung  X    Yangtze  entrance 
2  transports  outbound  with  landing  craft  and  few  troops  on  board. 

Sharps  Peak  Jap  naval  garrison  below  Foochow  for  past  2  weeks  abandoned 
station  on  the  morning  of  the  25th. 

FOR25/ 

CBO  FWR    Date  27  October  41     Serial  No.  10-750 


Originator : 

ASNAVAT  SHANGHAI 
Action : 

CINCPAC 

CINCAF 


NAVAT  CHUNGKING 
NAVAT  TOKYO 
OPNAV 

COM  16 
Information : 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  801 

U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF    U.    S.    PACIFIC    FLEET 

(Classification.)   Confidential  Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.     Please  return  to  coding  oflScer 
for  burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

2300  Thursday  13  orange  transports  were  seen  off  Wenchow  Tuesday  on  a 
southwest  course  X  A  hospital  ship  departed  Shanghai  from  upriver  with 
2000  wounded  X  Seen  off  Wenchow  on  Wednesday  afternoon  9  transport 
averaging  3000  tons  moderately  loaded,  with  no  troops  reported. 

CBO  EBR    Date  27  Oct.  41     Serial  No.  10-703 

Originator :  Information : 

ASST  NAV  AT  SHANGHAI  CINCPAC  NAVATTS 

Action:  CHUNGKING,  TOKYO 

CINCAF  OPNAV,  COM  16 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF   U.    S.    PACIFIC   FLEET 

(Classification.)     Confidential  Paraphrase 

This  is  a  paraphrase  of  a  classified  dispatch.    Please  return  to  coding  officer 
■  for  burning  when  of  no  further  use. 

It  is  reported  that  all  Jap  tankers  are  being  armed  with  2  guns. 

Izumo,  converted  carrier,  was  launched  at  Kobe  October  30th  and  was  moved 
to  the  dock  formerly  occupied  by  the  Zuikaku. 

The  main  Japanese  Fleet  departed  on  28  October  for  the  Kure  area. 

Master  of  foreign  vessel  order  charter  to  Nips  states  that  a  guard  ship  is 
now  stationed  at  Tsucaru  strait  and  signals  all  passing  ships  for  name,  nationality, 
and  destination. 

CBO  MRQ    Date  5  Oct.  41     Serial  No.  11-117 

Originator :  Information : 

ASST  NAV  ATT  SHANGHAI  CINCPAC 

Action :  CINCAF 

OPNAV  NAV  ATT  CHUNGKING 

COM  16 


8-e-c-r-e-t 


Hewitt  Inquirt  Exhibit  No.  28 

United  States  Pacific  Fleett 
U.  S.  S.  Pennsylvania,  Flagship 

PHARii  EUrbor,  T.  H.,  November  28,  1941. 


Memorandum  for:  Admiral. 

Subject :  Projected  Reconnaissance  Flight  over  Mandates  Islands. 

1.  The  subject  was  discussed  with  the  Intelligence  Section,  Hawaiian  Air 
Force,  on  27  and  28  November,  1941,  and  will  be  further  discussed  this  afternoon 
at  1430. 

2.  I  have  furnished  the  Intelligence  Officer,  Hawaiian  Air  Force,  with  Meet 
Intelligence  Bulletin  No.  45-41,  giving  the  general  summary  of  the  installations 
and  developments  in  the  Mandates.  The  Chief  of  G-2,  H.  A.  F.,  has  promised 
me  that  this  publication  will  not  be  reproduced  by  them  nor  given  any  circulation 
except  to  the  pilots  of  the  reconnaissance  planes  and  to  the  commanders  of  the 
Army  squadrons  to  be  stationed  on  Wake  and  Midway.  This  document  will  not 
be  carried  in  any  aircraft. 


802       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

3.  The  urgent  need  for  as  wide  a  reconnaissance  of  the  Marshalls,  Truk  and 
Ponape  was  stressed  with  particular  reference  to  Jaluit,  Eniwetok,  Kwajelien, 
Rongelap,  Wotje  and  Maloelap. 

4.  The  Fleet  Aerological  Officer  was  present  at  this  morning's  conference  and 
is  working  up  meteorological  data  in  conjunction  with  the  proposed  reconnais- 
sance. From  a  point  of  view  of  photographic  interpretation  the  hours  of  medium 
shadow  9-11  a.  m.  and  2-4  p.  m.  are  considered  most  advantageous  and  fog  con- 
ditions are  expected  to  be  best  at  around  10  a.  m.  Consequently,  that  hour  has 
been  tentatively  agreed  upon  for  arrival  at  first  objective. 

5.  The  Army  plans  to  fly  two  (2)  B-24  planes  fully  manned  with  defensive 
armament  and  photographic  equipment  from  Wake  on  the  selected  day,  de- 
partures to  be  staggered  so  that  arrivals  over  assigned  initial  points  would  be 
practically  simultaneous.  Lacking  definite  information  as  to  Radar  installa- 
tions in  the  Mandates  it  is  proposed  (tentatively)  to  make  the  first  objective  of 
the  planes  Jaluit  and  Truk  respectively.  The  Jaluit  plane  returning  via  Maloelap, 
Wotje,  Kwajelien,  Rongelap  and  Pokaakku.  The  Truk  plane  returning  via 
Ujelang  and  Eniwetok.  These  return  objectives  being  dependent  upon  discovery 
or  detection  at  or  after  first  objective,  and  existing  conditions  at  the  time. 

6.  The  second  reconnaissance  is  to  be  conducted  over  Ponape  enroute  to  Port 
Moresby  was  assigned  Ujelang,  Ponape  and  Kapingamarangi  (Greenwich  Island). 

7.  The  Hawaiian  Air  Force  has  requested  that  I  sit  in  on  all  conferences  after 
the  arrival  here  of  the  photographic  planes  and  that  I  brief  the  pilots  on  all 
matters  relating  to  the  Mandates  prior  to  their  takeoff. 

[s]     B.  T.  Latton. 


HEwrrr  Inquibt  Exhibit  No.  29 

U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Sehvioh 
Classified  commandeb-in-ohief  u.  s.  pacific  rLEOT  Incoming 

From :  Togo,  Foreign  Minister. 
To:       Consul  Honolulu. 

Please  inform  us  immediately  of  any  rumors  of  the  movements  of  warships 
after  the  4th. 

Togo. 
Date :  6  Dec.  41. 


U.  S.  Naval  Commttnication  Service 
Classified  commander-in-chief  tj.  s.  paciftc  fleet  Incoming 

From:  Kita. 
To:       Foreign  Minister,  Tokyo. 

1.  The  three  battleships  mentioned  in  your  X239  of  Friday  morning  the  5th 
entered  port.     They  expect  to  depart  port  on  the  8th. 

2.  On  the  same  day  the  LEXINGTON  and  5  heavy  cruisers  departed. 

3.  The  following  warships  were  anchored  on  the  afternoon  of  the  5th  : 

8  Battleships 
3  Light  cruisers 
16  Destroyers 
Coming  in  were  4  cruisers  of  the  Honolulu  tyi)e  and  2  destroyers. 

Kita. 
Date :  5  Dec.  41. 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  U.S.   PACIFIC   FLEETT 

Classified  Incoming 

From:  Foreign  Minister. 

T^o :       Kita,  Consul,  Honolulu. 

Strictly  Secret. 

Would  like  you  to  hold  on  to  your  list  of  code  words  (also  those  used  in  connec- 
tion with  radio  broadcast)  right  up  until  the  last  minute.  When  the  break  comes 
burn  immediately  and  wire  us  to  that  effect. 

Togo. 

Date:  3  Dec  41. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  803 

U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

COM MANDEE-IN -CHIEF  U.S.    PACIFIC   FLEET 

Classified  Incoming 

From:  Kita. 

To :       Foreign  Minister. 

On  tlie  afternoon  of  the  3rd  a  Britisli  man  of  war  entered  Honolulu  and  de- 
parted early  on  the  4th  about  1100  tons ;  one  stack,  and  had  a  4  inch  gun  fore 
and  aft.  Immediately  after  entering  port  the  crew  went  ashore  and  were  re- 
ceiving mail  at  the  British  consulate. 

KiTA. 

Date :  4  Dec.  41. 

U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 

COMMANDEB-IN-CHIEF  U.S.   PACIFIC  FLEBI 

Classified  Incoming 

From:  Kita. 

To  :       Foreign  Minister,  Tokyo. 

At  1300  on  the  4th  a  light  cruiser  of  the  Honolulu  class  hastily  departed. 

KiTA. 

Date :  4  Dec.  41. 


Cincpac  File  No.  United   States   Pacific   Fleet 

U.  S.  S.  Pennsylvania,  Flagship 

Consul  Kita  in  Honolulu  sent  following  as  #245  on  3  December,  1941. 
From :  Ichiro  Fujii. 
To  :       Chief  of  3rd  Section  of  General  Staff. 

1.  I  wish  to  change  method  of  communication  by  signal  to  following: 

Signal  # 

1.  Battleship  divisions  including  screen Preparing  to  sortie. 

2.  Aircraft  carriers Preparing  to  sortie. 

3.  Battleship  divisions  including  screen All  dep.  1-3  Dec. 

4.  Aircraft  carriers Several  dep.  1-3  Dec. 

5.  Aircraft  carriers All  dep.  1-3  Dec. 

6.  Battleship  divisions  including  screen All  dep.  4-6  Dec. 

7.  Aircraft  carriers Several  dep.  4-6  Dec. 

8.  Aircraft  carriers AH  dep.  4r-6  Dec. 

2.  (A  and  B.) 

Lanakai  beach  house  will  show  one  light  before  midnight  and  two  after  mid- 
night during  the  hour  number  representing  the  signal : 

Hour  Signal  # 

2000-2100 1 

2100-2200 2 

2200-2300 3 

2300-2400 4 

2400-0100 5 

0100-0200 6 

0200-0300 7 

0300-0400 8 

(C)  During  daylight  star  bot  at  Lanakai  showing  masthead  star  indicates 
signals  1-4.     Star  and  roman  numeral  three  indicates  signals  5-8: 

Signal 

1 * 

2__i * 

3__^ * 

4 * 

5 *III 

6 *III 

7 *iir 

8 *III 

79716— 46— Ex.  149,  vol.  2 10 


804       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(D)  At  the  times  indicated  a  one  hour  light  in  tlie  attic  window  of  Kalama 
house  indicates  the  corresponding  signal : 

Hours  Signal  # 

1900-2000 1 3 

2000-2100 4 

2100-2200 5 

2200-2300 6 

2300-2400 7 

2400-0100 8 

( E )  In  the  KGMB  Want  Ads  at  0945,  these  ads  have  following  signal  meaning : 
Want  Ad  Signal  # 

Chinese  rug  for  sale.    Apply  P.  O.  Box  1476 3  or  6 

Chicken  farm  for  sale.       "         "         "      "     4  or  7 

Beauty  Operator  wanted.  "        "        "     "     5  or  8 

2.  If  the  above  signals  cannot  be  made  from  Oahu  a  bonfire  on  Maui  about  6 
miles  north  of  Kula  Sanatarium  between  Lower  Kula  Road  and  Haleakala  Road 
at  point  Lat.  20-40  and  Long.  156-19  will  be  made  for  several  days  between  1900 
and  2200.  It  can  be  seen  from  the  south  west  or  south  east  of  Maui  and  the 
hour  at  which  it  is  shown  will  have  the  following  signal  meaning: 

Hour  Signal  # 

19-2000 3  or  6 

20-2100 4  or  7 

21-2200 5  or  8 


Hewitt  Inquiry  Exhibit  No.  80 

(Exhibit  No.  30  consisted  of  two  Japanese  panorama  views  of  Pearl 
Harbor  with  Japanese  log  on  the  reverse  side  recovered  from  a  Jap- 
anese submarine.     These  items  were  returned  to  Captain  Layton.) 


Hewitt  Inquiry  Exhibit  No.  30A 

(This  exhibit  consists  of  a  photostat  of  a  Japanese  log  which  ap- 
peared on  the  reverse  side  of  Exhibit  No.  30,  This  photostat  will  be 
found  reproduced  as  Item  No.  113,  EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, 
Hewitt  Inquiry.) 


Hewitt  Inquiry  Exhibit  No.  SOB 

Log  of  Attack 

1300    Completed  last  work  on  the  tube    (TN:   midget   sub?).     Went   aboard. 

Waves  fairly  high. 
1500    OAHU  I.    sighted.    Radio  station,  red  light,  and  surf  (?)  sighted.    L  20°. 

This  ship  90°. 
1615     Barbers  Point  Light  seen  operating.     L  40°. 
1800    Cruising  submerged,  depth  25  meters. 

1815    According  to  intelligence  reports,  ships  present  in  the  harbor  on  the  5th 
are  as  follows : 

5  BB's,  3  CL's,  16  DD's  docked. 
4  HONOLULU  Class  CL's,  5  DD's. 
Im 

5  Lt        180  m 

7  220  m 

12  430  m 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  805 

Hewitt  Inquiby  Exhibit  No.  31 

(Exhibit  No.  31  consisted  of  a  panorama  sketch  of  Pearl  Harbor 
from  positions  five  miles  south  of  Pearl  Harbor,  -which  was  recovered 
from  a  Japanese  submarine.  This  sketch  was  returned  to  Captain 
Lay  ton.) 


Hewitt  Inquiry  Exhibit  No.  31A 

(Exhibit  No.  31A  consists  of  two  photostats  of  Exhibit  No.  31,  being 
a  panorama  sketch  of  Pearl  Harbor  from  a  position  five  miles  south 
of  Pearl  Harbor  which  was  recovered  from  a  Japanese  submarine. 
These  photostats  will  be  found  reproduced  as  Items  Nos.  114  and  115, 
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,  Hewitt  Inquiry.) 


Hewitt  Inqubt  Exhibit  No.  32 

(Exhibit  No.  32  was  an  original  Japanese  chart  of  Pearl  Harbor 
recovered  from  a  Japanese  midget  submarine.  This  chart  was  re- 
turned to  Captain  Layton.) 


Hewitt  Inquiry  Exhibit  No.  32A 

(Exhibit  No.  32 A  consists  of  three  photostatic  copies  of  Exhibit 
No.  32,  as  follows : 

1.  Original  Japanese  chart  of  Pearl  Harbor  recovered  from 

a  Japanese  midget  submarine,  bearing  the  original  Jap- 
anese characters. 

2.  Ihid,    with    the    English    translations    of    the    Japanese 

characters. 

3.  Photostatic  copy  of  the  reverse  side  of  the  Japanese  chart 

mentioned  in  Item  No.  1  above. 
The  foregoing  material  will  be  found  reproduced  as  Items  Nos.  116, 
117,  and  118,  EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,  Hewitt  Inquiry.) 


Hewitt  Inquiry  Exhibit  No.  33 


(Exhibit  No.  33  was  an  original  Japanese  chart  of  Pearl  Harbor 
recovered  from  a  Japanese  submarine  showing  defensive  installations. 
This  chart  was  returned  to  Captain  Layton.) 


Hewitt  Inquiry  Exhibit  No.  33A 


(Exhibit  No.  33A  is  a  photostatic  copy  of  Exhibit  No.  33,  being  an 
original  Japanese  chart  of  Pearl  Harbor  recovered  from  a  Japanese 
submarine,  showing  defensive  installations.  This  photostatic  copy 
will  be  found  reproduced  as  Item  No.  119,  EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRA- 
TIONS, Hewitt  Inquiry.) 


806       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Hewitt  Inquiky  Exhibit  No.  34 

RESTRICTED 

STAFF  INSTRUCTIONS 

Staff  of  the  Commandeb-in-Chief  United  States  Pacifio  Flkkt,  1941 

A2-12(05)  United  States  Pacific  Fleett 

Serial  1525  U.  S.  S.  Pennsylvania,  Flagship 

Peael  Haeboe,  T.  H.,  July  14, 1941. 
The  following  Staff  Instructions  are  published  for  the  guidance  of  all  persons 
attached  to  or  serving  with  the  Staff  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  United  States 
Pacific  Fleet,  and  also  the  Staff  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  United  States  Fleet, 
while  both  commands  are  administered  jointly. 

The  1938  edition  of  the  Commander-in-Chief's  Staff  Instructions  are  hereby 
superseded  and  all  copies  should  be  destroyed. 

W.  W.  Smith, 
Captain,  U.  S.  Navy, 

Chief  of  Staff. 
Approved : 

H.  E.  KiMMEL, 

Admiral,  U.  S.  Navy, 

Commander-in-Chief,  United  States  Pacific  Fleet. 

TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

U.  S.  PACIFIC  FLEET  STAFF  INSTRUCTIONS,  1941 

Page  Nos . 

Section  I        Composition,  Organization  and  General  Cognizance  of  Duty 1-3 

Section  II       Individual  Cognizance  of  Duties 3-15 

Section  III     Battle  Stations Ifi 

Section  IV      Flag  Office  Personnel  and  General  Instructions ..- 17-20 

Section  V       Handling  of  Correspondence 21-28 

Section  VI      Confidential  and  Secret  Correspondence 29-30 

Section  VII    Libraries ._ 31 

Section  VIII  Rapid  Communications t-.. ..-  J2-39 

Section  IX     Registered  and  other  Secret  and  Confidential  Publications 40 

Section  X       Relationship  between  Flag  and  Ship _ 41-43 

STAFF  INSTRUCTIONS  1941 

DISTRIBUTION  LIST 

COMMAND  No  Copies 

Commander-in-Chief,  United  States  Pacific  Fleet 40 

Opnav 10 

Commander-in-Chief,  United  States  Atlantic  Fleet 5 

Commander-in-Chief,  United  States  Asiatic  Fleet 5 

Commander  Battle  Force,  Pacific  Fleet 5 

Commander  Scouting  Force,  Pacific  Fleet 5 

Commander  Base  Force,  Pacific  Fleet  (including  Subordinate  Command)   (3  each) 6 

Commander  Aircraft,  Battle  Force,  Pacific  Fleet 2 

Commander  Battleships,  Battle  Force,  Pacific  Fleet 2 

Commander  Cruisers,  Battle  Force,  Pacific  Fleet 2 

Commander  Destroyers,  Battle  Force,  Pacific  Fleet 2 

Commander  Mineeraft,  Battle  Force,  Pacific  Fleet 1 

Commander  Cruisers,  Scouting  Force,  Pacific  Fleet , 2 

Commander  Aircraft,  Scouting  Force,  Pacific  Fleet 1 

Commander  Submarines,  Scouting  Force,  Pacific  Fleet 2 

Compatwing   Two 1 

Commander  Mine  Squadron  THREE 1 

Commander  Transports,  Base  Force,  Pacific  Fleet 2 

Commanding  General,  Second  Mnrine  Division,  Fleet  Marine  Force 5 

Commandants  11th,  12th,  &  14th  Naval  Districts  (each  2) 2 

Fleet  Flagship 5 

Fleet   Personnel   Officer 1 

Total 107 

Spares 40 

Grand  total 147 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY 


807 


STAFF  INSTRUCTIONS 
Section  I.  Composition,  Organization  and  Geneeal  Cognizance  of  Duty 

111.  The  composition  of  the  Staff  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  United  States 
Pacific  Fleet  is  as  indicated  in  the  following  paragraphs. 

112.  The  Commander-in-Chief  is  available  to  the  entire  Staff  for  consultation, 
but  all  questions  for  decision  or  action  should  pass  through  the  Chief  of  Staff 
whenever  such  a  procedure  will  not  involve  an  undue  delay. 

113.  The  below  tables  indicate  in  general  the  assignment  of  duties  to  the 
members  of  the  Staff.  Primary  functions  are  indicated  at  the  top  of  each 
column ;  the  officer  whose  number  appears  first  after  each  of  the  subheads 
under  (a),  (b),  (c),  or  (d)  is  the  leader  in  the  duty  specified: 


COMMA  NDER-IN-  CHIEF— 00 


Chief  of  Staff— 01. 
Assistant  Chief  of  Staff— 02. 


Personal  Aides— 01,  05,  15. 
Staff  Duty  Officer— 14. 


(a)   OPERATIONS 

11,  12,  13,  15,  20,  90, 

95. 

Estimates,      Plans, 

Orders,  Instructions. 

11,  12,  13,  15,  20,  90, 

95. 


Communications. 

20,  05,  15,  18,  21,  22, 

30. 

Schedules,  Train- 

ing.Exercises,  Reports 

of  Exercises.    11,12, 

13,  15,  16,  20,  50,  90, 

95. 

Tactics.    11,  12,  13, 

15. 


Anchorages,  An- 
choring, Getting 
Underway,  Operat- 
ing Areas.  11,  12, 
13,  15. 

Joint  Army  and 
Navy     Operations. 

11,  12,  13,  16,  17,  86. 
Ship  and  Airplane 
Movements.    11, 

12,  13,  95,  15,  20,  50, 
90. 
Navigation.    12. 

Logistics.  50, 12, 90, 
95. 


Intelligence.    11, 25. 

Censorship.    25,  05. 

Aerologies!.    96,  95. 

Navy  Relief  Force. 
U,  12,  13,  88. 
Security.    21. 
Propaganda.  05,  25, 
26. 


Damage  Control. 
60,  11,  90,  75. 
Chemical    Warfare 
and  Mines.    90. 
Base  Hospitals.    11, 
75. 


(b)  ADMINISTRA- 
TION 
01,  05,  20,  21,  25,  75, 
90,  95,  96. 

Correspondence 
Files,  Records,  Le- 
gal Matters,  Flag 
Allotment  and 
Office,  Print  Shop, 
Flag  Personnel.  05. 
Communications. 

20,  05,  15,  18,  21,  22, 
30. 

Secret  and  Confi- 
dential Registered 
Publications.    20, 

21,  33. 

Guard  Duty,  Uni- 
forms, Calls,  Cele- 
brations, Ceremo- 
nies, Band,  Boats, 
Official  Cars.  15. 
Characteristic 
Cards.  50,  18,  90, 
95. 


Athletics  and  Rec-. 
reation.    15,  96. 

Requisitions,  Sur- 
veys, Ship's  Serv- 
ice.   50. 

Landing  Force  and 
Parades.  86,  15,  90. 
Annual  Report.  05. 
(Assisted  by  each 
member  of  the 
Staff). 

Intelligence.  25, 26, 
20,05. 

Censorship.  25,  26, 
05,20. 

Navy  Relief  Force 
11,  12,  13,  86. 
Aerological  and  Per 
sonnel.    96. 
Security.    21. 
Medical  (Sanita 
tion,  etc.)  and  Re 
ligous  Activities 
75. 

Public      Relations, 
27,  25,  26,  05. 
Damage      Control 
50,  90,  75. 
Base  Hospitals.    75, 

Customs  and  Agri 
cultural  Inspection 
Liaison.    75,  96. 


(c)   WAR  PLANS 

16,  17,  18,  19,  86. 

Estimates,  Plans 
.  Orders.    16, 17, 18, 
19. 


Marine  Corps  mat- 
ters.   86. 

Landing  Force.    86. 


Mobilization  plans. 
16,  17,  18,  19,  86. 


Joint  Army  and 
Navy  Operations. 
16,  17,  18,  86,  11. 


Logistic  Readiness 
for  War.  16,  17,  18, 
19,  50,  86,  90,  95. 
Radio  and  Sound 
(Signal  Equip- 
ment.  18,  20,  50,  22, 
16. 

Navy  Relief  Force. 
11,  12,  13,  86. 


(d)  MAINTENANCE 

fO,  90,  95. 

Overhauls,      Dock- 
ing.   50. 


Repairs,  Altera- 
tions.   50,  90,  95. 

Technical  Services. 
50,  18,  20,  90,  95. 


Bureau     of     Ships 
Activities.    50. 


Navigation.  50,  12. 
Bureau  of  Ord- 
nance.   90,  95. 


Aviation.    95. 
Aerological.    96. 


Mines,  Chemical 
Equipment.    90. 

Base  Hospitals.    71. 


Notk:  Detailed  assignments  of  duties  are  contained  in  section  II. 


808       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

COGNIZANCE  AND  DUTY 

114.  The  following  numbers  are  employed  to  identify  the  duties  of  the  officers 
attached  to  the  Staff : 

01  — Chief  of  Staff. 

02  — Assistant  Chief  of  Staff. 
05  —  Flag  Secretary. 

11  —  Operations  Officer. 

12  —  1st.  Assistant  Operations  Officer. 

13  —  2nd.  Assistant  Operations  Officer. 

14  — Staff  Duty  Officer. 

15  —  Flag  Lieutenant. 

16  — War  Plans  Officer. 

17  —  1st.  Assistant  War  Plans  Officer. 

18  —  2nd.  Assistant  War  Plans  Officer. 

19  —  3rd.  Assistant  War  Plans  Officer. 

20  —  Communication  Officer. 

21  —  Communication  Security  Officer. 

22  — Radio  Officer. 

23  —  Assistant  Communication  Officer. 

24  —  Assistant  Communication  Officer. 

25  —  Intelligence  Officer. 

26  —  Assistant  Intelligence  Officer. 

27  —  Public  Relations. 

30  —  Assistant  Communication  Officer. 

31  to  43  —  Communication  Duty  and  Coding  Officers. 
50  —  Maintenance  Officer. 

75  —  Medical  Officer. 

86  —  Marine  Officer,  (Assistant  War  Plans  Officer). 

90  —  Gunnery  Officer. 

95  —  Aviation  Officer. 

96  —  Aerological  and  Personnel  Officer. 

115.  The  following  table  shows  the  reliefs  for  members  of  the  Staff  who  ma'y 
be  absent  for  any  reason  : 


PRIMARY  DUTY 

01— Chief  of  Staff. 

05 — Flag  Secretary. 

11 — Operations  Officer. 

12— 1st.  Assistant  Operations  Offi- 
cer. 

13— 2nd  Assistant  Operations  Offi- 
cer. 

15— Flag  Lieutenant  and  Athletic 
Officer. 

16— War  Plans  Officer. 

17— 1st.  Assistant  War  Plans  Offi- 
cer. 

18— 2nd.  Assistant  War  Plans  Offi- 
cer. 

19— 3rd.  Assistant  War  Plans  Offi- 
cer. 

20— Communication  Officer. 

21— Communication  Security  Offl- 

22— Radio  Officer. 

23 — Assistant    Communication 

Officer. 
24 — Assistant    Communication 

Officer. 
25— Intelligence  Officer. 
26 — Assistant  Intelligence  Officer. 
27— Public  Relations  Officer. 
30 — Assistant    Communication 

Officer. 
31  to  43  inclusive — Communication 
50— Maintenance  Officer. 
75— Medical  Officer. 
86— Marine  Officer. 


RELIEF 

02— Assistant  C*ief  of  Staff. 

25— Intelligence  Officer. 

16— War  Plans  Officer. 

13— 2nd  Assistant  Operations  Offi- 
cer. 

12— 1st.  Assistant  Operations  Offi- 
cer. 

26 — Assistant  Intelligence  Officer. 


90— Gunnery  Officer. 
95— Aviation  Officer. 
96— Aerological     and     Personnel 
Officer. 


17— 1st.  Assistant  War  Plans  Offi- 
cer. 

18— 2nd.  Assistant  War  Plans  Offi- 
cer. 

19— 3rd.  Assistant  War  Plans  Offi- 
cer. 

18— 2nd.  Assistant  War  Plans  Offi- 

22— Radio  Officer. 

30— Assistant  Communication 
Officer. 

20 — Communication  Officer. 

24 — Assistant  Communication 
Officer. 

23 — Assistant  Communication 
Officer. 

26— Assistant  Intelligence  Officer. 

25 — Intelligence  Officer. 

05 — Flag  Secretary. 

31 — Assistant  Communication 
Officer. 

Watch  Officers  and  Coding  Board. 

13— Assistant  Operations  Officer. 

05— Flag  Secretary. 

05 — Flag  Secretary;  (and  Gun- 
nery Officer  for  Landing 
Force  etc.) 

95 — Aviation  Officer. 

90 — Gunnery  Officer. 

95— Aviation  Officer. 


REMARKS 

(02  is  same  as  11.) 

16 — Relieves   if  available,   other- 
wise 12  relieves  11. 


20 — Relieves  for  visual  communi- 
cations. 


Senior  CWO. 


War  Plans  Section  by  16,  17, 
18,  19. 

Assisted  by  12. 
Assisted  by  96. 
Assisted  by  05  for  personnel. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  809 

Section  II.  Individual  Cognizanck  of  Duties 

200.  Chief  of  Staff— 01— Personal  Aide. 

(See  Navy  Regulations  Articles  785 — 786). 

(a)  Carries  out  policies  prescribed  by  the  Commander-in-Chief. 

(b)  Exercises  general  supervision  over  and  coordinates  work  by  members 
of  the  Staff. 

(c)  Advises  the  Commander-in-Chief  on  all  matters  concerning  the  war  readi- 
ness and  battle  efficiency  of  the  Fleet. 

(d)  Supervises  the  preparation  of  campaign  orders  and  plans,  as  well  as 
strategical  and  tactical  problems  of  the  Fleet. 

(e)  Signs  correspondence  as  follows: 

(1)  Routine  Matters. 

(2)  Minor  recommendations,  or  minor  forwarding  endorsements  on  same, 
to  material  Bureaus  regarding  repairs  and  alterations  concerning  which  a 
policy  has  been  established. 

(3)  Orders  to  and  requests  from  officers  not  in  Command. 

(4)  Matters  concerning  which  the  policy  is  of  long  standing. 

(5)  Letters  from  the  Navy  Department  noted  for  compliance,  informa- 
tion, or  guidance. 

(6)  The  Commander-in-Chief  personally  will  sign  correspondence  regard- 
ing questions  of  particular  importance  involving  criticism,  approval,  or 
disapproval  of  previous  recommendations ;  action  on  legal  papers. 

201.  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff— 02— See  Operations  Officer  (11). 

202.  Flag  Secretary — 05 — Personal  Aide. 

(a)  Responsible  for  the  receipt,  dispatch,  recording,  routing,  and  filing  of  all 
official  written  correspondence.  He  shall  be  assisted  by  an  officer  (Assistant 
Communication  Officer)   designated  to  handle  the  SECRET  mail. 

(b)  Authenticates  and  checks  the  distribution  of  operation  plans,  orders, 
movement  orders  and  multiple  address  correspondence  requiring  authentication. 

(c)  In  charge  of  the  Flag  Office  organization  and  personnel  connected  there- 
with. 

(d)  Ascertains  that  outgoing  correspondence  is  in  agreement  with  current 
instructions  and  properly  distributed. 

(e)  Brings  to  the  attention  of  the  officers  concerned  all  conflicting,  incon- 
sistent or  overdue  communications. 

(f)  Responsible  for  the  general  dissemination  of  administrative  information. 

(g)  Supervises  the  handling  of  U.  S.  and  Guard  Mail  within  the  Fleet, 
(h)   Printing. 

(i)   Legal  and  disciplinary  matters. 

(j)   Signs  correspondence  "by  direction"  for: 

(1)  Papers  forwarded  or  returned  without  comment. 

(2)  Correspondence  consisting  of  information  or  appropriate  minor  action 
only. 

(3)  Receipts  and  tracers. 

(4)  Transmission  of  registered  mail,  or  publications. 

(5)  Transfers  and  orders  for  enlisted  personnel, 
(k)   Controls  Flag  Office  Allotment. 

(1)  War  Diary. 

203.  Operations  Officer— 11— {Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  02). 

(a)  Assists  the  Chief  of  Staff  as  required,  signing  correspondence  in  bis 
absence  as  "Assistant  Chief  of  Staff". 

(b)  As  head  of  Operations  Section  coordinates  operations  and  employment 
activities. 

(c)  Develops  Fleet  tactics  and  doctrine,  and  originates  recommendations 
for  revision  of  same. 

(d)  Prepares  problems  and  exercises. 

(e)  Assignments  of  vessels  to  special  duties. 

(f )  Prepares  estimates  of  the  situation,  campaign  orders,  operations  orders, 
and  plans  and  movement  orders. 

(g)  Assisted  by  other  members  of  Staff  reviews  and  analyzes  Fleet  exercises, 
(h)  Acts  as  head  of  the  Schedule  Board  for  preparing  the  Fleet  operation 

plans. 


810       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR.  ATTACK 

(i)  Navy  Relief  Force. 

(j)  Fleet  anchorages,  bases,  and  operating  areas. 

204.  First  Assistant  Operations  Officer — 12. 

(a)  Acts  as  Fleet  Navigator  with  corresponding  cognizance  of  navigational 
equipment,  charts,  etc. 

(b)  Assists  in  all  the  duties  under  the  cognizance  of  the  Operations  Oflacer. 

(c)  Coordinates  the  duties  of  Operations  Officer  with  those  of  the  War  Plans 
Section. 

(d)  Acts  as  member  of  the  Schedule  Board. 

(e)  Commander-in-Chiefs  Night  Order  Book. 

205.  Second,  Assistant  Operations  Officer — 13. 

(a)  Assists  the  Operations  Officer  in  all  the  duties  of  that  office. 

(b)  Responsible  for  maintaining  location  plot  and  movement  report  system 
for  vessels  of  the  Fleet. 

(c)  Edits  Quarterly  Fleet  Organization  information. 

205A.  Staff  Duty  Officer— U. 
(See  paragraph  226). 

206.  Flag  Lieutenant — 15 — Personal  Aide. 

(a)  Acts  as  Fleet  Signal  Officer;  supervises  the  dissemination  of  tactical 
signals,  under  the  Fleet  Communication  Officer;  is  responsible  for  the  efficiency 
of  Fleet  signalling  operations  and  material. 

(b)  Fleet  Athletic  Officer;  liaison  officer  with  Fleet  Recreation  and  Morale 
Officer  based  ashore. 

(c)  Boarding  officer. 

(d)  Has  cognizance  of: 

(1)  Matters  relating  to  ceremonies,  salutes,  honors,  and  official  calls. 

(2)  Entertainments. 

(3)  Club  privileges,  invitations,  etc. 

(4)  Uniform. 

(5)  Boats,  boat  crews,  and  official  cars. 

(6)  Military  and  Medical  Guard  Dpties. 

(7)  Band  or  orchestra. 

(e)  When  on  board  during  working  hours,  attends  the  side. 

(f)  Maintains  flag  combat  bill. 

(g)  Acts  on  requests  for  bands,  parades,  visits  to  ships,  etc. 
(h)   In  charge  of  Admiral's  mess  attendants. 

207.  War  Plans  Officer— 16. 

(a)  As  head  of  the  War  Plans  Section  is  responsible,  under  the  Chief  of  Staff, 
for  the  preparation  of  War  Plans  for  the  Fleet  and  for  all  matters  pertaining 
thereto. 

(b)  Has  general  custody  of  War  Plans  and  secret  letters  relative  thereto. 

(c)  Member  of  Schedule  Board. 

(d)  Maintains  liaison  with  War  Plans  representatives  of  subordinate  Com- 
manders. 

(e)  Maintains  liaison  with  U.  S.  Army  in  War  Plans  matters, — via  District 
Commandant  if  appropriate. 

(f)  Makes  recommendations  on  designs  of  new  ships — general  features — and 
on  alterations  of  old  ships  that  affect  military  characteristics. 

(g)  Makes  recommendations  on  matters  pertaining  to  reserves  of  material, 
particularly  ammunition,  mines,  bombs,  torpedoes,  fuel,  provisions,  etc.,  and 
their  distribution. 

(h)  Maintains  liaison  with  Commandants  of  Naval  Districts  in  War  Plans 
matters. 

(i)  Is  responsible  for  the  review  of  War  Plans  of  subordinate  commanders 
and  of  District  Commandants  and  Coastal  Frontier  Commanders  insofar  as  these 
Plans  may  affect  the  Fleet. 

208.  Assistant  War  Plans — 17. 

(a)  Assistant  to  War  Plans  Officer,  specifically  charged  with  following: 

(1)  Fleet  estimates  and  plans. 

(2)  Collaboration  with  Naval  Coastal  Frontiers  and  Commandants  of 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  811 

Naval  Districts. 

(3)  Liaison  witli  Army  on  War  Plans  matters. 

(4)  Duties  of  18  when  that  assignment  is  vacant. 

209.  Assistant  War  Plans — 18. 

(a)  Assistant  to  War  Plans  Officer,  specifically  charged  with  following: 

(1)  Review  of  subordinate  plans,  including  those  of  Naval  Coastal  Fron- 
tiers and  Naval  Districts. 

(2)  Prosecution  of  current  War  Plans  tasks  and  projects. 

(3)  Action  on  administrative  matters  and  correspondence  in  which  War 
Plans  has  an  interest. 

(4)  Logistic  studies  and  data. 

210.  Assistant  War  Plans — 19. 

(a)  Assistant  to  War  Plans  Officer,  specifically  charged  with  following: 

(1)  Office  administration  and  correspondence. 

(2)  Compilation  and  assembly  of  data. 

(3)  Specific  custody  of  War  Plans  publications  and  files. 
Fleet  Marine  Officer — 86.     (See  paragraph  222).  ' 

211.  Fleet  Communication  Officer — 20. 

(a)  Responsible  for  the  efficiency  of  Fleet  communications. 

(b)  Supervises  training  in  Fleet  communications. 

(c)  Assists  Operations  Officers  and  War  Plans  Officers  with  strategic  opera- 
tions and  with  war  plans. 

(d)  Prepares  Fleet  communication  plans. 

(e)  Directs  activities  of  flag  radio  and  sound  schools  and  assignments  of  com- 
munication personnel. 

(f)  Collaborates  with  "96"  concerning  radio  and  sound  schools  and  assign- 
ments of  communication  personnel. 

(g)  Supervises  activities  ashore  of  communication  stations  when  manned  by 
Fleet  personnel. 

(h)  Supervises  the  assignment  and  utilization  of  Fleet  radio  frequencies, 

(i)  Coordinates  with  "50"  on  matters  of  communication  material, 

(j)  Responsible  for  registered  publications, 

(k)  Supervises  communication  watch  officers. 

(1)  Cryptographic  and  radio  security,  with  "21". 

212.  Communication  Security  Officer — 21. 

(a)  Assists  Fleet  Communication  Officer. 

(b)  Is  responsible  for  security  of  Fleet  Communications  and  directly  those  of 
Fleet  flagship : 

(1)  Inspection  of  radio  traffic  handled  by  Fleet  flagship. 

(2)  Inspection  of  communication  plans  and  orders  of  subordinate  com- 
manders. 

(3)  Supervision  and  control  of  monitor  watch. 

(4)  Preparation  of  Fleet  Letters  and  orders  on  communication  security. 

(5)  Recommendations  for  improvement  of  crytographic  aids. 

(6)  Recommendations  for  distribution  and  allowances  of  cryptographic 
aids. 

(7)  By  personal  contact  and  instruction  improve  security  of  communi- 
cations. 

(c)  Is  in  immediate  charge  of  Radio  Intelligence  Unit. 

(d)  Is  in  charge  of  Commander-in-Chief's  registered  publications  library. 
Signs  all  routine  transfer  and  destruction  reports  and  inventories  "by  direction". 

(e)  Is  responsible  for  production  and  security  of  U.  S.  F.  publications  and 
other  classified  publications  and  printed  matter  issued  by  the  Commander-in- 
Chief. 

(f )  Advises  concerning  and  ensures  security  of  handling  of  secret  and  confiden- 
tial correspondence. 

(g)  Is  responsible  for  the  organization  and  training  of  the  Fleet  Coding  Board. 

213.  Fleet  Radio  Officer— 22. 

(a)  Assists  Fleet  Communication  Officer. 

(b)  Assists  "50"  in  regard  to  technical  aspects  of  Degaussing. 

(c)  Recommends  assignment  of  Radio  frequencies  to  20. 

(d)  Supervises  radio,  sound  and  landwire  communications  and  material  in- 
stallations of  the  Fleet. 


812       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(e)  Initiation  and  conduct  of  radio  training  operations  in  the  Fleet. 

(f )  Instruction  and  training  of  radio  and  sound  personnel. 

(g)  Liaison  with  commercial  radio  and  cable  companies. 

(h)   Material  inspection  reports  of  radio  and  sound  installations  in  the  Fleet, 
(i)    Recognition  and  identification  installations  in  the  Fleet. 

234.  Intelligence  Officer — 25. 

(a)  Directs  assembly  of  Enemy  Information  and  evaluates  same,  disseminating 
to  various  members  of  staff,  indicating  where  action  is  required. 

(b)  Provides  Operation  Officer  and  War  Plans  Officer  information  essential  for 
current  estimates  (monograph  material). 

(c)  Maintains  Section  II  (a),  (b),  (c),  (d),  (e),  (f),  and  (g)  of  Estimate 
of  Situation  (Enemy  Forces) .  Maintains  location  plot  of  Fleets  of  possible  enemy 
or  allies. 

(d)  Directs  counter  espionage  and  counter  information. 

(e)  Maintains  Intelligence  Records  (See  Naval  Intelligence  Manual). 

(f )  Prepares  Fleet  Intelligence  Bulletins. 

(g)  Evaluates  Intelligence  Information  received  of  procedures  or  practices  of 
other  navies  and  prepares  deSnite  recommendation  as  to  any  action  to  be  taken 
within  own  Fleet. 

(h)   In  charge  of  censorship. 

(i)   Internal  Security  of  ships. 

(j)   Supervises  reconnaissance  photographic  activities. 

215.  Assista7it  Intelligence  Officer — 26 

In  addition  to  assisting  "25"  in  all  duties  of  the  Intelligence  section,  performs 
the  following  additional  assignments : 

(a)  Maintains  Merchant  Marine  plot  and  analysis. 

(b)  Prepares  silhouettes  of  own  and  enemy  ships  and  planes  for  dissemination 
to  Fleet. 

(c)  Assembly,  evaluation  and  dissemination  of  Eenemy  information. 

(d)  Maintenance  of  Current  Estimate  of  Situation  (Enemy  Forces)  and  loca- 
tion plot  of  Fleets  of  possible  enemy  or  allies. 

216.  Pumic  Relations  Officer— 21. 

(a)  Liaison  officer  with  the  Press. 

(b)  Releases  all  Fleet  publicity  requiring  the  Commander-in-Chief's  review. 

(c)  Maintains  file  of  clippings  from  current  periodicals. 

(d)  Maintains  photographic  file. 

(e)  Maintains  biographical  file  of  flag  and  commanding  officers. 

(f)  Cognizance  of  Staff  library. 

(g)  Motion  Picture  Officer. 

(h)  Assists  in  recruiting  activities  in  collaboration  with  the  Bureau  of 
Navigation. 

( i )   In  charge  of  Staff  photographer. 

(j)  Assists  15  (Flag  Lieutenant)  in  connection  with  press  releases  for  visitors, 
visits,  social  activities,  athletics,  and  other  recreational  subjects. 

(k)   Publicity  liaison  with  other  U.  S.  government  activities. 

(1)  Propaganda  in  time  of  war. 

(m)  When  directed  assist  "25",  and  "26"  with  censorship  and  collaborates  in 
intelligence  matters  as  necessary. 

(n)   Reviews  ship's  papers  in  the  fleet. 

(o)  Reviews  congressional  records,  bills,  etc. 

217.  Assistant  Communication  Officer — 30. 

(a)  In  addition  to  the  following,  assists  the  Fleet  Communication  Officer  as 
directed. 

(m)  Is  in  charge  of  internal  distribution  and  contduct  of  Flag  rapid  com- 
munications within  the  Flagship. 

(c)  Is  in  charge  of  the  Flag  Communications  Office,  including  personnel,  rou- 
tine operations,  files,  forms,  and  publications. 

(d)  Coordinates  the  duties  of  the  Communication  Watch  Officers  and  Coding 
Watch  Officers. 

(e)  Under  Flag  Secretary,  has  duty  as  officer  responsible  for  receipt,  routing, 
custody,  and  dispatch  of  secret  mail. 

(f)  Responsible  for  cleanliness  and  upkeep  of  the  Flag  Communication  Office 
and  communication  spaces. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  813 

218.  Communication  Watch  Officers — 31,  32.  33,  34. 

(a)  Communication  Watch  Officers  stand  communication  desk  watches,  being 
governed  in  the  i)erformance  of  these  duties  by  the  provisions  of  the  Communi- 
cation Instructions  and  such  orders  and  instructions  as  may  be  issued  by  the  Fleet 
Communication  Officer,  Fleet  Radio  Officer,  or  Assistant  Communication  Officer. 

(b)  A  Communication  Watch  Officer  is  the  Flag  Division  Officer.  He  is  assisted 
in  this  assignment  by  the  communication  watch  officers  who  are  designated  as 
Junior  Division  Officers  for  the  Flag  Division. 

(c)  Communication  Watch  Officers  must  become  proficient  in  the  use  of  codes 
and  ciphers  and  be  familiar  with  Fleet  Operations,  routine,  and  staff  procedure. 
In  addition  to  performing  routine  code  and  cipher  duties  they  may  be  assigned 
coding  board  duties  at  a  battle  station. 

(d)  One  Communication  Watch  Officer  is  detailed  as  custodian  of  non-regis- 
tered communication  publications  which  he  shall  keep  corrected. 

(e)  One  Communication  Watch  Officer  is  detailed  as  custodian  of  the  Regis- 
tered Publications  which  he  shall  keep  corrected. 

219.  Coding  Board  Officers— 35,  36,  37,  38,  (39,  40). 

(a)  Coding  Board  Officers  stand  Coding  Board  watches,  being  governed  in  the 
performance  of  these  duties  by  the  instructions  issued  by  the  Assistant  Communi- 
cation Officer. 

(b)  They  shall  familiarize  themselves  with  all  cryptographic  systems  in  use 
and  become  proficient  in  their  proper  use. 

(c)  They  shall  assist  the  Fleet  Security  Officer  in  matters  of  Fleet  Crypto- 
graphic Security. 

(d)  They  shall  familiarize  themselves  with  the  duties  of  Communication 
Watch  Officers  to  the  end  that  they  may  stand  Communication  Watch  Officer 
watches  when  required. 

(e)  All  Coding  Board  Officers  shall  assist  Fleet  Security  Officer  in  the  correc- 
tion, custody,  preparation,  and  care  of  registered  and  classified  matter. 

(f)  The  Coding  Board  of  the  Fleet  Flagship  is  required  to  perform  Flag  Coding 
Board  functions,  as  directed. 

220.  Fleet  Engineer  and  Maintenance  Officer — 50. 

(a)  Docking  and  overhaul  schedules. 

(b)  Engineering  performances. 

(c)  Repairs,  preservation  and  alterations  of  ships  of  the  Fleet. 

(d)  Fleet  repair  and  docking  facilities. 

(e)  Tests  and  upkeep  of  material. 

(f)  Design,  construction,  and  operation  of  machinery  and  governing  in- 
instructions. 

(g)  Orders  for  and  reports  of  military  and  material  inspections, 
(h)  Damage  Control. 

(i)  Allowance  lists  (Bureau  of  Ships),  requisitions  and  surveys, 
(j)   Chip's  Service  store  activities, 
(k)  Training  of  engineering  personnel. 
(1)  Member  of  Schedule  Board, 
(m)   Fuel  and  provisioning  schedules, 
(n)   Ship's  characteristics  cards  and  logistics.  " 
(o)   Supply  Department  matters. 

(p)  Assists  War  Plans  Officer  in  preparation  of  War  Plans, 
(q)  Makes    recommendations    on    design    of    new    ships    (Bureau    of    Ships 
cognizance). 

(r)  Degaussing. 

221.  Fleet  Medical  Officer— 75. 

(a)  Keeps  himself  informed  by  inspections,  and  advises  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  sanitary  conditions  of  ships  of  the  Fleet. 

(b)  Prepares  a  periodic  F'leet  Medical  News  Letter. 

(c)  Acts  as  liaison  officer  with  civilian  medical  activities. 

(d)  Interests  himself  in  making  such  provisions  for  medical  services  at  bases 
as  may  not  be  otherwise  provided  for. 

(e)  Customs  and  agricultural  inspections. 

(f )  Shall  obtain  for,  or  advise  Units  of  the  Fleet  in  the  obtaining  of  Bills  of 
Health  and  the  securing  of  pratique  in  accordance  with  local  and  foreign  health 
regulations. 

(g)  Holds  periodic  conferences  with   medical  officers  of  the  Fleet  for   the 


814       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

purpose  of  standardizing  practices  not  specially  provided  for  by  regulations  and 
for  other  purposes  in  the  interest  of  increased  efficiency  of  the  medical  department. 

(h)   Has  cognizance  of  religious  activities. 

(i)  Has  cognizance  of  and  advises  upon  Damage  Control  Activities  within  the 
purview  of  Bureau  of  Medicine  and  Surgery. 

222.  Fleet  Marine  Officer— 86. 

(a)  General  cognizance  of  matters  concerning  Marine  Corps  and  Fleet  Marine 
Force. 

(b)  Data  on  organization,  strength,  equipment,  etc.,  of  Marine  Divisions, 
Defense  Battalions,  and  Detachments. 

(c)  Assistant  to  War  Plans  Officer,  specifically  charged  with  the  following: 

(1)  Plans  for  amphibious  operations. 

(2)  Seizure,  establishment,  and  defense  of  advance  bases. 

(3)  Demolition  and  related  operations. 

(4)  Logistic  data  (Marines  and  Army). 

(5)  Review  of  Marine  Corps  subordinate  plans. 

223.  Fleet  Gunnery  Officer— 90. 

(a)  Supervises  gunnery,  training,  gunnery  exercises,  and  the  care  and  upkeep 
of  the  armament  of  the  Fleet. 

(b)  Keeps  informed  of  the  efficiency  in  gunnery  and  the  condition  of  the 
armament  of  the  Fleet. 

(c)  Advises  in  regard  to  tactical  maneuvers  for  obtaining  advantageous  range 
bands,  greatest  fire  effect,  and  dispositions  for  the  best  use  of  the  armament. 

(d)  Prepares  outlines  of  schedules  of  gunnery  exercises  for  the  Fleet  and 
advises  concerning  detailed  schedules  prepared  by  Force  Commanders. 

(e)  Supervises  small  arms  training  and  exercises  of  the  Fleet. 

(f )  Consults  with  Aviation  Officer  in  connection  with  aircraft  and  antiaircraft 
gunnery. 

(g)  In  charge  of  the  following  matters,  consulting  with  Operations  Officer 
regarding  tactical  aspects :  "  , 

(1)  Mining  and  sweeping  exercises  and  material. 

(2)  Torpedoes  and  torpedo  practices. 

(3)  Smoke  screens,  both  offensive  and  defensive. 

(4)  Chemical  warfare  service — Material  and  training  of  personnel.     (In 
collaboration  with  Fleet  Maintenance  Officer). 

(h)  Supervises  courses  of  study  in  Ordnance  and  Gunnery  technical  schools  of 
the  Fleet. 

(i)  Assists  War  Plans  Officer  in  preparation  of  War  Plans  and  in  matters  of 
liaison  with  Army. 

(j)  Reviews  military  and  material  inspection  reports. 

(k)  Consults  with  Fleet  Maintenance  Officer  on  Damage  Control. 

(1)  Exercises  particular  supervision  over  recommendations  for  changes  to 
"Orders  for  Gunnery  Exercises,"  "Gunnei-y  Instructions"  and  other  ordnance, 
gunnery  and  fire  control  publications. 

(m)  Makes  recommendations  on  designs  of  news  ships  (Bureau  of  Ordnance 
cognizance. 

(n)   Member  of  Schedule  Board. 

(o)   Advises  on  gunnery  features  of  tactical  plans  and  publications. 

(p)   With  86  has  cognizance  of  matters  involving  landing  forces. 

(q)  Handles  matters  affecting  training,  assignments,  rating,  and  qualifications 
of  gunnery  personnel  (consults  with  96). 

224.  Fleet  Aviation  Officer— 95. 
(a)  Advises  with  reference  to: 

(1)  All  aircraft  operations  and  aviation  matters  including  those  pertaining 
to  policy  with  respect  to  : 

(A)  Material. 

(B)  Personnel. 

(C)  Gunnery  arid  Bombing. 

(D)  Radio. 

(2)  Aircraft  Operations,  and  aviation  shore  facilities. 

(3)  Coordination  of  aviation  activities  of  the  Fleet. 

(4)  Employment  of  aircraft  in  tactical  exercises,  analysis  and  reports 
thereon. 

(5)  The  development  of  aircraft  tactics,  gunnery  and  doctrine. 

(6)  Naval  air  operating  policy. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  815 

(b)  Assists  War  Plans  Officer  in  the  preparation  of  War  Plans. 

(c)  Keeps  informed  as  to  the  effectiveness  of  aircraft  units  of  the  Fleet. 

(d)  Assists  Operation  Officer  in  the  preparation  of  Fleet  Schedules  dealing  with 
aircraft  and  aircraft  services. 

(e)  Consults  v?ith  Gunnery  Officer  in  connection  with  aircraft  and  anti-aircraft 
gunnery.    Handles  Aircraft  Gunnery  Reports. 

(f)  Member  of  Schedule  Board. 

(g)  Has  cognizance  of,  keeps  informed  of  aircraft  material  matters. 

225.  Fleet  Aerological  and  Personnel  Office?- — 96. 

(a)  In  charge  of  the  aerological  office  and  keeps  the  Commander-in-Chief  and 
members  of  his  staff  advised  of  weather  conditions  as  concerns  the  planning  and 
executions  of  Fleet  Operations.     Assists  War  Plans  Officer. 

(b)  Advises  with  reference  to  the  establishment  of  new  aerological  units  in 
matters  concerning : 

(1)  Equipment. 

(2)  Personnel. 

(3)  Weather  information  required. 

(c)  Coordinates  aerological  activities  in  the  Fleet,  including: 

(1)  Collection  and  dissemination  of  weather  reports. 

(2)  Weather  forecasts  and  advisory  storm  warnings. 

(3)  Aerological  research. 

(d)  Exercises  supervision  over  the  training  and  instruction  of  aerological 
personnel. 

(e)  Prepares  such  weather  summaries  as  are  required  in  connection  with 
orders  for  Fleet  Problems  and  Tactics. 

(f)  Consults  with  Gunnery  Officer  in  connection  with  atmospheric  ballistic 
information  pertaining  to  gunnery. 

(g)  Advises  with  reference  to  exchange  of  weather  information  between  the 
Fleet  and  the  U.  S.  Weather  Bureau  or  other  activities  maintaining  meteorologi- 
cal facilities. 

(h)   In  charge  of  all  matters  relating  to  : 

(1)  Orders  for  officers  and  enlisted  i)ersonnel. 

(2)  Naval  Reserve  Officers  on  active  duty. 

(3)  Transportation  in  ships  of  the  Fleet. 

(4)  Congressional  mail  regarding  personnel  matters. 

(5)  Action  on  leave  requests  for  all  officers  and  preparation  of  endorse- 
ments for  signature  of  Admiral,  Chief  of  Staff  and  Flag  Secretary,  depend- 
ing upon  the  rank  of  officer  requesting  leave. 

(6)  Examinations  and  promotions. 

(7)  Navy  Relief  and  Red  Cross. 

(i)   In  charge  of  entertainment  and  welfare  of  enlisted  personnel. 

(j)   Shore  Patrol. 

(k)  Liberty  for  the  Fleet. 

226.  Staff  Duty  Officer— IJ,. 

(a)  Such  Officers  as  may  be  designated  by  the  Chief  of  Staff  shall  stand  a 
day's  duty  in  port  and  a  watch  on  the  Flag  Bridge  at  sea  when  a  watch  is 
established. 

(b)  The  officer  having  the  day's  duty  shall : 

(1)  Receive  routine  reports. 

(2)  Act  on  routine  matters. 

(3)  Act  as  necessary  on  matters  when  the  officer  having  cognizance  and 
his  relief  are  absent,  informing  officers  concerned  of  action  taken  as  soon  as 
possible. 

(4)  Attend  the  side  when  the  Flag  Lieutenant  is  not  available.  The  pro- 
cedure for  tending  the  side  is  laid  down  in  Section  X  of  these  Staff  instruc- 
tions. 

(5)  Regulate  movements  of  Admiral's  Barge,  Chief  of  Staff's  Gig,  and 
Staff  boats  in  absence  of  Mag  Lieutenant  or  outside  of  working  hours.  The 
Officer-of-the-Deck  will  keep  the  Staff  Duty  Officer  and  Flag  Lieutenant 
informed  of  the  movements  of  the  Admiral's  Barge,  Chief  of  Staff's  Gig, 
and  Staff  Duty  boats. 

(6)  Keep  informed  as  to  Staff  Officers  on  board  or  absent  from  the  ship. 

(7)  In  the  absence  of  the  Flag  Lieutenant  see  that  boarding  calls  on  visit- 
ing men  of  war  are  made  by  an  officer  from  Fleet  flagship. 


816       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(8)  Receive  aerological  forecasts  from  the  Aerologist  and  when  bad 
weather  is  forecast  transmit  the  necessary  information  to  the  ships  present. 

(9)  Initial  all  dispatches,  taking  action  if  necessary  when  action  officer  is 
not  on  board. 

(10)  See  that  the  Commander-in-Chief  and  the  Chief  of  Staff  are  kept  in- 
formed of  all  important  matters,  and  particularly  that  they  are  informed 
promptly  upon  their  return  to  the  sliip  of  all  important  matters  that  occur 
during  their  absence ;  and  similarly  keep  the  Operations  Officer  informed  of 
all  ship  movements  observed  by  the  signal  watch. 

(11)  Examine  all  mail  received  during  the  absence  of  the  Flag  Secretary 
or  his  regularly  designated  relief,  and  decide  what  action  if  any  shall  be 
taken. 

(c)  Day's  duty  will  begin  at  0900,  except  Sundays  and  holidays  when  it  will 
begin  at  1100.  The  sequence  will  be  uninterrupted  by  the  fact  that  the  ship  may 
be  at  sea  when  regular  watches  are  set.  » 

(d)  The  duties  of  the  Staff  Duty  Officer  assume  particular  importance  when, 
in  the  absence  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Chief  of  Staff,  or  other  members  of 
the  staff,  he  is  called  upon  to  make  decisions  in  cases  of  emergency,  or  on  matters 
which  cannot  be  delayed  for  reference  to  higher  authority  or  to  the  officers  having 
cognizance.  This  fact  makes  it  imperative  that  all  officers  standing  duty  keep 
themselves  informed  as  to  existing  situations,  the  policies  of  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  and  the  usual  and  proper  manner  of  taking  action  on  all  matters  which 
may  arise. 

(e)  In  important  emergency  cases  the  Staff  Duty  Officer  will  take  such  action 
as  may  be  necessary.  lastructions  should  be  obtained  by  the  most  expeditious 
manner  of  communication  with  the  Chief  of  Staff  and,  failing  to  locate  him,  with 
the  Commander-in-Chief.  The  Operations  Officer  should,  if  practicable,  be  fully 
informed  of  the  situation. 

(f )  When  civilians  or  officials,  other  than  personal  friends  of  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  or  officials  whose  status  is  a  matter  of  doubt,  come  on  board  the  flagship 
to  confer  with  the  Commander-in-Chief,  he  shall  first  present  them  to  the  Chief 
of  Staff,  Flag  Lieutenant,  or  in  their  absence,  to  the  Operations  Officer. 

(g)  Should  an  emergency  arise  necessitating  action  involving  the  Fleet  Relief 
Force,  the  Staff  Duty  Officer  will  carry  out  the  following : 

(1)  Notify  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Chief  of  Staff  and  Operations  Officer. 

(2)  Send  staff  boats  to  landing,  keeping  one  at  ship  as  may  be  advisable. 

(3)  Land  field  radio  and  signalmen  if  BASRAD  is  out  of  commission. 

(h)  Assignment  of  Berths.  Requests  for  berths  are  received  occasionally  by 
the  Staff  Duty  Officer  for  immediate  action  during  the  absence  of  the  Operations 
Officers.  To  assist  the  Staff  Duty  Officer  in  assigning  berths,  an  anchorage  chart 
is  kept  in  the  Oi)erations  Office,  together  with  a  copy  of  current  instructions. 
See  also  the  Commander-in-Chief's  current  letter  in  regard  to  anchorage  assign- 
ments. 

(i)  In  the  absence  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  or  Chief  of  Staff,  he  shall  take 
steps  to  correct  any  defects  in  external  Fleet  routine  which  would  constitute  an 
adverse  i-eflection  on  the  Fleet. 

(j)  Leave— Relief  for  Day's  Dutij.  (1)  The  Day's  Duty  list  for  Staff  Duty 
Officers  is  prepared  on  the  basis  that  the  sequence  will  not  be  interrupted  by  the 
fact  that  the  ship  may  be  at  sea.  Nor  is  it  to  be  interrupted  by  absence  on,  duty, 
illness  or  leave. 

(2)  Staff  Duty  Officers  are  "Relief  Officers"  in  inverse  order  of  seniority.  A 
Relief  Duty  List  is  posted  in  the  Staff  Duty  Book.  When  an  officer  stands  a 
relief  duty  watch,  he  will  inform  the  senior  watch  officer.  The  next  officer  on 
the  list  then  becomes  the  "Relief  Duty  Officer." 

(3)  For  extended  periods  of  leave,  greater  than  10  days  the  Relief  Duty  Officer 
will  take  the  duty  for  the  officer  scheduled  for  the  Day's  Duty.  For  shorter 
periods  of  leave,  officers  are  expected  to  arrange  for  their  own  reliefs  by  agreeable 
shifts  with  other  Staff  Duty  Officers.  In  every  case,  inform  the  Senior  Staff 
Duty  Officer  of  the  arrangements  made. 

SEA  WATCHES 

(k)  An  officer  of  the  Staff  shall  be  on  the  bridge  at  all  times  when  the  Fleet 
flagship  is  imderway  in  company  with  vessels  of  the  Fleet  acting  as  a  unit. 

(1)  He  is  the  representative  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  on  the  bridge  and  bears 
the  same  relation  to  him  that  the  Officer-of-the-Deck  bears  to  the  Captain  of  the 
ship.     He  shall  keep  himself  informed  of  the  location  of  all  units  and  ships  in 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  817 

whatever  disposition  or  formation  tlie  Fleet  is  at  tlie  time  ;  whatever  land  or  lights 
are  in  sight ;  \Vhether  either  are  likely  to  be  seen ;  and  of  all  other  particulars 
which  may  be  of  use  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  in  keeping  the  ships  of  the  forma- 
tion out  of  danger. 

(1)  In  case  of  emergency,  when  neither  the  Commander-in-Chief  nor  the  Chief 
of  Staff  is  on  the  bridge,  he  shall  make  such  signals  as  are  required  by  the  circum- 
stances, reporting  his  action  immediately  to  the  Commander-in-Cliief,  the  Chief 
of  Staft  and  the  Operations  Officer.  ACT  FIRST,  REPORT  AFTERWARDS. 
Under  all  other  conditions  the  formation  shall  not  be  maneuvered  without  the 
authority  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  or  the  Chief  of  Staff.  Furthermore,  under 
these  latter  conditions,  the  Staff  Duty  Officer  shall  report  the  circumstances  to 
the  Operations  Officer.  Also,  he  shall  call  the  Flag  Lieutenant  and  Operations 
Officer  to  the  bridge  at  once  if  immediate  action  is  required — otherwise  those 
officers  shall  be  informed  of  the  time  when  their  presence  on  the  flag  bridge  will 
be  required  and  the  reasons  therefor. 

(m)  He  shall  promptly  report  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  through  the  Chief 
of  Staff,  all  land,  shoals,  rocks,  lighthouses,  beacons,  buoys,  discolored  water,  ves- 
sels, or  wrecks  sighted ;  all  changes  of  weather  or  shifts  of  wind ;  all  signals 
made;  all  changes  in  speed,  formation,  disposition,  or  course;  in  general,  all 
occurrences  worthy  of  notice. 

(n)  He  shall  handle  all  dispatches  which  in  port  are  routed  to  the  Officer 
having  the  day's  Staff  duty. 

(o)  When  the  Flag  Lieutenant  is  on  the  Bridge  he  will  handle  all  tactical 
signals,  relieving  the  Staff  Duty  Officer  of  this  function  of  his  usual  duties. 

(p)  Record  of  events. — ^A  Record  of  Events  during  the  watch  will  be  kept  by 
the  Staff  Officer  on  watch  assisted  by  a  duty  yeoman.  This  record  will  include 
items  of  importance,  movements,  major  and  minor  contacts  with  the  enemy,  aerial 
and  submarine  activity,  weather  information,  etc.  The  Record  of  Events 
will  be  typed  in  quadruplicate,  signed  by  the  Officer  on  watch  and  handled  as 
follows:  Original  to  be  placed  in  a  file  folder  in  Flag  Plot.  (This  folder  will  be 
kept  in  Flag  Plot  until  the  completion  of  the  exercise,  when  it  shall  be  turned  over 
to  the  file  yeoman  by  the  yeoman  securing  the  watch) .  At  0800  each  day  the  three 
copies  of  the  Record  of  Ev,ents  covering  the  watches  of  the  preceding  24  hours 
shall  be  turned  over  to  the  Flag  Office  for  the  following  distribution :  one  copy 
to  the  Admiral,  one  copy  to  the  Chief  of  Staff,  and  one  copy  to  the  Operations 
Officer. ) 

(q)  When  necessary  to  make  a  signal  to  change  course  or  speed  to  avoid  a  vessel 
or  unit  having  the  right  of  way,  make  such  changes  great  enough,  and  execute 
the  signal  soon  enough  to  leave  no  doubt  in  the  minds  of  the  other  officers  of  the 
deck  as  to  your  intentions.  Avoid  crossing  ahead  of  vessels  or  units  having  the 
right  of  way. 

(r)   When  fog  closes  in  : 

(1)  Order  bridge  radios  manned  if  not  already  in  effect. 

(2)  Order  fog  buoys  streamed. 

(3)  Order  fog  searchlights  manned. 

(4)  Comply  with  Fleet  Communication  letter — 2RLr-41  summarized  briefly 

as  follows : 

(a)  Take  soundings  at  short  intervals  to  ensure  safety  of  the  forma- 

tion. 

(b)  Designate  a   ship   to:   At  least  half-hourly  or  oftener;  obtain 

bearings  froip  shore  radio  direction  finder  stations,  and  radio 
bearings  of  ships  in  company. 

(c)  Plot  all  bearings  and  soundings  on  a  chart.     This  ensures  safety. 

(d)  Establish  a  transmitting  and  receiving  watch,   (on  distress  fre- 

quency). 

(e)  Provided  Radio,  restrictions  so  permit  broadcast  in  plain  language 

followed  by  International  Code :  visibility  conditions,  names  of 
ships  in  compai^y,  position,  and  time  of  origin  OCT.  If  other 
ships  reply  to  this  safety  transmission  shift  to  422  kcs.  and  ex- 
change information. 

227.  The  night  order  book  is  written  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  for  guidance 
of  officers  having  night  watches.  Each  officer  having  a  night  watch  shall  initial 
the  book  after  reading  the  orders,  and  before  relieving  the  watch.  The  night 
order  book  is  prepared  by  the  Fleet  Navigator  (12) . 

228.  Nothing  herein  is  intended  to  contravene  existing  regulations  or  to  pre- 
clude taking  such  additional  precautions  as  may  seem  desirable. 


818       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Section  III.  Battle  Stations 

300.  The  Ctombat  Organization  of  the  Staff  is  covered  in  a  separate  confidential 
issue  of  this  section.     It  is  distributed  to  the  flagship  and  flag  personnel  only.     . 

Section  IV.  Flag  Office  Peesonnel  and  General  Instructions 

401.  The  authorized  Flag  Allowance  of  yeomen  is : 

Chief  Yeoman 3 

Yeoman  1st  class , 4 

Yeoman  2nd  class 5 

Yeoman  3rd  class : 6 

Total 18 

Yeoman  on  board  are  assigned  in  general  as  follows: 
1  Yeoman — In  general  charge. 
1  Yeoman — ^Admiral,  Chief  of  Staff  and  Flag  Lieutenant. 

1  Yeoman — Flag  Secretary  and  Division  Officer. 

3  Yeomen — Operations  and  Assistant  Operations  Officers. 

2  Yeomen — War  Plans  Officers. 

2  Yeomen — Communication,  Radio,  and  Comm.  Security  Officers. 

1  Yeoman — Intelligence  Officer. 

1  Yeoman — Aviation  Officer. 

1  Yeoman — Gunnery  Officer. 

1  Yeoman — Engineer  and  Maintenance  Officer. 

1  Yeoman — Aerological  Officer. 

1  Yeoman — Files  and  Correspondence  Classification. 

1  Yeoman — Outgoing  Mail  Desk. 

1  Yeoman — Communication  Office. 
These  assignments  will  be  augmented  by  yeoman  strikers.     Yeoman 
strikers  will  also  be  assigned  to  other  Flag  Office  details,  such  as  incoming 
mail,  File  Section,  Tracer  desk,  etc. 

402.  Assignment  of  yeomen  will  necessarily  depend  largely  on  their  individual 
aptitude  for  certain  duties,  and  their  availability.  One  Pharmacist's  Mate 
is  included  in  the  Flag  Allowance  and  is  assigned  to  the  Fleet  Medical  Officer. 
One  Marine  Sergeant  Major  is  assigned  to  the  Marine  Officer. 

403.  Whenever  an  officer  finds  that  he  requires  additional  clerical  assistance, 
he  will  apply  to  the  Flag  Secretary.  Additional  clerical  assistance  can  in  this 
way  be  secured  with  a  minimum  of  delay  and  without  interfering  with  the 
routine  of  the  office. 

404.  The  Chief  Yeoman  in  charge  has  general  supervision  of  the  Flag  Office 
and  personnel  under  the  Flag  Secretary,  who  is  in  direct  charge  of  the  offices 
of  the  Commander-in-Chief.  The  Chief  Yeoman  in  Charge  is  responsible  for 
the  cleanliness  of  the  offices  and  storerooms,  for  the  carrying  out  of  the  office 
instructions,  for  the  conduct  and  proper  performance  of  duty  by  the  enlisted 
personnel  and  for  regulating  watch  lists,  liberty  and  leave  in  accordance  with 
existing  instructions  and  orders.  He  will  supervise  the  drawing  of  office  sup- 
plies against  the  flag  allotment,  issuing  of  stationery,  etc.,  and  exercise  care 
that  expenditures  are  kept  within  requirements. 

405.  Routine  Duty,  (a)  Routine  hours  of  duty  in  flag  offices  and  print  shop 
are  as  follows : 

Daily 0800  to  1600 

Half  Holidays 0800  to  1130 

(b)  Handling  of  work  outside  regular  office  hours.  Routine  work  outside 
of  regular  office  hours  will  be  handled  by  the  yeoman  of  the  officer  desiring 
such  work  done,  when  that  yeoman  is  on  board,  otherwise  by  the  duty  section. 
There  is  always  a  duty  printer  on  board  who  sleeps  in  the  print  shop. 

(c)  No  uncompleted  work  shall  be  stowed  away  in  office  desk  drawers,  but 
shall  be  kept  above  the  desks  in  labeled  baskets  or  envelopes,  and  available 
to  the  staff  officers  concerned,  or  to  the  duty  section,  if  required. 

406.  Eamdling  of  mail  upon  arrival  in  port.  The  taking  up  and  distribution 
of  mail  upon  arrival  in  port  will,  without  exception,  be  an  "all  hands"  job. 
All  yeomen  will  prepare  routing  sheets  and  assist  in  clearing  up  all  mail  re- 
ceived. No  liberty  will  be  granted  on  arrival  in  port  until  such  mail  has  been 
received,  routed  and  distributed  to  the  cabinets  of  the  officers  concerned. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  819 

407.  Liberty  and  Lewve.  (a)  Liberty  and  leave  for  the  flag  ofl3ce  personnel 
will  be  regulated  to  conform,  as  closely  as  work  will  permit,  to  that  of  the 
flagship.  Subject  to  the  approval  of  the  officers  for  whom  the  yeomen  work, 
after  routine  working  hours,  or  Saturdays  after  1130,  Wednesday  afternoons, 
Sundays  and  holidays,  will  be  considered  routine  liberty  periods.  Liberty  cards 
are  issued  under  the  supervision  of  the  Division  Officer  for  all  flag  personnel. 

(b)  All  requests  for  other  than  regular  liberty  shall  first  be  referred  to  the 
officer  for  whom  the  yeoman  works,  the  Flag  Division  Officer  and  to  the  Chief 
Yeoman  in  Charge  for  designation  of  relief  if  required,  then  to  the  Flag  Secre- 
tary for  approval  or  disapproval.  If  the  request  is  one  for  leave  and  is  approved 
by  the  Flag  Secretary  as  Head  of  Department,  it  will  then  be  sent  to  the  Execu- 
tive Officer  for  issuance  of  formal  leave  papers. 

40S.  Cleanliness  of  Offices,  (a)  The  cleanliness  of  flag  offices  and  storerooms 
will  be  under  the  supervision  of  the  Chief  Yeoman  in  Charge.  Each  yeoman 
will  be  required  to  keep  his  own  desk  neat  and  clean,  as  well  as  the  desk 
of  the  officer  for  whom  he  works.  Offices  will  be  cleaned  daily,  prior  to  0800, 
and  a  field  day  shall  be  held  between  1200  and  1300  each  Friday. 

(b)  Flag  offices,  shops,  storerooms  and  other  spaces  will  be  included  in  the 
commanding  officer's  inspection  of  adjacent  ship  spaces.  Personnel  in  charge 
of  offices,  shops,  storerooms  and  other  flag  spaces  shall  have  their  spaces  open 
and  ready  and  shall  stand  by  for  inspection  at  the  times  designated  in  the  daily 
schedule  issued  by  the  flagship.  Yeomen  shall  have  the  drawers  of  their  desks 
neatly  stowed  and  ready  for  removal  should  they  be  directed  to  do  so  by  the 
inspecting  officers. 

409.  FlG}g  Office  Duty  Section,  (a)  The  Flag  Office  personnel  will  be  divided 
into  duty  sections  of  not  less  than  three  men,  one  of  whom  shall  be  a  com- 
petent stenographer.  Duty  changes  at  0900  daily,  Sundays  excepted.  The  Duty 
Section  will  function  in  the  Flag  Office  during  the  following  hours: 

Daily 0730  to  0815 

1130  to  1300 

1600  to  2200 
Half  Holidays 0730  to  0815 

1130  to  2200 
Whole  Holidays 0730  to  2200 

(b)  The  duty  section  will  handle  all  emergency  work  outside  of  regular  work- 
ing hours  and  if  the  Outgoing  Mail  Yeoman  is  not  on  board,  will  mail  all  signed 
outgoing  correspondence.  The  entire  duty  section  will  remain  in  the  flag  offices 
during  the  hours  specified  in  subparagraph  (a)  except: 

(1)  Only  one  rated  man  need  remain  in  the  flag  office  during  mealtimes. 

(2)  When  the  press  of  work  permits  and  when  in  the  discretion  of  the  senior 
duty  yeoman  their  services  are  not  immediately  required,  members  of  the  duty 
section  may  be  allowed  to  attend  the  evening  movies  on  deck,  subject  to  call ; 
however,  one  rated  member  of  the  duty  section  shall  remain  in  the  flag  office 
during  the  authorized  absence  of  the  rest  to  attend  the  movies.  From  time 
to  time,  if  the  Staff  Duty  Officer  grants  permission  to  do  so,  the  offices  may  be 
locked  and  keys  turned  over  to  him,  during  movies,  smokers,  etc. 

(3)  When  the  Flag  is  based  temporarily  ashore,  the  Duty  Section  will  maintain 
a  continuous  one-man  security  watch  in  the  Flag  Office  during  the  following 
hours : 

Daily 1600  to  0800 

Half-holidays 1200  to  0800 

Holidays 0800  to  08GO 

This  watch  will  be  armed,  the  primary  duty  of  which  is  to  prevent 
unauthorized  persons  from  entering  the  Fleet  War  Plans  Offices  and  all 
other  Flag  Offices  of  the  Commander-in-Chief.  This  Security  Watch  will 
normally  be  sufficient  to  remain  in  the  Flag  Office  after  working  hours. 
The  entire  Duty  Section  is  available  for  call  by  the  Staff  Duty  Officer  at 
any  time. 

(c)  Handling  of  mail  and  correspondence.  Before  going  on  liberty  the  incom- 
ing and  outgoing  mail  yeomen  will  inform  the  senior  duty  yeoman  of  any  special 
instructions,  who  in  turn  will  inform  his  section.  Special  instructions  may  be : — 
To  watch  for  special  correspondence  exi)ected  in  the  incoming  mail — to  see  that 
certain  U.  S.  or  guard  mail  is  dispatched.  File  numbers  will  not  be  entered  on 
incoming  mail  by  the  duty  section  unless  the  correspondence  is  of  an  urgent 

79716 — 46 — ^Ex.  149,  vol.  2 11 


820       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

nature,  in  which  case  a  file  number  will  be  entered  on  the  routing  sheet  and 
file  yeoman  notified  when  he  returns  from  liberty.  Incoming  correspondence 
shall  be  made  ready  for  the  examination  of  the  Staff  Duty  Ofiicer  with  minimum 
delay  and  report  shall  be  made  to  him  that  it  is  ready  for  his  examination.  On 
hoard  ship,  immediately  after  the  end  of  working  hours,  the  duty  section  shall 
gather  up  all  confidential  and  other  important  correspondence  from  the  Staff 
Officers'  rooms  and  retain  such  correspondence  in  the  Flag  Ofiice  overnight,  dis- 
tributing it  immediately  after  08(00  the  following  working  day.  In  offices  ashore, 
immediately  after  the  end  of  working  hours,  the  duty  section  shall  gather  up  all 
confidential  correspondence  from  the  desks  of  the  Staff  officers  and  deposit  it  in 
the  locked  cabinet  provided  for  this  purpose.  Just  prior  to  0800  the  next  working 
day,  the  correspondence  shall  be  returned  to  the  respective  officers'  desks. 

(d)  Security  of  Flag  Offices.  The  duty  section  will  stand  watch  in  the  main 
flag  office.  The  offices  will  be  secured  promptly  at  2200  and  keys  turned  over  to 
the  Flag  Secretary,  if  on  board,  otherwise  to  the  Staff  Duty  Officer.  If,  for  any 
urgent  reason,  it  is  desired  to  keep  offices  open  after  220O,  permission  should  be 
requested  from  the  Staff  Duty  Ofiicer.  Flag  offices  shall  never  be  left  unguarded. 
Outside  regular  working  hours  a  constant  check  should  be  kept  on  the  Staff 
offices,  operations  office,  and  file  room  to  see  that  it  is  either  occupied  by  staff 
personnel,  or  looked.  If  it  is  necessary  for  everyone  to  leave  flag  offices  on  duty, 
the  last  person  to  leave  will  lock  offices  and  take  keys  with  him,  posting  a  note 
on  main  flag  office  door  as  to  who  has  keys.  Offices  should  be  reopened  as  soon  as 
possible. 

(e)  Visitors  to  flag  offices.  No  general  visitors  will  be  permitted.  Other  than 
flag  personnel  admitted  by  senior  duty  yeoman,  only  officers  and  men  on  duty,  or- 
persons  accompanied  by  staff  duty  officer,  will  be  permitted  in  the  flag  offices  out- 
side of  working  hours. 

(f)  Waste  paper  baskets  in  Cabins  and  Staterooms.  Waste  paper  baskets  in 
Admiral's  Cabin,  Chief  of  Staff''s  Cabin  and  Staff  officers'  staterooms  will  be 
emptied  and  the  contents  burned,  or  stowed  in  flag  office  pending  burning,  at  the 
following  times : 

Regular  working  days 1500 

Half  and  Whole  Holidays 1115 

410.  Security  of  Classified  Matter.  All  personnel  of  the  staff  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief whose  duties  require  handling  of  classified  matter,  shall  acquaint 
themselves  with  the  Navy  Regulations  and  other  instructions  pertaining  to  the 
security  of  classified  matter. 

(a)  Offices,  Print  Shop,  Mnltilith  Shop,  Flag  Plot  Officers'  Staterooms.  Flag 
personnel  are  responsible  that  classified  matter  under  staff  routing,  or  in  spaces 
in  which  flag  activities  are  paramount,  is  constantly  attended.  Attended,  as 
employed  herein,  signifies  that  the  matter  is  receiving  care  while  being  used,  or 
that  it  is  under  surveillance  with  respect  to  possible  pilferage  or  perusal  by  un- 
authorized persons,  or  that  it  is  under  lock. 

(b)  Trash  and  waste.  Will  be  removed  from  flag  activities  and  burned  at 
times  specified  in  subparagraph  409  (f).  Should  the  incinerator  be  secured,  or 
out  of  commission,  such  rubbish  will  be  returned  to  flag  oflices,  flag  plot,  print  or 
multilith  shops  for  retention  awaiting  suitable  opportunity  for  its  burning.  The 
Senior  Duty  Yeoman  will  personally  supervise  collection  and  burning  as  set  out 
in  409  (f ).  However,  during  routine  hours  of  duty  (see  Article  405),  this  may  be 
done  by  a  rated  yeoman  designated  by  the  Chief  Yeoman  in  Charge. 

(c)  Keys.  The  key  to  the  flag  storerooms,  the  keys  to  the  flag  offices  and 
mimeograph  shop,  and  duplicate  keys  to  the  print  shop  and  multilith  shop  are 
in  the  custody  of  the  Flag  Secretary.  The  Chief  Printer  and  the  Duty  Printer 
will  each  retain  a  key  to  the  print  shop,  and  the  Multilith  Printer  will  retain  a 
key  to  the  multilith  shop.  Keys  to  the  Flag  Office  files  will  be  in  the  custody 
of  the  Flag  Secretary,  Gunnery  Yeoman,  File  Yeoman,  or  Duty  Yeoman.  At  the 
end  of  working  hours,  whenever  classified  matter  is  being  produced  in  the  print 
shop  or  multilith  shop,  the  keys  to  the  print  shop  galley  racks  and  stowage 
locker  will  be  placed  in  the  main  flag  office  key  locker.  During  office  hours  the 
key  to  the  flag  offices  will  be  in  the  main  flag  office.  When  offices  are  secured 
for  the  night,  the  keys  to  confidential  files  will  be  placed  in  the  main  flag  ofiice 
key  locker  and  the  keys  to  the  flag  offices  turned  over  to  the  Flag  Secretary,  if  on 
board,  otherwise  to  the  Staff  Duty  Officer.  Except  as  herein  specified,  personnel 
are  forbidden  to  have  duplicate  keys  to  flag  offices  and  print  shop  spaces  in  their 
possession. 

(d)  Files,  Lockers,  Storerooms.    Access  to  the  flag  storeroom  by  other  than 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  821 

regularly  authorized  personnel  may  be  had  upon  application  to  the  Flag  Secre- 
tary. In  all  cases  when  a  confidential  file  jacket  is  to  be  removed  from  the  flag 
offices,  a  receipt  will  be  required  from  the  recipient. 

(e)  Nonconfidential  file  jackets  should  be  obtained  from  the  File  Yeoman  or 
in  his  absence  from  the  duty  yeoman.  If  the  file  jacket  is  to  be  removed  from 
the  flag  office,  a  receipt  will  be  signed  by  the  recipient. 

(f )  Classified  matter  may  be  removed  from  the  Print  Shop  only  at  the  instance 
of  the  officer  for  whom  the  work  is  being  done,  or  an  officer  of  the  Staff.  Classi- 
fied matter  will  not  be  allowed  to  remain  in  the  multilith  shop  overnight,  but 
will  be  stowed  under  lock  in  the  print  shop  stowage  locker. 

Section  V.  Handling  of  Coebespondence 

501.  (a)  Incoming  Mail,  is  delivered  to  the  Incoming  Mail  Desk. 

(b)  Upon  receipt  of  Registered  U.  S.  Mail  in  the  Main  Flag  Office,  it  shall  be 
taken  immediately  to  the  Secret  Mail  Officer  or  the  Chief  Yeoman  designated  as 
Secret  Mail  Yeoman.  In  their  absence  the  mail  shall  be  taken  to  the  Duty  Com- 
munication Watch  Officer  who  shall  open  it  and  extract  the  envelopes  marked 
"SECRET".  A  receipt  for  the  envelopes  so  retained  shall,  in  all  cases,  be  ob- 
tained on  the  "Incoming  Registered  Guard  Mail  Log".  The  envelopes  marked 
"CONFIDENTIAL"  .shall  be  returned  to  the  Flag  Duty  Yeoman.  All  "SECRET" 
mail  received  by  the  C.  W.  O.  shall  be  logged  in  the  book  provided  for  that  purpose, 
and  then  taken  to  the  Staff  Duty  Officer  who  shall  open  it  in  order  to  determine 
its  urgency.  If  the  Staff  Duty  Officer  retains  any  of  the  Secret  Mail  his  receipt 
therefor  shall  be  obtained.  All  Secret  Mail  shall  be  delivered  to  the  Secret  Mail 
Officer  at  the  first  opportunity. 

(c)  Incoming  personal  mail  for  the  Commander-in-Chief  will  be  delivered  to 
his  orderly  and  placed  on  his  desk.  If  Admiral  is  not  on  board,  it  will  be  placed 
in  the  routing  cabinet  in  the  Flag  Office  and  will  be  delivered  upon  the  Admiral's 
return  to  the  ship. 

(d)  Incoming  personal  mail  for  other  staff  officers  will  be  delivered  by  a  Flag 
Office  messenger  immediately  upon  its  receipt  in  the  Flag  Office.  In  the  absence 
of  any  Staff  Officer  his  personal  mail  will  be  placed  in  the  routing  cabinet  in  the 
Flag  Office  and  delivered  to  him  upon  his  return  to  the  ship. 

502.  Urgent  Correspondence.  When  URGENT  correspondence  is  received  on 
board,  routing  sheets  shall  be  prepared  immediately,  an  URGENT  tag  securely 
attached  to  and  visible  on  the  routing  sheet,  and  correspondence  delivered  by 
hand  to  the  Flag  Secretary,  or  in  his  absence,  to  the  Staff  Duty  Officer.  Such 
correspondence  shall  be  shown  to  Action  Officer  and  a  copy  delivered  to  him  if 
desired,  prior  to  routing  to  other  officers.  If  a  copy  is  delivered  to  Action  Officer, 
a  notation  of  this  fact  will  be  made  on  routing  sheet.  If  file  yeomen  are  not  on 
duty  or  in  the  office  when  URGENT  mail  is  received,  such  mail  shall  be  assigned 
a  file  number  by  the  Duty  Yeoman  and  handled  as  indicated  above.  No  corre- 
spondence, or  other  papers,  shall  be  kept  visible  as  the  top  paper  on  the  corre- 
spondence. If  correspondence  or  other  papers  are  of  an  urgent  nature  and  no 
URGENT  tag  accompanies  it,  the  officer  concerned  shall  indicate  to  this  yeoman 
that  the  matter  is  urgent  and  the  latter  shall  then  attach  an  URGENT  tag. 

503.  Routine  Correspondence. 

(a)  Incoming  Mail  Yeoman.  Opens  all  incoming  mail  immediately  upon  its 
receipt,  except  U.  S.  registered  mail,  which  is  handled  in  accordance  with  sub- 
paragraph 501  (b),  above.  (See  Section  VI  for  method  of  handling  registered 
U.  S.  mail  by  receiving  officers.) 

Logs  the  envelope  number  and  descriptive  data  of  all  correspondence  received 
via  registered  guard  mail  and  U.  S.  Mail. 

Carefully  checks  all  incoming  mail  to  insure  that  it  is  complete  and  the  listed 
enclosures  are  attached,  or  in  case  enclosures  have  been  forwarded  under  sepa- 
rate cover  keeps  a  memorandum  check-off  record  of  such  enclosures  so  that  they 
can  be  readily  identified  and  properly  distributed  upon  receipt. 

I'asses  correspondence  to  File  Yeoman  and  then,  after  File  Yeoman  has  assigned 
office  file  numbers,  prepares  routing  slips  for  all  matter  received  except  certain 
routine  reports  designated  by  the  Flag  Secretary,  and  MAILGRAMS.  MAIL- 
GJRAMS  received  by  registered  mail  are  logged  and  then  sent  to  the  Flag  Com- 
munication office  without  being  taken  up  on  routing  slips. 

After  routing  slips  have  been  typed,  detaches  memorandum  routing  slip  and 
delivers  mail  to  Chief  Mail  Yeoman  in  Charge.  From  data  shown  on  the  retained 
memorandum  routing  slips,  maintains  the  Incoming  Mail  Log  in  loose-leaf  form. 


822       CONGRESSIOISI AL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

This  log  shall  be  a  permanent  record  of  all  correspondence  received  and  will 
show: 

Date  of  receipt. 

OflBce  of  origin. 

File  and  serial  number  of  office  of  origin. 

Date  of  correspondence. 

Subject. 

Cincus  file  number  of  jacket  in  which  permanently  filed. 

Serial  number  of  routing  slip  on  which  correspondence  has  been  taken  up. 

(b)  File  Yeoman.    Assigns  file  numbers.     (See  Article  505.) 

(c)  Chief  Yeoman  in  Charge.     Routes  correspondence. 

(d)  Flag  Secretary.  Confirms  routing  of  correspondence,  or  changes  routing 
where  required. 

(e)  Tracer  Yeoman.  Removes  routed  correspondence  from  the  outgoing  bas- 
ket of  the  Flag  Secretary,  detaches  duplicate  routing  sheet,  stamps  date  of 
delivery  to  first  ofiicer  indicated  in  order  of  routing  and  delivers  the  correspond- 
ence, (except  URGENT — see  Article  502),  through  routing  cabinet  to  officers 
concerned  in  accordance  with  the  assigned  order  of  routing. 

Files  duplicate  routing  sheet  as  a  tracer  against  outstanding  correspondence  in 
the  office. 

(f )  Yeoman  Concerned.  Takes  cognizance  of  and  removes  all  correspondence 
from  routing  boxes  of  officers  for  whom  he  works  and  delivers  to  officers  as 
directed. 

When  the  officer  for  whom  he  works  is  absent,  he  will  return  the  correspond- 
ence checked  to  that  officer  for  Information,  to  the  Tracer  Yeoman,  to  be  checked 
to  the  next  officer  in  the  order  of  routing,  and  deliver  Acti'bn  correspondence  to 
the  assigned  relief  officer. 

(g)  Officer  Concerned.  In  general,  papers  will  pass  from  one  officer  to  another 
via  Tracer  Yeoman  as  indicated  on  the  routing  sheet. 

Correspondence  requiring  action  will  be  routed  first,  if  the  Flag  Secretary 
deems  it  necessary,  to  the  Action  Officer,  the  latter  being  responsible  that  other 
interested  officers  are  consulted  before  letter  or  endorsement  is  prepared. 

Correspondence  routed  for  information  should  not  be  placed  in  the  routing 
cabinet  for  an  officer  temporarily  absent  until  it  has  been  noted  by  all  other  officers 
checked  for  information. 

Ordinarily,  when  necessary  data  is  available,  action  should  be  completed  on 
correspondence  within  forty-eight  hours  after  receipt. 

Any  officer  desiring  to  hold  correspondence,  in  order  to  compile  data,  reports, 
etc.,  should  return  the  correspondence  to  the  files  and  draw  it  from  the  files  when 
needed. 

A  list  will  be  furnished  each  officer  on  Tuesday  showing  all  correspondence 
which  the  records  of  the  Flag  Office  indicate  has  been  in  his  possession  since  the 
preceding  Tuesday.  Officers  indicated  as  being  charged  with  the  correspondence 
should  check  this  list  and  mark  in  the  column  provided  the  items  which  they 
have  in  their  possession. 

(h)  Yeoman  Concerned.  Prepares  outgoing  letter  or  endorsement  as  directed 
(See  Article  504). 

Keeps  outgoing  basket  of  officer  for  whom  he  works  empty — delivering  routed 
correspondence  on  which  action  is  required  or  taken  to  Tracer  Yeoman. 

Insures  that  officer  concerned  has  initialed  in  the  space  provided  on  the  rout- 
ing sheet  and  that  notation  is  made  when  action  is  taken  by  a  method  other 
than  a  letter  or  endorsement. 

(i)  Tracer  Yeoman.  Delivers  through  the  routing  cabinet,  correspondence 
on  which  routing  is  incomplete. 

Scrutinizes  all  correspondence  on  which  routing  is  complete  to  see  that  no 
correspondence  requiring  action  goes  to  file  and  that  officers  concerned  have 
initialed  in  the  space  provided  on  the  routing  sheet. 

The  correspondence  to  be  finally  cleared  by  the  Tracer  Yeoman  falls  into 
three  classes : 

(1)  Incoming  letters  on  which  no  action  is  required,  or  on  which  dispatch 
action  was  taken  and  so  noted  on  the  original  routing  slip. 

(2)  Incoming  letters  which  were  endorsed  or  are  the  basis  for  additional 
correspondence. 

(3)  Letters  originated  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  with  no  incoming  corre- 
Bpondence  attached. 

When  correspondence  described  by  (1)  above  has  completed  its  routing  the 
!rracer  Yeoman  will  destroy  his  duplicate  routing  slip,  initial  in  the  space  pro- 


PROCEEDINGS  OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  823 

vided  on  the  original  routing  slip  under  "Tracer,"  and  pass  this  correspondence 
to  the  File  Yeoman,  However,  if  there  is  a  cross  file,  the  duplicate  routing  slip 
shall  not  be  destroyed  but  will  be  attached  to  the  correspondence  for  filing. 

When  correspondence  described  by  (2)  above  has  completed  its  routing  the 
Tracer  Yeoman  will  destroy  his  duplicate  routing  slip  (unless  it  has  a  cross  file 
number)  initial  in  the  upper  right-hand  corner  of  the  file  copy  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief's action,  and  on  the  original  routing  slip,  and  pass  this  corre- 
spondence to  the  File  Yeoman. 

504.  Outgoing  Mail. 

(a)  General . — ^Dates  and  serial  numbers  will  be  stamped  by  the  Outgoing 
Mail  Yeoman  after  the  letter  is  actually  signed.  The  original  sheet  of  corre- 
spondence of  a  personal  nature  shall  not  bear  a  file  or  serial  number.  The 
originator's  yeoman  shall  address  envelopes  for  this  class  of  correspondence. 

The  use  of  staples  in  fastening  correspondence  should  be  limited  to  printed 
or  mimeographed  letters  of  two  or  more  pages.  Staples  shall  then  be  used  in 
the  upper  left  hand  corner. 

Letterhead  paper  shall  be  used  for  the  original  sheet  and  all  copies  of  corre- 
spondence. 

(b)  Corresiwndence  for  signature  shall  be  prepared  and  assembled  as  follows: 

(1)  Sheets  shall  be  arranged  in  numerical  order  from  bottom  to  top,  i.  e., 
page  one  on  the  bottom,  last  page  or  endorsement  on  top.  Enclosures  to  the 
entire  correspondence  shall  be  in  alphabetical  sequence,  fastened  directly  behind 
the  letter  or  endorsement  to  which  it  is  an  enclosure  and  securely  fastened  by 
brass  fasteners,  with  ends  turned  over  the  face  of  the  sheet.  When  enclosures 
are  too  bulky  to  be  attached,  then  a  separate  slip  with  notation  should  indicate 
that  the  enclosures  have  been  temporarily  retained  by  the  originator. 

(2)  In  preparing  endorsements,  reference  should  be  made  to  the  basic  corre- 
spondence as  prescribed  by  Fleet  Regulations. 

(3)  In  preparing  a  letter,  the  original  shall :  Indicate  the  distribution, 
acknowledgement  (if  desired),  signature,  and  obtain  file  number  from  file  yeo- 
man or,  in  the  case  of  a  reply,  assign  same  file  number  as  has  been  placed  on 
the  routing  sheet  of  the  incoming  letter  plus  the  originator's  symbol  number. 

Ascertain  that  there  is  a : 

(A)  Green  file  copy  (pinned  on  top  of  a  complete  copy  of  the  Incoming 
correspondence  with  the  routing  sheet  on  the  bottom. ) 

(B)  Yellow  information  copy.  The  day  following  the  mailing  of  corre- 
spondence, information  copies  shall  be  bound  and  routed  to  all  oflicers. 
After  completion  of  routing,  these  copies  shall  be  destroyed. 

(0)  Pink  Copy.  This  is  retained  by  the  tracer  yeoman  until  the  corre- 
spondence is  signed,  after  which  it  is  sent  to  the  outgoing  mail  desk  and 
subsequently  returned  to  the  originator  bearing  the  date  and  serial  number. 

(4)  The  original  and  all  copies  shall  show  in  the  upper  right-hand  corner  the 
initials  of  the  yeoman  typing  the  letter  and  the  originator's  symbol  number 
immediately  following  the  file  number. 

(5)  Correspondence  shall  be  clipped  together  with  paper  clips  in  the  following 
order:  Original  and  copies  for  information  addresses;  file  copy  (green)  ;  infor- 
mation copy  (yellow)  ;  pink  copy.  The  green  copy  shall  extend  at  least  an  inch 
to  the  right  side  of  the  correspondence  to  permit  the  initials  of  the  originator 
(indicated  by  red  diagonal  mark)  as  well  as  other  interested  officers  (indicated 
by  pencil  diagonal  mark). 

(c)  Correspondence  to  be  printed.  Four  copies  shall  be  typed,  original  on 
green  paper,  copy  on  white  bond  for  the  printer,  one  yellow  information  copy 
and  one  pink  copy.  The  word  ''PRINT"  shall  be  typed  on  the  left  side  of  the 
last  page,  opposite  the  signature,  and  immediately  over  the  word  "DISTRIBU- 
TION." When  the  green  copy  (original)  has  been  signed,  it  will  pass  through 
the  outgoing  mail  desk  to  be  numbered  and  dated,  and  for  the  preparation  of  a 
printing  order. 

(d)  Correspondence  to  he  mimeographed.  In  order  to  reduce  the  amount  of 
typing  required  for  letters  that  will  be  mimeographed,  the  yeoman  doing  the  typing 
will  insert  a  green  sheet  provided  for  this  purpose  under  the  stencil  when  cutting 
the  latter.  When  this  impression  copy  has  been  signed  by  the  Admiral  or  Chief 
of  Staff,  the  Flag  Secretary  affixes  his  authentication,  using  a  stencil  stylus, 
and  the  stencil  and  impression  copy  are  then  delivered  to  the  Outgoing  Mail 
Yeoman  for  entry  of  date  and  serial  number,  mimeographing,  (done  by  the 
Mimeograph  Yeoman),  and  ultimate  mailing.     (Article  504  (j)   (10)). 

(e)  Multiple  Address  Letters.  Multiple  address  letters  are  those  addressed 
to  more  than  one  office.    The  original  of  the  multiple  address  letter  shall  be 


824       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

made  on  green  paper,  and  one  onion  skin  copy  stiall  be  made  for  each  addressee. 
Thiese  onion  skin  copies  shall  be  checked  off  by  the  yeoman  preparing  the  corre- 
spondence, an  arrow  check  being  placed  immediately  after  the  office  addressed. 
All  action  copies  of  multiple  address  letters  shall  be  authenticated  by  the  Flag 
Secretary.  The  original  (green),  arranged  in  the  manner  prescribed  in  Art. 
504  (b)  (5),  will  be  signed  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  or  Chief  of  Staff  and  is 
kept  as  the  file  copy. 

(f )  When  a  letter  is  required  to  be  rewritten,  the  pink  copy  shall  be  removed 
from  the  file  on  the  tracer  desk  and  all  copies  of  the  letter  as  originally  pre- 
pared shall  be  immediately  destroyed  except  the  one  copy  on  which  corrections 
have  been  indicated.  This  copy  shall  be  attached  to  the  pink  copy  of  the  letter 
as  rewritten  and  will  be  returned  with  the  pink  copy  to  the  yeoman  of  the  officer 
taking  action.  With  the  exception  of  recommendations  on  a  subject  made  by 
various  staff  officers,  these  instructions  shall  also  apply  to  rough  drafts  of  let- 
ters or  endorsements.  Copies  of  letters  on  which  corrections  have  been  made 
and  rough  drafts  of  letters  or  endorsements  shall  not  be  filed  in  the  correspond- 
ence files  unless  retention  in  the  file  is  indicated. 

(g)  Letters  that  have  not  been  signed  should  be  returned  to  the  tracer  yeo- 
man in  order  that  the  latter  may  inform  the  originator  accordingly,  meanwhile 
returning  to  him  the  pink  copy. 

(h)  When  correspondence  is  signed  by  other  than  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
the  following  words  shall  be  typed  immediately  below  the  name  of  the  officer 
signing : 

Signed  by  Signatubh  Typewritten 

Chief  of  Staff  —                name 

Chief  of  Staff 

Operations  Officer  when  Chief  —                name 

of  Staff  is  absent  Acting  Chief  of  Staff 

Flag   Secretary   or   Flag   Lleur  —                name                              name 

tenant      (Authentication     of  Flag  Secretary             Flag  Lieutenant 

multiple  address  letters).  (or  Acting  Flag  Secretary) 

Flog   Secretary   or   Flag  Lieu-  — ■                name 

tenant    (for    single    address  by  direction 

letters). 

(i)  When  information  addressees  are  directed  to  take  action  by  copy  of 
letters  or  endorsements,  such  copy  shall  be  authenticated  by  the  Flag  Secretary. 

(j)  When  correspondence  is  ready  for  signature  the  following  procedure  shall 
be  followed: 

(1)  Deliver  to  Tracer  Yeoman. 

(2)  Tracer  Yeoman.  Uses  the  pink  copy  for  tracing  correspondence  circulat- 
ing through  the  staff  for  initialing.  When  correspondence  is  initialed  by  all 
officers  except  Flag  Secretary  and  Chief  of  Staff,  delivers  to  Chief  Yeoman  in 
Charge. 

(3)  Chief  Yeoman  in  Charge.  Checks  correspondence  to  see  that  it  is  com- 
plete and  in  agreement  with  regulations,  policies  and  current  instructions. 

(4)  Flag  Secretary.  Checks  correspondence  to  see  that  it  is  complete  and 
that  it  is  in  agreement  with  regulations,  policies  and  current  instructions. 

Brings  to  the  attention  of  officers  concerned  any  conflicting  or  inconsistent 
orders  or  instructions. 

Authenticates  all  multiple  address  letters,  and  copies  of  letters  or  endorse- 
ments directing  action.     Signs  single  address  letters. 

Releases  printed  and  mimeographed  letters  for  mailing. 

(5)  Tracer  Yeoman.  Removes  correspondence  from  the  outgoing  basket  of 
Flag  Secretary.  * 

Delivers  correspondence  signed  "By  direction"  to  the  Outgoing  Mail  Yeoman, 
attaching  pink. 

Places  unsigned  correspondence  in  the  Chief  of  Staff's  box  in  the  routing 
cabinet  and  indicates  by  notation  on  pink  copy  date  and  time  that  it  has  been 
placed  in  Chief  of  Staff's  box  in  the  routing  cabinet  for  signature  or  initialing. 

(6)  Chief  of  Staff's  Orderly  or  Yeoman.  Removes  correspondence  from  Chief 
of  Staff's  box  in  the  routing  cabinet,  and  delivers  to  Chief  of  Staff  for  initials 
or  signature. 

Removes  correspondence  from  outgoing  basket  of  Chief  of  Staff  and  delivers 
to  Tracer  Desk. 

(7)  Tracer  Yeoman.  When  correspondence  is  initialed  by  Chief  of  Staff, 
places  it  in  Commander-in-Chief's  box  in   the  routing   cabinet,   indicating  by 


PROCEEDINGS  OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  825 

notation  on  pink  copy  date  and  time  that  it  has  been  placed  on  Commander-in- 
Chief's  box  for  signature.  Delivers  mail  signed  by  the  Chief  of  Staff  to  the 
Outgoing  Mail  Yeoman,  attaching  pinks. 

(8)  Flag  Secretary.  Removes  correspondence  from  the  Commander-in-Chief's 
box  in  the  routing  cabinet.  Sees  that  all  correspondence  is  initialed  by  Chief 
of  Staff  and  delivers  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  for  signature. 

(9)  Tracer  Yeoman.  When  correspondence  has  been  signed  by  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief removes  pink  copies  from  tracer  file,  and  attaches  same  to  the 
letters  to  which  they  belong;  delivers  them  to  Outgoing  Mail  Yeoman. 

Makes  daily  check  on  pink  copies  vphere  letters  are  outstanding. 

(10)  Outgoing  Mail  Yeoman.  Insures  that  correspondence  is  complete;  en- 
closures, if  any,  attached;  properly  arranged  (See  Art.  504  (b) )  ;  initialed  by 
Flag  Secretary ;  signed ;  that  there  are  sufficient  copies  for  all  action  and  infor- 
mation addressees ;  that  each  copy  of  CONFIDENTIAL  correspondence  is  so 
marked ;  that  information  and  pink  copies  have  been  prepared  where  necessary. 

Returns  correspondence  which  is  found  to  be  delinquent  in  any  of  the  above 
respects  to  the  Chief  Yeoman  in  Charge  for  corrective  action. 

Stamps  serial  number  (except  on  personal  letters)  and  date  on  original  and 
all  copies ;  stamps  date  of  mailing  on  file  information  and  pink  copies,  and 
initials  file  copy. 

Provides  for  the  registry  of  all  records  of  proceedings  of  Naval  Courts  and 
Boards,  all  SECRET  and  CONFIDENTIAL  correspondence  and  other  corre- 
spondence as  directed.  Maintains  a  record  of  all  registry  numbers  and  records 
the  serial  file  number  or  other  description  of  the  correspondence  for  which  each 
register  number  is  used.     ' 

Is  responsible  for  the  correct  addressing  of  envelopes  for  all  mail  passing 
over  the  Outgoing  Mail  Desk  and  for  its  being  placed  in  the  mail  properly 
protected  to  insure  its  delivery  free  from  damage  by  normal  handling.  In 
connection  with  the  former,  he  shall  keep  himself  informed  of  the  location  and 
prospective  movements  of  all  ships  and  transfers  of  all  Flags. 

Requests  instructions  from  Flag  Secretary  regarding  mailing  of  multiple 
addressed  letters,  operation  orders,  plans,  etc.,  to  Commanders  who  are  absent 
when  several  of  the  vessels  under  their  command  are  present  with  the 
Commander-in-Chief. 

Under  the  direction  of  Flag  Secretary  determines  the  distribtuion  and  number 
of  copies  necessary  to  be  printed  or  mimeographed  using  "U.  S.  Fleet  Mail 
Distribution  Lists"  or  such  other  distribution  as  may  be  assigned.  Prepares 
Distribution  Memorandum  on  Printing  Orders. 

Prepares  Printing  Order  and  forwards  with  White  copy  of  the  letter  to  be 
printed  to  print  shop.  The  print  shop  shall  send  the  Printing  Order  with  each 
proof  to  the  yeoman  designated  to  proof-read  it.  This  yeoman  shall  initial  in 
the  space  provided  for  each  proof  and  when  correct  in  all  respects  and  con- 
sidered ready  for  printing  the  yeoman  shall  refer  the  final  proof  and  the 
printing  order  to  the  originating  ofiicer,  who  shall,  if  he  approves  for  printing, 
initial  on  the  Printing  Order  in  the  space  "Read  and  found  correct".  The  Flag 
Secretary  will  release  all  letters  for  printing  and  distribution.  The  green  (file 
copy)  is  held  by  the  Outgoing  Mail  Yeoman  until  the  letter  is  printed  and 
mailed,  when  it  is  given  to  the  Tracer  Yeoman  for  necessary  action.  Yellow 
and  pink  copies,  are  handled  in  the  same  manner  as  for  other  outgoing  corre- 
spondence. The  date  sent  to  the  print  shop,  instead  of  the  date  of  mailing 
will  appear  on  the  file  copy.  When  distribution  is  made  and  entered  in  the 
outgoing  mail  log,  a  printed  copy  with  original  "Printing  Order"  securely 
attached  thereto,  shall  be  sent  to  file. 

Note  :  The  Mimeograph  Yeoman  will  mimeograph  the  required  number  of 
copies  shown  on  the  Distribution  Memorandum. 

A  copy  of  each  mimeographed  letter  originating  in  the  office  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief will  be  marked  "INFORMATION  COPY",  and  will  be  handled 
in  the  same  manner  as  other  "Information"  copies. 

When  the  Distribution  Memorandum  is  released  for  mailing  by  the  Flag  Secre- 
tary, the  Outgoing  Mail  Yeoman  mails  the  printed  or  mimeographed  letter  and 
furnishes  the  Tracer  Yeoman  with  the  necessary  copies  for  a  Staff  Distribution ; 
stamps  date  of  mailing  and  initials  on  the  Distribution  Memorandum ;  sends  file 
copy  to  the  Tracer  Yeoman  with  the  Distribution  Memorandum  securely  attached 
thereto. 

Assigns  and  maintains  a  record  of  serial  numbers,  in  their  proper  numerical 
sequence,  of  Operation  Plans,  Operation  Orders,  U.  S.  and  Pacific  Fleet  Letters, 
Memoranda,  Notices,  etc. 


826       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Insures  that  when  required,  URGENT  tags  are  securely  attached  to  the  cor- 
respondence, and  to  the  outside  envelope.     (See  Article  502). 

Removes  any  SPECIAL  NOTICE  tags  before  mailing. 

Handles  all  guard  mail,  incoming  and  outgoing,  and  will  promptly  inform  Flag 
Secretary  of  any  variation  from  the  scheduled  trips  called  for  by  Fleet  Regula- 
tions. Logs  registered  number,  originator  and  addressee  of  all  incoming  regis- 
tered guard  mail.  Delivers  incoming  mail  to  Incoming  mail  Yeoman,  and  has 
outgoing  mail  ready  for  Guard  Mail  Petty  Officers  at  the  designated  times.  When 
the  ship  is  at  the  Navy  Yard,  is  responsible  that  necessary  guard  mail  trips  are 
made  to  the  Commandant's  Office. 

lAt  the  end  of  each  day,  checks  numerical  sequence  and  enters  in  the  outgoing 
mail  log,  loose  leaf  form,  all  correspondence  mailed  that  day.  This  log  shall  be  a 
permanent  record  of  correspondence  mailed  and  will  show: 

(1)  Serial  number  of  letter. 

( 2 )  Cincpac  file  number  of  jacket  in  which  filed. 

(3)  To  whom  sent. 

(4)  Date  of  letter, 

(5)  Subject. 

The  above  data  shall  also  be  entered  for  all  mimeographed  and  printed  letters 
dated  and  serialled  that  day,  even  though  they  are  not  mailed  on  that  day.    A  note 

"Mailed  on "  shall  be  made  in  "Subject"  column  of  log  and  the  date  of 

mailing  inserted  on  the  date  the  mimeographed  or  printed  letter  is  mailed. 

Confidential  and  Secret  correspondence  will  be  so  designated  in  the  log  and, 
in  the  case  of  secret  correspondence,  the  subject  will  not  be  entered. 

When  correspondence  has  been  entered  in  the  log,  gives  file  copies  to  Tracer 
Yeoman,  pink  copies  to  the  yeoman  of  the  officer  taking  action  as  indicated  by  the 
officer's  number  (not  the  initials  of  the  yeoman) . 

Arranges  yellow  information  copies  in  numerical  sequence  and  prepares  routing 
sheets  next  morning  and  delivers  to  Chief  Yeoman  in  Charge. 

(11)  Tracer  Yeoman.  Takes  appropriate  action  being  governed  by  the  pre- 
ceding provisions  of  this  Article. 

(12)  File  Yeoman.     Handles  correspondence  as  directed  in  Article  506-1. 

505.  FILE  NUMBERS.  The  file  yeoman  will  assign  file  numbers  to  all  cor- 
respondence. If  the  File  Yeoman  is  not  on  duty  or  in  the  office  when  URGENT 
mail  is  received,  such  mail  shall  be  handled  as  directed  in  Article  502.  In  assign- 
ing file  numbers  to  correspondence,  the  File  Yeoman  shall  use  the  U.  S.  Navy  Filing 
Manual  as  the  basis  for  filing  arrangement.  Correct  file  numbers  are  essential 
in  order  to  locate  correspondence  readily.  A  new  jacket  shall  be  prepared  for 
each  new  number  so  assigned. 

506.  In  addition  to  the  standard  file  numbers  assigned  to  outgoing  correspond- 
ence, the  originator's  symbol  number  and  a  serial  number  wiU  be  used.  The 
originator's  symbol  number  shall  be  placed  after  the  file  number  and  enclosed 
in  parenthesis.  The  serial  number  will  appear  after  the  word  "Serial"  and  will 
not  be  in  parenthesis.  New  serial  numbers  will  be  started  on  each  January  1st, 
and  will  run  throughout  the  calendar  year.  The  first  figure  of  all  CONFI- 
DENTIAL serial  numbers  shall  be  a  "0". 

506-1.  The  File  Yeoman  shall: 

Scrutinize  correspondence  to  see  that  none  goes  to  file  unless  complete  action 
has  been  taken;  that  routing  sheet  has  been  initialed  by  all  officers  and  the 
Tracer  Yeoman  and  that  original  routing  sheet  is  attached  to  correspondence. 

Prepare  correspondence  for  file,  retain  spare  copies  in  the  spare  copy  file 
when  action  is  so  indicated  on  routing  sheet. 

File  correspondence.  CONFIDENTIAL  correspondence  must  actually  be 
placed  in  the  jackets  by  the  File  Yeoman  himself.  He  may  utilize  his  assistants 
for  filing  correspondence  of  a  lower  classification. 

Check  off,  in  colored  pencil,  all  entries  in  the  incoming  and  outgoing  mail 
logs  to  see  that  all  mail  received  and  originated  has  been  checked  to  file.  Undue 
delays  shall  be  reported  after  check  has  been  made  with  the  Tracer  Yeoman. 

Keep  an  up-to-date  Index  of  the  files. 

Cooperate  with  the  Tracer  Yeoman  in  preparing  the  Weekly  List  of  Outstanding 
Correspondence. 

507.  Where  correspondence  treats  of  more  than  one  subject,  it  shall  be  filed 
under  the  principal  subject,  and  cross-index  tracers  prepared  and  filed  under 
the  other  subjects  treated  or  referred  to.  Cross-index  tracers  shall  be  printed 
on  white  paper. 

508.  Yeomen  preparing  correspondence  shall  type  the  file  number  appearing 
on  the  routing  sheet,  the  symbol  number  of  the  originator  in  parenthesis  and 


PROCEEDINGS  OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  827 

the  word  "Serial"  below  the  file  number  after  which  the  serial  number  will  be 
entered  by  the  Outgoing  Mail  Yeoman. 

509.  FILING  OF  PRINTED  MATTER.  Fleet  Letters,  Memoranda,  Notices, 
etc.,  must  be  kept  in  an  unbroken  serial  titled  "file  for  ready  reference"  in  addi- 
tion to  being  placed  in  the  subject  file  jacket.  Care  must  be  taken  to  make  cross- 
index  files  complete  and  to  make  sure  that  signed  copy  is  filed. 

None  of  the  above  matter  will  be  removed  from  the  files  merely  because  it  has 
been  cancelled  or  superseded,  but  a  notation  to  this  effect  shall  be  made  on  the 
file  copy  showing  reference  numbers  of  the  dispatch  or  letter  cancelling  and 
superseding  it.  Extra  copies  held  for  issue  will,  however  be  destroyed.  When- 
ever the  number  of  spare  copies  of  a  particular  publication  is  low,  or  a  request 
for  spare  copies  is  large,  the  requests  will  be  referred  to  the  Flag  Secretary. 
Normally  requests  from  ships  should  be  handled  by  Type  commanders. 

510.  WEEKLY  CHECK  OF  OUTSTANDING  CORRESPONDENCE.  On  Tues- 
days of  each  week  a  sight  check  will  be  made  by  the  Tracer  Yeoman  of  all 
outstanding  correspondence  that  records  indicate  has  been  in  the  possession  of  an 
oflScer  since  the  preceding  Tuesday,  and  a  list  prepared  for  each  such  oflicer 
showing  correspondence  thus  outstanding.  The  duplicate  routing  sheet  will  be 
used  as  a  "tickler"  tracer  for  checking  outstanding  letters  in  the  office.  A  nota- 
tion will  be  made  on  the  outstanding  correspondence  sheet  showing  the  date 
the  check  was  made  and  the  officer  who  acknowledges  having  each  piece  of 
correspondence  in  his  possession  on  that  date. 

511.  If,  after  making  a  thorough  canvass  of  the  offices,  no  trace  can  be  found 
of  a  letter  that  has  not  moved  in  its  routing  from  one  officer  to  another  within 
the  past  week,  the  outstanding  correspondence  sheet  will  be  delivered  to  the 
Flag  Secretary  with  a  report  of  the  search. 

512.  Lists  of  outstanding  correspondence  checked  to  the  Admiral  and  Chief  of 
Staff  will  be  delivered  to  the  Flag  Secretary, 

Seotion  VI. — Confidential  and  Seobet  Coreespondence 

601.  Confidential  mail  shall  be  handled  in  accordance  with  Article  410  and  the 
following : 

( a )  All  correspondence  classified  as  CONFIDENTIAL  wUl  have  the  word  "CON- 
FIDENTIAL" stamped  and  typed,  or  printed  in  the  upper  left-hand  corner,  under 
file  number,  of  each  sheet. 

(b)  All  routing  sheets  for  confidential  correspondence  shall  be  printed  on  blue 
paper  and  are  plainly  marked  "CONFIDENTIAL". 

(c)  All  confidential  correspondence  will  be  filed  in  separate  filing  cases  known 
as  "the  CONFIDENTIAL  files". 

(d)  All  confidential  correspondence  placed  in  U.  S.  or  Guard  Mail  will  be  placed 
in  double  envelopes  with  the  inner  envelope  stamped  "CONFIDENTIAL".  Con- 
fidential correspondence  forwarded  by  U.  S.  Mail  or  Guard  Mail  must  be  registered. 

602.  SECRET  correspondence  shall  be  handled  in  accordance  with  the  following 
instructions : 

(a)  Stoicage  and  Handling.  (1)  SECRET  correspondence  files  shall  be  kept 
in  a  safe  under  the  immediate  supervision  of  the  Secret  Mail  Officer ;  except  corre- 
spondence regarding  War  Plans  which  may  be  retained  by  the  War  Plans  Officer, 
and  that  concerning  Communication  Intelligence  which  may  be  retained  by  the 
Fleet  Security  Officer. 

(2)  The  yeomen  assigned  to  the  War  Plans  Officer  and  the  Secret  Mail  Yeoman 
are  authorized  to  handle  secret  correspondence.  Secret  correspondence  shall  not 
be  typed  or  handled  by  any  enlisted  personnel  other  than  the  yeoman  who  have 
been  so  authorized.  Secret  correspondence  must  not  be  permitted  to  pass  out  of 
the  personal  custody  of  staff  officers  at  any  time. 

(b)  Incoming  Mail.  (1)  The  Secret  Mail  Officer,  or  in  his  absence,  his  au- 
thorized relief,  the  duty  communication  officer,  will  receive  all  incoming  Officer 
Messenger  Mail,  and  show  same  to  the  Flag  Secretary  or  in  the  latter's  absence 
to  the  Staff  Duty  Officer. 

(2)  Incoming  mail  marked  SECRET  will  be  handled  by  the  Secret  Mail  Officer 
subject  to  instructions  by  the  Flag  Secretary. 

(3)  The  Secret  Mail  Yeoman,  under  the  supervision  of  the  Secret  Mail  Officer, 
shall  log  all  incoming  SECRET  correspondence,  attach  secret  routing  slips,  and 
deliver  to  the  Flag  Secretary  for  routing. 

(4)  The  Secret  Mail  Officer  or  the  Secret  Mail  Yeoman  shall  deliver  the  SECRET 
correspondence  to  the  staff  officers  concerned.    Receipts  shall  be  obtained  for  all 


828       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

SECRET  correspondence  left  in  the  custody  of  officers.     Officers  not  having  au- 
thorized secret  stowage  shall  not  retain  correspondence  overnight. 

(c)  Outgoing  Mail.  (1)  An  officer  desiring  to  originate  a  SECRET  letter 
shall  prepare  a  rough  draft  in  long  hand  or  dictate  the  letter  to  a  yeoman  au- 
thorized to  handle  secret  correspondence.  The  letter  shall  be  typed  and  delivered 
by  personnel  authorized  to  handle  secret  documents  to  staff  officers  concerned  for 
initialling  and  signature. 

(2)  The  file  copy  of  outgoing  secret  correspondence  prepared  by  the  War  Plans 
Officer  may  be  retained  in  his  files.  In  such  cases  a  copy  of  the  letter  shall  be 
delivered  to  the  Secret  Mail  Officer  for  filing  in  the  secret  correspondence  files. 

(3)  SECRET  correspondence  will  be  forwarded  in  accordance  with  Article 
76(4),  U.  S.  Navy  Regulations. 

(4)  Outgoing  SECRET  mail  will  be  marked  with  an  identification  number  of 
five  figures  preceded  by  CINCPAC  or  CINCUS  as  appropriate.  Franked  cards 
bearing  a  return  receipt  shall  be  enclosed  with  each  letter  and  will  indicate  the 
identity  of  the  letter  by  both  the  serial  and  shipment  numbers. 

Section  VII.  Libraries 

701.  Every  effort  will  be  made  to  maintain  an  office  library  of  official  publica- 
tions required  for  reference  by  members  of  the  Staff.  Officers  are  requested  to 
advise  the  Flag  Secretary  of  publications  they  desire  to  have  ordered. 

The  office  library  consists  of  various  books  and  pamphlets  such  as : — ^Annual 
Reports,  Regulations,  Bureau  Manuals,  Registers,  Directories  and  miscellaneous 
publications.  The  library  will  be  added  to  as  publications  are  received  from  time 
to  time.  Any  publications  carried  in  the  library  which  have  become  obsolete 
will  be  submitted  to  the  Flag  Secretary,  who  will  issue  the  necessary  instructions 
as  to  their  disposition. 

Each  publication  is  listed  and  assigned  a  serial  number,  and  filed  according  to 
that  number. 

The  File  Yeoman  will  be  responsible  for  the  proper  classification  and  filing  of 
the  library. 

702.  The  Commander-in-Chief's  Library  is  maintained  under  the  supervision 
of  the  Fleet  Public  Relations  Officer.  It  consists  principally  of  non-fiction  although 
some  works  of  fiction  may  be  included.  The  books  are  kept  in  book  cases  in  the 
Admiral's  and  guest  cabins  and  elsewhere  as  necessary.  The  Fleet  Public  Rela- 
tions Officer  will  publish  to  the  staff  a  list  of  books  on  hand  and  lists  of  additions 
as  received.  All  members  of  the  staff  are  invited  to  make  use  of  the  facilities 
afforded  by  this  library.  It  is  desired  to  augment  and  improve  the  Commander- 
in-Chief's  library.  To  this  end  suggestions  as  to  books  which  should  be  obtained 
are  requested  from  all  members  of  the  Staff.  Keys  to  the  bookcase  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief's Library  will  be  kept  in  the  key  locker  in  the  flag  office. 

Section  VIII.  Rapid  Communications  of  Commander-in-Chief,  United  States 

Paoifo  Fleet 

part  a GENERAL 

801.  Drafting  of  Despatches,  (a)  In  order  that  the  Commander-in-Chief  may 
set  an  example  of  propriety  in  drafting  of  despatches,  all  officers  of  the  Staff 
will  familiarize  themselves  with  the  provisions  of  Communication  Instructions 
relative  to  that  subject.  Communication  watch  and  coding  board  officers  should 
bring  to  the  attention  of  originating  officers  all  violations  of  these  instructions 
and  recommend  necessary  corrections.  In  no  case  will  a  change  in  a  despatch 
be  made  without  the  consent  of  the  originating  officer. 

(b)  An  officer  originating  a  non-classified  or  restricted  despatch  will  have  the 
message  typed  by  his  own  yeoman,  or  duty  seaman.  After  it  has  been  initialed 
by  the  originating  officer  it  will  be  delivered  to  the  communication  watch  officer 
who  will  obtain  the  initials  of  the  information  and  releasing  officers  and  super- 
vise the  transmission  of  the  despatch. 

(c)  An  officer  originating  a  classified  despatch  will  write  or  type  the  message 
on  an  outgoing  classified  despatch  blank.  After  initialing  by  the  originating 
officer  it  will  be  delivered  to  the  communication  watch  officer  who  will  obtain 
initials  of  the  information  and  releasing  officers,  have  the  despatch  encrypted 
and  supervise  its  transmission. 

(d)  All  despatches  will  normally  be  released  only  by  the  Admiral  or  Chief  of 
Staff.  In  case  of  emergencies  or  special  circumstances,  despatches  may  be  re- 
leased by  other  members  of  the  Staff. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF   HEWITT   INQUIRY  829 

(e)  An  officer  desiring  to  have  a  message  passed  to  supplementary  addresses 
for  action  or  information  will  inform  the  communication  watch  officer  who  will 
prepare  the  necessary  despatch  or  procedure  signal  and  obtain  initials  of 
originating,  information  and  releasing  officers. 

802.  Security  of  Communications,  (a)  Visual  methods  or  landline  will  be  used 
for  transmission  of  despatches  whenever  practicable.  The  use  of  radio  for  trans- 
mission of  administrative  despatches  shall  ie  kept  at  a  minimum. 

(b)  If  a  delay  in  the  delivery  of  a  despatch  is  acceptable,  such  message  should 
be  sent  by  despatch  mail  (mailgram).  Mail  grams  should  be  used  particularly 
for  transmission  of  despatches  to  information  addresses  when  it  is  desirable 
that  their  radio  calln  do  not  appear  in  the  heading  of  the  radio  despatch. 

803.  Distribution  of  Despatches,  (a)  Copies  of  all  outgoing  and  incoming  non- 
classified and  restricted  administrative  despatches  are  provided  for  the  Admiral, 
Chief  of  Staff,  Operations  Officer,  Staff  Duty  Officer,  Flag  Secretary  and  Com- 
munication Officer.  Outgoing  despatch  books  also  contain  a  copy  for  the  originat- 
ing officer.  Incoming  despatch  books  also  contain  an  action  copy  and  two  in- 
formation copies  which  are  available  to  any  member  of  the  Staff  who  may 
request  such  copies  from  the  communication  orderly.  The  Communication 
Officer's  copies  of  despatches  will  be  placed  on  a  file  in  the  Staff  Office  where 
they  will  be  available  for  perusal  by  all  members  of  the  Staff. 

(b)  Only  one  copy  of  outgoing  and  incoming  classified  administrative  des- 
patches (other  than  restricted  despatches)  will  be  made.  Paraphrases  of 
secret  and  confidential  despatches  shall  be  kept  at  a  minimum  and  will  be 
furnished  only  at  the  specific  request  of  officers,  and  must  be  returned  to  the 
coding  room  for  burning  when  no  longer  needed.  Paraphrases  of  secret  messages 
will  be  furnished  only  to  the  action  or  originating  officer,  and  shall  be  receipted 
for  in  the  same  manner  as  registered  publications. 

(c)  Only  four  copies  of  the  translations  of  tactical  despatches  will  be  made 
for  distribution  to  appropriate  boards. 

804.  Routing  and  Delivery  of  Despatches.  (Internal)  (a)  Correct  and  com- 
plete routing  of  despatches  is  a  function  of  the  communication  watch  officer. 

(b)  The  Staff  Duty  Officer  should  see  all  despatches  when  the  action  officer 
is  not  on  board.  In  such  cases  instructions  will  be  requested  by  the  orderly  from 
the  Staff  Duty  Officer  as  to  whether  the  latter  wil  accept  responsibility  for  the 
message  or  whether  it  should  be  held  for  the  action  officer. 

(c)  Whoever  initials  the  message  for  the  action  officer  and  accepts  the  action 
copy  assumes  full  responsibility  for  taking  the  required  action  and  for  informing 
the  designated  action  officer  of  the  action  taken. 

805.  Movement  Reports,  (a)  The  movement  report  sheets  and  cards  will  be 
corrected  and  maintained  by  communication  personnel  under  the  supervision 
of  the  communication  watch  officer  designated  as  Movement  Report  Officer. 

(b)  Movement  reports  of  the  flag  plane  will  be  originated  by  the  pilot  making 
the  flight  and  will  be  prepared  and  released  by  the  flagship. 

806.  Fleet  Coding  Board,  (a)  The  fleet  coding  board  will  consist  of  four 
officers  of  the  Staff  and  five  officers  detailed  by  the  Commanding  Officer  of  the 
Fleet  Flagship. 

(b)  The  fleet  coding  board  will  be  charged  with  encrypting  and  decrypting 
messages  sent  or  received  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  or  the  Fleet  flagship,  as 
directed  by  the  Fleet  Communication  Officer. 

(c)  The  Communication  Security  Officer  will  be  responsible  for  the  organiza- 
tion and  training  of  the  fleet  coding  board. 

807.  Shutting  Down  Transmitters.  Except  in  ca«e  of  emergency,  permission 
for  securing  transmitters  must  be  obtained  from  the  Fleet  Communication  Officer. 

PABT  B — ^INSTRUCTIONS  FOR  COMMUNICATION  PERSONNEL 

808.  Administrative  Communication  Organization,  (a)  The  following  stations 
will  normally  be  manned : 

(1)  Main  radio  room  ; 

(2)  Signal  bridge; 

(3)  Main  communication  station; 

(4)  Flag  communication  office; 

(5)  Coding  room. 

(b)  The  communication  watch  will  normally  consist  of: 

(1)  Communication  Watch  Officer 

(2)  Coding  Board  Officer 

(3)  Communication  Supervisor 


830       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(4)  Communication  Yeoman 

(5)  Communication  Orderly 

(6)  Radio  Supervisor 

(7)  Signal  Supervisor 

(8)  Radio  Operators 

(9)  Signalmen 

(c)  The  communication  watch  oflicer  will  stand  a  day's  duty,  relieving  the 
watch  at  0800.  He  will  inform  his  relief  regarding  unfinished  business,  effective 
organization,  frequency  plan  in  effect,  circuits  up,  visual  signalling  conditions, 
and  all  pertinent  information  necessary  for  the  proper  conduct  of  his  duties. 

(d)  The  coding  board  oflBcer  will  stand  a  day's  duty,  relieving  the  watch  at 
0800.  He  will  inform  his  relief  regarding  unfinished  business  and  all  pertinent 
information  necessary  for  the  proper  conduct  of  his  duties. 

(e)  Relief  Communication  Watch  Officers.  The  first  and  second  relief  com- 
munication watch  officers  will  maintain  a  continuous  watch  in  the  Flag  Com- 
munication Office  during  working  hours.  The  second  relief  communication 
watch  officer  will  stand  watch  for  0800  until  after  lunch.  The  first  relief  com- 
munication officer  will  stand  watch  from  after  lunch  until  1530,  at  which  time 
he  will  be  relieved  by  the  communication  watch  officer  with  the  day's  duty.  Other 
relief  communication  watch  officers  are  available  for  duty  when  the  traffic 
situation  requires. 

(f )  The  first  and  second  relief  coding  board  officers  will  maintain  a  continuous 
watch  in  the  Coding  Room  during  working  hours.  The  watches  will  correspond 
to  those  stood  by  relief  communication  watch  officers.  Other  relief  coding 
board  officers  are  available  for  duty  when  the  traffic  situation  requires. 

(g)  Communication  Supervisor.  The  communication  supervisor  will  stand  a 
day's  duty  under  the  administrative  organization  in  the  Main  Communication 
Station.  He  will  act  as  an  assistant  to  the  communication  watch  officer.  The 
time  of  relieving  and  hours  on  watch  will  be  the  same  as  those  prescribed  for 
the  communication  watch  officer.  The  watches  for  the  communication  super- 
visors will  be  arranged  by  the  Senior  Chief  Radioman  and  will  be  approved  by 
the  Assistant  Communication  Officer. 

(h)  The  radio  and  signal  supervisors  shall  maintain  continuous  watches  in 
the  Main  Radio  Room  ,and  Signal  Bridge  respectively.  The  watches  for 
supervisors  will  be  arranged  by  the  leading  radio  and  signal  chief  petty  officers 
and  will  be  approved  by  the  flagship's  Radio  and  Signal  Officers,  respectively. 

(i)  Communication  Yoeman.  Communication  yoemen  will  maintain  a  con- 
tinuous watch  in  the  Flag  Communication  Office.  The  watches  will  be  arranged 
by  the  Senior  Communication  Yoeman  and  approved  by  the  Assistant  Com- 
munication Officer. 

(j)  The  flagship  will  provide  sufficient  communication  orderlies  to  permit  a 
continuous  watch  in  the  Flag  Communication  Office.  When  the  flagship  is 
underway  a  continuous  watch  will  also  be  maintained  on  the  Flag  Bridge. 
Orders  for  the  communication  orderlies  will  be  promulgated  by  the  Assistant 
Communication  Officer. 

(k)  Watches  prescribed  In  the  preceding  articles  will  not  be  exchanged  without 
permission  of  the  officers  concerned. 

809.  Tactical  Communication  Organization,  (a)  The  following  Stations  will 
normally  be  manned : 

(1)  Main  Radio  Room; 

(2)  Signal  Bridge 

(3)  Main  Communication  Station ; 

(4)  Flag  Communication  Office 

(5)  Flag  Bridge  Radio  Station; 

(6)  Flag  Bridge  Communication  Office; 

(7)  Coding  Room. 

(b)  The  communication  watch  normally  consists  of: 

(1)  Communication  watch  officer; 

(2)  Coding  board  officer; 

(3)  Two  communication  yoemen; 

(4)  Two  communication  orderlies; 

(5)  Communication  Supervisor; 

(6)  Radio  Supervisor ; 

(7)  Signal  Supervisor; 

(8)  Radio  Operators ; 

(9)  Signalmen; 

(10  Additional  members  of  coding  board  as  necessary. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  831 

(c)  Communication  watch  offices  shall  maintain  a  continuous  watch  in  the 
Flag  Bridge  Communication  Office.  Off-watch  communication  watch  officers  are 
available  for  handling  administrative  traffic  and  coding  duties  as  the  situation 
requires. 

(d)  Coding  Board  Officers  shall  maintain  a  continuous  watch  in  the  Coding 
Eoom.  Off-watch  coding  board  officers  are  available  for  coding  duties  as  the 
situation  requires. 

(e)  The  Chief  Radiomen  assigned  to  the  Flag  Allowance  shall  maintain  a 
day's  duty  watch  in  the  Main  Communication  Station,  and  a  continuous  watch 
as  radio  supervisor  in  the  Flag  Bridge  Radio  Station.  This  watch  list  may  be 
augmented  by  qualified  first  class  radiomen  as  required. 

(f )  The  radio  and  signal  supervisors  shall  maintain  a  continuous  watch  in  the 
Main  Radio  Room  and  Signal  Bridge. 

(g)  Communication  yoemen  shall  maintain  continuous  watches  in  the  Flag 
Bridge  Communication  Office  and  the  Flag  Communication  Office. 

(h)  The  flagship  will  provide  sufficient  communication  orderlies  to  permit 
continuous  watches  in  the  Flag  Communication  Office  and  on  the  Flag  Bridge. 

810.  Duties  of  Communication  Watch  Offlcer.  (a)  The  communication  watch 
officer  is  in  direct  charge  of  the  communications  of  the  Commander-in-Chief. 

(b)  The  communication  watch  officer  is  responsible  for  the  efficiency  of  the 
communication  watch  and  will  require  an  alert  and  military  watch  of  all 
communication  personnel. 

(c)  The  communication  watch  offlcer  is  responsible  for  complete  and  rapid 
internal  distribution  of  despatches  and  for  the  expeditious  handling  of  outgoing 
traffic, 

(d)  The  communication  watch  offlcer  is  responsible  for  the  handling  of  en- 
crypted despatches  and  the  efficiency  of  the  coding  watch. 

(e)  The  communication  watch  officer  must  be  fully  cognizant  of  the  effective 
organization  of  the  Fleet  and  is  responsible  for  setting  up  and  maintaining  the 
communication  channels  required  by  the  organization. 

811.  Duties  of  Coding  Board  Officers,  (a)  The  coding  board  offlcer  is  in  charge 
of  the  operation  of  the  Commander-in-Chief's  coding  room. 

(b)  The  coding  board  officer  is  responsible  for  expeditious,  accurate  and 
efficient  encryption  and  decryption  of  despatches. 

(c)  The  coding  board  officer  must  be  fully  cognizant  of  the  rules  for  crypto- 
graphic security  and  will  ensure  strict  observance  of  these  rules  in  the  handling 
of  the  encrypted  traffic  of  the  Commander-in-Chief. 

(d)  The  coding  board  officer  is  responsible  for  the  custody  of  the  cryptographic 
aids,  publications  and  devices  in  the  coding  room. 

812.  Qualification  of  Communication  Watch  Officers  and  Coding  Board  Officers. 
Upon  reporting  for  duty  communication  watch  officers  and  coding  board  officers 
must  undergo  sufficient  instruction  to  qualify  taking  over  a  watch.  To  be  con- 
sidered qualified  a  communication  watch  officer  or  coding  board  officer  must : 

(a)  have  a  working  knowledge  of  Communication  Instructions,  Basic  Com- 
munication Plan,  Frequency  Plans  and  Tactical  Instructions; 

(b)  have  a  working  knowledge  of  the  call  systems,  the  General  Signal  Book 
and  Signal  Vocabulary; 

(c)  have  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  U.  S.  Fleet  Staff  Instructions  and  Staff 
Organization ; 

(d)  have  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  operation  of  the  communication  plant 
of  the  Fleet  Flagship; 

(e)  be  proficient  in  the  use  of  all  cryptographic  systems  held  by  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief. 

(f )  have  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  principles  and  rules  of  communication 
and  ci'yptographic  security  and  their  application. 

813.  Routing  of  Despatches,  (a)  Full  and  complete  routing  of  despatches  is  a 
function  of  the  communication  watch  officer.  A  despatch  must  be  seen  by  every 
officer  having  a  possible  interest  in  it.  Intelligent  and  complete  routing  requires  a 
thorough  knowledge  of  the  Staff  organization  and  a  careful  application  of  this 
knowledge  to  each  despatch. 

(b)  Copies  of  dispatches  concerning  routine  reports  and  requests  should  not  be 
delivered  to  the  Admiral.  Such  despatches  will  be  marked  "NN"  and  the  Ad- 
miral's copy  will  be  delivered  to  the  Assistant  Communication  Officer  for  dis- 
position. 

(c)  Classified  despatches,  other  than  restricted,  shall  be  routed  to  the  Chief  of 


832       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Staff,  Operations  Officer,  Communication  Officer  and  Communication  Security 
Officer  in  addition  to  action  or  information  officers.  The  Chief  of  StafE  shall  be 
the  first  to  see  classified  despatches  and  shall  approve  the  routing  prior  to  further 
delivery.  When  the  Chief  of  StafE  is  not  available  despatches  may  be  shown  to 
the  action  officer  prior  to  final  approval  of  the  routing. 

(d)  The  flag  is  responsible  for  delivery  of  messages  addressed  to  the  flagship. 
Copies  of  such  messages  and  copies  of  messages  which  are  not  addresed  to,  but 
which  are  of  interest  to  the  flagship,  shall  be  delivered  to  the  flagship  communi- 
cation office  for  internal  distribution. 

814.  Delivery  of  despatches,  (a)  The  communication  watch  officer  will  be 
responsible  for  requiring  orderlies  to  deliver  all  messages  promptly  between 
0800  and  2230  unless  otherwise  directed.  Between  2230  and  0700  messages  will 
be  delivered  to  action  and  information  officers  when  so  directed  by  the  communi- 
cation watch  officer.  In  case  of  doubt,  messages  will  be  delivered  regardless  of 
the  hour.  Priority  despatches  will  always  be  delivered  to  the  action  officer 
immediately. 

(b)  Delivery  of  all  traffic  accumulated  during  the  night  will  be  completed  by 
0900  daily. 

(c)  Speed  in  delivery  of  despatches,  especially  those  of  priority  precedence,  is 
essential  and  the  system  must  not  be  allowed  to  delay  action.  However,  it  is 
also  essential  that  despatches  be  accurately  written  up.  It  is  the  responsibility 
of  the  communication  watch  officer  to  insure  that  a  complete  and  accurate  copy 
of  all  despatches  is  delivered  to  the  proper  officers  as  soon  as  possible. 

815.  Emergencies,  (a)  The  communication  watch  officer  should  bear  in  mind 
that  speed  in  the  delivery  of  a  message  indicating  an  Emergency  is  the  primary 
consideration. 

(b)  Make  use  of  the  telephone  as  well  as  messengers.  Above  all,  do  not  let 
the  system  delay  action. 

(c)  Call  relief  watches  as  necessary  to  assist  in  handling  the  situation  and 
retain  them  on  watch  as  long  as  required. 

(d)  Be  prepared  to  handle  any  emergency  at  night.  Before  turning  in  leave 
clear  and  definite  instructions  to  be  notified  immediately  in  the  case  of  any 
unusual  occurrence. 

816.  Encrypted  Despatches,  (a)  If  time  permits,  the  encryption  of  each  out- 
going encrypted  despatch  will  be  checked  prior  to  transmission  by  an  officer  other 
than  the  one  who  encrypted  the  despatch.  If  time  does  not  permit  the  encryption 
to  be  checked  prior  to  transmission  it  will  be  checked  as  soon  as  possible  there- 
after, 

(b)  All  intercepted  encrypted  despatches  will  be  delivered  to  the  coding  room 
where  they  will  be  decrypted  for  information  if  traffic  conditions  permit. 

817.  Intercepted  Traffic.  Intercepted  traffic  of  possible  interest  to  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief will  be  written  up  and  distributed  for  information.  Each  copy 
will  be  marked  "Written  up  for  Cincpac  information." 

818.  Radio  Logs.  Radio  logs  shall  be  kept  in  accordance  with  Articles  1413- 
1417,  Communication  Instructions,  1937.  The  communication  watch  officer  will 
examine  radio  logs  carefully  during  his  watch  for  despatches  addressed  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  for  violations  of  communication  instructions,  for  inter- 
cepted despatches  of  possible  interest  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  to  ascer- 
tain that  circuit  discipline  in  being  maintained. 

19.  Transmitting  and  Receiving  Data.  Transmitting  and  receiving  data  will 
be  recorded  by  the  radio  operator  or  signalman  as  indicated  below : 

Radio 

(1)  Time  of  Delivery  or  Receipt 

(2)  Frequency 

(3)  Operator's  sign. 

Visual 

(1)  Time  of  Delivery  or  Receipt 

(2)  System 

(3)  Signalman's  sign. 

820.  Communication  Files,  (a)  General  File.  The  general  file  includes  one 
copy  of  each  message  transmitted  or  received.  Service  messages  (except  des- 
patches) shall  be  stapled  to  the  message  to  which  they  refer.  Procedure  signals 
not  classified  as  service  messages  and  messages  not  bearing  time  groups  shall 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY 


833 


be  filed  according  to  time  of  receipt  or  delivery.    Classified  mailgrams  (other  than 
restricted)  shall  be  filed  in  the  classified  tiles  and  a  tickler  filed  in  the  general  file. 

(b)  Shore  station  Schedule  Files.  A  copy  of  each  message  received  by  I  or  F 
method  shall  be  filed  in  these  files.  A  separate  file  shall  be  maintained  for  each 
shore  station.    Messages  shall  be  filed  by  shore  station  serial  numbers. 

(c)  Movement  Report  File.  A  copy  of  each  notice  or  modification  to  the  Ship 
Movement  Report  Sheets  shall  be  placed  in  this  file. 

(d)  Flag  Files.  The  flag  file  includes  one  copy  of  each  message  originated  by 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  addressed  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  or  vpritten  up 
for  information  of  the  Commander-in-Chief.  These  messages  shall  be  filed  in 
chronological  order  of  time  groups  under  the  headings  incoming  and  outgoing. 

(e)  AInav  File.  A  copy  of  each  alnav  message  shall  be  placed  in  this  file  in 
order  of  alnav  number. 

(f )  Fleet  File.  A  copy  of  each  fleet  message  shall  be  placed  in  this  flle  in  order 
of  fleet  number. 

(g)  Classifled  Files.  Translations  of  classified  despatches  shall  be  placed 
in  these  files  in  order  of  coding  room  serial  number.  Secret  despatches  shall  be 
placed  in  a  file  separate  from  the  regular  classified  files. 

(h)  Tactical  Translation  Files.  The  tactical  translation  files'contain  one  copy 
of  the  exact  translation  of  each  encrypted  tactical  despatch  and  one  copy  of  each 
plain  language  tactical  despatch.  Messages  will  be  filed  in  chronological  order 
of  date  time  groups. 

821.  Composition  and  Standard  Distribution  of  Message  Books: 
(a)   Outgoing  Circuit 


Front  Cover 
First  copy 
Second  copy 
Third  copy 
Back  copy 

(b)  Outgoing  Administrative 

Fi'ont  cover 
First  copy 
Second  copy 
Third  copy 
Fourth  copy 
Fifth  copy 
Sixth  copy 
Seventh  copy 
Eighth  copy 
Ninth  copy 
Back  cover 

(c)  Outgoing  Tactical 

Front  cover 
First  copy 
Second  copy 
Back  cover 

(d)  Outgoing  Umpire 

Front  cover 
First  copy 
Back  cover 

(e)  Incoming  Circuit 

Front  cover 
First  copy 
Second  copy 
Back  copy 

(f)  Incoming  Administrative 

Front  cover 
*  First  copy 
Second  copy 
Third  copy 
Fourth  copy 
Fifth  copy 
Sixth  copy 
Seventh  copy 
Eighth  copy 
Back  cover 


General  File 
Station  File 
Flag  File 
Originator 
Ship 

General  File 

Flag  File 

Originator 

Admiral 

Chief  of  Staff 

Operations  Officer 

Flag  Secretary 

Staff  Duty  Officer 

Communication  Officer 

Station  File 

Ship 

Translation  File 
Flag  Plot 
Flag  Plot 
Coding  Board 

Translation  File 
Umpire 
Coding  Board 

General  File 
Spare  copy 
Advance  action 
Check  copy 

Flag  File 

Action 

Admiral 

Chief  of  Staff 

Operations  Officer 

Flag  Secretary 

Staff  Duty  Officer 

Information 

Information 

Communication  Officer 


834       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(g)  Incoming  Tactical 

Front  cover  —  Translation  File 

First  copy  —  Flag  Plot 

Second  copy  —  Flag  Plot 

Back  copy  —  Coding  Board 
(h)  Incoming  Contact  Report 

Front  cover  —  Translation  File 

First  copy  —  Flag  Plot 

Second  copy  —  Flag  Plot 

Back  cover  —  Ship 

(i)  Incoming  Umpire  — 

Front  cover  —  Translation  File 

First  copy  —  Umpire 

Back  cover  —  Coding  Board 

Section  IX.  Registeeed  and  Otheb  Sexjeei  and  Confidential  Publications 

901.  The  Communication  Security  OfBcer  is  responsible  to  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  and  to  the  Department  for  the  custody  of  all  registered  publications. 

902.  A  Communication  Watch  OflScer,  designated  as  Registered  Publications 
Officer,  is  the  custodian  of  registered  and  other  secret  and  confidential  p)ubli- 
cations.  He  shall  receipt  to  the  Fleet  Communication  Security  Officer  for  all 
registered  publications  and  for  other  important  confidential,  secret  or  restricted 
documents  which  must  be  accounted  for  by  the  Commander-in-Chief. 

903.  All  registered  and  other  important  publications  shall  be  catalogued  to 
show  their  receipt  and  the  safes  in  which  they  are  stowed.  No  registered  pub- 
lication shall  be  issued  except  on  written  receipt  of  an  authorized  individual, 
which  receipt  shall  be  obtained  at  the  time  of  issue.  Other  confidential  or 
secret  publications  and  important  documents  shall  be  handled  in  a  similar 
manner, 

904.  In  accounting  for  registered  publications  when  preparing  quarterly  returns, 
each  publication  actually  must  be  sighted  by  the  officers  taking  the  inventory. 

905.  Confidential  and  secret  publications  shall  be  kept  only  in  authorized 
stowages. 

906.  The  Coding  Board  Officer  on  watch  shall  be  responsible  for  the  publi- 
cations in  the  communication  office  safes.  The  Registered  Publications  Officer 
shall  make  a  weekly  inventory  of  the  contents  of  the  communication  office  safes. 

907.  The  Registered  Publications  Officer  shall  be  the  only  person  regularly 
in  possession  of  the  combinations  of  safes  containing  un-issued  registered 
publications,  except  for:  (a)  communication  office  safes:  (b)  War  plans  safe; 
(c)  Security  Officer's  safe.  In  order  that  access  to  any  safe  may  be  had  in 
the  absence  of  the  regular  custodian,  the  Registered  Publications  Officer  shall 
maintain  in  sealed  envelopes  the  combinations  of  all  safes  assigned  to  the 
Staff.  These  sealed  envelopes  shall  be  kept  in  the  communication  office  secret 
safe.  Prompt  report  shall  be  made  to  the  regular  custodian  of  a  safe  whenever 
the  envelope  containing  the  combination  thereto  is  opened  for  any  purpose. 

908.  The  Registered  Publications  Officer  shall  change  the  combination  of  all 
safes  when  he  first  receipts  for  the  registered  publications,  and  from  time  to 
time  thereafter;  particularly  subsequent  to  the  opening  of  a  safe  by  another 
officer. 

909.  The  Registered  Publications  Officer  shall  keep  a  record  of  all  "shipment 
memoranda"  to  insure  receipt  of  all  new  matter.  He  is  responsible  that  all 
publications  in  his  custody  are  corrected  to  date.  It  is  desirable  that  members 
of  the  staff  correct  their  own  publications ;  but  even  though  they  do  so,  their 
work  shall  be  checked  by  the  Registered  Publications  Officer,  who  is  responsible, 
for  their  being  corrected. 

910.  When  not  actually  in  use,  war  plans  shall  be  stowed  in  the  safes  es- 
pecially provided  for  them.  Corrections  to  the  war  plans  shall  be  made  under 
the  direction  of  the  War  Plans  Officer.  War  plans  shall  not  remain  out  of  the 
above  safes  overnight.  The  War  Plans  Officer  shall  have  custody  of  all  War 
Plans  in  use  by  the  War  Plans  Section,  receipting  for  them  to  the  Registered 
Publication  Officer. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  835 

Section  X.  Relationship  Between  Flag  and  Ship. 
A  —  Station  keeping  and  maneuvering  of  flagship. 

1001.  When  in  formation,  the  flagship  will  normally  maneuver  in  obedience) 
to  signal  in  the  same  manner  as  other  vessels  of  the  formation. 

1002.  The  Commander-in-Chief  will,  however,  as  circumstances  warrant,  ver- 
bally direct  the  flagship  to  make  changes  in  course,  speed,  or  jjosition. 

1003.  When,  for  any  reason,  the  movements  of  thci  flagship  are  no  longer 
to  be  directed  by  the  flag,  the  Captain  of  the  flagship  will  be  so  informed.  He 
will  be  further  informed  as  may  be  practicable,  of  the  interval  during  which 
he  is  expected  to  act  independently. 

1004.  When  in  position,  the  commanding  ofiicer  is  responsible  for  the  station 
keeping,  course,  and  speed  of  the  flagship  as  circumstances  dictate. 

B  —  Honors. 

1005.  Responsibility  for  rendering  proper  honors  lies  with  the  flagship  except 
that  no  gun  salutes  shall  be  fired  without  the  authority  of  the  Commander-in- 
Chief.  Advance  information  as  to  honors  shall  be  furnished  by  the  Flag 
Lieutenant  or  Staff  Duty  Officer. 

O  —  Personnel 

1006.  Officers  of  the  Staff  shall  be  careful  to  preserve  the  unity  of  command 
of  the  flagship.  To  this  end  they  shall  give  no  orders  to  the  officer-of-the-deck 
except  in  an  emergency.  Personal  requests  may  be  made  to  subordinate  officers 
of  the  flagship  but  official  requests  to  the  ship  shall  always  be  made  direct 
to  the  Captain  or  Executive  Officer.  Such  requests  should  be  headed,  "The 
Admiral  desires  you Etc." 

1007.  The  Flag  Division  Officer  and  the  Division  Officers  will  be  the  Com- 
munication Watch  Officers  or  Coding  Board  Officers  so  designated. 

1008.  Leaver  and  liberty  for  all  men  assigned  special  duty  with  the  flag  will 
be  regulated  by  the  Flag  Secretary  who  will  regulate  it  to  conform  as  closely 
to  that  of  the  flagship,  as  flag  work  will  permit.  (See  Article  407(a)).  The 
flagship  will  regulate,  control,  and  administer  the  following  functions  pertaining 
to  flag  personnel : 

(a)  Reports,  inspections,  records  and  accounts,  and  advancements  in  ratings. 

(b)  Personal  requests  (via  Flag  Secretary). 

(c)  Disciplinary  matters. 

(d)  The  division  parade  is  assigned  by  the  flagship.  The  Flag  Division 
Officer  is  in  charge  at  division  parade.  He  reports  to  the  Executive  Officer 
at  quarters,  the  number  of  unauthorized  absentees. 

1009.  The  following  instructions  govern  the  routine  muster  or  flag  personnel : 

(a)  All  flag  personnel  except  the  marines  will  muster  at  quartcirs  with  the 
flagship. 

(b)  The  marines  assigned  as  flag  allowance,  will  muster  with  the  ship's 
marine  detachment. 

1010.  Flag  Division  personnel  will  be  stationed  for  abandon  ship  drill  and 
will  report  at  quarters  for  this  drill  unless  excused.  At  fire  and  collision  drills 
and  general  quarters.  Flag  division  personnel  will,  when  men  detailed  by  the 
ship  have  failed  to  do  so,  secure  ports,  etc.,  in  offices  and  other  places  devoted 
strictly  to  Flag  activities.  The  Flag  division,  will  not  go  to  quarters  for  these 
drills  except  that  radio  and  visual  communications  will  actually  be  manned. 

1011.  The  Flag  division  officer  and  the  junior  Flag  division  officers  will  conduct 
bag  and  bedding  inspections  of  the  Flag  Division.  The  ship  will  provide  berthing 
and  messing  for  all  personnel  of  the  Flag  Division.  Flag  Division  personnel  under 
the  direction  and  supervision  of  the  Flag  Division  Officer  will  clean  all  compart- 
ments dedicated  exclusively  to  Flag  use.  Boat  crews,  under  the  direction  of  the 
Flag  Lieutenant,  will  clean  the  barges  and  staff  boats ;  the  signal  force,  under 
the  direction  of  the  Flag  Lieutenant,  will  clean  the  Flag  Signal  Bridge  and  Flag 
Conning  Tower. 

1012.  All  members  of  the  Staff  shall  be  assigned  battle  stations  which  will  be 
manned  when  "General  Quarters"  is  sounded.  Enlisted  men  of  the  Flag  not 
required  for  Staff  Battle  Stations  will  be  assigned  to  ship  battle  stations.  En- 
listed men  of  the  Flag  will  stand  Flag  condition  and  cruising  watches,  but  will 
not  stand  ship  cruising  watches. 

1013.  The  Flag  Lieutenant  is  in  direct  charge  of  the  boat  crews,  chauffeur, 
signal  force,  Admiral's  mess  attendants,  boats,  and  automobiles    (Band  and 

79716 — 46— Ex.  149,  vol.  2 12 


836       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK. 

Orchestra  is  assigned),  and  is  directly  responsible  to  the  Commander-in-Chief 
for  their  appearance,  training  and  performance.  The  ship  is  responsible  for 
maintenance  and  upkeep.  The  Flag  Lieutenant,  and,  in  his  absence,  the  Staff 
Duty  Officer,  regulates  the  employment  of  the  Staff  motor  boats  and  the  Chief  of 
Staff's  barge  when  it  is  used  as  the  Staff  duty  boat.  He  will  prepare  the  schedules 
for  all  staff  motor  boats,  prescribing  the  routine  hours  for  securing  and  the  places 
of  securing  away  from  the  ship  and  will  furnish  information  as  to  liberty  of 
boat  crews,  after  securing,  to  the  Flag  Secretary.  The  Officer-of-the-Deck  will 
keep  the  Flag  Lieutenant,  and  in  his  absence,  the  Staff  Duty  Officer,  informed  of 
the  movements  of  the  barges  and  the  staff  motor  boats. 

1014.  The  Commanding  Officer  of  the  Flagship  shall  be  responsible  that  all 
safety  precautions  of  the  barge  and  staff  gig  be  made  as  are  required  by  existing 
regulations  and  instructions. 

D — Routine  Reports 

1015.  In  order  that  the  routine  reports  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  may  be 
complete  and  uniform,  the  Commanding  Officer  of  the  flagship  is  requested  to 
promulgate  the  following  instructions : 

(a)  AT  ANCHOR 

(1)  The  Officer-of-the-Deck  shall  make  reports  to  Commander-in-Chief  as 
follows : 

(a)  The  hours  of  0800, 1200  and  2000. 

(b)  Ship's  Movements. 

(c)  All  marked  changes  in  the  weather.  . 

(d)  Display  of  storm  signals. 

(e)  All  occurrences  worthy  of  notice. 

(2)  The  Officer-of-the-Deck  shall  report  salutes  fired,  exchanges  of  official  calls, 
shifting  of  personal  flags  and  movements  of  ships  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  the 
Chief  of  Staff,  and  to  the  Flag  Lieutenant,  or  in  the  absence  of  the  Flag  Lieu- 
tenant to  the  Staff  Duty  Officer. 

(3)  The  Officer-of-the-Deck  shall  announce  requirements  for  Staff  attendance 
at  the  accommodation  ladder  by  loud  speaker:  "Staff  Gangway".  Boat  gongs 
shall  also  be  sounded  in  number  equal  to  the  number  of  side  boys  required  In 
attendance;  e.  g.,  for  Admiral  and  Vice  Admiral,  eight  (8)  gongs;  for  Rear 
Admiral,  six  (6)  gongs;  and  for  Captain,  four  (4)  gongs.  The  above  procedure 
shall  be  carried  out  by  the  Officer-of-the-Deck  in  sufficient  time  for  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, the  Chief  of  Staff,  and  the  Flag  Lieutenant,  or,  in  his  absence, 
the  Staff  Duty  Officer,  to  reach  the  Quarter  Deck  and  properly  meet  visiting 
officers.  When  the  Commander-in-Chief  is  leaving  the  ship,  the  Officer-of-the- 
Deck  will  notify  the  Flag  Lieutenant,  or  in  his  absence,  the  Staff  Duty  Officer, 
and  the  Chief  of  Staff,  when  the  barge  or  automobile  is  alongside.     - 

(4)  The  signal  Bridge  supervisor  shall  report  all  movements  of  ships  getting 
underway,  or  coming  to  anchor,  shifting  of  personal  flags,  exchange  of  salutes, 
and  any  occurrences  worthy  of  notice  to  the  Officer-of-the-Deck. 

(5)  When  the  Admiral  has  retired,  the  Officer-of-the-Deck  shall  make  necessary 
reports  to  the  Staff  Duty  Officer  who  will  indicate  what  action  is  to  be  taken. 

(6)  During  the  night  the  Officer-of-the-Deck  shall  report  to  the  Staff  Duty 
Officer  only  such  movements  of  ships  as  he  deems  necessary.  The  Signal  Bridge 
supervisor  will  report  to  the  Flag  Lieutenant  or  to  the  Staff  Duty  Office,  prior  to 
0800,  any  movements  of  ships  occurring  during  the  preceding  night. 

(b)  UNDERWAY 

(1)  The  Officer-of-the-Deck  shall  report  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  via  the 
Staff  Duty  Officer  on  watch  on  the  Flag  Bridge : 

(a)  The  sighting  of  land,  rocks,  shoals,  lighthouses,  beacons,  buoys,  and  dis- 
colored water. 

(b)  All  vessels  or  wrecks  discovered. 

(c)  All  marked  clianges  in  the  weather. 

( d )  All  occurrences  worthy  of  notice. 

If  the  ship  is  operating  independently,  the  Officer-of-the-Deck  shall  make  the 
above  listed  reports  direct  to  the  Chief  of  Staff  and  officer  with  the  day's  Staff 
Duty. 

(2)  If  the  Commander-in-Chief  should  be  on  the  Navigating  Bridge,  the  Officer- 
of-the-Deck  will  make  reports  direct  to  him,  reporting  thereafter  to  the  Staff 
Duty  Officer  on  watch. 

(3)  When  underway  making  passage  or  outside  the  usual  operating  areas  the 
Navigator  shall  report  the  ship's  position  at  0800,  1200  and  2000. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  837 

Hewitt  Inquiey  Exhibit  No.  35 

My 

SECRET 

United  States  Pacific  Fleet 

U.  S.  S.  Pennsylvania,  Flagship 
Cincpac  file  no. 
A16/WPPac-46(16) 
Serial  063W 

Pearl  Harbor,  T,  H.,  July  25,  1941. 

From:  Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet. 
To:   Distribution  List  for  WPPac-46. 
Subject:   WPPac-46. 

1.  The  subject  publication  is  distributed  herewith.  This  Plan  has  not  yet 
been  approved  by  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  but  may  be  placed  in  effect 
prior  to  the  receipt  of  such  approval. 

2.  Attention  is  invited  to  the  Introduction,  Chapter  III,  article  0301  of  the 
Plan  concerning  the  preparation  of  supporting  plans  by  Task  Force  Commanders. 
At  the  present  time  it  is  desired  that  the  following  submit  supporting  plans  for 
approval  by  the  Commander-in-Chief: 

Commanders  Task  Forces  Two,  Three,  Six,  Seven  and  Nine.  (Commander 
Task  Force  Nine  may,  if  he  desires,  delegate  preparation  of  the  plan  to  the 
Senior  Officer  of  that  type  in  the  Hawaiian  Area.) 

The  Commanders  of  the  Naval  Coastal  Frontiers  addressed  may  provide  for 
the  accomplishment  of  such  tasks  as  are  assigned  them  in  this  0-1  Plan  by 
including  suitable  measures  in  their  0-4  or  other  plans,  rather  than  to  prepare 
separate  supporting  plans  for  this  0-1  Plan.  The  Commander  Southeast  Pacific 
Force  (Commander  Cruiser  Division  Three)  is  required  to  submit  the  plan  for 
operations  of  that  force  after  its  detachment  from  the  Fleet  to  the  Chief  of  Naval 
Operations  for  approval. 

3.  Supporting  Plans  as  required  above  will  be  submitted  for  approval  of  the 
Commander-in-Chief  prior  to  20  August  1941.  After  approval  they  will  be 
incorporated  with  the  Fleet  Plan  as  annexes  as  prescribed  by  the  Commander- 
in-Chief. 

4.  Further  annexes  prepared  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  cover  operations 
to  be  undertaken  in  later  phases  of  the  war  will  be  distributed  when  completed 
and  approved. 

5.  Suitable  binders  for  this  Plan  will  be  forwarded  as  soon  as  received  by  this 
command. 

H.  E.  Kimmel. 
H.  E.  Kimmel. 

[i\  SECRET 

United  States  Pacific  Fleet 

U.  S.  S.  Pennsylvania,  Flagship 
CinCpac  File 
A16/WPPac-46(16) 
Serial  056W. 

Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H.,  July  21,  1941. 
From:  Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  PACIFIC  FLEET. 
To:  Distribution  List  for  WPPac-46. 
Subject:  WPPac-46,  promulgation  of. 
Enclosures: 

(A)  Pages  for  WPPac-46;  Reg.  No.  5Jncluding  list  of  effective  pages. 

(B)  Receipt  form  in  duplicate. 

1.  U.  S.  PACIFIC  FLEET  Operating  Plan  Rainbow  Five  (Navy  Plan  0-1, 
Rainbow  Five)  (WPPac-46)  is  promulgated  herewith.  Holders  of  Commander- 
in-Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  Secret  letter  A16(R-5)040W  of  May  27,  1941  and 
the  tentative  Operation  Plan  promulgated  thereby,  will  destroy  them  by  burning 
and  make  report  of  destruction  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet. 

2.  A  receipt  form  is  enclosed  to  be  accomplished  and  forwarded  to  the  Chief 
of  Naval  Operations  (Registered  Publications  Section). 

3.  This  publication  will  be  handled  and  accounted  for  in  accordance  with  the 
instructions  contained  in  the  Navy  Regulations,  the  System  of  War  Planning  and 
the  Registered  Publication  Manual. 

4.  This  volume  shall  not  be  carried  in  aircraft,  and  when  not  in  use,  shall  be 
kept  in  Class  "A"  storage  as  prescribed  in  the  Registered  Publication  Manual. 


838       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

5.  IT  IS  FORBIDDEN  TO  MAKE  EXTRACTS  FROM  OR  COPY  POR- 
TIONS OF  THIS  PUBLICATION  WITHOUT  SPECIFIC  AUTHORITY 
FROM  THE  CHIEF  OF  NAVAL  OPERATIONS,  EXCEPT  AS  PROVIDED 
FOR  IN  CURRENT  EDITION  OF  THE  REGISTERED  PUBLICATION 
MANUAL. 

6.  SPECIAL  WARNING— the  contents  of  this  publication  shall  be  given 
the  nainimum  dissemination  compatible  with  thorough  preparation  of  the  sub- 
ordinate plans. 

P.  C.  Crosley,  H.  E.  Kimmel. 

P.  C.  Crosley, 

Flag  Secretary. 

InJ  U.    S.    Pacific    Fleet    Operating   Plan — Rainbow    Five    (Navy    Plan    0-1, 

Rainbow  Five) 
LIST  OF  EFFECTIVE  PAGES— WPPa^jie 


Subject  Matter 

Page  Number  > 

Change 
in  Effect 

Promulgating  letter:  C 

incPacfile  A16/WPPac-46(16)  Serial  056W 
WPPac-46 

1 

Original 

of  July  21,  1941. 
List  of  Effective  Pages 

ii 

Table  of  Corrections- 

Distribution  List 

iv 

Title  Page. 

1 

Table  of  Contents 

2,  2a,  2b  .           

Parts  I  to  V  (incl.) 

3-52  incl 

52a-52h  incl 

53-56  incl 

56a-56d  incl 

57-74  incl 

Annex  I.      

I-l  to  I-ll  incl 

Annex  II. _. 

II-l  to  II-9  inci 

AnnexIII 

III-l  to  III-5  inci 

Annex  IV •_ 

IV-1  to  IV-3  incl 

^  Pages  referred  to  are  indicated  by  italic  figures  enclosed  by  brackets  and  represent 
pages  of  original  exhibit. 
[««]  TABLE  OF  CORRECTIONS 


Change  No. 

Date  of 
entry 

Signature  and  rank  of  officer  entering  change 

[iv] 


DISTRIBUTION  LIST 


Regis- 
tered 
Official  to  Whom  Issued  Nos. 

Chief  of  Naval  Operations ..  1,2,3,4,5,6 

Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet 7,8 

Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Atlantic  Fleet 9 

Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Asiatic  Fleet 10,11 

Commander,  Task  Force  One  (Combatfor) 12,13 

Commander,  Task  Force  Two  (Comairbatfor) 14, 15 

Commander,  Task  Force  Three  (Comscofor) 16,17 

Commander,  Battleships  Battle  Force 18 

Commander,  Battleship  Division  One 19 

Commander,  Battleship  Division  Two. 20 

Commander,  Cruisers  Battle  Force 22 

Commander,  Cruiser  Division  Three 23 

Commander,  Carrier  Division  One.. ...      .      .      ...  25 

Commander,  Destroyers  Battle  Force 26 

Commander,  Destroyer  Flotilla  One 27 

Commander,  Minecraft  Battle  Force 28 

Commander,  Cruisers  Scouting  Force. 29 

Commander,  Cruiser  Division  Five 30 

Commander,  Cruiser  Division  Six 31 

Commander,  Aircraft  Scouting  Force 32 

Commander,  Patrol  Wing  Two. _ 33 

Commander,  Submarines  Scouting  Force  .  .      . 34 

Commander,  Base  Force _ 35,36 

Commanding  General,  Second  Marine  IDivision 37 

Commandant,  Naval  Station,  Samoa 38 

Commandant,  Eleventh  Naval  District .  ..    ..  39 

Commandant,  Twelfth  Naval  District .       ...  40 

Commandant,  Thirteenth  Naval  District. 41 

Commandant,  Fourteenth  Naval  District 42 

Commandant,  Fifteenth  Naval  District 43 

Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  is  holding  registered  numbers  21,  24,  and  44  to  60  in 
reserve. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  839 

SECRET 

[1]      U.  S.  PACIFIC  FLEET  OPERATING  PLAN— RAINBOW  FIVE 
(NAVY  PLAN  0-1,  RAINBOW  FIVE) 

WPPac-46 

[i]  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Subject                                                           Page  Nos.  i 
Introduction: 

Chapter  I.  Navy  Basic  War  Plan  (Rainbow  Five) - 3 

Chapter  II.  Format  of  Fleet  Plans 4 

Chapter  III.  Subordinate  Plans. 1...  6 

Chapter  IV.  Mobilization. 8 

Part  I.  Task  Organization,  Assumptions,  Information: 

Chapter  I.  Task  Organization 9 

Chapter  II.  Assumptions 15 

Section  1.  General  Assumptions _ 15 

Section  2.  Special  Assumption 16 

Chapter  III.  Information 17 

Section  1.  General  Information 17 

Section  2.  Enemy  Information 20 

Section  3.  Estimate  of  Enemy  Action 21 

Part  II.  Outline  of  Tasks: 

Chapter  I.  Tasks  Assigned  by  Navy  Basic  Plan, — Mission.. 24 

Chapter  II.  Tasks  Formulated  to  Accomplish  the  Assigned  Missions 25 

Part  III.  Task  AssignmeiU: 

Chapter  I.  Phase  1 28 

Section  1.  Task  Force  One 28 

Section  2.  Task  Force  Two 29 

Section  3.  Task  Force  Three 30 

Section  4.  Task  Force  Nine  (Patrol  Plane  Force) 32 

Section  5.  Task  Force  Seven  (Undersea  Force) 33 

Section  6.  Task  Force  Eight  (Mining  Force) 34 

Section  7.  Task  Force  Six  (Logistic  and  Control  Force) 35 

Sections.  Naval  Coastal  Frontiers 36 

Section  9.  Tasks  Jointly  Applicable 38 

\ia]              Chapter  II.  Phase  lA 39 

Section  1.  Task  Force  One. 39 

Section  2.  Task  Force  Two 40 

-  Section  3.  Task  Force  Three 41 

Section  4.  Task  Force  Nine  (Patrol  Plane  Force) 42 

Section  5.  Task  Force  Seven  (Undersea  Force) 45 

Section  6.  Task  Force  Eight  (Mining  Force) 48 

Section  7.  Task  Force  Six  (Logistic  and  Control  Force) 49 

Section  8.  Naval  Coastal  Frontiers 50 

Section  9.  Tasks  Jointly  Applicable 51 

Chapter  III.  Phases  Succeeding  Phase  lA 52 

Section  1.  Task  Force  One 52 

Section  2.  Task  Force  Two 52a 

Section  3.  Task  Force  Three 62b 

Section  4.  Task  Force  Nine  (Patrol  Plane  Force) 52c 

Section  5.  Task  Force  Seven  (Undersea  Force) 52d 

Section  6.  Task  Force  Eight  (Mining  Force) 52e 

Section  7.  Task  Force  Six  (Logistic  and  Control  Force) 52f 

Section  8.  Naval  Coastal  Frontiers 52g 

Section  9.  Tasks  Jointly  Applicable 52h 

Chapter  IV.  Execution  of  the  Plan 53 

Chapter  V.  Initial  Transfer  of  Units 54 

Part  IV.  Logistics: 

Chapter  I.  General 56 

Chapter  II.  Transportation 56a 

Chapter  III.  Hospitalization  and  Evacuation 56b 

Chapter  IV.  Prize  Crews 56c 

Chapter  V.  Salvage..... 56d 

Part  V.  Special  Provisions: 

Chapter  I.  Time  to  be  Used 57 

Chapter  II.  Communications 58 

Chapter  III.  Location  of  Commander-in-Chief 59 

Chapter  IV.  Tentative  Operations  Plans— Phase  land  lA 60 

Section  1.  Phase  I 61 

Section  2.  Phase  lA 68 

[Sb]       Annex  I.  Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan '. I-l  to  I-ll 

Annex  II.  Marshall  Reconnaissance  and  Raiding  Plan.. _. II-l  to  II-9 

Annex  III.  Communication  Plan _.. III-l  to  III-5 

Annex  IV.  Command  Relationship  and  Coordination  of  Activities  at  Outlying  Bases_ IV-1  to  IV-3 

*  Pages  referred  to  are  indicated  by  italic  figures  enclosed  by  brackets  and  represent 
pages  of  original  exhibit. 


840       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 
[S]  SECRET 

U.  S.  PACIFIC  FLEET  OPERATING  PLAN  RAINBOW  FIVE 
(NAVY  PLAN  0-1,  RAINBOW  FIVE) 

Introduction 

chapter  i.  navy  basic  war  plan  (rainbow  five) 

0101.  Navy  Basic  War  Plan  (Rainbow  Five)  is  the  directive  which  this  U.  S. 
PACIFIC  FLEET  Operating  Plan  (Rainbow  Five)  is  designed  to  implement  in 
so  far  as  the  tasks  assigned  the  U.  S.  PACIFIC  FLEET  are  concerned.  As  the 
Basic  Plan  is  in  the  possession  of  most  of  the  recipients  of  this  Fleet  Plan,  only 
particularly  pertinent  parts  of  it  will  be  repeated  herein.  These  parts  have  to  do 
chiefly  with  assumptions,  concepts  of  enemy  action,  and  tasks. 

[4]  CHAPTER   II.    FORMAT    OF    FLEET    PLANS 

0201.  This  Plan  follows  the  standard  War  Plan  form  of  WPL-8  except  for  small 
variations  made  for  the  purpose  of  facilitating  ready  reference  and  quick  dissemi- 
nation on  the  outbreak  of  war.     These,  in  brief,  are  as  follows: 

a.  In  Part  I  the  order  of  presentation  is: 

Chapter  I — Task  Organization. 
Chapter  II — Assumptions. 
Chapter  III — Information. 

b.  In  Part  II  are  incorporated: 

Chapter  I  — Task  assigned  by  Basic  Plan. 

Chapter  II — Phases;  and  specific  tasks,  arranged  by  phases,  for  accom- 
plishing the  assigned  mission  together  with  (in  a  few  in- 
stances) decisions  as  to  how  they  will  be  initially  carried 
out. 

c.  In  Part  III  the  first  three  chapters  each  cover  one  phase.  Within  each  of 
those  chapters  the  tasks  assigned  to  each  task  force  are  grouped  in  a  separate 
section,  except  the  naval  coastal  frontiers,  which  are  grouped  together.  Perti- 
nent special  information  and  logistic  instructions  are  placed  with  the  tasks  given 
therein  or  they  are  placed  in  an  appropriate  annex  of  this  0-1  Plan.  Where  a 
task  requires  coordinated  action  with  other  task  forces,  reference  is  simply  made 
to  the  annex  which  comprises  the  plan  for  such  coordinated  action. 

d.  Sections  1  and  2  of  Chapter  IV,  Part  V  are  tentative  fleet  operation  plans 
which,  when  completed  by'the  assignment  of  forces  actually  available  at  the  time, 
and  modified  to  meet  any  change  in  the  conditions  whi^h  have  been  visualized 
in  this  Fleet  War  Plan  {tj.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  Operating  Plan — Rainbow  Five),  are 
considered  suitable,  together  with  the  annexes,  for  placing  into  eff'ect  the  measures 
of  Phase  I  and  Phase  lA  of  this  Plan.  In  other  words  Chapter  IV,  Part  V  could 
be  omitted  as  the  material  therein  is  completely  covered  in  the  text  that  precedes 
{5\  them.  They  are  included,  however,  for  the  sake  of  clarity  and  in  order  to 
have  immediately  available  tentative  fleet  operation  plans  in  the  conventional 
form  with  which  all  concerned  are  familiar. 

e.  Annexes  I,  II,  etc.,  are  plans,  special  plans  issued  by  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  for  a  particular  purpose.  They  may  be  made  effective  separately  if  occa- 
sion requires.  The  forces  affected  are  indicated  in  the  annex  itself.  Some  of 
the  annexes  may  ultimately  be  only  guides  for  promulgation  of  an  operation  order 
by  despatch  or  letter. 

f.  Supporting  plans  of  subordinate  commanders,  which  are  prescribed  in  the 
next  chapter,  are  to  be  appended  as  lettered  annexes. 

[6]  CHAPTER   in.    SUBORDINATE    PLANS 

0301.  Subordinate  plans  to  support  this  Fleet  Operating  Plan  will  be  prepared 
as  follows: 

a.  The  Commanders  of  the  forces  designated  in  the  Task  Organization  in 
Chapter  I,  Part  I  of  this  Plan,  will  prepare  supporting  plans  for  each  assigned 
task,  the  accomplishment  of  which  would  be  facilitated  by  further  planning. 

b.  These  supporting  plans  will  be,  as  closely  as  practicable,  in  the  standard 
form  of  operation  plans,  and  will  be  incorporated  as  annexes  to  this  Fleet  Operat- 
ing Plan.  Where  the  nature  of  the  tasks  lends  itself  to  such  procedure,  the  plan 
for  their  accomplishment  may  be  in  the  form  of  a  single  annex.  Where  such  is 
not  the  case,  as  where  tasks  are  assigned  in  one  or  more  of  the  Commander-in- 
Chief's  annexes,  several  plans  may  be  required. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  841 

c.  Letter  designations  for  annexes  are  assigned  to  each  commander  as  listed 
below.  The  first  annex  to  be  prepared  will  be  designated  as  "Letter-1",  the 
second  as  "Letter-2",  etc.  It  should  be  noted  that  if  the  nature  of  a  task  as- 
signed at  present  does  not  require  the  preparation  of  a  subordinate  plan  by  a 
commander,  the  annex  assigned  him  below  will  be  vacant. 

Task  Force  One A-1,  etc. 

Task  Force  Two B-l)  " 

Task  Force  Three C-l]  " 

Aircraft  Scouting  Force D-l',  " 

Submarines  Scouting  Force E-1,'  " 

Minecraft  Battle  Force F-l'  " 

Base  Force G-l,  " 

Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier H-l'  " 

Pacific  Southern  Naval  Coastal  Frontier ' J-l/  " 

Pacific  Northern  Naval  Coastal  Frontier K-l,  " 

d.  In  the  subordinate  plans,  forces  should,  in  general,  be  listed  in  the  task 
organization  by  organizations  and  approximate  numbers  of  types  rather  than 
by  name,  unless  it  is  known  that  specific  units  will  be  available. 

e.  If  a  commander  considers  it  desirable  to  disseminate  the  considerations 
which  have  governed  his  decision  and  task  assignments,  he  should  append  a 
brief  and  sum-  [7]  marized  estimate  of  the  situation  as  an  addendum  to 
his  plan.  Auxiliary  directives  such  as  communication  plans  should  also  be  ap- 
pended as  addenda  to  the  task  force  commander's  plan. 

f.  If  the  execution  of  the  subordinate  plans  would  be  facilitated  by  still  further 
preliminary  planning,  task  force  commanders  should  require  their  group  com- 
manders to  submit  plans  for  the  accomplishment  of  the  tasks  assigned  them  in 
the  task  force  commander's  plans.  These  will  be  designated  as  addenda,  but 
will  not  be  incorporated  with  this  Fleet  Plan.  They  need  be  submitted  only  to 
the  task  force  commander  for  acceptance, 

g.  If  appropriate,  each  subsidiary  plan  will  include  in  an  addendum,  the  logistic 
requirements  for  carrying  out  the  plan  in  so  far  as  they  can  be  foreseen.  Such 
addenda  may  or  may  not  be  incorporated  in  the  Fleet  Plan,  but,  in  every  case, 
copies  will  be  supplied  to  Commander  Base  Force. 

h.  The  plans  must  be  predicated  upon  realities  and  must  provide  for  maximum 
possible  utilization  of  forces  presently  available.  Unless  absolutely  necessary, 
plans  should  not  be  based  upon  either  conceptions  or  material  not  reasonably 
attainable.  When  material,  equipment  or  personnel,  not  immediately  available, 
is  necessary  for  the  successful  execution  of  the  measures  to  be  undertaken,  this 
shall  be  made  the  subject  of  an  addendum.  The  commander  concerned  shall  take 
immediate  action  to  remedy  the  deficiencies,  forwarding  necessary  correspondence 
through  the  Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet.  Thereafter  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  shall  be  informed  of  corrections  of  these  deficiencies  as  the}'  occur. 

i.  Task  force  commanders  will  employ,  in  subdividing  their  forces,  the  decimal 
system  of  numbering  subdivisions. 

j.  In  numbering  the  pages  of  the  plans  which  form  annexes  of  this  Fleet  Plan, 
lower  case  letters  to  correspond  to  the  letters  assigned  in  subparagraph  c  above 
will  be  used.  Thus  the  first  page  of  the  plan  of  Commander  Task  Force  One 
will  be  "a-1". 

[8]  CHAPTER   IV.    MOBILIZATION 

0401.  At  the  date  of  issue  of  this  plan,  the  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  has  virtually 
mobilized,  and  is  operating,  with  intensive  security  measures,  from  the  Pearl 
Harbor  base.  It  is  expected,  therefore,  that  the  major  portion  of  the  Fleet  can 
be  ready  for  active  service  within  four  days  of  an  order  for  general  mobilization. 
To  provide  for  the  contingency  of  M-day  being  set  prior  to  the  date  on  which 
hostilities  are  to  open,  the  day  of  execution  of  this  Plan  is  designated  throughout 
the  Plan  as  W-da}'.  The  day  that  hostilities  open  with  Japan  will  be  designated 
J-day.     This  may  or  may  not  coincide  with  W-day. 

[9]  Part  I.  Task  Organization,  Assumptions,  Information 

CHAPTER  I.    TASK  ORGANIZATION 

1101.  The  forces  available  to  the  Pacific  Fleet  are  listed  in  the  current  Appendix 
II  of  the  Basic  Plan.  In  addition,  the  Commanders  of  the  Pacific  Southern, 
Pacific  Northern,  and  Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontiers,  and  the  Commandants 


842       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

of  the  Naval  Stations  Guam  and  Samoa  are  considered  to  be  oflBcers  of  the  U.  S. 
Pacific  Fleet,  and,  through  them,  the  local  defense  and  coastal  forces  are  subject 
to  the  orders  of  the  Commander-in-Chief. 

1102.  For  planning  purposes,  tasks  are  assigned  to  the  commanders  of  the 
current  task  forces  in  the  Fleet  and  to  certain  other  commanders  who  are  to 
become  task  force  commanders  as  indicated  in  paragraph  1107  below. 

1103.  As  of  July  1,  1941,  the  major  task  forces,  their  commanders,  and  their 
broad  tasks  for  which  they  are  training,  are  as  follows: 

Task  Force  One. — for  covering  operations — Commander  Battle  Force  in 
command. 

Task  Force  Two. — for  reconnaissance  in  force  and  raiding  operations — Com- 
mander Aircraft  Battle  Force  in  command. 

Task  Force  Three. — for  landing  attack  operations — Commander  Scouting 
Force  in  command. 

1104.  The  subdivision  of  the  Fleet  which  is  made  in  paragraph  1107  below  is 
designed  to  provide  a  flexible  overall  task  organization  from  which  may  be  drawn 
the  task  forces  to  accomplish  the  operations  which  can  be  visualized  at  this  time. 
It  must  be  realized  that,  for  most  operations,  certain  units  must  be  transferred 
between  task  forces,  some  will  be  absent  in  the  navy  yard  or  for  other  reasons, 
and,  in  some  cases,  two  or  more  task  forces  will  be  merged  under  the  command  of 
the  senior  oflBcer  concerned.  Also  many  of  the  tasks  assigned  to  a  task  force  in 
this  plan  do  not  require  the  employment  of  the  whole  task  force.  In  such  cases 
the  task  force  commander  will  utilize  such  units  of  his  force  as  are  required  to 
accomplish  the  assigned  task. 

[10]  CHAPTER  I.    TASK    ORGANIZATION 

1105.  It  is  not  expected  that  the  Task  Organization  as  shown  below  will  be 
efi"ective  throughout  the  campaign.  Rather  it  will  be  the  basis  for  making  up 
particular  task  organizations  for  the  various  operations  that  may  be  required. 
It  will  be  the  specific  plans  and  orders  in  effect  at  any  given  time  which  will  show 
the  task  organizations  at  that  time. 

1106.  Units  assigned  to  a  task  force  or  to  a  task  group  in  the  normal  organiza- 
tion that  are  subsequently  assigned  to  another  task  force  or  task  group  will 
thereafter  continue  as  an  integral  part  of  the  last  organization  to  which  assigned 
until  released  by  the  commander  thereof.  The  commanders  mentioned  will 
release  such  units  as  promptly  as  the  situation  at  the  time  permits  when  the 
period  of  assignment  to  their  commands  has  terminated  or  when  further  reassign- 
ment is  made  by  competent  authority. 

[11]         1107.  The  Normal  Task  Organization  for  this  Plan  is  as  follows: 

1.  TASK  FORCE  ONE  Commander  Battle  Force 

Batdivs  2,  4 6  BB 

SARATOGA 1  CV 

Crudivs  3,  9 5  CL 

Desflot  1  less  Desrons  5,  9 4  OCL# 

2  DL 
16  DD# 
2  AD 
(Wncludfts  Southeast  Pacific  Force  of  2  OCL  and  4  DD.) 

2.  TASK  FORCE  TWO  Commander  Aircraft  Battle  Force 

Batdiv  1 3  BB 

Cardiv  2  less  YORKTOWN 1  CV 

Crudiv  5 1 4  CA# 

Desflot  2  less  Desrons  4,  8  and  Desdiv  50 1  OCL 

8  DD 
2  AD 
(#lncludes  Atlantic  Reenforcement  of  4  CA.) 

3.  TASK  FORCE  THREE  Commander  Scouting  Force 

Crudivs  4,  6 8  CA 

Cardiv  1  less  SARATOGA 1  CV 

Desrons  4,  5 2  DL 

16  DD 

Minron  3,  less  Mindivs  5,  6 5  DM 

Available  Transports  Base  Force —  AP 

—  APD 

2d  Marine  Div  less  Defense  Batt. 
2d  Marine  Air  Group. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  843 

[12]  4.  TASK  FORCE  NINE  (Patrol  Plane  Force)  Commander  Aircraft 
Scouting  Force 

All  units  of  Aircraft  Scouting  Force 107  VP 

2  AV 
2  AVP 
4  AVD 
Utility  Squadron  from  Base  Force _ 10  VJR 

5.  TASK  FORCE  SEVEN  (Undersea  Force)  Commander  Submarines  Scouting 
Force 

All  units  of  Submarines  Scouting  Force  except  Sound  School.  _     30  SS 

2  OSS 
1  SM 

1  ODD 

3  AS 

2  ASR 
1  AM 

6.  TASK  FORCE  EIGHT  (Mining  Force)  Commander  Minecraft  Battle 
Force 

All  units  of  Minecraft  Battle  Force 1  CM 

8  DM 

7.  TASK  FORCE  SIX  (Logistic  &  Control  Force)  Commander  Base  Force 

All  units  of  Base  Force  except  AP,  APD  and  Minron  3  less       8  DMS 
Divs  5  and  6  and  10  VJ.  4  AF 

6  AT 

1  AH 
13  AO 

2  AR 

1  ARD 

2  AK 
2  AE 

1  AKS 
10  AM 

4  AG 
Utility 

Wing 
[13]         8.   TASK  FORCE  FOUR   (Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier)    Com- 
mandant, Fourteenth  Naval  District. 
Local  defense  forces. 

9.  TASK  FORCE  FIVE  (Pacific  Southern  Naval  Coastal  Frontier)  Com- 
mandant, Twelfth  Naval  District. 

Coastal  and  local  defense  forces. 

10.  TASK  FORCE  TEN  (Pacific  Northern  Naval  Coastal  Frontier)  Com- 
mandant, Thirteenth  Naval  District. 

Local  defense  forces. 
[14]  1108.  The  Southeast  Pacific  Force  and  the  Atlantic  Reenforcement, 
composed  as  indicated  above,  will  operate  under  the  Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S. 
Pacific  Fleet  until  specifically  detached  by  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations.  They 
will  not,  however,  be  sent  to*  such  distances  from  Pearl  Harbor  as  would  prevent 
their  arrival  in  the  Canal  Zone  twenty-one  days  after  their  transfer  is  ordered. 

[IS]  Chapter  II.  Assumptions 

Section  1.  General  Assumptions 

1211.  The  general  assumptions  on  which  this  Plan  is  based  are: 

a.  That  the  Associated  Powers,  comprising  initially  the  United  States,  the 
British  Commonwealth,  (less  Eire),  the  Netherlands  East  Indies,  the  Govern- 
ments in  Exile,  China,  and  the  "Free  French"  are  at  war  against  the  Axis  powers, 
comprising  either: 

1.  Germany,  Italy,  Roumania,  Hungary,  Bulgaria,  or 

2.  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  Roumania,  Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and  Thailand. 
Note.  As  of  22  June  war  exists  between  the  European  Axis  and  Russia, 

and  the  latter  may  be  tentatively  considered  as  an  aUy  against  that  part  of 
the  Axis  but  not  necessarily  against  Japan. 

b.  That  even  if  Japan  and  Thailand  are  not  initially  in  the  war,  the  possibility 
of  their  intervention  must  be  taken  into  account, 

c.  That  Latin  American  Republics  will  take  measures  to  control  subversive 


844       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

elements,  but  will  remain  in  a  non-belligerent  status  unless  subject  to  direct 
attack;  in  general,  the  territorial  waters  and  land  bases  of  these  Republics  will 
be  available  for  use  by  United  States  forces  for  purposes  of  Hemisphere  Defense. 

d.  That  the  principal  military  effort  of  the  Associated  Powers  will  be  in  the 
Atlantic  and  European  Areas,  and  that  operations  in  other  areas  will  be  so  con- 
ducted as  to  facilitate  that  effort.  Therefore,  transfer  of  units  from  the  Pacific 
Fleet  to  the  Atlantic  Fleet  is  provided  for  in  the  Navy  Basic  Plan,  and  additional 
transfers  may  become  necessary. 

e.  That  the  Asiatic  Fleet  will  not  be  reinforced  by  the  Pacific  Fleet,  but  that 
eventually,  if  Japan  enters  the  war,  heavy  British  reenforcements  will  be  made 
in  the  Far  East. 

[16]         Section  2.  Special  Assumption 

1221.  That  the  Pacific  Fleet  is  virtually  mobilized  and  is  based  at  Pearl  Harbor, 
but  regular  navy  yard  overhauls  are  in  progress  which  would  reduce  forces 
immediately  available  by  about  one-fifth. 

[17]  CHAPTER   III.    INFORMATION 

Section  1.  General  Information 

1311.  a.  The  Pacific  Area,  which  is  under  the  command  of  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  is  that  part  of  the  area  of  the  Pacific  Ocean: 

1.  North  of  Latitude  30°  North  and  west  of  Longitude  140°  East. 

2.  North  of  the  equator  and  east  of  Longitude  140°  East. 

3.  South  of  the  equator  and  east  of  Longitude  180°  to  the  South  American 
Coast  and  Longitude  74°  West. 

4.  Less  waters  in  which  Canada  may  assume  strategic  direction  of  military 
forces. 

b.  In  addition,  the  United  States  will  afford  support  to  British  Naval  Forces 
in  the  regions  south  of  the  equator,  as  far  west  as  Longitude  155°  East. 

c.  The  Southeast  Pacific  Sub- Area,  when  established^  wUl  be  that  part  of  the 
Pacific  Area  south  of  the  Panama  Naval  Coastal  Frontier  and  between  the  West 
Coast  of  South  America  and  approximately  Longitude  95°  West. 

d.  The  Pacific  Southern  Naval  Coastal  Frontier  includes  the  coastal  zone 
extending  from  the  northern  boundary  of  California  to  the  southern  boundary  of 
Mexico. 

e.  The  Pacific  Northern  Naval  Coastal  Frontier  includes  the  coastal  zone  of 
the  Northwestern  United  States  north  of  the  northern  boundary  of  California, 
and,  in  addition,  Alaska. 

f .  The  Pacific  sector  of  the  Panama  Naval  Coastal  Frontier  includes  the  coastal 
zone  defined  to  be  within  a  broken  line  drawn  from  the  Mexico-Guatemala 
boundary  to  a  point  in  Latitude  5°  South,  Longitude  95°  West  and  thence  to  the 
Peru-Ecuador  border,  and  to  include  the  sea  routes  near  the  southern  and  western 
borders  of  that  zone. 

[18]  g.  The  Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier  consists  of  Oahu,  and  all  the 
land  and  sea  areas  required  for  the  defense  of  Oahu.  The  coastal  zone  extends  to 
a  distance  of  500  miles  from  all  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  including  Johnston  and 
Palmyra  Islands  and  Kingman  Reef. 

h.  The  Far  East  Area  is  defined  as  the  area  from  the  coast  of  China  in  Latitude 
30°  North,  east  to  Longitude  140°  East,  thence  south  to  the  equator,  thence  east 
to  Longitude  141°  East,  thence  south  to  the  boundary  of  Dutch  New  Guinea  on 
the  south  coast,  thence  westward 'to  Latitude  11°  South,  Longitude  120°  East, 
thence  south  to  Latitude  13°  South,  thence  west  to  Longitude  92°  East,  thence 
north  to  Latitude  20°  North,  thence  to  the  boundary  between  India  and  Burma. 

i.  In  the  Far  East  Area,  responsibility  for  the  strategic  direction  of  the  naval 
forces  of  the  Associated  Powers,  except  of  naval  forces  engaged  in  supporting  the 
defense  of  the  Philippines  will  be  assumed  by  the  British  Naval  Commander-in- 
Chief,  China.  The  Commander-in-Chief,  United  States  Asiatic  Fleet,  will  be 
responsible  for  the  direction  of  naval  forces  engaged  in  supporting  the  defense  of 
the  Philippines. 

j.  The  Australia  and  New  Zealand  Area  comprises  the  Australian  and  New 
Zealand  British  Naval  Stations  west  of  Longitude  180°  and  south  of  the  equator. 
The  British  Naval  Commander-in-Chief,  China,  is  responsible  for  the  strategic 
direction  of  the  naval  forces  of  the  Associated  Powers  operating  in  this  Area. 

1312.  The  foregoing  delineation  of  principal  areas  and  the  agreements  as  to 
cooperation  between  the  United  States  and  the  British  Commonwealth  are  con- 
tained in  the  Report  of  United  States-British  StafiF  Conversations   (ABC-1). 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  845 

Joint  United  States-Canada  War  Plan  No.  2  (ABC-22)  is  now  in  the  process  of 
preparation.  Similar  agreements  with  the  Netherlands  East  Indies  are  being 
made. 

[19]         1313.  The  following  principles  of  command  will  obtain: 

a.  As  a  general  rule,  the  forces  of  the  United  States  and  those  of  the  United 
Kingdom  should  operate  under  their  own  commanders  in  the  areas  of  responsi- 
bility of  their  own  Power. 

b.  The  assignment  of  an  area  to  one  Power  shall  not  be  construed  as  restricting 
the  forces  of  the  other  Power  from  temporarily  extending  appropriate  operations 
into  that  area,  as  may  be  required  by  particular  circumstances. 

c.  The  forces  of  either  Power  which  are  employed  normally  under  the  strategic 
direction  of  an  established  commander  of  the  other,  will,  with  due  regard  to  their 
type,  be  emploj^ed  as  task  forces  charged  with  the  execution  of  specific  strategic 
tasks.  These  task  forces  will  operate  under  their  own  commanders  and  will 
not  be  distributed  into  small  bodies  attached  to  the  forces  of  the  other  Power. 
Only  exceptional  military  circumstances  will  justify  the  temporary  suspension 
of  the  normal  strategic  tasks. 

d.  When  units  of  both  Powers  cooperate  tactically,  command  will  be  exercised 
by  that  oflBcer  of  either  Power  who  is  the  senior  in  rank,  or  if  of  equal  rank,  of 
time  in  grade. 

e.  United  States  naval  aviation  forces  employed  in  British  Areas  will  operate 
under  United  States  Naval  command,  and  will  remain  an  integral  part  of  United 
States  Naval  task  forces.  Arrangements  will  be  made  for  coordination  of  their 
operations  with  those  of  the  appropriate  Coastal  Command  groups. 

1314.  The  concept  of  the  war  in  the  Pacific,  as  set  forth^in  ABC-1  is  as  foUows: 
Even  if  Japan  were  not  initially  to  enter  the  war  on  the  side  of  the  Axis 
Powers,  it  would  stiU  be  necessary  for  the  Associated  Powers  to  deploy  their 
forces  in  a  manner  to  guard  against  Japanese  intervention.  If  Japan  does 
enter  the  war,  the  military  strategy  in  the  Far  East  will  be  defen-.  [20] 
sive.  The  United  States  does  not  intend  to  add  to  its  present  military 
strength  in  the  Far  East  but  will  employ  the  United  States  Pacific  Fleet 
offensively  in  the  manner  best  calculated  to  weaken  Japanese  economic  power, 
and  to  support  the  defense  of  the  Malay  barrier  by  diverting  Japanese 
strength  away  from  Malaysia.  The  United  States  intends  to  so  augment  its 
forces  in  the  Atlantic  and  Mediterranean  areas  that  the  British  Common- 
wealth will  be  in  a  position  to  release  the  necessary  forces  for  the  Far  East. 

Section  2.  Enemy  Information 

1321.  Information  of  the  enemy  will  be  disseminated  prior  to  and  on  the  exe- 
cution of  this  Plan,  by  means  of  intelligence  reports. 

1322.  Information  which  is  of  special  interest  with  respect  to  a  specific  task 
is  included  with  that  task  in  Part  III  or  in  the  Annexes. 

[21]         Section  3.  Estimate  of  Enemy  Action 

1331.  It  is  believed  that  German  and  Italian  action  in  the  Pacific  will  be 
limited  to  commerce  raiding  with  converted  types,  and  possibly  with  an  occasional 
pocket  battleship  or  heavy  cruiser. 

1332.  It  is  conceived  that  Japanese  action  will  be  as  follows: 

a.  The  principal  offensive  effort  to  be  toward  the  eventual  capture  of  Malaysia 
(including  the  Philippines)  and  Hong  Kong. 

b.  The  secondary  offensive  efforts  to  be  toward  the  interruption  of  American 
and  Allied  sea  communications  in  the  Pacific,  the  Far  East  and  the  Indian  Ocean, 
and  to  accomplish  the  capture  of  Guam  and  other  outlying  positions. 

c.  The  offensive  against  China  to  be  maintained  on  a  reduced  scale  only. 

d.  The  principal  defensive  efforts  to  be: 

1.  Destruction  of  threatening  naval  forces. 

2.  Holding  positions  for  their  own  use  and  denying  positions  in  the  Central 
and  Western  Pacific  and  the  Far  East  which  may  be  suitable  for  advanced 
bases. 

3.  Protecting  national  and  captured  territory  and  approaches. 

1333.  To  accomplish  the  foregoing  it  is  beUeved  that  Japan's  initial  action 
wiU  be  toward: 

a.  Capture  of  Guam. 

b.  Establishment  of  control  over  the  South  China  Sea,  Philippine  waters,  and 
the  waters  between  Borneo  and  New  Guinea,  by  the  establishment  of  advanced 
bases,  and  by  the  [22]  destruction  of  United  States  and  aUied  air  and 
naval  forces  in  these  regions,  followed  by  the  capture  of  Luzon. 

c.  Capture  of  Northern  Borneo. 


846       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

d.  Denial  to  the  United  States  of  the  use  of  the  Marshall-Caroline- Marianas 
area  by  the  use  of  fixed  defenses,  and,  by  the  operation  of  air  forces  and  light 
naval  forces  to  reduce  the  strength  of  the  United  States  Fleet. 

e.  Reenforcement  of  the  Mandate  Islands  by  troops,  aircraft  and  light  naval 
forces. 

f.  Possibly  raids  or  stronger  attacks  on  Wake,  Midway  and  other  outlying 
United  States  positions. 

1334.  The  initial  Japanese  deployment  is  therefore  estimated  to  be  as  follows: 

a.  Troops  and  aircraft  in  the  Homeland,  Manchukuo,  and  China  with  strong 
concentrations  in  Formosa  and  Hainan,  fairly  strong  defenses  in  the  Carolines, 
and  comparatively  weak  but  constantly  growing  defenses  in  the  Marshalls. 

b.  Main  fleet  concentration  in  the  Inland  Sea,  shifting  to  a  central  position 
(possibly  Pescadores)  after  the  capture  of  Guam  and  the  reenforcement  of  the 
Mandates. 

c.  A  strong  fleet  detachment  in  the  Mindanao-Celebes  area  (probable  main 
base  in  Halmahera). 

d.  Sufficient  units  in  the  Japan  Sea  to  counter  moves  of  Russian  Naval  forces 
in  that  area. 

e.  Strong  concentration  of  submarines  and  light  surface  patrol  craft  in  the 
Mandates,  with  such  air  scouting  and  air  attack  units  as  can  be  supported  there. 

f.  Raiding  and  observation  forces  widely  distributed  in  the  Pacific,  and  sub- 
marines in  the  Hawaiian  Area. 

[S3]  g.  Obsolete  and  weaker  units  on  patrol  of  coastal  areas  and  focal  areas 
of  lines  of  communication. 

h.  Merchant  ships  in  neutral  ports  or  proceeding  home  via  detours  wide  of 
usual  routes. 

[S4]  Part  II.  Outline  of  Tasks 

CHAPTER  I.    TASKS  ASSIGNED  BY  NAVY  BASIC  PLAN — MISSION 

2101.  The  Navy  Basic  War  Plan  (Rainbow  Five)  assigns  the  following  tasks 
within  the  Pacific  Area  to  the  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet: 

a.  Support  the  forces  of  the  associated  powers  in  the  Far  East  by  diverting 
enemy  strength  away  from  the  Malay  Barrier,  through  the  denial  and  capture 
of  positions  in  the  Marshalls,  and  through  raids  on  enemy  sea  communications 
and  positions; 

b.  Prepare  to  capture  and  establish  control  over  the  Caroline  and  Marshall 
Island  area,  and  to  establish  an  advanced  fleet  base  in  Truk; 

c.  Destroy  axis  sea  communications  by  capturing  or  destroying  vessels  trading 
directly  or  indirectly  with  the  enemy; 

d.  Support  British  naval  forces  in  the'area  south  of  the  equator  as  far  west  as 
longitude  155"  east;  "^"'^^      -^  p.. 

e.  Defend  Samoa  in  category  "D";  W  W^  w'-f^<^-^  *•  ^  p'^' 

f .  Defend  Guam  in  category  "  F" ;  '^  b»  ^  -^  -.  u„  «  ^  >- 

g.  Protect  the  sea  communications'^of^the  associated  powers  by  escorting, 
covering,  and  patrolling  as  required  by  circumstances,  and  by  destroying  enemy 
raiding  forces; 

h.  Protect  the  territory  of  the  associated  powers  in  the  Pacific  area  and  prevent 
the  extension  of  enemy  military  power^^into  the  Western  Hemisphere  by  destroying 
hostile  expeditions  and]by  supporting  land  and  air  forces Jn  denying  the  enemy 
the  use  of  land  positions  in  that  hemisphere; 

i.  Cover  the  operations  of  the  naval  coastal  frontier  forces; 

j.  Establish  fleet  control  zones,  defining  their  limits^from  time  to  time  as 
circumstances  require; 

k.  Route  shipping  of  associated  powers  within  the  fleet  control  zones. 

[25]         CHAPTER   II.    TASKS   FORMULATED   TO   ACCOMPLISH   THE    ASSIGNED   MISSIONS 

2201.  It  will  be  noted  that  the  tasks  assigned  in  the  previous  chapter  are  based 
upon  Assumption  a2  of  paragraph  1211  (Japan  in  the  war).  In  formulating  tasks 
the  Commander-in-Chief  has  provided  also  for  Assumption  al  and  divides  the 
tasks  to  be  accomplished  by  the  Pacific  Fleet  into  phases,  as  follows: 

a.  PHASE  I — Initial  tasks — Japan  not  in  the  war. 

b.  PHASE  lA — Initial  tasks — Japan  in  the  war. 

c.  PHASE  II,  etc. — Succeeding  tasks. 

2202.  Phase  I  tasks  are  as  follows: 

a.  Complete  mobilization  and  prepare  for  distant  operations;  thereafter  main- 
tain all  types  in  constant  readiness  for  distant  service. 

b.  Maintain  fleet  security  at  bases  and  anchorages  and  at  sea. 


PEOCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  847 

c.  Transfer  the  Atlantic  reenforcement,  if  ordered. 

d.  Transfer  the  Southeast  Pacific  Force,  if  ordered. 

e.  Assign  twelve  patrol  planes  and  two  small  tenders  to  Pacific  Southern  and  a 
similar  force  to  Pacific  Northern  Naval  Coastal  Frontier,  on  M-day. 

f.  Assign  two  submarines  and  one  submarine  rescue  vessel  to  Pacific  Northern 
Naval  Coastal  Frontier  on  M.day. 

g.  Protect  the  communications  and  territory  of  the  associated  powers  and 
prevent  the  extension  of  enemy  military  power  into  the  Western  Hemisphere  by 
patrolling  with  light  forces  and  patrol  planes,  and  by  the  action  of  striking  groups 
as  necessary.  In  so  doing  support  the  British  Naval  Forces  south  of  the  equator 
as  far  west  as  Longitude  155°  East. 

h.  Establish  defensive  submarine  patrols  at  Wake  and  Midway. 

[S6]  2202.  i.  Observe,  with  submarines  outside  the  three  mile  limit,  the 
possible  raider  bases  in  the  Japanese  mandates,  if  authorized  at  the  time  by  the 
Navy  Department. 

j.  Prosecute  the  establishment  and  defense  of  subsidiary  bases  at  Midway, 
Johnston,  Palmyra,  Samoa,  Guam  and  Wake,  and  at  Canton  if  authorized. 

k.  Continue  training  operations  as  practicable. 

1.  Move  the  maximum  practicable  portion  of  second  Marine  Division  to  Hawaii 
for  training  in  landing  operations. 

m.  Guard  against  surprise  attack  by  Japan. 

Phase  I A 

2203.  Phase  lA  tasks  are  as  follows: 

a.  Continue  tasks  outlined  in  2202  a,  b,  g,  h,  and  k.    ■ 

b.  AccompUsh  such  of  the  tasks  in  2202  c,  d,  e,  f,  and  j  as  have  not  been  com- 
pleted. 

c.  Make  an  initial  sweep  for  Japanese  merchantmen  and  enemy  raiders  and 
tenders  in  the  northern  Pacific. 

d.  Continue  the  protection  of  the  territory  and  communications  of  the  asso- 
ciated powers,  and  of  the  naval  coastal  frontier  forces,  chiefly  by  covering  opera- 
tions. 

e.  1.  Make  reconnaissance  and  raid  in  force  on  the  Marshall  Islands. 

2.  If  available  cruisers  and  other  circumstances  permit,  make  cruiser  raids 
against  Japanese  shipping  in  waters  between  Hansei  Shoto  and  Nanpo  Shoto. 

f.  Establish  and  maintain  maximum  practicable  submarine  patrols  against 
Japanese  forces  and  communications  near  the  Japanese  homeland. 

g.  Maintain  air  patrols  against  enemy  forces  in  the  approaches  to  Oahu  and 
outlying  bases. 

[27]  2203.  h.  Escort  important  shipping,  including  troop  movements,  be- 
tween the  Hawaiian  rea  Aand  the  West  Coast. 

i.  Route  shipping  in  the  fleet  control  zone  when  established. 

j.  Augment  the  local  defense  forces  of  the  Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier 
as  necessary. 

k.  Move  from  San  Diego  to  Hawaii  the  remaining  units  and  equipment  of  the 
Second  Marine  Division. 

1.  Prepare  to  capture  and  establish  control  over  the  Marshall  Island  Area. 

Phase  II  and  subsequent  phases 

2204.  Tasks  of  Phase  II  and  Subsequent  Phases  which  can  be  formulated  at 
this  time  are: 

a.  Capture  and  establish  a  protected  fleet  anchorage  in  the  Marshall  Island 
Area. 

b.  Capture  or  deny  other  positions  in  the  Marshall  Island  Area  as  necessary 
for  further  advance  to  the  westward. 

c.  Raid  other  Japanese  land  objectives  and  sea  communications. 

d.  Capture  and  establish  an  advanced  fleet  base  at  Truk. 
6.  Continue  uncompleted  tasks  of  Phase  lA. 


848       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 
[28]  PA.RT  III.  Task  Assignment 

CHAPTER    I.    PHASE    I 

Section  1.  TASK  FORCE  ONE 

3111.  Task  Force  One  will  perform  tasks  as  required  by  the  following  para- 
graphs of  this  section. 

3112.  When  directed  release  two  small  light  cruisers  and  one  destroyer  division 
to  become  the  Southeast  Pacific  Force  as  required  by  the  navy  basic  plan. 

3113.  Perform  the  tasks  assigned  in  the  patrol  and  sweeping  plan  (Annex  I). 

[39]         Section  2.   TASK  FORCE  TWO 

3121.   Task  Force  Two  will: 

Perform  the  tasks  assigned  in  the  patrol  and  sweeping  plan  (Annex  I) . 
[SO]         Section  8.   TASK  FORCE  THREE 

3131.  Task  Force  Three  will  perform  the  tasks  assigned  in  the  following  para- 
graphs of  this  section. 

3132.  Perform  the  tasks  assigned  in  the  Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan  (Annex  I). 

3133.  a.  Move  from  San  Diego  to  Hawaii  the  maximum  practicable  portion  of 
the  Second  Marine  Division,  employing  attached  transports. 

b.  Make  preparations  and  train  for  landing  attacks  on  Japanese  bases  in  the 
Marshalls  for  purposes  of  capture  or  demolition,  with  particular  emphasis  on  plan 
for  capture  of  Eniwetok. 

c.  1.  Special  Information. 

As  of  July  1,  1941,  the  Marine  defenses  in  Hawaii  and  the  outlying  islands  are 
as  follows: 

MIDWAY    —34  officers 
750  men 

6  5' 751  caliber  guns 
12  3'750  caliber  AA  guns 
30  0.50  caliber  machine  guns 
30  0.30  caliber  machine  guns 
4  searchlights. 
JOHNSTON— 18  men 

2  5'751  caliber  guns 
4  0.30  caliber  machine  guns 
PALMYRA  —4  officers 
101  men 

4  5' 751  caliber  guns  ' 

4  3' 750  caliber  A  A  guns 
4  0.50  caliber  machine  guns 
4  0.30  caliber  machine  guns 
[31]      OAHU  —32  officers 

620  men 

4  5' 751  caliber  guns 
8  3' 750  caliber  A  A  guns 
20  0.50  caliber  machine  guns 
16  0.30  caliber  machine  guns 

Note:  The  above  personnel  are  defense  battalion  person- 
nel only  and  are  in  addition  to  personnel  employed  in  guard 
duty,  barracks  duty,  etc. 
WAKE  —None. 

2.   Task 

Furnish  additional  -defenses  for  outlying  bases  as  may  be  requested  by  the 
Commander  Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier  and  approved  by  the  Commander- 
in-Chief. 
[3S]         Section  4.  TALK  FORCE  NINE  (PATROL  PLANE  FORCE) 

3141.  Task  Force  Nine  will  perform  the  tasks  assigned  in  the  following  para- 
graphs of  this  section. 

3142.  On  W-day  transfer  twelve  patrol  planes  and  two  tenders  to  each  of  the 
Pacific  Southern  and  Pacific  Northern  Naval  Coastal  Frontiers.  Continue  admin- 
istration of  these  forces  and  rotate  detail  at  discretion. 

3143.  Perform  tasks  assigned  in  the  patrol  and  sweeping  plan  (Annex  I). 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  849 

[S3]        Section    5.  TASK    FORCE   SEVEN    (UNDERSEA    FORCE) 

3151.  Task  Force  Seven  will  perform  tasks  as  required  by  the  following  para- 
graphs of  this  section. 

3152.  a.  Special  Information. 

1.  There  are  indications  that  Axis  raiders^^have  been  basing  in  the  Marshall 
area. 

2.  The  imminence  of  the  entry  of  Japan  into  the  war  requires  a  deploy- 
ment suitable  for  this  eventuality. 

3.  NARWHAL  and  NAUTILUS  are  fitted  to  carry   13,500  gallons  of 
aviation  gasoline  each  for  fueling  patrol  planes. 

b.  Task. 

Maintain  patrols  required  by  the  patrol  and  sweeping  plan  (Annex  I) . 

c.  Special  Logistics. 

Logistic  replenishment  at  Pearl  Harbor  and  to  a  limited  degree  at  Midway. 

3153.  Assign  one  submarine  division  to  Task  Force  Three  as  required  for  land- 
ing attack  training. 

3154.  On  W-day  transfer  two  submarines  and  one  submarine  rescue  vessel  to 
Pacific  Northern  Naval  Coastal  Frontier  to  assist  in  defense  of  the  Alaskan 
sector.    Continue  administration  of  these  units  and  rotate  detail  at  discretion. 

[34]        Section  6.  TASK  FORCE  EIGHT  {MINING  FORCE) 
3161.   Task  Force  Eight  will: 
Continue  operations  and  training  under  commanders  Task  Forces  One  and  Two. 

[35]        Section  7.  TASK  FORCE  SIX  (LOGISTIC  &  CONTROL  FORCE) 

3171.  Task  Force  Six  will  perform  tasks  as  required  by  the  following  paragraphs. 

3172.  Provide  logistic  service  to  the  fleet  and  cooperate  with  Commander 
Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier  in  providing  logistic  services  to  outlying  bases. 

3173.  Perform  tasks  required  by  The  Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan  (Annex  I). 

3174.  Maintain  in  the  office  of  Commander  Pacific  Naval  Coastal  Frontier  an 
officer  to  maintain  liaison  with  respect  to  logistic  requirements  of  the  fleet,  the 
loading  of  base  force  and  NTS  vessels,  and  the  routing  and  protection  of  U.  S. 
and  Allied  shipping.  Maintain  close  liaison  with  Commander  Hawaiian  Naval 
Coastal  Frontier  for  the  same  purposes. 

3175.  Transfer  ten  VJR  to  Commander  Task  Force  Nine. 

[36]  Section  8.  NAVAL  COASTAL  FRONTIERS 

Task  Force  Four  (Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier) 

3181.  Special  Information. 

The  Basic  Plan  assigns  the  following  tasks  to  the  Commander,  Hawaiian 
Naval  Coastal  Frontier: 

a.  Defend  the  Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier  in  Category  "D".  (Category 
"D" — May  be  subject  to  major  attack).  (N.  B.  The  Commander-in-Chief, 
U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet,  does  not  consider  Category  "D"  will  apply  during  Phase  I.) 

b.  Protect  and  route  shipping  within  the  Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier. 
~~  c.  Support  the  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet. 

d.  Support  the  Army  and  Associated  Forces  within  the  Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal 
Frontier. 

3182.  By  this  Fleet  Plan,  Task  Force  Four  is  assigned  the  tasks  below. 

a.  Assist  in  providing  external  security  for  units  of  the  Fleet  in  the  Hawaiian 
Naval  Coastal  Frontier,  in  cooperation  with  the  Army  and  the  units  concerned. 
(As  of  the  date  of  issue  of  this  plan,  the  security  plan  of  the  Commander,  Hawaiian 
Naval  Coastal  Frontier  (as  Commander,  Base  Defense)  is  already  in  eff"ect). 

b.  Prosecute  the  establishment  of  subsidiary  bases  at  Midway,  Johnston, 
Palmyra,  and  Wake,  and  at  Canton  if  authorized.  Assist  as  practicable  in  the 
development  of  Samoa  and  Guam. 

c.  Make  the  facilities  of  outlying  bases  available  for  Fleet  units  operating  in 
the  vicinity;  and  directly  and  through  own  task  group  commanders  cooperate 
with  other  task  force  and  task  group  commanders  in  coordinating  the  military 
activities  at  these  bases.     (See  Annex  IV.) 


850       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

U.  S.  PACIFIC  FLEET  OPER ATI NGIPL AN—RAINBOW  FIVE 
{NAVY  PLAN  0-1,  RAINBOW  FIVE) 

PART  III.     TASK  ASSIGNMENT 

CHAPTER   I.      PHASE   I. 

[37]  3182.  d.  Utilize  units  of  the  Fleet  Marine  Force,  made  available  for 
the  purpose,  to  defend  Midway,  Johnston,  and  Palmyra,  and,  when  authorized, 
Wake  and  Canton. 

Task  Force  Five  {Pacific  Southern)  and  Task  Force  Ten  {Pacific  Northern 
Naval  Coastal  Frontier) 

3183.  Commanders  Task  Forces  Five  and  Ten  perform  tasks  assigned  by  the 
Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan  (Annex  I). 

[38]  Section  9.  TASKS  JOINTLY  APPLICABLE 

3191.  Until  detached  from  the  Fleet,  all  forces  less  those  of  Naval  Coastal 
Frontiers  will  perform  the  following  tasks: 

|f  a.  Units  in  the  Hawaiian  Area  complete  mobilization  at  Pearl  Harbor  by  the 
end  of  four  W-day;  units  designated  for  early  operations  complete  mobilization 
prior  to  the  time  designated  for  their  operations  to  commence.  Units  on  the 
Pacific  Coast  complete  mobilization  there  as  rapidly  as  possible. 

b.  Maintain  vessels  of  all  types  in  constant  readiness  for  distant  service. 

0.  Maintain  internal  and  external  security  of  forces  at  all  times,  cooperating 
with  commanders  of  naval  coastal  frontiers  while  within  the  limits  of  those 
frontiers.     Guard  against  surprise  attack  by  Japanese  forces. 

d.  Continue  such  training  activities  of  the  fleet  as  the  commander-in-chief 
may  direct. 

e.  Reinforce  local  defense  and  coastal  forces  as  directed. 

f.  Protect  the  territory  and  communications  of  the  associated  powers,  the 
operations  of  coastal  forces,  and  troop  movements  by  covering  and  other  opera- 
tions as  directed  by  the  commander-in-chief. 

{Sd\  CHAPTER   II.    PHASE    lA 

Section  1.  TASK  FORCE  ONE 

3211.  Task  Force  One  will  perform  tasks  as  required  by  the  following  para- 
graphs of  this  section. 

3212.  Perform  task  assigned  in  the  patrol  and  sweeping  plan  (Annex  I). 

3213.  Reenforce  and  support  operations  of  Task  Force  Two  as  required  in  the 
Marshall  reconnaissance  and  raiding  plan  (Annex  II). 

[40]         Section  2.  TASK  FORCE  TWO 

3221.  Task  Force  Two  will  perform  tasks  as  required  by  the  following  para- 
graph, 

3222.  Conduct  reconnaissance  and  raid  in  force  against  the  Marshalls  as 
required  in  the  Marshall  reconnaissance  and  raiding  plan  (Annex  II). 

[41]         Section  3.  TASK  FORCE  THREE 

3231.  Task  Force  Three  will  perform  tasks  as  required  by  the  following  para- 
graphs of  this  section. 

3232.  Conduct  initial  sweep  against  enemy  commerce  and  raiders  as  required 
in  The  Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan  (Annex  I). 

3233.  Reenforce  Task  Force  Two  as  required  by  the  Marshall  Reconnaissance 
and  Raiding  Plan  (Annex  II). 

3234.  Move  from  San  Diego  to  Hawaii  the  remaining  units  and  equipment  of 
the  Second  Marine  Division  and  continue  training  for  landing  exercises. 

3235.  Continue  task  assigned  in  subparagraph  3133  c,  2. 

[42]        Section  4.  TASK  FORCE  NINE  {PATROL  PLANE  FORCE) 

3241.  Task  Force  Nine  will  perform  tasks  as  required  in  the  following  para- 
graphs of  this  section. 

3242.  a.  Special  Information. 

1.  Patrol  plane  operations  from  Midway,  Wake,  Johnston,  Palmyra,  and 
Canton  are  feasible,  the  extent  of  such  operations  being  dependent  upon  the 
defenses,  facilities  and  supplies  available  at  the  time  operations  commence. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  851 

Those  defenses,  facilities  and  supplies  are  being  augmented.  As  of  July  1,  1941, 
tenders  cannot  base  at  Wake  or  Canton,  but  Pan-American  Airways'  facilities 
may  be  used  by  special  arrangement  or  by  commandeering.  A  project  for  the 
improvement  of  Wake  as  a  base  is  underway.  No  such  project  for  Canton  has 
been  approved. 

2.  No  aircraft  are  assigned  a-t  present  to  the  Commander,  Hawaiian  Naval 
Coastal  Frontier. 

3.  Our  submarines  will  assist  in  the  defense  of  Midway  and  Wake,  and  will 
habitually  operate  offensively  in  enemy  waters. 

4.  Land  defenses  exist  on  outlying  islands,  as  described  in  paragraph  3133c, 
1.  Commander  Task  Force  Four  (Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier),  is  charged 
with  the  defense  of  these  outlying  islands  and  will  make  them  available  for  patrol 
plane  operations. 

5.  It  is  believed  that  enemy  action  in  the  area  subject  to  our  patrol  plane  search 
will  comprise: 

(a)  Submarine  raids  and  observation  off  Oahu  and  outlying  islands  and  along 
our  lines  of  communication. 

[45]         (b)   Surface  raids  on  our  lines  of  communications. 

(c)  Surface  and  air  raids  against  Wake  and  possibly  against  iMidway,  Johnston, 
Palmyra  and  Canton. 

(d)  Possibly  carrier  raid  against  Oahu. 

b.  Tasks. 

1.  Perform  patrols  required  by  patrol  and  sweeping  plan  (Annex  I). 

2.  Subject  to  the  specific  tasks  prescribed  elsewhere  in  this  plan,  operate  patrol 
planes  in  the  Hawaiian  Area  including  outlying  islands  so  as  to  gain  the  earliest 
possible  information  of  advancing  enemy  forces.  Use  them  offensively  only 
when  other  types  of  our  own  are  not  within  striking  distance,  and  the  risk  of 
damage  to  the  planes  is  small;  or  when  the  importance  of  inflicting  damage  on 
the  objective  appears  to  justify  the  risk  of  receiving  the  damage  which  may  result. 

3.  Coordinate  the  service  of  information  with  the  operations  of  other  forces. 

4.  Perform  tasks  assigned  in  the  Marshall  reconnaissance  and  raiding  plan 
(Annex  II). 

5.  Coordinate  operations  of  patrol  planes  with  submarines  operating  in  same 
general  area. 

6.  Withdraw  patrol  planes  from  advance  bases  when  necessary  to  avoid  dis- 
proportionate losses. 

[44]  3242.  b.  7.  Maintain  not  less  than  two  squadrons  (one  may  be  VJ 
Squadron  from  base  force)  based  on  Oahu  at  all  times.  During  the  absence  of 
major  portions  of  the  fleet  from  the  vicinity  of  Oahu,  such  squadrons,  at  dis- 
cretion, may  be  temporarily  transferred  to  commander  Task  Force  Four  (Hawai- 
ian Naval  Coastal  Frontier). 

c.  Special  Logistics. 

Logistic  support  at  outlying  bases  will  be  supplied  by  own  tenders,  Hawaiian 
Naval  Coastal  Fontier,  Base  Force,  and,  if  necessary,  by  Pan-American  Airways 
facilities. 

[45]  Section  5.   TASK  FORCE  SEVEN  {UNDERSEA  FORCE) 

3251.   Task  Force  Seven  will  perform  tasks  as  required  by  the  following  paragraph. 
3252a.   1.  Special  Information. 

1.  Surface  units  of  the  Fleet  will  initially  conduct  the  operations  required  by 
the  Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan  (Annex  I)  and  the  Marshall  Reconnaissance  and 
Raiding  Plan  (Annex  II).  Thereafter  operations  will  be  conducted  for  the  cap- 
ture of  the  Marshalls  and  Carolines,  with. occasional  sweeps  toward  the  Marianas 
and  the  Japanese  Homeland. 

2.  Our  patrol  planes  will  be  operating  from  Midway,  and  possibly  Wake  and 
Johnston  Islands. 

3.  Japan  is  developing  extensively  the  defenses  of  the  Mandated  Islands. 
Land  planes  are  known  to  be  based  at  Saipan,  Truk  and  Jaluit  and  have  been 
reported  at  Marcus  Island.  Air  fields  are  believed  to  exist  at  Wotje  and  Maloe- 
lap.  Port  Lloyd  in  the  Bonins  is  a  minor  operating  base  and  some  aircraft 
usually  base  there  and  at  Hachijo  Jima.  Aircraft  may  be  present  on  Amami 
Oshima. 

4.  Considerable  air  strength  is  based  on  the  Japanese  Homeland  but  it  is  be- 
lieved that,  with  many  commitments  elsewhere  and  a  general  lack  of  patrol 
planes,  the  air  patrol  surrounding  the  Homeland  will  not  be  particularly  intensive. 

5.  The  main  units  of  the  Japanese  Fleet  will  probably  be  operating  from  the 
Inland  Sea. 

79716 — 46— Ex.  149,  vol.  2 13 


852       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

6.  All  important  harbors  will  probably  be  mined  and  netted  against  submarines 
and  are  well  fortified.  A  considerable  number  of  small  patrol  craft  must  be 
expected. 

[4-6]  3252.  a.  7.  The  southwestern  and  western  lines  of  communications 
from  Japan  may  be  considered  vital  needs  and  those  toward  the  Mandates  are 
very  important. 

8.  It  is  expected  that  all  Japanese  Merchantmen  will  be  armed  or  will  be 
operating  under  naval  control,  and  will  therefore  be  subject  to  submarine  attack. 
Specific  instructions  on  this  subject  will  be  issued  later. 

9.  Arrangements  will  be  made  with  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Asiatic  Fleet,  to 
extend  the  Pacific  Area  sufficiently  for  submarines  to  pass  through  the  Nansei 
Shoto  as  far  south  as  Latitude  28°-30'  N. 

10.  Mining  Japanese  waters  outside  the  three  mile  limit  may  be  planned.  The 
specific  authority  for  such  mining  will  be  issued  later. 

b.  Tasks 

1.  Continue  patrol  of  two  submarines  each  at  Wake  and  Midway. 

2.  Establish  maximum  practicable  initial  patrol  off  the  Japanese  homeland  and 
thereafter  maintain  it  at  the  maximum  strength  permitted  by  operating  condi- 
tions, giving  Stations  the  following  priority. 

YOKOHAMA 

BUNGO  CHANNEL 

KII  CHANNEL 

TSUSHIMA 

NAGASAKI 

SHIMONOSEKI 

TSUGARU 

3.  Inflict  maximum  damage  on  enemy  forces  including  shipping,  utilizing 
torpedoes  and  mines,  and,  if  appropriate,  gunfire. 

[47]  3252.  b.  4.  Report  important  enemy  movements  by  radio  if  success  of 
attack  mission  is  not  thereby  jeopardized. 

c.  Special  Logistics. 

Utilize  facilities  at  Midway  as  necessary  to  increase  endurance  on  patrol. 

[48]         Section  6.  TASK  FORCE  EIGHT  {MINING  FORCE) 

3261.   Task  Force  Eight  will: 

Report  to  Commander  Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier  to  augment  the 
local  defense  forces  during  this  phase. 

[49]         Section  7.  TASK  FORCE  SIX  {LOGISTIC  &  CONTROL  FORCE) 

3271.   Task  Force  Six  will: 

Continue  tasks  assigned  for  Phase  I  and  perform  the  tasks  assigned  in  the 
patrol  and  sweeping  plan  (annex  I)  and  the  Marshall  reconnaissance  and  raiding 
plan  (annex  II). 

[50]         Section  8.  NAVAL  COASTAL  FRONTIERS 

3281.  Task  Force  Five  (Pacific  Northern)  and  Task  Force  Ten  (Pacific  Southern 
Naval  Coastal  Frontier)  will: 

Continue  tasks  assigned  for  phase  I  and  perform  the  tasks  assigned  in  the 
patrol  and  sweeping  plan  (annex  I). 

3282.  Task  Force  Four  (Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier)  will: 
Continue  tasks  assigned  for  phase  I. 

[51]         Section  9.   TASKS  JOINTLY  APPLICABLE 
3291.  All  task  forces  concerned: 

a.  Continue  tasks  assigned  in  paragraph  3191. 

b.  Perform  tasks  assigned  in  the  patrol  and  sweeping  plan  (annex  I). 

[52]  CHAPTER  III.    PHASES  SUCCEEDING  PHASE  lA 

Section  1.   TASK  FORCE  ONE 

3311.   Task  Force  One  will: 

Cover  operations  of  other  forces  as  prescribed  in  the  Eniwetok  plan  (annex  — ), 
and  other  plans  for  the  capture  of  the  Marshalls  and  Carolines. 

[52a]         Section  2.   TASK  FORCE  TWO 

3321.   Task  Force  Two  will: 

Reenforce  Task  Forces  One  and  Three  as  required  in  Eniwetok  and  other  plans 
and  perform  such  reconnaissance  and  raiding  as  is  directed. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  853 

[Sm         Section  8.   TASK  FORCE  THREE 
3331.   Task  Force  Three  will: 

a.  Continue  training  for  landing  attacks. 

b.  Perform  tasks  assigned  in  Eniwetok  plan  (annex  — )  and  other  operations 
involving  landing  attacks. 

c.  Patrol  as  directed  in  subsequent  plans. 

d.  Continue  task  assigned  in  subparagraph  3133  c,  2. 

[52c]        Section  4-   TASK  FORCE  NINE  {PATROL  PLANE  FORCE) 
3341.   Task  Force  Nine  will: 

a.  Continue  tasks  assigned  in  subparagraphs  3242  b,  2,  3,  5,  6,  and  7. 

b.  Perform  tasks  assigned  in  Eniwetok  plan  (annex  — )  and  other  plans  for 
the  capture  of  the  IMarshalls  and  Carolines. 

[52d]        Section  5.  TASK  FORCE  SEVEN  (UNDERSEA  FORCE) 
3351.   Task  Force  Seven -will: 

a.  Continue  tasks  assigned  in  subparagraphs  3252  b,  1,2,  3,  and  4. 

b.  Carry  out  tasks  assigned  in  Eniwetok  plan  (annex  — )  and  other  plans  for 
the  capture  of  the  IMarshalls  and  Carolines. 

L^  S.  PACIFIC  FLEET  OPERATING  PLAN— RAINBOW  FIVE 
(NAVY  PLAN  0-1,  RAINBOW  FIVE) 

PART  III.  TASK  ASSIGNMENT 

CHAPTER    III.    PHASES    SUCCEEDING    PHASE    lA 

[d2e]         Section  6.  TASK  FORCE  EIGHT  (MINING  FORCE) 

3361.   Task  Force  Eight  will: 

Perform  such  mining  tasks  as  may  be  assigned  in  Eniwetok  plan  (annex  — ) 
and  other  operations  and  continue  to  augment  local  patrols  as  directed. 

[52f]         Section  7.   TASK  FORCE  SIX  (LOGISTIC  AND  CONTROL 
FORCE) 
3371.    Task  Force  Six  will: 

a.  Continue  tasks  prescribed  in  paragraphs  3172  to  3174. 

b.  Prepare  plans  for  the  establishment  of  a  fleet  anchorage  at  Eniwetok  and 
a  fleet  base  at  Truk  after  the  positions  have  been  captured. 

[52g]         Section  8.  NAVAL  COASTAL  FRONTIERS 
3381.   Task  Forces  Four,  Five,  and  Ten  will: 
Continue  the  tasks  assigned  in  paragraphs  3182  and  3183. 

[52h]        Section  9.  TASKS  JOINTLY  APPLICABLE 
3391.  All  task  forces  concerned: 
Continue  tasks  assigned  in  paragraph  3291. 

[53]  CHAPTER   IV.    EXECUTION    OF    THE    PLAN 

3401.  The  execution  of  this  Plan  may  be  in  one  or  two  steps  depending  on 
whether  Japan  does  or  does  not  become  a  belligerent  on  the  first  day  of  execution. 

a.  If  action  against  European  Axis  Powers  only  is  to  be  taken  the  despatch  will 
be  "EXECUTE  NAVY  PLAN  OPTION  DASH  ONE  RAINBOW  FIVE 
PHASE  ONE". 

b.  When  action  against  JAPAN  is  to  be  taken  the  despatch  for  execution  will 
be  "EXECUTE  NAVY  PLAN  OPTION  DASH  ONE  RAINBOW  FIVE 
PHASE  ONE  AFIRM". 

3402.  In  the  event  of  an  overt  act  of  war  by  a  foreign  power  against  the  United 
States  prior  to  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  senior  commander 
on  the  spot  to  take  such  action  in  the  defense  of  his  command  and  the  national 
interests  as  the  situation  may  require,  and  report  the  action  taken  to  superior 
authority  at  once. 

[54]  CHAPTER   V.    INITIAL   TRANSFER    OF   UNITS 

3501.  The  table  below  gives,  for  ready  reference,  a  summary  of  the  transfers 
to  be  made  in  going  from  the  current  peace  time  organization  to  the  task  organ- 
ization as  of  W-Day  and  as  of  J-Day.  Those  transfers  for  W-Day  will  be  made 
upon  the  placing  into  effect  of  Phase  I  of  this  Plan.     Those  for  J-Day  will  be 


854       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


made  when  the  execution  of  Phase  lA  is  ordered.     Units  concerned  will  report  by 
despatch  to  the  commanders  of  the  task  forces  to  which  they  are  transferring. 


From 

To 

Unit  transferred 

Transfer  eflected 

Remarks 

Southeastern  Pa- 
cific For. 
Taskfor  3 

f2  OCL 

[when  directed- - 
W-Day 

W-Day 

When  directed.. 

When  directed.. 

W-Day.     

U  Desdiv 

1  CL 

For   rotation    on   patrol 

Taskfor  3 

1  CA 

until  J-Day. 
For   rotation   on   patrol 

Atlantic  Reen 

Taskfor  2 -. 

PSNCF 

4  CA    

until  J-Day. 
If  Atlantic  Reen.  is  de- 

Taskfor 3 

2CA ..-- 

tached. 
If  Atlantic  Reen.  is  de- 

fl2 VPB 

tached. 

fAdrninistration  remains. 
1    Units  may  be  rotated. 

h  AVD 

PNNCF 

tl  AVP 

W-Day 

12  VPB - 

/Administration  remains. 
\    Units  may  be  rotated. 

Taskfor  9   (Patrol 
Plane  Force). 

1  AVD 

PNNCF 

1  AVP 

}w-Day 

12  SS           

(■Administration  remains. 
\    Units  may  be  rotated. 

Taskfor  7  (Under- 

\1 ASR 

Taskfor  3 

W-Day  

sea  Force). 

NARWHAL  or 
NAUTILUS. 

/I  CM                

Base    Samoa.    Released 

[BS] 

Hawaiian  NCF... 
Taskfor  3 

)j-Day 

on  J-Day. 
Until  further  orders. 

Taskfor  8  (Minfor). 

\8DM 

W-Day 

Taskfor  6  (Logistic 
and  Control  For). 

1  AO 

Base  Samoa,  released  on 

Taskfor  2 

1  AO 

J-Day 

J-Day. 
For  fueling  at  sea  ships 

2  AO 

J-Day.— 

in  initial  sweep.     To 

revert  when  released. 

For  fueling  at  sea  ships 

Taskfor  9 

10  VJR 

J-Day 

in     initial    reconnais- 
sanceofMARSHALLS. 
To    revert    when    re- 
leased. 
Until  further  orders. 

All  Forces 

Hawaiian  NCF_.. 
Taskfor  6  (Logistic 

and  Control 

Force). 

As  directed 

Any  ship  passing 
between     West 
Coast  and  .Ha- 
waii. 

When  directed- - 
Prior  to  sched- 
uled   date   of 
departure. 

For  escort  duty.    To  re- 
vert on  completion. 

[56] 


Part  IV.  Logistics 


CHAPTER   I.    GENERAL 


4101.  Commander  Task  Force  Six  (I>ogistics  and  Control  Force)  is  charged 
with  the  logistic  supply  of  the  Fleet  and,  in  cooperation  with  Commander  Task 
Force  Four  (Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier),  with  supplying  the  present  out- 
lying bases  in  the  Mid  Pacific.  He  will  make  requests  for  replacements  as  required 
by  paragraph  4322  g  of  the  Navy  Basic  Plan.  He  will  maintain  a  liaison  officer 
in  the  office  of  Commander  Task  Force  Five  (Pacific  Southern  Naval  Coastal 
Frontier)  and,  through  him,  will  control  the  quantities  and  times  of  delivery  of 
material  and  personnel  requirements  to  the  Fleet.  In  so  far  as  practicable,  a 
reserve  of  consumable  supplies  will  be  established  and  maintained  at  Pearl  Harbor. 
After  capture  of  bases  in  the  MARSHALLS  and  CAROLINES  a  reserve  of 
supplies  will  be  maintained  at  these  places,  as  permitted  by  storage  and  transporta- 
tion facilities  available. 

4102.  The  supply  of  units  of  the  Second  Marine  Division  after  they  have  left 
the  West  Coast  will  be  included  with  that  of  the  Fleet. 

4103.  Special  logistic  instructions  affecting  particular  tasks  have  been  included 
in  the  task  assignments  in  Part  III  and  the  Annexes  of  this  Plan. 

4104.  For  the  benefit  of  Commander  Task  Force  Six,  Commanders  of  other 
task  forces  will  include,  in  the  plans  which  they  prepare,  their  logistic  require- 
ments as  far  as  they  can  be  foreseen. 

4105.  The  requirements  of  the  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  are  placed  in  the  second  highest 
priority  classification  by  paragraph  4261  of  the  Navy  Basic  Plan. 

[56a]  CHAPTER   II.    TRANSPORTATION 

4201.  Commander  Task  Force  Six  (Logistics  and  Control  Force),  through  his 
liaison  officer  in  the  office  of  Commander  Task  Force  Five  (Pacific  Southern 
Naval  Coastal  Frontier),  will  coordinate  the  transportation  of  material  and  per- 
sonnel by  Fleet  transportation  faciUties  and  the  Naval  Transportation  Service. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT   INQUIRY  S55 

4202.  The  Naval  Transportation  Service  vessels  assigned  to  assist  in  the  sup- 
ply of  the  Hawaiian  and  Alaskan  areas  will  be  shown  in  a  revised  Chapter  IX, 
Appendix  II,  of  the  Navy  Basic  Plan.  If  practicable,  they  will  not  be  employed 
for  transportation  farther  westward  than  Hawaii. 

4203.  The  employment  of  commercial  vessels  to  assist  in  transportation  from 
the  West  Coast  to  Hawaii  is  most  desirable  and  is  acceptable  to  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet, 

[56b]  CHAPTER   III.    HOSPITALIZATION    AND    EVACUATION 

4301.  The  facilities  of  the  Fleet  including  those  of  hospital  ships,  advanced 
base  hospitals  and  mobile  medical  units  will,  as  far  as  practicable,  provide  hospi- 
talization for  sick  and  wounded  personnel. 

4302.  As  necessary,  such  personnel  will,  under  the  coordinated  supervision  of 
the  task  force  commanders  responsible  for  the  personnel  and  for  the  transportation 
facilities  employed,  be  evacuated  to  the  nearest  shore  establishment  having  hospi- 
tal space  available. 

4303.  The  ships  concerned  will  furnish  hospitalization  to  embarked  Army 
forces  until  ineffectives  can  be  transferred  ashore. 

[56c]  CHAPTER   IV.    PRIZE    CREWS 

4401.  The  Navy  Department  will  furnish  prize  crews  as  follows:  U.  S.  Pacific 
Fleet — 8;  Southeast  Pacific  Force — 8.  If  those  for  the  Pacific  Fleet  are  available 
they^^will  be  placed  aboard  ships  assigned  to  make  the  search  for  enemy  merchant 
ships  in  the  Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan  (Annex  I) . 

[66d]  CHAPTER   v.    SALVAGE 

4501.  All  units,  particularly  of  Task  Force  Six  (Logistic  and  Control  Force) 
and  suitable  units  of  Task  Force  Seven  (Underseas  Force)  will  render  salvage 
service,  as  practicable,  to  naval  and  other  vessels  in  the  Pacific  Area  outside  of 
a  zone  lying  500  miles  from  the  continental  United  States,  Alaska,  and  Panama. 
Within  the  above  mentioned  zone,  salvage  service  will  be  rendered  by  the  shore 
establishment. 

[57]  Part  V.  Special  Provisions 

CHAPTER    I.    time    TO    BE    USED 

5101.  GREENWICH  Civil  Time  wiU  be  used  in  carrying  out  this  Plan. 

[58]  CHAPTER    II.    COMMUNICATIONS 

5201.  Communications  will  be  in  accordance  with  USF-70  as  modified  by 
Annex  III  to  this  Plan. 

[59]  CHAPTER  III.    LOCATION  OF  COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 

5301.  The  Fleet  wiU  be  kept  informed  of  the  location  of  the  Commander-in- 
Chief. 

[60]  CHAPTER    IV.    TENTATIVE    OPERATION    PLANS PHASES    I    AND    lA 

5401.  Tentative  Operation  Plans  Nos.  1-R5  and  1A-R5  as  formulated  below 
are  designed  to  facilitate  the  promulgation  and  execution  of  the  tasks  assigned  for 
Phases  I  and  I A  of  this  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  Operating  Plan  (Rainbow  Five).  It 
is  expected  that  they  will  be  modified  and  executed  by  despatch  when  the  corre- 
sponding Phase  of  this  0-1  Plan  is  placed  in  efi"ect  as  prescribed  in  paragraph  3401. 

[61]         Section  1.  Phase  I 

United  States  Pacific  Fleet 

U.  S.  S.  PENNSYLVANIA,  Flagship 

Place 

Date 
Operation  Plan  No.  1-R5 

Initial  Task  Organization 

(See  paragraph  1107  of  this  Plan  for  normal  organization) 

(a)  Task  Force  One — Commander  Battle  Force. — Normal  units  this  task  force 
plus  Yz  minecraft  less  1  cruiser  in  rotation  to  Task  Force  Three  patrol  pool. 


856       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(b)  Task  Force  Two — Commander  Aircraft,  Battle  Force. — Normal  units  this 
task  force  plus  }i  minecraft  less  one  cruiser  in  rotation  to  Task  Force  Three  patrol 
pool. 

(c)  Task  Force  Three — Commander  Scouting  Force. — Normal  units  this  task 
force  plus  1  cruiser  each  from  Task  Forces  One  and  Two  for  cruiser  patrol  pool  plus 
1  SS  from  Task  Force  Seven,  1  AO  from  Task  Force  Six,  and  (on  request)  1  patron 
and  tender  from  Task  Force  Seven  for  South  Pacific  operations. 

(d)  Task  Force  Nine  (Patrol  Plane  Force)  (S.  O.  P.  Airscofor  Hawaiian  Area). — 
Normal  units  this  task  force  less  24  VP  and  tenders  transferred  to  Naval  Coastal 
Frontiers,  and  (if  requested  by  Commander  Task  Force  Three)  1  patron  and  tender 
to  Task  Force  Three. 

[6S]  (e)  Task  Force  Seven  (Undersea  Force) — Commander  Submarines, 
Scouting  Force. — Normal  units  this  task  force  less  2  SS  and  1  ASR  to  Task  Force 
Ten  and  1  SS  to  Task  Force  Three. 

(f)  Task  Force  Eight  (Mining  Force). — Non-operative  as  such;  normal  units 
thereof  being  divided  between  Task  Forces  One  and  Two. 

(g)  Task  Force  Six  (Logistic  and  Control  Force) — Commander  Base  Force. — 
Normal  units  this  task  force  plus  any  units  transferred  from  other  forces  for  escort 
duty  West  Coast-Hawaii  less  1  AO  to  Task  Force  Three. 

(h)  Task  Force  Four  (Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier) — Commandant, 
Fourteenth  Naval  District. — Normal  units  this  task  force  plus  units  from  other 
fleet  forces  when  and  if  the  Commander-in-Chief  directs  transfer. 

(i)  Task  Force  Five  (Pacific  Southern  Naval  Coastal  Frontier) — Commandant, 
Twelfth  Naval  District. — Normal  units  this  task  force  plus  12  VP  and  tender  from 
Task  Force  Nine. 

(j)  Task  Force  Ten  (Pacific  Northern  Naval  Coastal  Frontier) — Commandant, 
Thirteenth  Naval  District. — Normal  units  this  task  force  plus  12  VP  and  tender 
from  Task  Force  Nine  plus  2  SS  and  1  ASR  from  Task  Force  Seven. 

[6S]  1.  Information,  Assumptions,  etc.,  as  previously  given  in  Parts  I,  II 
and  III  of  Navy  Plan  0-1,  Rainbow  Five. 

2.  This  Fleet  will,  in  the  Pacific  Area,  protect  the  territorj^  and  sea  communica- 
tions of  the  Associated  Powers  and  will  support  British  Naval  Forces  south  of  the 
equator  as  far  west  as  Longitude  155°  East,  while  continuing  training  and  guarding 
against  attack  by  Japan. 

3.  (a)  Task  Force  One. — (1)  When  directed  release  two  small  light  cruisers  and 
one  destroyer  division  to  become  the  Southeast  Pacific  Force  as  required  by  the 
Navy  Basic  Plan. 

(2)   Perform  the  task  assigned  in  the  Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan  (Annex  I). 

(b)  Task  Force  Two. — (1)  Perform  the  tasks  assigned  in  the  Patrol  and  Sweep- 
ing Plan  (Annex  I). 

(c)  Task  Force  Three. — (1)  Maintain  the  patrols  required  by  the  Patrol  and 
Sweeping  Plan  (Annex  I). 

(2)  Move  from  San  Diego  to  Hawaii  the  maximum  practicable  portion  of  the 
Second  Marine  Division,  employing  attached  transports. 

(3)  Make  preparations  and  train  for  landing  attacks  on  Japanese  bases  in  the 
Marshalls  for  purposes  of  capture  or  demolition,  with  particular  emphasis  on  plan 
for  capture  of  Eniwetok. 

[64]  (4)  Furnish  additional  defenses  for  outlying  bases  as  may  be  requested 
by  Commander  Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier  and  approved  by  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief. 

(d)  Task  Force  Nine  (Patrol  Plane  Force). — (1)  Transfer  twelve  patrol  planes 
and  two  tenders  to  each  of  the  Pacific  Southern  and  Pacific  Northern  Naval 
Coastal  Frontiers.  Continue  administration  of  these  forces  and  rotate  detail  at 
discretion. 

(2)   Perform  tasks  assigned  in  the  Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan  (Annex  I). 

(e)  Task  Force  Seven  (Undersea  Force). —  (1)  Maintain  patrols  required  by  the 
Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan  (Annex  I). 

(2)  Asi  ign  one  submarine  division  to  Task  Force  Three  as  required  for  landing 
attack  training. 

(3)  Transfer  two  submarines  and  one  submarine  rescue  vessel  to  Pacific 
Northern  Naval  Coastal  Frontier  to  assist  in  defense  of  the  Alaska  sector.  Con- 
tinue administration  of  these  units  and  rotate  detail  at  discretion. 

(f)  Task  Force  Eight.  (Mining  Force) . — (1)  Continue  training  under  Commander 
Task  Force  One. 

(g)  Task  Force  Six  (Logistic  and  Control  Force). — (1)  Provide  logistic  services 
to  the  Fleet  and  cooperate  with  Commander  Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier 
in  providing  logistic  services  to  outlying  bases. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT   INQUIRY  857 

[65]         (2)   Perform  tasks  required  by  the  Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan  (Annex  I) . 

(3)  Maintain  in  the  Office  of  Commander  Pacific  Naval  Coastal  Frontier  an 
officer  to  maintain  liaison  with  respect  to  logistic  requirements  of  the  Fleet,  the 
loading  of  Base  Force  and  Naval  Transportation  Service  vessels,  and  the  routing 
and  protection  of  United  States  and  Allied  shipping.  Maintain  close  liaison 
with  Commander  Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier  for  the  same  purposes. 

(h)  Task  Force  Four  (Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier). — (1)  Assist  in  pro- 
viding external  security  for  units  of  the  Fleet  in  the  Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal 
Frontier,  in  cooperation  with  the  Army  and  the  units  concerned. 

(2)  Prosecute  the  establishment  of  subsidiary  bases  at  Midway,  Johnston, 
Palmyra,  and  Wake,  and  at  Canton  is  authorized.  Assist  as  practicable  in  the 
development  of  Samoa  and  Guam. 

(3)  Make  the  facilities  of  the  outlying  bases  available  for  Fleet  units  operating 
in  the  vicinity  and  cooperate  with  Commanders  of  Mobile  Forces  in  coordinating 
the  military  activities  at  these  bases.     (See  Annex  IV) . 

(4)  Utilize  units  of  the  Fleet  Marine  Force,  made  available  for  the  purpose, 
to  defend  Midway,  Johnston,  and  Palmyra,  and,  when  authorized.  Wake  and 
Canton. 

(i)  Task  Force  Five  (Pacific  Southern  Naval  Coastal  Frontier). — (1)  Perform 
tasks  assigned  by  the  Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan  (Annex  I) . 

[66]  (j)  Task  Force  Ten  (Pacific  Northern  Naval  Coastal  Frontier). — 
(1)   Perform  tasks  assigned  by  Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan  (Annex  I). 

(x)  (1)  Units  in  the  Hawaiian  area  complete  mobilization  at  Pearl  Harbor 
within  four  days  of  date  of  execution  of  this  Plan;  units  designated  for  early 
operations  complete  mobilization  prior  to-the  time  designated  for  their  operations 
to  commence.  Units  on  the  Pacific  Coast  complete  mobilization  there  as  rapidly 
as  possible. 

(2)  Maintain  vessels  of  all  types  in  constant  readiness  for  distant  service. 

(3)  Maintain  internal  and  external  security  of  forces  at  all  times,  cooperating 
with  the  Commanders  of  Naval  Coastal  Frontiers  while  within  the  limits  of  those 
frontiers.     Guard  against  surprise  attack  by  Japanese  Forces. 

(4)  Continue  such  training  activities  of  the  Fleet  as  the  Commander-in-Chief 
may  direct. 

(5)  Reenforce  local  defense  and  coastal  forces  as  directed. 

(6)  Protect  the  territory  and  communications  of  the  Associated  Powers,  the 
operations  of  coastal  forces,  and  troop  movements  by  covering  and  other  opera- 
tions as  directed  by  the  Comrhander-in-Chief . 

4.  Logistic  replenishment  at  Pearl  Harbor,  on  the  West  Coast,  and  as  specially 
provided  for  in  the  Annexes. 

5.  (a)  Communications  in  accordance  with  U.  S.  F.  Seventy,  as  modified  by 
Annex  III. 

(b)  Use  Greenwich  Civil  Time. 

(c)  The  Commander-in-Chief  will  keep  the  Fleet  advised  of  his  location. 


Admiral,  U.  S.  Navy, 

Commander-in-  Chief, 
United  States  Pacific  Fleet. 

[68]  CHAPTER  IV.    TENTATIVE  OPERATION  PLANS PHASES  I  AND  lA 

Section  2.  Phase  I A 

Tentative 

United  States  Pacific  Fleet, 
U.  S.  S.  PENNSYLVANIA,  Flagship, 
Place 
Date. 
Operation  Plan  No.  1A-R5. 

Initial  task  organization 

(See  Basic  Fleet  Plan  for  normal  organization.) 

(a)  Task  Force  One.  Commander  Battle  Force. —  Normal  units  this  task  force 
less  any  cruiser  absent  on  patrol  with  Task  Force  Three  less  1  CV  and  all  other 
large  CL's  to  Task  Force  Two  for  reconnaissance  of  MARSHALLS. 

(b;  Task  Force  Two.  Commander  Aircraft,  Battle  Force. —  Normal  units  this 
task  force  plus  1  CV  and  available  CL's  (approximately  4)  from  Task  Force  One 


858       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

plus  1  CV  from  Task  Force  Three  less  any  cruiser  absent  on  patrol  with  Task 
Force  Three. 

(c)  Task  Force  Three.  Commander  Scouting  Force. — Same  as  for  Operation 
Plan  1-R5  less  1  CV  to  Task  Force  Two  less  1  SS  and  1  AO  from  SAMOA  returned 
to  their  respective  normal  task  forces  plus  1  AO  from  Task  Force  Six  for  fueling 
at  sea. 

(d)  Task  Force  Nine  (Patrol  Plane  Force)  Senior  Officer  Present,  Aircraft, 
Scouting  Force,  HAWAIIAN  AREA). — Same  as  for  Operation  Plan  1-R5. 

[69]  Part  V.  Special  Provisions 

CHAPTER    IV,    TENTATIVE    OPERATIONS    PLANS PHASES    I    AND    lA 

Section  2.  Phase  I A 

(e)  Task  Force  Seven  (Undersea  Force)  Commander  Submarines,  Scouting 
Force. 

Same  as  for  Operation  Plan  1-R5 

plus  1  SS  returned  from  Task  Force  Three. 

(f)  Task  Force  Eight  (Mining  Force) 

Non-operative  as  such,  normal  units  thereof  being  detached  from  Task 
Forces  One  and  Two  at  end  of  Phase  I  and  on  commencement  of  Phase 
lA  being  transferred  to  Task  Force  Four. 

(g)  Task  Force  Six  (Logistic  and  Control  Force)  Commander  Base  Force. 
Same  as  for  Operation  Plan  1-R5, 

plus  1  AO  returned  from  Task  Force  Three 
less  2  AO  transferred  to  Task  Force  Two 
less  1  AO  transferred  to  Task  Force  Three. 
(h)   Task  Force  Four  (Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier)   Commandant,   Four- 
teenth Naval  District. 

Normal  units  this  task  force 
plus  all  units  of  Minecraft,  Battle  Force. 
(i)   Task  Force  Five  (Pacific  Southern  Naval  Coastal  Frontier)  Commandant, 
Twelfth  Naval  District. 

Same  as  for  Operation  Plan  1-R5. 
(j)   Task  Force  Ten  (Pacific  Northern  Naval  Coastal  Frontier)  Commandant, 
Thirteenth  Naval  District. 

Same  as  for  Operation  Plan  1-R5. 
1.  Information,  Assumptions  sa  previously  given  in  Parts  I,  II,  and  III  of  this 
Navy  Plan  0-1,  Rainbow  Five. 

[70]  2.  This  Fleet,  while  protecting  the  sea  communications  and  territory  of 
the  Associated  Powers  in  the  Pacific  Area,  and  supporting  the  operations  of  the 
British  Navy  south  of  the  equator  as  far  west  as  Longitude  one  hundred  fifty-five 
degrees  East,  will: 

(a)  Conduct  an  initial  sweep  with  light  forces  and  aircraft  against  enemy 
merchant  ships  and  raiders. 

(b)  Raid  Japanese  communications  to  westward  of  NANPO  SHOTO  with 
cruisers. 

(c)  Patrol  Japanese  homeland  with  submarines. 

(d)  Conduct  a  reconnaissance  and  raid  against  the  MARSHALLS,  in  order  to 
divert  Japanese  forces  away  from  MALAYSIA,  and  to  prepare  for  the  capture  of 
the  MARSHALL-CAROLINE  area. 

3.   (a)    Task  Force  One. 

(1)  Perform  task  assigned  in  the  Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan  (Annex  I  to  Navy 
Plan  0-1,  Rainbow  Five). 

(2)  Reenforce  and  support  operations  of  Task  Force  Two  as  required  in  the 
MARSHALL  Reconnaissance  and  Raiding  Plan  (Annex  II  to  Navy  Plan  0-1, 
Rainbow  Five). 

(b)    Task  Force  Two. 

(1)  Conduct  Reconnaissance  and  Raid  in  force  against  the  MARSHALLS  as 
required  in  the  MARSHALL  Reconnaissance  and  Raiding  Plan  (Annex  II  to 
Navy  Plan  0-1,  Rainbow  Five). 

[71]         (c)    Task  Force  Three. 

(1)  Conduct  initial  sweep  against  enemy  commerce  and  raiders  as  required  in 
the  Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan  (Annex  I  to  Navy  Plan  0-1,  Rainbow  Five). 

(2)  Reenforce  Task  Force  Two  as  required  by  the  MARSHALL  Reconnaissance 
and  Raiding  Plan  (Annex  II  to  Navy  Plan  0-1,  Rainbow  Five). 

(3)  Move  from  SAN  DIEGO  to  HAWAII  the  remaining  units  and  equipment 
of  the  Second  Marine  Division  and  continue  training  for  landing  exercises. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  859 

(4)  Continue  preparations  and  training  for  landing  attacks  on  Japanese  bases 
in  the  MARSHALLS  with  particular  emphasis  on  plan  for  capture  of  ENI- 
WETOK. 

(5)  Furnish  additional  defenses  for  outlying  bases  as  may  be  requested  by 
Commander  Task  Force  Four  (Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier)  and  approved 
by  the  Commander-in-Chief. 

(d)  Task  Force  Nine  (Patrol  Plane  Force). 

(1)  Subject  to  the  specific  tasks  prescribed  below,  operate  patrol  planes  in  the 
HAWAIIAN  Area  including  outlying  islands  so  as  to  gain  the  earliest  possible 
information  of  advancing  enemy  forces.  Use  them  offensively  only  when  other 
types  of  our  own  are  not  within  striking  distance,  and  the  risk  of  damage  to  the 
planes  is  small;  or  when  the  importance  of  inflicting  damage  on  the  objective 
appears  to  justify  the  risk  of  receiving  the  damage  which  may  result. 

[72]  (2)  Perform  patrols  required  by  the  Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan  Annex  I 
to  Navy  Plan  0-1,  Rainbow  Five). 

(3)  Coordinate  the  service  of  information  with  the  operations  of  other  forces. 

(4)  Perform  tasks  assigned  in  the  MARSHALL  Reconnaissance  and  Raiding 
Plan  (Ajinex  II  to  Navy  Plan  O-I,  Rainbow  Five). 

(5)  Withdraw  patrol  planes  from  advance  bases  when  necessary  to  avoid 
disproportionate  losses. 

(6)  Maintain  not  less  than  two  squadrons  (one  may  be  VJ  squadron  from  Base 
Force)  based  on  OAHU  at  all  times.  During  the  absence  of  major  portions  of 
the  Fleet  from  the  vicinity  of  OAHU,  such  squadrons  may,  at  discretion,  be 
temporarily  transferred  to  Commander  Task  Force  Four  (Hawaiian  Naval 
Coastal  Frontier). 

(e)  Task  Force  Seven  (Undersea  Force). 

(1)  Continue  patrol  of  two  submarines  each  at  WAKE  and  MIDWAY. 

(2)  Establish  maximum  practicable  initial  patrol  off  the  Japanese  Homeland 
and  thereafter  maintain  it  at  the  maximum  strength  permitted  by  operating 
conditions,  giving  stations  the  following  priority: 

YOKOHAMA 

BUNCO  CHANNEL 

KII  CHANNEL 

TSUSHIMA 

NAGASAKI 

SHIMONOSEKI 

TSUGARU 
[73]         (The  Commander-in-Chief  will  make  arrangements  for  submarines  to 
pass  through  that  part  of  the  Far  Eastern  Area  in  the  NANSEI  SHOTO  as  far 
south  as  Latitude  twenty-eight  degrees,  thirty  minutes  North). 

(3)  Inflict  maximum  damage  on  enemy  forces,  including  shipping,  utilizing 
mines  and  torpedoes  and,  if  appropriate,  gunfire.  Mining  of  Japanese  waters 
outside  the  three  mile  limit  may  be  planned.  Specific  authority  for  such  mining 
will  be  issued  later. 

(4)  Report  important  enemy  movements  by  radio  if  success  of  attack  mission 
is  not  thereby  jeopardized. 

(f)  Task  Force  Eight  (Mining  Force). 

(1)  Report  to  Commander  Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier  to  augment  the 
local  defense  forces  during  this  Phase. 

(g)  Task  Force  Six  (Logistics  and  Control  Force). 

(1)  Continue  general  logistic  support  of  Fleet  and  assistance  to  outlying  bases. 

(2)  Perform  tasks  assigned  in  the  Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan  (Annex  I  to  Navy 
Plan  0-1,  Rainbow  Five),  and  the  MARSHALL  Reconnaissance  and  Raiduig 
Plan  (Annex  II  to  Navy  Plan  0-1,  Rainbow  Five). 

(h)    Task  Force  Four  (Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier). 

(1)  Continue  tasks  assigned  in  Operation  Plan  1-R5,  with  regard  for  the 
probable  increase  in  enemy  activities. 

[74]         (i)    Task  Force  Five  (Pacific  Southern  Naval  Coastal  Frontier), 
(j)    Task  Force  Ten  (Pacific  Northern  Naval  Coastal  Frontier). 

(1)  Continue  tasks  assigned  in  Operation  Plan  1-R5  with  regard  for  the 
probable  increase  in  enemy  activities. 

(2)  Perform  the  tasks  assigned  by  the  Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan  (Annex  I  to 
Navy  Plan  0-1,  Rainbow  Five). 

4.  Logistic  replenishment  at  PEARL  HARBOR,  on  the  West  Coast,  and  as 
specially  provided  for  in  the  Annexes. 


860       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

5.   (a)   Communications  in  accordance  with   Annex  III  to   Navy   Plan  0-1, 
Rainbow  Five. 

(b)  Use  GREENWICH  Civil  Time. 

(c)  The  Commander-in-Chief  will  keep  the  Fleet  advised  of  his  location. 


Adiniral,  U.  S.  Navxj, 

Co  m  m  ander-in  -  Chief, 

U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet. 


[I-l]  ANNEX  I 


United  States  Pacific  Fleet, 

U.  S.  S.  PENNSYLVANIA,  Flagship 

Place 

Date 

Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan 

No.  . 

INITIAL  TASK  ORGANIZATION 

(a)  Task  Force  One. 

(b)  Task  Force  Two. 

(c)  Task  Force  Three. 

(d)  Task  Force  Nine  (Patrol  Plane  Force). 

(e)  Task  Force  Seven  (Undersea  Force). 

(f)  Task  Force  Six  (Logistic  and  Control  Force). 

(g)  Task  Force  Four  (Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier). 

(h)   Task  Force  Five  (Pacific  Southern  Naval  Coastal  Frontier), 
(i)  Task  Force  Ten  (Pacific  Northern  Naval  Coastal  Frontier) . 
(Units  of  these  task  forces  initially  same  as  in  Operation  Plan  1-R5.) 

1.  Information  and  Assumptions  as  previously  given  in  Parts  I,  II,  and  III  of 
this  Navy  Plan  0-1,  Rainbow  Five.  Latest  information  of  enemy  dispositions, 
estimated  intentions,  and  location  of  merchant  shipping  will  be  furnished  by  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet,  at  time  of  execution. 

2.  Phase  I 

This  Fleet  will,  in  the  Pacific  Area,  protect  the  territory  and  sea  communica- 
tions of  the  Associated  Powers  by: 

[1-2]  (a)  Patrolling  against  enemy  forces,  particularly  in  the  vicinity  of 
the  Hawaiian  Islands;  and  on  shipping  lanes  (1)  West  Coast-Hawaii,  (2)  Trans- 
Pacific  westward  of  Midway  and  (3)  in  South  Seas  in  vicinity  of  Samoa. 

(b)  Escorting  as  conditions  require  and  forces  available  permit. 

(c)  Covering. 

(d)  Employing  striking  forces  against  enemy  raids  and  expeditions. 

(e)  Routing  shipping. 

Phase  I A 

This  Fleet  will:  (a)  continue  the  operations  of  Phase  I,  except  as  to  patrols 
which  will  be  modified  or  discontinued  as  necessary  in  order  to  carry  out  pre- 
scribed offensive  operations; 

(b)  attack  enemy  communications  by  making  initial  sweep  for  enemy  mer- 
chant ships  and  raiders,  and  by  raiding  Japanese  sea  communications  westward 
of  Nanpo  Shoto; 

(c)  reconnoiter  and  raid  the  Marshall  Islands. 

Subsequent  Phases 

This  Fleet  will:  (a)  continue  operations  of  Phase  I  except  as  to  patrols,  for  which 
further  directives  will  be  issued  later. 

3.  (a)    Task  Force  One. 

(1)   Cover  territory,  forces  and  shipping  of  the  Associated  Powers  as  directed. 

[IS]  (2)  Furnish  one  cruiser  (in  rotation  as  practicable)  to  Task  Force 
Three  for  cruiser  patrol  pool;  and  be  prepared  to  furnish,  on  order,  other  patrols  or 
a  striking  force,  or  both. 

(3)  While  en  route  in  accordance  with  Marshall  Reconnaissance  and  Raiding 
Plan  (Annex  II  to  Navy  Plan  0-1)  conduct  such  sweep  as  information  and  circum- 
stances at  the  time  permit  without  interference  with  the  primary  task. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  861 

(b)  Task  Force  Two. 

(1)  Furnish  one  cruiser  (in  rotation  as  practicable)  to  Task  Force  Three  for 
cruiser  patrol  pool.     (In  case  of  detachment  of  Atlantic  reenforcement  this  sub- 

-  paragraph  is  inapplicable) . 

(2)  Be  prepared  to  furnish,  on  order,  other  patrols  or  a  striking  force,  or  both. 

(3)  Develop  contacts  made  by  patrol  planes  from  Oahu  if  vessels  of  Task  Force 
Three  are  not  within  supporting  distance  of  such  contacts. 

(4)  While  en  route  in  accordance  with  Marshall  Reconnaissance  and  Raiding 
Plan  (Annex  II  to  Navy  Plan  0-1)  conduct  such  sweep  as  information  and  cir- 
cumstances at  the  time  permit  without  interference  with  the  primary  task. 

(c)  Task  Force  Three,  reenforced  with  one  cruiser  each  from  Task  Forces  One 
and  Two  (for  cruiser  patrol  pool),  NARWHAL  or  NAUTILUS  from  Task  Force 
Seven  (Undersea  Force),  and  one  oiler  from  Task  Force  Six  (Logistic  and  Control 
Force),  also  further  reenforced  by  one  squadron  of  patrol  planes  and  tenders  from 
Task  Force  Nine  (Patrol  Plane  Force)  (by  request  on  Commander  Task  Force 
Nine)  when  the  situation  in  the  South  Pacific  requires  and  facilities  there  permit: 

(1)  Patrol  against  enemy  units  that  may  attack  own  and  allied  communication 
lines,  operating  in  general  as  follows: 

[1-4]  (a)  Maintain  two  cruisers  (one,  if  Atlantic  Reenforcement  is  detached) 
on  patrol  between  Hawaii  and  the  Pacific  Coast  in  areas  more  than  five  hundred 
miles  from  land.     Reservice  such  ships  either  in  Hawaii  or  on  Pacific  Coast. 

(b)  (i)  Maintain  two  cruisers,  two  destroyers,  one  submarine  and  one  oiler 
in  the  South  Pacific  based  on  Samoa,  normally  keeping  one  cruiser  on  patrol 
within  one  thousand  miles  of  Samoa  along  routes  to  New  Zealand. 

(ii)  When  the  situation  in  the  South  Pacific  requires  and  facilitates  there  permit, 
request  from  Commander  Task  Force  Nine  (Patrol  Plane  Force)  assignment  of  a 
patrol  squadron  and  tenders;  and  advance  it  into  that  area  for  operations. 

(iii)  Coordinate  activities  of  unit  operating  in  the  South  Pacific  with  British 
naval  forces  as  far  west  as  longitude  one  hundred  fifty-five  degrees  East  as  the 
situation  at  the  time  makes  expedient;  and  in  accordance  with  such  directives 
as  may  from  time  to  time  be  issued. 

(c)  Maintain  one  cruiser,  based  on  Midway,  on  patrol  to  the  northward  of  the 
Midway- Marianas  line,  in  the  vicinity  of  trans-Pacific  trade  routes. 

(2)  Upon  commencement  of  Phase  lA,  dispatch  two  heavy  cruisers  in  company 
to  raid  Japanese  communications  westward  of  the  Nanpo  Shoto,  and  return  to 
base  when  fuel  situation  or  other  circumstances  require.  Arrange  directly  with 
Commander  Task  Force  Six  for  fueling  such  cruisers  at  or  near  Midway  on  out- 
ward passage  and  on  return  as  may  be  feasible.  The  Commander-in-Chief  will 
make  arrangements  with  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Asiatic  Fleet,  concerning  the 
utilization  of  the  portion  of  the  Far  Eastern  Area  involved. 

[7-5]  (3)  Upon  commencement  of  Phase  lA,  discontinue  patrols  required 
by  paragraph  3  (c)  (1)  and  sweep  for  enemy  merchant  ships,  operating  along  the 
following  general  lines: 

(a)  Samoa  based  cruisers  and  destroyers  sweep  northward  to  latitude  twenty 
thence  to  rendezvous  designated  by  Task  Force  Commander  for  operations  in 
conjunction  with  the  Marshall  Reconnaissance  and  Raiding  Plan  (Annex  II  to 
Navy  Plan  0-1).     Other  Samoa  based  units  rejoin  their  normal  commands. 

(b)  Cruisers  on  patrol  between  West  Coast  and  Hawaii  sweep  or  search  for 
specific  enemy  merchantmen,  as  Task  Force  Commander  may  require  enroute  to 
rendezvous  designated  by  him  for  operations  in  conjunction  with  Marshall  Raid. 

(c)  Other  available  units  conduct  maximum  practicable  sweep  in  general  area 
bounded  by  Hawaiian  Island  chain,  latitude  forty-six  North,  and  longitudes  one 
hundred  sixty-seven  West  and  one  hundred  eighty;  such  sweep  to  occupy  about 
six  days,  and  to  begin  on  or  as  soon  after  J-day  as  possible. 

(d)  Units  operating  in  the  foregoing  northerly  area  originate  radio  traffic  to 
indicate  an  advance  toward  Japan  via  a  northern  route. 

(4)  (a)  Upon  completion  of  sweep  directed  in  subparagraph  (3)  (c)  above, 
rendezvous  with  oiler  supplied  by  Task  Force  Six  (Logistics  and  Control  Force)  in 
latitude  twenty-seven  North,  and  one  hundred  seventy-eight  West,  or  other 
rendezvous  you  may  have  designated.  Fuel  and  proceed  to  join  Task  Force  Two 
(Marshall  Reconnaissance  and  Raiding  Plan,  Annex  II  to  Navy  Plan  0-1)  on 
twelve  J-day  at  rendezvous  Tare  in  latitude  sixteen  North,  longitude  one  hundred 
seventy -seven  East  or  other  designated  time  and  rendezvous, 

(b)  If  any  units  will  be  delayed  in  joining  Task  Force  Two,  advise  the  com- 
mander thereof  as  to  the  extent  of  the  delay. 

[1-6]  (c)  If  conflict  of  tasks  exists,  operations  against  inferior  enemy  forces 
within  striking  distance  take  precedence  over  joining  Task  Force  Two. 


862       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(5)  If  Atlantic  Reenforcement  is  detached,  assign  two  heavy  cruisers  to  Task 
Force  Two.  (In  such  event  the  assignment  of  one  cruiser  from  Task  Force  Two  to 
Task  Force  Three,  hitherto  mentioned  will,  of  course,  not  be  made) . 

(d)  Task  Force  Nine  (Patrol  Plane  Force). 

(1)  Having  due  regard  for  time  required  to  overhaul  and  upkeep  planes  and  for 
conservation  of  personnel,  maintain  maximum  patrol  plane  search  against  enemy 
forces  in  the  approaches  to  the  Hawaiian  area. 

(2)  Initially  base  and  operate  one  patrol  plane  squadron  from  Midway.  At 
discretion  increase  the  number  of  planes  operating  from  bases  to  westward  of 
Pearl  Harbor  to  two  squadrons,  utilizing  Johnston  and  Wake  as  the  facilities 
thereat  and  the  situation  at  the  time  makes  practicable. 

(3)  Be  prepared,  on  request  of  Commander  Task  Force  Three,  to  transfer  one 
patrol  squadron  and  tenders  to  that  force  for  prompt  operations  in  the  South 
Pacific. 

(4)  Be  particularly  alert  to  detect  disguised  raiders. 

(5)  In  transferring  planes  between  bases,  conduct  wide  sweep  enroute. 

(6)  Planes  engaged  in  training  operations  furnish  such  assistance  to  Naval 
Coastal  Frontiers  in  which  based  as  may  be  practicable. 

(7)  Effect  closest  cooperation  practicable  with  surface  forces  engaged  in 
sweeping  during  initial  sweep  of  Phase  lA. 

[7-7]  (8)  Modify  patrols  as  necessary  in  order  to  carry  out  tasks  assigned 
in  Marshall  Raiding  and  Reconnaissance  Plan  (Annex  II  to  Navy  Plan  0-1). 

(9)  Units  operating  from  outlying  bases  cooperate,  to  the  extent  compatible 
with  assigned  tasks,  with  other  forces  thereat.  Be  guided  by  principles  of  com- 
mand relationship  set  forth  in  Annex  IV  to  Navy  Plan  0-1. 

(e)  Task  Force  Seven  (Undersea  Force). 

(1)  Maintain  two  submarmes  on  patrol  at  Wake  and  two  at  Midway  for  gain- 
ing information  and  for  attack  on  enemy  units  approaching  tliose  places. 

(2)  Be  prepared,  if  Commander-in-Chief  directs,  during  Phase  I  to  conduct 
observations,  by  submerged  submarines  from  outside  the  three-mile  zone,  of 
probable  radar  bases  in  the  Japanese  Mandates. 

(3)  At  commencement  of  Phase  lA,  or  earlier  if  so  directed,  establish  patrols 
off  the  Japanese  homeland  as  prescribed  in  the  basic  Fleet  Plan. 

(4)  Route  submarines  advancing  to  westward  for  patrols  so  as  to  cover  wide 
front.  Coordinate  such  routing  with  other  patrol  and  sweeping  operations, 
including  that  prescribed  for  cruisers  in  the  area  westward  of  Nanpo  Shoto,  so  as 
to  avoid  contact  of  submarines  with  own  forces. 

(5)  Keep  Commander-in-Chief  and  task  force  commanders  concerned  advised 
as  to  location  and  routes  of  own  submarines. 

(6)  Transfer  NAUTILUS  or  NARWHAL  to  Task  Force  Three  for  operations 
in  South  Pacific  during  Phase  I. 

(f)  Task  Force  Six  (Logistio  and  Control  Force). 

(1)  Through  liaison  with  Commanders  of  Task  Force  Five  (Pacific  Southern) 
and  Task  Force  Four  (Hawaiian  [1-8]  Naval  Coastal  Frontiers)  ensure 
that  routing  of  shipping  is  in  accordance  with  general  directives  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief and  is  coordinated  with  the  protection  offered  by  Fleet  patrols 
and  with  the  routing  and  protective  measures  of  the  British  in  the  South  Pacific. 

(2)  Escort  important  ships  or  convoys  by  using  combatant  vessels  en  route  to 
or  from  the  West  Coast  and  Hawaii,  which  vessels  are  made  available  for  that 
purpose.  If  escort  is  found  necessary  and  suitable  vessels  will  be  not  available 
by  modifying  schedules  of  escorts  or  convoys,  make  suitable  representations  to 
the  Commander-in-Chief  as  far  in  advance  as  possible. 

(3)  During  Phase  I  maintain  one  oiler  at  Samoa  to  operate  under  Commander 
Task  Force  Three. 

(4)  Provide  oiler  to  fuel  at  sea  units  of  Task  Force  Three  on  eight  J-Day  in 
latitude  twenty-seven  North,  Longitude  one  hundred  seventy-eight  West,  or  at 
time  and  place  designated  by  commander  of  that  Task  Force. 

(5)  See  also  oiler  requirements  under  Marshall  Reconnaissance  and  Raiding 
Plan  (Annex  II  to  Navy  Plan  0-1). 

(g)  Task  Force  Four  (Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier). 

(1)  Coordinate,  as  practicable,  patrol  in  coastal  zone  with  patrols  by  other  Fleet 
forces. 

(2)  Through  liaison  with  Commander  Task  Force  Six  (Logistics  and  Coastal 
Force)  and  Commander  Task  Force  Five  (Pacific  Southern  Naval  Coastal  Frontier) 
coordinate  routing  and  escort  of  shipping  in  the  Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier 
with  that  in  the  Fleet  Control  Zone,  when  and  if  established,  and  in  the  general 
Pacific  Area. 

[1-9]         (h)   Task  Force  Five  (Pacific  Southern  Naval  Coastal  Frontier). 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  863 

(1)  Coordinate  routing  of  shipping  with  the  protection  afforded  by  Fleet  forces 
and  by  British  forces  in  accordance  with  current  situation,  and  with  general 
directives  that  may  be  issued  by  the  Commander-in-Chief. 

(2)  Conduct  such  search  and  patrols  in  vicinity  of  own  theater  as  practicable 
with  available  forces.  Keep  the  Commander-in-Chief  fully  advised  of  informa- 
tion gained.  Also,  when  circumstances  warrant,  communicate  such  information 
direct  to  any  Fleet  forces  in  the  vicinity. 

(3)  In  the  initial  stages  of  Phase  lA,  particularly,  cooperate  with  any  Fleet 
forces  in  the  vicinity  in  locating  enemy  merchantmen  within  flying  rainge  of  the 
West  Coast,  obtaining  assistance  and  cooperation  of  Army  units  as  is  practicable. 

(i)    Task  Force  Ten  (Pacific  Northern  Naval  Coastal  Frontier). 

(1)  Conduct  such  search  and  patrols  in  vicinity  of  own  theater  as  practicable 
with  available  forces.  Keep  the  Commander-in-Chief  fully  advised  of  information 
gained.  Also,  when  circumstances  warrant,  communicate  such  information 
direct  to  any  Fleet  forces  in  the  vicinity. 

(2)  In  initial  stages  of  Phase  lA,  particularly,  cooperate  with  any  Fleet  forces 
in  the  vicinity  in  locating  enemy  merchantmen  within  flying  range  of  the  West 
Coast,  obtaining  assistance  and  cooperation  of  Army  units  as  is  practicable.  It 
is  especially  desired  to  cover  until  eight  J-Day  UNIMAK  PASS  and  the  maximum 
area  to  the  southward  of  Dutch  Harbor  that  daily  flights  and  available  planes  will 
permit. 

(x)  (1)  This  plan  effective  simultaneously  with  Navy  Plan  0-1,  Rainbow  Five. 

[I-IO]  (2)  All  task  forc€f  make  available  to  Commander  Task  Force  Six 
(Logistics  and  Control  Force)  for  escort  duty,  all  ships  enroute  between  Hawaii 
and  West  Coast. 

(3)  Destroy  enemy  combatant  ships  encountered. 

(4)  Capture  or  destroy  enemy  merchant  ships  encountered. 

(5)  Investigate  neutral  merchant  ships  encountered;  send  them  to  port  for 
adjudication  if  investigation  warrants;  or  if  necessary  and  permissible  under 
international  law,  destroy  them.  (See  "Instructions  for  the  Navy  of  the  United 
States  Governing  Maritime  Warfare"). 

(6)  Seize  any  opportunity  to  inflict  disproportinate  damage  on  the  enemy, 
modifying  or  discontinuing  plans  in  operations  if  necessary  in  order  to  do  so. 

(7)  Disseminate  pertinent  information  to  other  Task  Force  Commanders  as 
conditions  of  radio  silence  and  other  circumstances  permit. 

(8)  Aircraft  attempt,  without  taking  undue  risk,  to  force  merchant  ships  to 
the  vicinity  of  supporting  surface  vessels  or  to  United  States*  ports. 

(9)  This  plan  effective  with  Navy  Plan  0-1. 

(10)  Be  prepared  to  transfer  units  of  Southeast  Pacific  Force  and  Atlantic 
Reenforcement  on  short  notice.  So  employ  such  units  that  if  transferred  they 
can  reach  Canal  Zone  within  twenty-one  days.  If  transferred,  such  units  proceed 
along  routes  and  conduct  such  sweeps  as  the  Commander-in-Chief  may  prescribe. 

(11)  Continue  such  training  as  these  and  other  prescribed  operations  permit. 
[I-ll]        4.  Logistics  as  in  Navy  Plan  0-1,  Rainbow  Five. 

5.  Provisions  of  Part  V  Navy  Plan  0-1,  Rainbow  Five  apply. 


Admiral,  U.  S.  Navy, 

Commander-in-Chief, 
United  States  Pacific  Fleet. 


[II-l]  ANNEX    II 


United  States  Pacific  Fleet 

U.  S.  S.  PENNSYLVANIA,  Flagship 

Place 

Date 

Marshall  Reconnaissance  and  Raiding  Plan  No. 

Initial  Task  Organization. 
(a).    Task  Force  One. 
(b).   Task  Force  Two. 
(c).    Task  Force  Three. 
(d).  Task  Force  Nine  (Patrol  Plane  Force), 
(e).    Task  Force  Seven  (Undersea  Force), 
(f).    Task  Force  Six  (Logistic  and  Control  Force). 
tFnits  of  these  task  forces  initially  same  as  in  Operation  Plan  1A-R5. 


864       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

1.  (a)  Information. — (1)  This  plan  covers  the  initial  operations  in  the 
MARSHALLS  for  carrying  out  the  basic  task  of  diverting  Japanese  strength 
away  from  the  MALAY  BARRIER  through  the  denial  and  capture  of  positions 
in  the  MARSHALLS. 

2.  This  force  will: 

(a)  Reconnoiter  the  MARSHALLS,  particularly  ENIWETOK,  preparatory  to 
a  raid  in  force  and  to  eventual  capture,  in  order  to  develop  the  mobile  and  land 
defenses  and  material  installations  therein. 

(b)  Raid  the  MARSHALLS  with  ships  and  aircraft  and  small  landing  groups 
in  order  to  destroy  enemy  mobile  forces,  fixed  defenses  and  facilities. 

[1 1-2]  3.  (a)  Task  Force  One. — (1)  Transfer  available  large  Jight  cruisers 
and  carrier  to  Task  Force  Two  on  J-Day. 

(2)  About  Five  J-Day,  depart  PEARL  HARBOR  with  remainder  of  force  and 
proceed  to  rendezvous  with  Task  Force  Two  at  Point  Tare  on  Eleven  J-Day. 
If  delay  in  arriving  at  rendezvous  is  in  prospect,  advise  Commander,  Task  Force 
Two,  of  the  probable  time  of  arrival.  Transmit  any  such  message  prior  to 
departing  from  the  PEARL  HARBOR  area,  if  possible.  Sweep  as  practicable 
along  the  route  as  required  by  Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan  (Annex  I  to  Navy  Plan 
0-1,  Rainbow  Five. 

(3)  If  the  Oommander-in-Chief  is  not  present  upon  making  the  rendezvous, 
Commander  Task  Force  One  assume  general  charge  of  all  further  operations  in 
connection  with  this  reconnaissance  and  raid,  and  direct  Commander  Task  Force 
Two  to  commence  the  raid  at  a  suitable  time  after  he  has  reported  ready. 

(4)  Upon  making  rendezvous,  assume  command  of  battleships  of  Task  Force 
Two. 

(5)  Cover  operations  of  Task  Force  Two,  as  reenforced,  from  the  area  to  the 
northward  of  the  MARSHALLS,  furnishing  such  support  to  that  force  as  devel- 
opments require,  and  keeping  its  commander  informed  as  to  the  location  of  Task 
Force  One.  Detail  escorts  for  any  damaged  ships  of  Task  Force  Two  which  it  may 
be  necessary  to  return  to  base. 

(6)  Utilize-security  offered  by  operations  of  patrol  planes  at  WAKE. 

[II-S]  (7)  After  Task  Force  Two  has  completed  raids  and  rejoined,  if  the 
Commander-in-Chief  is  not  present,  Commander  Task  Force  One  carry  out 
further  operations  of  a  similar  nature  or  conduct  the  combined  forces  to  PEARL 
HARBOR  at  discretion. 

(b)  Task  Force  Two,  reenforced  as  provided  in  this  plan,  reconnoiter  and  raid 
the  MARSHALLS,  carrying  out  the  following  approximate  procedure: 

(1)  On  One  J-Day,  unless  otherwise  directed,  depart  PEARL  HARBOR  with 
reenforcements  provided  by  this  Plan  and  proceed  toward  TAONGI;  battleships 
and  destroyer  screen  at  fifteen  knots,  remainder  of  force  at  twenty  knots.  Sweep 
along  the  route  in  accordance  with  Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan  (Annex  I  to  Navy 
Plan  0-1,  Rainbow  Five)  and  furnish  security  as  practicable  to  Task  Force  One. 
Furnish  destroyer  escort  to  oilers  as  prescribed  in  paragraph  3  (f)  (1). 

(2)  Five  J-Day,  fuel  the  advance  group  from  oilers  at  Rendezvous  Tare  or 
other  designated  rendezvous. 

(3)  Six  J-Day  to  Nine  J-Day  reconnoiter  the  MARSHALLS  as  follows: 

(i)  Reconnoiter  by  air  such  atolls  as  weather  conditions,  forces,  time  and  devel- 
opments permit,  giving  particular  attention  to  ENIWETOK,  BIKINI,  RONGE- 
LAP,  WOTJE,  JALUIT,  KWAJALEIN,  MALOELAP  and  ARNO.  Recon- 
noiter ENIWETOK  particularly  with  a  view  to  an  early  attack  for  its  seizure. 

[II-Ji]  (ii)  So  conduct  reconnaissance  as  to  leave  the  enemy  in  doubt  as  to 
what  further  reconnaissance  is  about  to  be  undertaken,  or  as  to  what  particular 
places  may  be  attacked. 

(iii)  Supplement  air  reconnaissance  by  reconnaissance  from  surface  units  and 
by  landing  patrols,  and  raid  with  forces  immediatel}^  available  if  the  situation 
and  developments  at  the  time  indicate  that  such  supplementary  action  is  desirable 
and  feasible. 

(iv)  Utilize  both  photographic  and  visual  observations  to  determine  as  accu- 
rately as  practicable  the  opposition  that  may  be  expected  to  raids  and  landing 
parties;  and  the  targets  suitable  for  air  and  surface  bombardment.  Of  particular 
interest  are: 

ships  and  aircraft; 

storage  tanks; 

power  plants  and  radio  installations; 

docks; 

air  fields; 

storehouses  and  other  buildings; 


PROCEEDINGS  OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  865 

guns  and  observation  posts; 

mines ; 

channel  and  beach  obstructions; 

other  defense  installations; 

beaches  suitable  for  landing  operations; 

extent  of  anchorage  area; 

hydrographic,  topographic,  and 

meteorological  features. 

(v)  Retire  on  own  battleships  or  Task  Force  One  for  assistance  should  circum- 
stances require. 

(vi)   Operate  battleship  group  to  furnish  support  as  necessary. 

(vii)  Unless  persistent  bad  weather  or  other  unforeseen  developments  prevent, 
adjust  operations  to  complete  reconnaissance  in  four  days  or  less  after  making 
initial  flights  over  enemy  territory. 

[II-5\  (viii)  Upon  the  completion  of  reconnaissance,  withdraw  to  join 
Task  Forces  One  and  Three.  Transfer  battleships  to  Task  Force  One.  Task 
Force  Three  will  merge  into  Task  Force  Two  at  this  time. 

(ix)  Study  and  analyze  information  gained  in  reconnaissance;  determine  upon 
the  atolls  to  be  raided  and  the  specific  objectives  for  attack.  Complete  final 
plans  therefor,  with  due  regard  for  subparagraph  (4)  below,  and  issue  to  those 
concerned.  Via  destroyer,  furnish  the  Commander,  Task  Force  One  and  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  if  present,  with  information  and  aerial  photographs  ob- 
tained, and  copy  of  raiding  plan. 

(x)  Report  by  visual  (or  by  destroyer  if  out  of  signal  distance)  to  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, if  he  is  within  the  general  area,  otherwise  to  the  Commander, 
Task  Force  One,  the  time  it  is  desired  to  place  the  raiding  plan  into  effect. 

(4)  Beginning  about  Thirteen  J-Day,  when  directed,  carry  out  the  raiding 
plan.     In  preparing  and  carrying  out  the  raiding  plan,  be  guided  by  the  following: 

(i)  Make  such  additional  air  reconnaissance  immediately  prior  to  attack  as  best 
meets  the  existing  situation. 

(ii)  Attack  the  selected  objectives  with  air  and  surface  forces,  the  scheme  of 
attack  being  at  the  discretion  of  the  Task  Force  Commander  and  designed  to 
provide  the  best  economy  of  force.  Avoid  directing  enemy  attention  in  advance 
to  the  objectives  of  attack. 

[1 1-6]         (iii)  The  priority  of  objectives  is  as  follows: 
combatant  ships,  tenders,  and  aircraft; 
other  ships; 
fuel  tanks; 

power  and  radio  installations; 
troop  concentrations; 
storehouses ; 
other  installations. 

(iv)  Except  in  unusual  circumstances,  no  vessel  expend  more  than  twenty-five 
per  cent  of  bombs  or  ammunition  on  fixed  objectives. 

(v)  Where  conditions  appear  favorable,  land  personnel  to  demolish  installa- 
tions and  eliminate  enemy  personnel. 

(vi)   Do  not  enter  lagoons  with  ships. 

(vii)  Make  suitable  arrangements  for  the  protection  of  and  withdrawal  of 
damaged  ships,  requesting  escorts  from  Task  Force  One. 

(viii)  If  sufficient  weakly  held  positions  are  developed  to  warrant  further  raids, 
carry  them  out,  otherwise  discontinue  raids  at  discretion  and  join  Task  Force  One. 

(c)  Task  Force  Three. — (1)  If  Atlantic  Reenforcement  has  been  detached, 
transfer  two  heavy  cruisers  at  PEARL  HARBOR  to  Task  Force  Two. 

(2)  If  carrier  is  available,  assign  it  to  Task  Force  Two  for  this  operation  begin- 
ning J-Day. 

[1 1-7]  (3)  While  in  the  Northern  Pacific  carrying  out  the  Patrol  and  Sweep- 
ing Plan  (Annex  I  to  Navy  Plan  0-1,  Rainbow  Five)  employ  radio  to  deceive 
enemy  as  to  intentions  in  the  MARSHALLS. 

(4)  If  available,  assign  combat  unit  of  about  one  hundred  fifty  marines  to  each 
cruiser  which  will  eventually  join  Task  Force  Two. 

(5)  Upon  completion  of  the  task  assigned  in  the  Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan  on 
about  Ten  J-Day,  join  Task  Force  Two  with  cruisers  and  destroyers  at  Point  Tare 
or  other  designated  rendezvous.  Thereafter  operate  as  part  of  Task  Force  Two 
until  released  upon  completion  of  the  raiding  operation  of  this  plan. 

(d)  Task  Force  Nine  (Patrol  Plane  Force)  coordinate  operations  of  patrol  planes 
with  those  of  other  forces  as  follows: 

(1)  Prior  to  Five  J-Day  advance  maximum  practicable  patrol  plane  strength 


866       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

to  WAKE,  MIDWAY,  and  JOHNSTON,  leaving  not  less  than  two  operating 
squadrons  at  OAHU. 

(2)  JOHNSTON-based  planes,  during  passage  of  units  of  other  forces  to  the 
westward,  search  along  the  route  of  advance  from  the  vicinity  of  JOHNSTON 
to  longitude  one  hundred  seventy-eight  degrees  west. 

(3)  MIDWAY-based  planes  search  sectors  to  the  southwestward  of  MIDWAY 
to  prevent  surprise  attack  across  that  sector  on  units  operating  toward  the 
MARSHALLS. 

[1 1-8]  (4)  WAKE-based  planes  make  preliminary  air  reconnaissance  of 
TAONGI  and  BIKAR  on  Five  J-Day,  or  as  soon  thereafter  as  practicable,  and 
acquaint  Commander  Task  Force  Two  with  the  results.  Thereafter,  conduct 
search,  to  the  extent  that  available  planes  and  supplies  will  permit,  to  prevent 
surprise  attack  from  the  westward  by  enemy  surface  forces  on  own  units  operating 
toward  the  MARSHALLS. 

(5)  On  completion  of  the  raiding  operations  of  Task  Force  Two  resume  normal 
operations  as  required  by  paragraph  3242b.  of  the  Fleet  Operating  Plan. 

(e)  Task  Force  Seven  (Undersea  Force). — No  primary  tasks  in  connection  with 
this  plan  are  assigned  but: 

(1)  Submarines  which  may  have  been  in  the  MARSHALLS  in  carrying  out  the 
Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan  (Annex  I  to  Navy  Plan  0-1,  Rainbow  Five)  report 
enemy  information  obtained. 

(2)'  While  en  route  to  patrol  stations  to  the  westward: 

(i)   Seize  opportunities  to  damage  important  enemy  units. 

(ii)  Avoid  contacts  with  own  forces. 

(iii)  Force  Commander  keep  other  forces  advised  of  location  and  movements  of 
submarines. 

(f)  Task  Force  Six  (Logistic  and  Control  Force).  Despatch  two  oilers  to  carry 
out  the  following: 

(1)  Proceed  on  J-Day  with  destroyer  escort  provided  by  Commander  Task 
Force  Two  to  rendezvous  with  the  advance  group  of  Task  Force  Two  on  Five  J- 
Day  at  Point  Tare,  or  as  directed  by  Commander  Task  Force  Two. 

[II-9]  (2)  Thereafter  conduct  fueling  and  proceed  as  directed  by  Com- 
mander Task  Force  Two. 

(x)  (1)  Seize  every  opportunity  to  damage  the  enemy,  but  avoid  engaging 
at  a  disadvantage. 

(2)  Be  alert  to  detect  and  destroy  enemy  mobile  forces,  particularly  raids  or 
expeditions  which  may  be  directed  at  our  outlying  islands. 

(3)  Restrict  the  use  of  radio  to  a  minimum. 

(4)  This  plan  effective  simultaneously  with  the  execution  of  PhasellA  of 
U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  Operating  Plan  (Rainbow  Five). 

4.  (a)   Fuel  from  oiler  as  prescribed  in  paragraph  3  (f)  above. 

(b)  Fuel  destroyers  from  large  ships  at  discretion  of  force  and  group  commanders. 

(c)  Logistic  support  for  submarines  and  patrol  planes  as  in  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet 
Operating  Plan  (Rainbow  Five). 

5.  (a)  Communications  in  accordance  with  Annex  III  to  Navy  Plan  0-1, 
Rainbow  Five. 

(b)  Use  GREENWJCH  Civil  Time. 

(c)  Rendezvous  Tare:  Latitude  sixteen  degrees  North;  Longitude  one  hundred 
seventy-seven  degrees  East. 

(d)  The  Commander-in-Chief  will  keep  the  Fleet  advised  as  to  his  location. 


Admiral, 
Commander-in-  Chief, 
United  States  Pacific  Fleet. 


[III-l]  ANNEX   III 


United  States  Pacific  Fleet 

U.  S.  S.  PENNSYLVANIA,  Flagship 

Place 

Date 

Communication  Plan  No.  1,  Rainbow  Five 

USF-70  effective  as  modified  herein.  The  numbered  parts,  sections,  and 
paragraphs  of  USF-70  listed  are  efi'ective  in  toto,  or  as  indicated.  Omitted 
numbered  parts,  sections,  or  paragraphs  are  not  effective  unless  specifically 
made  so  by  Task  Force  Commanders  by  supplementary  communication  plans. 

1110.  Efi^ective. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  867 

1120.  Effective.     Unless  otherwise  directed  this  communication  plan  is  effec- 
tive coincident  with  the  placing  in  effect  of  Navy  Plan  0-1  Rainbow  Five. 
1170  to  1178.  Effective. 

1179.  Effective.     The  above  procedure  shall  be  usedior  Radar  contact  reports. 
No  receiver  not  supplied  by  Bureau  of  Ships  shall  be  used  for  this  or  any  other 

purpose  until  it  has  been  thoroughly  tested  to  assure  that  it  does  not  transmit  a 
carrier  from  its  oscillating  circuit. 

1180.  Effective. 
1190.  Effective. 
1212.  Effective. 
1220.  Effective. 

13S0.  Allied  communications  in  Pacific  Area  are  governed  by  SP  02376;  in  the 
Eastern  Theater  by  current  Andus  publications. 

[1 1 1-2]         2120.  Condition  19  effective. 

21S1.  Effective. 

2200.  The  radio  frequency  plans  are  as  set  forth  in  Appendix  B,  USF-70,  except 
that  Naval  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Communication  Plans  will  be  governed  by 
Article  4005,  1(a)  of  WPDNC-46. 

No  transmission  shall  be  made  on  500  kcs.  frequency  without  the  authority  of 
the  O.  T.  C.  of  a  Task  Force. 

When  the  O.  T.  C.  of  a  Task  Force  or  component  at  sea  considers  that  the  risk 
is  justified  by  the  importance  of  the  traffic  concerned  he  may  transmit  traffic  to 
the  nearest  shore  radio  station  that  guards  the  Naval  Calling  Frequency  (355  kc) 
or  to  Radio  Washington  or  Honolulu  on  the  4235  kc  series.  He  shall  not,  except 
in  extreme  emergency  and  when  he  is  sure  that  the  situation  justifies  the  risk, 
answer  calls  or  receive  traffic  on  355  kc,  except  by  interception. 

The  various  circuit  guards  required  shall  be  so  disposed  as  to  permit  the  maxi- 
mum number  of  ships  to  set  watches  on  the  radio  direction  finder,  underwater 
listening  equipment  and  other  intelligence  equipment  as  directed  by  Task  Force 
Commanders. 

The  Senior  Commander  of  Units  from  different  task  organizations  operating 
in  the  same  area  shall  arrange  for  rapid  means  of  inter-communications,  preferably 
by  available  shore  stations.  Task  Organization  Commander  in  a  port  or  operat- 
ing area  shall  establish  an  area  radio  frequency  for  use  under  circumstances  when 
visual  systems  will  not  serve.  In  port  radio  shall  not  be  used  [III-S]  '■  for 
inter-communication  or  communication  with  shore  when  a  visual  link  or  landline 
exists  or  may  be  established. 

Guard  NPM  Primary  Fox  regardless  of  geographical  position. 

2300.  Effective. 

2400.   Effective. 

2510.  CSP-1161  effective  with  this  communication  plan  and  shall  be  used  in 
lieu  of  CSP-776  for  Task  Organization  command  traffic. 

2520.  Use  effective  Confidential  Radio  Call  Sign  lists  and  ciphers  for  adminis- 
trative traffic. 

25JfO.  Effective. 

2720.  Effective. 

2740.  Effective. 

SOOO.  Effective.    • 

4120.  Effective. 

5000.  Effective. 

5230.  Until  receipt  of  satisfactory  radio  recognition  device  for  aircraft  the 
following  approach  and  recognition  procedure  shall  govern  the  approach  of  Naval 
aircraft  to  either  units  of  the  Fleet  or  Naval  outlying  island  bases.  Separate 
special  procedure  will  be  prescribed  for  major  bases  and  areas. 

Aircraft  approach  from  outside  of  gun  range  in  simple  cruising  formation  (if 
more  than  one  plane)  on  bearing  045°  T.  or  225°  T.  [III-4]  on  odd  days 
(OCT),  and  135°  T.  or  315°  T.  on  even  days  (OCT),  from  center  of  formation  or 
station  at  1000  feet  or  under.  (These  bearings  may  be  changed  if  necessary  by 
local  authorities.)  They  shall  never  approach  from  the  bearing  on  the  sun  when 
the  sun  is  low. 

If  station  does  not  recognize  plane  as  friendly  it  challenges  by  making  "Zs"  on 
searchlight,  or  by  training  searchlight  with  red  filter  on  plane  if  available;  other- 
wise at  shore  bases  use  a  red  smoke  bomb  during  daylight  and  a  red  rocket  at  night. 

On  seeing  challenge  plane,  or  leading  plane  if  there  is  a  formation,  replies  as 
follows : 

(a)  Daytime. — On  odd  day  of  the  month  (GCT),  leave  formation,  circle  to  the 
right  and,  when  back  on  the  approach  course,  dip  right  wing  twice,  on  even  days 
(GCT),  leave  formation,  circle  to  the  left  and,  when  back  on  approach  course, 
79716 — 46— Ex.  149,  vol.  2 14 


868       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

dip  left  wing  twice.  This  must  be  made  distinctive,  dipping  the  wing  about  30 
degrees  to  the  prescribed  side  and  returning  to  horizontal  after  each  dip. 

(b)  Nighttime. — Turn  on  running  lights  and  proceed  as  for  daytime  replies  to 
challenge,  except  circling  may  be  omitted;  or  make  emergency  identification 
pyrotechnic  signal  prescribed  in  effective  CSP. 

When  approaching  aircraft  are  recognized  as  friendly,  the  recognition  station 
shall  [III-5]  train  on  the  approaching  aircraft  a  powerful  searchlight, 
make  "Fs"  or  show  green  colored  light.  Those  signals  indicate  to  planes  that  they 
are  recognized  as  friendly  and  will  not  be  fired  on. 

In  a  Fleet  formation  the  recognition  stations  will  be,  unless  otherwise  desig- 
nated, those  ships  on  the  outer  circle  closest  to  approach  bearings  045°  T.  and 
225°  T.  or  135°  T.  and  315°  T.  (depending  on  the  day)  from  Fleet  center. 

0131.  Effective. 

6200.  Effective. 

6400.  Effective. 

6500.  Effective. 

6610.  Effective. 

7000  (less  7100).  Effective. 

[IV~1]  ANNEX  IV 

Command  relationships  and  coordination  of  activities  ai  outlying  bases 

1.  Forces  operating  from  outlying  stations  or  bases,  under  this  Plan,  may 
consist,  broadly,  of  the  following: 

(a)  Local  Defense  Forces,  consisting  of  the  local  garrison  and  the  local  defense 
forces  (which  may  include  submarines  and  aircraft  especially  designated  for  this 
purpose),  operating  under  the  direct  control  of  the  base  or  station  commander, 
and  with  the  primary  mission  of  defending  the  base  or  station  against  hostile 
attack. 

(b;  Fleet  forces  consisting  of  submarines,  airplanes  and  possibly  surface  ships 
or  detachments,  operating  under  a  fleet  task  force  commander  or  commanders, 
whose  missions,  while  contributing  indirectly  to  local  defense,  are  primarily 
dictated  by  broader  strategical  and  tactical  considerations  in  connection  with 
other  operations. 

2.  Command  relationships,  under  these  conditions,  will  be  governed  by  the 
following: 

(a)  The  base  or  station  commander  will,  normally,  command  and  direct  the 
operations  of  local  defense  forces,  in  accordance  with  the  directive  of  the  Com- 
mander Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier  (Commandant,  Fourteenth  Naval 
District).  This  base  commander,  a  task  group  commander  under  the  Commander 
Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier,  who  is  himself  a  task  force  commander  under 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  may,  on  occasion,  also  have  functions  of  command  in 
connection  with  Fleet  units  in  the  vicinity. 

(b)  Fleet  forces  will,  normally,  be  operated  in  accordance  with  directives  of 
their  respective  Fleet  task  organization  commanders.  In  entrance  and  egress, 
use  of  facilities,  arrangements  for  berthing  and  services,  etc.,  they  will  conform 
to  and  be  guided  by  the  local  regulations. 

(c)  In  the  event  of  contact  with  enemy  forces  which  may  threaten  the  base, 
or  the  forces  operating  [lV-2]  therefrom  or  in  connection  therewith,  the 
senior  officer  present  in  the  base  area  will  assume  command  of  all  forces  and  activ- 
ities in  the  vicinity  as  necessary  to  take  appropriate  action  against  the  threatening 
enemy.  As  it  is  entirely  possible  that  such  procedure  may  temporarily  divert 
Fleet  forces  from  some  broader  task  contemplated  by  their  task  force  commanders 
of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  local  commanders  must  bear  this  in  mind  and  reduce 
such  diversion  to  a  minimum.  They  must  also,  within  the  limits  of  the  informa- 
tion available  to  them,  and  as  permitted  by  the  urgent  local  situation,  so  direct 
an}'  action  taken  by  Fleet  units  under  their  temporary  command,  as  to  further 
the  broad  operating  plan  in  effect. 

(d)  To  obviate  to  a  maximum  the  difficulties  which  are  inherent  in  the  com- 
mand and  communication  relationships  at  such  bases,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
insure  that  all  interested  commanders,  including  the  commanders  of  bases  con- 
cerned, are  made  information  addressees  of  all  appropriate  plans,  orders,  and 
reports  of  enemy  forces.  Commanders  of  all  forces  within  the  area  will  ensure 
that  the  base  or  station  commander,  as  well  as  the  Senior  Officer  Present,  is 
familiar  with  the  general  nature  of  their  orders  and  with  their  general  operations 
(unless  specifically  directed  otherwise). 

(e)  In  general,  the  question  of  command  in  such  circumstances  is  covered  by 
articles  801  and  1486,  U.  S.  Navy  Regulations. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY 


869 


(f)  The  shifting  of  vessels,  squadrons,  or  other  units  within  an  area  may  result 
in  consequent  changes  in  seniority  among  those  actually  present. 

3.  (a)  A  Base  Defense  Plan  and  a  supporting  Communication  Plan  will  be 
prepared  under  the  direction  of  the  Commander  Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier. 
They  must  provide  for  the  Fleet  units  present  participating  in  the  defense,  and 
for  adequate  communications  among  the  various  fixed  and  mobile  forces,  both 
local  and  Fleet.  Commander  Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontier  will  furnish 
copies  of  such  plans  to  appropriate  fleet  force  commanders.  [IV-2]  The 
latter  will,  whenever  practicable,  supply  copies  to  units  of  their  command  prior 
to  departure  for  operations  at  the  outlying  base.  A  unit  commander  arriving 
in  the  area  without  receiving  the  plans  in  advance,  however,  will  obtain  them  as 
soon  as  possible  after  arrival. 

(b)  The  Base  Defense  Plan  should  be  analogous  to  the  one  currently  in  effect 
for  the  Pearl  Harbor  area.  The  Senior  Officer  Present,  in  exercising  his  function 
of  command  (paragraph  2  (c)  of  this  Annex)  should  normally  conform  to  the 
Base  plans. 

(c)  The  Communication  Plan  should  include  provisions  for: 

(1)  Inter-communication  between  units  of  the  local  defense  forces,  and  between 
such  forces  and  the  local  defense  commander. 

(2)  Communication  between  local  defense  commanders  and  fleet  task  organiza- 
tion commanders. 

(3)  An  area  radio  frequency  which  may  be  used  within  that  area  for  both  (1) 
and  (2)  above  and  for  inter-communication  between  the  fleet  task  organization 
commanders  present. 


Hewitt  Inqxjiey  Exhibit  No.  36 


Sep  9,  1941. 


Oi>-12B-2-djm 
(SC)A16/EF12 
Serial  098912 

D-33956 
Secret 

From :  The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 
To :  The  Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet. 
Subject:  The  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  Operating  Plan,  Rainbow  No.  5   (Navy  Plan 

O-l,  Rainbow  No.  5)  WPPac-46,  review  and  acceptance  of. 
Reference:   (a)  CinCPac  Secret  let.  Serial  064W  of  25  July,  1941. 

1.  The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  has  reviewed  subject  Plan  and  accepts  it. 

2.  The  urgency  of  delivery  of  this  document  is  such  that  it  will  not  reach  the 
addressee  in  time  by  the  next  available  officer  coiu'ier.  The  originator  therefore 
authorizes  the  transmission  of  this  document  by  registered  mail  within  the  conti- 
nental limits  of  the  United  States. 

H.  R.  Stakk. 


BOTJTING  AND  TBANSFER  SUP — NA\Tr  DEPT.,  KOOM   2055 

(SC)  A16/FF12  Document  No.  33956 

SUBJECT:  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  Operating  Plan— Rainbow  Five  (WPPae-46) 
Date  received  8-12-41  Parcel  or  Postal  No.  Five 


From— 

To— 

File 

Serial 

Date 

Copy 
No. 

With 
enclo- 
sures 

Without  enclosure 

Itr:  CinCPac 

CNO 

Al6/WPPae-46  (16) 

064W 

7-25-41 

1-5 

A 

Ends,  received  di- 
rect by  20-P 

Routed 
to— 

Copy 
No. 

With  en- 
closures 

No.  Cy. 
enclo- 
sures 

SECRET       Remarks       CONFIDENTIAL 

12 

1-5 

870       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 
[SH] 

WHEN  NO  LONGER  REQUIRED  FOR  ACTION  OR  IMMEDIATE  REFERENCE  PLEASE 
RETURN  ATTACHED  DOCUMENT(S)  TO  ROOM  2055,  OFFICE  OF  THE  CHIEF  OF  NAVAL 
OPERATIONS. 

IF  IT  IS  DESIRED  TO  RETAIN  ATTACHED  DOCUMENT(S)  INDEFINITELY  PLEASE 
REMOVE  ORIGINAL  OF  THIS  ROUTING  AND  TRANSFER  SLIP  AND  RETURN  SAME  TO 
ROOM   2055,    OFFICE    OF    C.    N.    O. 

Doc.  No.  33956       Copy  No. Doc.  No.  33956       Copy  No.  - 

With  enclosures With  enclosures 

9  Received Received 10 

(Date)  (Date) 

Op Op 

GPO                                 (Signature)  gpo                                   (Signature) 

Doc.  No.  33956       Copy  No Doc.  No.  33956        Copy  No.  - - 

With  enclosures With  enclosures 

7  Received - Received 8 

(Date)  (Date) 

Op — Op 

Op. GPO                                    (Signature) 

GPO                                (Signature)  Doc.  No.  33956       Copy  No 

Doc.  No.  33956       Copy  No With  enclosures 

With  enclosures Received 6 

5  Received (Date) 

(Date)  Op 

Op. GPO                                   (Signature) 

GPO                                (Signature)  Doc.  No.  33956       Copy  No 

Doc.  No.  33956       Copy  No.  1-4  With  enclosures 

With  enclosures Received. 4 

3  Received  9-9-41  (Date) 

(Date)  Op 

Op.  12                                       W.  C.  Blaine  gpo                                 (Signature) 

GPO                                   (Signature)  Doc.  No.  33956       Copy  No.  1-4 

Doe.  No.  33956       Copy  No.  1-5  With  enclosures 

With  enclosures Received  9-6-^1                                                          2 

1  Received  8-12-41  (Date) 

(Date)  Op.  IOC                                                 A.  Meek 

Op.  12                                          W.  C.  Blaine  gpo  16-15240                    (Signature) 
GPO                                   (Signature) 

[S-ff]         [Stamped :]  Received  S-C  files,  Room  2055.      Aug  12  1941.     Route  to : 
12.     Op  File  No.  (SC)  A16/FF12.     Doc.  No.  33956.     Copy  No.  1  of  5. 

UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

U.  S.  PENNSYLVANIA,  FlagSllip 

Peael  Haebob,  T,  H.,  July  25,  1941. 
CinC  File  No. 
A16/WPPac-46(16) 
Serial  064W 
Secret 

From :  Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet. 

To :  The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 

Subject:       U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  Operating  Plan— Rainbow  Five  (WPPac-46). 
Reference:  (a)  WPLr46. 
Enclosure:  (A)   Six  (6)  copies  of  WPPac-46,  registered  numbers  1  to  6  inclusive. 

1.  As  required  by  reference  (a),  the  subject  Plan  is  submitted  herewith  for 
approval. 

2.  In  order  that  the  task  force  commanders  of  the  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  might 
have  a  basis  for  planning,  and  for  action  in  case  of  an  early  outbreak  of  war,  this 
Plan  has  been  distributed  prior  to  its  approval  by  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 

8.  The  Plan  required  by  paragraph  8215  a.2  of  reference  (a)  will  be  submitted 
when  completed. 

4.  Plans  for  other  operations  are  under  investigation  and 'will  be  submitted  as 
they  are  developed. 

5.  This  0-1  Plan  is  the  best  that  this  command  has  been  able  to  evolve  for 
carrying  out  the  tasks  assigned  in  the  Basic  Plan.  Every  investigation  of  pro- 
spective operations  among  the  Japanese  Mandated  Islands  shows  that  risk  of 
serious  damage  from  enemy  submarines  and  shore-based  aircraft  must  be  in- 
curred. The  Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  finds  himself  severely  handi- 
capped for  any  such  operations,  because  of  the  limited  forces  made  available  to 
him,  particularly  by  the  small  number  of  destroyers  and  other  anti-submarine 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT   INQUIRY  871 

vessels,  and  the  lack  of  transports  and  a  properly  trained  and  equipped  marine 
force. 

6.  If  this  Plan  is  put  into  eifect  in  whole  or  in  part  the  actual  conduct  of  any 
particular  operation  must  be  adjusted  to  accord  with  the  situation  actually  ex- 
isting and  the  forces  actually  available. 

H.  E.  Kimmel 
H.  E.  Kimmel. 

Hewitt  Inqtjiry  Exhibit  No.  36A" 

14H]         [Stamped:]  Received  S-C  files,  Room  2055.    Aug.  12,  1941.    Route  to: 
12.     Op  File  No.  (SC  A16/FF12.    Doc.  No.  33956.    Copy  No.  2  of  5. 

Peabl  Harbor,  T.  H.,  July  25,  1941. 
A16/WPPac-46(16) 
Serial  064W 
Secret 

From :  Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet. 

,  To :  The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 

Subject :      U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  Operating  Plan— Rainbow  Five  (WPPac-46). 
Reference:   (a)  WPL-46. 
Enclosure:  (A)   Six  (6)  copies  of  WPPac-46,  registered  numbers  1  to  6  inclusive. 

1.  As  required  by  reference  (a),  the  subject  Plan  is  submitted  herewith  for 
approval. 

2.  In  order  that  the  task  force  commanders  of  the  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  might, 
have  a  basis  for  planning,  and  for  action  in  case  of  an  early  outbreak  of  war,  this 
I'lan  has  been  distributed  prior  to  its  approval  by  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 

3.  The  Plan  required  by  paragraph  3215  a.2  of  reference  (a)  will  be  submitted 
when  completed. 

4.  Plans  for  other  operations  are  under  investigation  and  will  be  submitted  as 
they  are  developed. 

5.  This  0-1  Plan  is  the  best  that  this  command  has  been  able  to  evolve  for 
carrying  out  the  tasks  assigned  in  the  Basic  Plan.  Every  investigation  of  pro- 
spective operations  among  the  Japanese  Mandated  Islands  shows  that  risks  of 
serious  damage  from  enemy  submarines  and  shore-based  aircraft  must  be  in- 
curred. The  Comander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  finds  himself  severely  handi- 
capped for  any  such  operations,  because  of  the  limited'  forces  made  available  to 
him,  particularly  by  the  small  number  of  destroyers  and  other  anti-submarine 
vessels,  and  the  lack  of  transports  and  a  propei'ly  trained  and  equipped  marine 
force. 

6.  If  this  Plan  is  put  into  effect  in  whole  or  in  part  the  actual  conduct  of  any 
particular  operation  must  be  adjusted  to  accord  with  the  situation  actually  ex- 
isting and  the  forces  actually  available. 

H.  E.  Kimmel. 

[73"]  charge  slip 

c.  n.  o.  files 

• 

File  No.  (SC)  A16/FF12 

Serial  No.     09S912    D-33956 

Date  Sep.  9,  1941 

From  CNO 

To.  CincPac. 

Subject  U.  S.  Pac.  Fleet  Operating  Plan,  Rainbow  No.  5  (Navy  Plan  0-1,  Rain- 
bow No.  5)  WPPac-46,  review  and  acceptance  of. 

Enclosures  Doc.  33956— CincPiic  Ltr.  of  July  25,  1941  to  CNO  on  same  subject. 
(Orig.  &  3  copies.)     - 

Charged  to  Comdr.  Griswold  For  Admiral  Hewitt. 

Charged  by  Lt.  N.  M.  Blake 

Date  May  26,  1945. 

Received  by 


872        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Date  22  November,  1941. 


Hewitt  Inquiry  Exhibit  No.  37 

U.  S.  NAVAL  COMMUNICATION  SERVICE 
COMMANDEE-IN-CHIEF 


U.  S.  PACIFIC  FLEET 

OUTGOING 

From  CINCPAC  [U  PAC] 

Info  To: 

Classification:   Plain 

Originator:  12 

HO 

To  COlVrt'ATWINQ  2 

Precedence:    Routine 

Release:  01 

System:  LL 

Show  to:  13  95 

Heading:  Z  F5L  220130  M9U  QRS 

UJ] 

URSER  0780  AFFIRMATIVE 
Ref :  CLASSIFIED. 


Sent  at  0131/TT 
Flag  file.    TS  01976 


P\v  #2  0131A/22 
MHA 


(At  this  point  in  Exhibit  No.  37  there  appears : 

1.  A  copy  of  a  routing  slip  bearing  Cincus  routing  No,  10548 

and  date  19  November  1941. 

2.  A  memorandum  form  bearing  handwritten  notations. 
This  material  will  be  found  reproduced  as  Items  Nos.  120  and  121, 
respectively,  EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,  Hewitt  Inquiry.) 

[Endorsed :]  A4-3/FF12-7     A4-3/VZ 
PW2/A4-3/0780 


Confidential 
From : 
To: 

Subject : 
Enclosure 


Pateol  Wing  Two, 
U.  S.  Naval  Air  Station, 
Pearl  Harior,  T.  H.,  19  Nov.  1941. 


The  Commander  Task  Force  NINE. 

The  Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet. 

Revised  Schedule  for  Remainder  of  Second  Quarter,  Fiscal  Year,  1942. 

(A)  Two  copies  of  proposed  revised  schedule. 

1.  Changed  conditions  have  necessitated  a  revision  of  the  schedule  for  units  of 
Task  Force  NINE  for  the  remainder  of  the  second  quarter. 

2.  Approval  of  enclosure  (A)  is  requested. 


N.  L.  Bellinger 
N.  L.  Beixingeb. 
10543 


(The  enclosures  mentioned  supra,  being  two  copies  of  proposed 
revised  schedule  for  November  and  December  1941  for  the  Commander 
of  Task  Force  Nine,  will  be  found  reproduced  as  Items  Nos.  122  and 
123,  EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,  Hewitt  Inquiry.) 


Hewitt  Exhibit  No.  38 
(This  exhibit  consists, of  two  parts,  viz,  Exhibit  Nos.  38 A  and  38B.) 


PEOCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  873 

Hewitt  Inquiby  Exhibit  No.  38A 
INTERCEPTS,  JAPANESE  CONSUL  GENERAL,  HONOLULU,  10/1/41-12/2/41 

SECEET 

1-466 

Wednesday,  1  October  1941 

0900 o     MURAOKA  to  TSUSHIMA.— Out— Have  him  call. 

0912  i     NJ  to  OG  for  birth  date.     NI. 

1108  i    Man  to  MURAOKA  re  sports. 

1115  i     MIKAMI  to  SAKAI.     NI. 

1255  0    MURAOKA  asks  Tamako  /female  name/  to  come  to  see  them  next  week. 

/This  has  all  the  earmarks  of  straight  social  talk./ 
1257  o    SAKAI  tells  wife  /?/  that  they  won't  need  the  car  this  Sunday. 
1305  o    Man  asks  HBD  for  thick  drawing  paper  and  a  fountain  pen.    NI. 
1310  i    XX  to  MIKAMI  ordering  a  car  for  2.15. 
1320  o     SEKI   to   NAKAMURA  of   HBD    re   paper   and    maps.     /No    localities 

indicated./ 
1324  o    To  HBD  for  supplies. 


1-467 


End 


Thursday,  2  Octobee  1941 


0900  0     To  NISHIKAWA.— Out.— Have  him  call. 

1028  i     Universal  Motors  says  the  parts  are  ready  at  any  time. 

1042  i     MURAOKA  to  NISHIKAWA  /commercial ;  NI/. 

1055  i     Man  to  SAKAI  re  XP.     Routine  info. 

1115  o    To  MIKAMI  asking  him  to  call  XX. 

1121  o    To  RCA  for  messenger. 

1121  i    For  closing  hours. 

1134  i  TAKAGISHI  to  XX  inviting  him  for  next  Monday,  the  6th,  at  about  2 :  00. 
T.  also  thanks  XX  and  apologizes  for  keeping  him  up  late.  T.  remarks 
that  XX  was  "high"  at  the  /wedding/  party  /of  Sumida's  son/  and  j'elled 
a  lot  and  XX  says  he  remembers  having  a  good  time,  but  doesn't  remem- 
ber yelling.     T.  will  call  for  him. 

1140  0  XX  to  Mrs.  ?  saying  he  has  just  learned  from  Mr.  TAKAGISHI  that  he 
was  pretty  bad  the  other  night.  He  apologizes  for  his  behavior  and 
seems  to  be  sincerely  remorseful.  She  says  that  the  incident  T.  referred 
to  was  quite  late  when  XX  entered  the  maid's  room  and  got  tangled 
with  the  maid.  He  says  he  learned  about  it  from  T.  She  giggles  and 
is  amused  at  his  contrite  heart.  He  asks  what  time  the  Incident  /not 
War/  took  place. — About  1 :  30.  /It  seems  that  MIKAMI  failed  to  show 
up  when  he  was  supposed  to  and  XX  got  beyond  his  depth  in  sake.  He 
forgot  somethink  there  that  night,  and  Mrs.  ?  /Sumida?/  asks  when 
she  may  return  it  to  him.  They  both  laugh  unroariously  at  the  "missing 
link"  of  his  evening's  adventure.  She  asks  whether  he  is  at  home  and 
learns  that  he  is  at  the  ofRce.  She  refers  to  it  as  "that",  which  leads  to 
more  merriment,  and  says  she  will  send  "that"  up  this  afternoon. 

1145  o     NI. 

1330  o    O.  G.  to  Rev.  IKEZAKI  re  girl  that  lives  at  Koloa,  born  7  Feb.  1916. 


1-468 


Fbiday,  3  October  1941 


0900  i     NAKATSUKA  to  XX.— Not  in. 

0905  i  NAKATSUKA  to  XX  re  the  Advertiser  spread  about  Senator  Gillette's 
remarks  on  the  subversive  activities  of  X.  N.  asks  XX  whether  the 
accusations  are  just. — No,  they  are  only  rumors. — Do  you  have  any 
idea  how  the  rumor  started? — ^No.  I  don't  know  at  all  what  activities 
are  referred  to  as  leading  to  the  X  in  Hawaii. — Have  you  heard  anyone 
from  the  American  Government  asking  you  questions?  According  to 
Senator  Gillette,  the  FBI  and  Army  and  Navy  Intelligence  services 
desire  such  an  inquiry.  He  gives  the  idea  that  they  are  more  or  less 
following  the  activities  of  X.    /They  both  agree  that  very  foolish  state- 


874        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

ments  often  get  into  the  papers./  ....  Have  you  heai-d  anything 
about  the  Japanese  on  the  Pacific  Coast?— No,  I  don't  tliink  so. — You 
feel  they  are  just  as  loyal  as  the  Js.  in  Hawaii,  then? — Yes,  I  think  so. — 
They,  of  course,  you  deny  all  what  he  says.— Yes,  I  deny  it. — Cate- 
gorically deny  it  ? — Oh,  yes. — He  mentions  here  that  some  organizations 
send  funds  to  Japan  or  help  distribute  propaganda  films  in  the  U.  S. 
Do  you  feel  that  these  allegations  are  true  or  not? — No,  I've  never  heard 
about  the  Army  /apparently  misunderstood  N.  to  say  the  Army  was 
sending  them/  sending  films  here. — You  deny  that  X  is  taking  part  in 
any  subversive  activity,  of  course? — Yes.  /N.  will  let  XX  look  over 
whatever  he  writes  on  this  matter./ 

0911  i     KAWAMOTO  of  NJ  to  SAKAI  re  data  on  man  named  NITTA.     NI. 

0938  i  NAKATSUKA  to  XX  reading  his  story  re  Senator  Gillette's  allegations 
of  "unconsular"  activities  on  the  part  of  X.  XX  then  asks  N.  to  wait  a 
moment. — What  for? — I  am  preparing  a  statement  for  you. — You  mean 
you  are  translating  your  J.  statement  into  English? — Yes. — Are  you 
writing  a  long  statement? — No.  /N.  then  continues  reading  his  story. 
XX  asks  for  his  phone  number  and  says  he  will  call  him  back./ 

0949  0     SEKI  TO  NAKAMURA  of  HBD  for  paper. 

0959  0  XX  to  NAKATSUKA  saying  he  put  the  matter  in  very  simple  Japanese, 
but  believes  N.'s  story  covers  it  very  well.  XX  adds  that  he  has  heard 
for  the  first  time  of  the  Japanese  military  league  in  the  U.  S.  which 
is  accused  of  subversive  activities  on  the  West  Coast.  XX  requests 
N.  to  look  at  his  paper  of  4  and  5  January.  VX  called  XX's  attention 
to  the  fact  that  Gillette  made  a  statement  on  the  4th  and  the  following 
day  a  S-B  editorial  referred  to  him.  XX  approves  N.'s  story  including 
XX's  denial  that  the  J.  War  Office  distributed  films  in  America. 

1008  o        SAKAI  to  KAWAMOTO  at  NJ.— Out  at  a  meeting.— Have  him  call. 

1053  i  /FPM/  Man  tells  OG  he  has  received  a  letter  which  indicates  that  the 
Federal  Govt,  is  going  to  treat  all  dual  citizens  as  aliens  beginning  1 
October.     Can  X  do  anything  about  it? — No. — Thanks. 

1139  i        KONISHI  to  SAKAI.     Routine  request  for  data. 

1355  i  NAWATANI  to  YUGE.  /A  very  cryptic  brief  conversation  In  which 
great  surprise  was  expressed  at  some  telegram  or  wireless  message 
received.     No  details  given./ 


i-470 


1-471 


1-472 


Sattjbday,  4  October  1941 


0952  i  KATSUNUMA  asks  OG  re  Nakazo  FUJII.  He  has  died  in  Hilo  and 
his  friends  have  phoned  to  find  out  what  ken  he  is  from.  They  are  all 
embarrassed  about  the  fimeral  /i.e.,  they  don't  know  which  kenjin-kai 
will  take  charge/.     Call  98310. 

1037  o  OG  to  KATSUNUMA  saying  he  is  not  listed,  but  his  younger  brother, 
Nobuta,  is  given.     Yamaguchi. 

1045  i  NAKATSUKA  to  XX.  XX  approves  N.'s  story  re  Gillette's  accusa- 
tions. N.  asks  whether  XX  has  had  any  commimication  re  the  two 
NYK  ships  coming  here. — No ;  none ;  I  have  read  about  them  in  the 
paper.  I  wonder  where  they  got  the  information.  I  haven't  received 
any  letters  from  Japan  since  July.  I  haven't  received  any  inforrnation 
at  all  about  this. 

1050  i  KONISHI  to  MURAOKA  re  XP  of  a  Korean.— That's  impossible.  The 
Koreans  are  in  the  same  position  as  the  British  or  Germans  with  regard 
to  dual  citizenship. — This  is  a  student  at  the  University  who  has  been 
told  he  must  XP  before  he  can  be  eligible  for  an  exchange  scholar- 
ship.— After  a  check,  I  find  that  it  is  impossible  for  a  Korean  to  XP. 
End 


Sunday,  5  October  1941 

Not  Covered 
Monday,  6  October  1941 


0945  i     NAKATSUKA  asks  XX  about  ships.     They  agree  that'  the  rumors  are 
persistent,  but  no  oflJcial  confirmation  has  been  received. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT   INQUIRY  875 

0957  i    NOMURA  /f/  to  MURAOKA  re  passport  issued  in  1889   (28  Nov.)   to 

Sanzuchi  IWASAKI.     Proof  of  arrival  and  date  of  marriage  of  parents 

lacking. 
1012  o     KOTOSHIRODO  /?/  to  man.     /Very  brief,  indistinct./ 
1047  0     SAKAI  to  MIHO.— He's  at  National  Mortgage ;  call  6221.— Have  him  call. 

He  sent  a  check  to  cover  some  fees.     We  asked  him  to  send  cash. — 

Alright.    /A  sign  of  the  times.     Fees  paid  in  in  cash  are  not  subject  to 

control  or  are  easily  kept  out  of  reach  of  the  controllers.     X  refuses  all 

checks  now./ 
1053  o    No  answer.     NR. 
1102  0    NOMURA  to  MURAOKA  again.— We  find  we  have  the  record.     He  came 

in  1887  on  the  11th  of  December  on  the  Wakaura  Maru,  ship  No.  4. 

1120  i    Man  /possibly  Dr.  of  Maui/  to  LG  arranging  to  see  her 

•  /at  X  ?/  this  afternoon. 
1127  0    XX  to  cook  saying  he  will  not  require  lunch.     /He  also  went  to  hear 

Bowles  at  PPU./ 
1137  0    /NR/    No  answer. 

1205  o     SAHARA  to  Mr.  BEERLT  /?/.— He's  busy. 
1207  i     Woman  to  MURAOKA  re  picnic. 
1300  0     SEKI  to  NAKAMURA.— Out.— When  will  he  be  back?— He's  gone  to 

McCully.— I'll  call  again.— Shall  I  have  him  call?— No,  I'd  rather  call 

myself  for  it  may  be  evening  before  I  call. 
1303  0     OG  to  friend  re  picnic  this  Saturday.     NC. 
1316  0     ?  to  KOGO.— Out.— When  will  he  be  back?— Probably   about  4:30.— 

I'll  call. 

1-473 

1359  0     SAKAI  for  ?— He's  left. 

140i  0     01  to  his  OG  for  ?'s  number.— 6361,  local  105. 

1405  0  OI  to  Mr.  AUSTIN  /?/  at  6361,  local  105.  01  says  the  secretary  of  X 
returned  here  in  1940  on  a  diplomatic  passport.  Is  he  a  blocked  na- 
tional?— I  think  he  probably  would  be. — You  do? — Sure,  no  doubt  .  .  . 
What's  his  name? — Mr.  YUGE.  He  has  over  $1,000  in  one  of  those  three 
banks. 

1410  0  YUGE  to  SUZUKI  at  YSB  saying  he  made  deposits  the  14th  June  and 
26th  July  of  this  year.  YUGE's  balance  at  beginning  of  business  26th 
July  was  $7..51 ;  on  14th  June,  $562.87. 

1420  0  MURAOKA  to  woman  saying  the  letter  is  ready.  This  evening  MURAO- 
KA will  be  out  till  about  7 :  30  this  evening. — I'll  see  you  tomorrow. 


1-m 


End 

TtTESDAY,  7  OCTOBEB  1941 


0932  i  YSB  To  TSUKIKAWA  re  balance.  On  1  June  of  last  year  your  balance 
was  $642.44.  On  14  May  of  this  year  it  was  $730.02.  On  26  July  it  was 
zero. 

0936  0  TSUKIKAWA  to  OI  giving  the  data  of  the  preceding.— If  you  have  no 
balance,  it  can't  be  frozen. 

1026  i     Man  asks  for  date  of  his  XP. 

1031  o     NI. 

1203  o     SAKAI  to  his  wife.    NI  . 


1-475 


End 

Wednesday,  8  October  1941 


1147  i  NAKATSUKA  to  XX  re  simplified  XP  procedure.  N.  asks  whether 
"Stimson's  bill"  seems  to  XX  to  be  a  good  one.  XX  has  a  stock  answer 
to  any  and  every  question :  I  don't  know. — N. :  Do  you  think  that  will 
eliminate  a  lot  of  trouble? — I  don't  know. — Do  you  think  it  will  help  us 
eliminate  the  dual  citizenship  problem? — I  don't  know  what  the  attitude 
of  the  J.  Govt,  will  be. — What  is  your  personal  opinion  then? — "I  can't 
have  my  personal  opinion  if  I  do  not  know  the  attitude  of  our  Govern- 
ment."— Don't  you  know  for  youi'self  whether  it  would  help  or  not? — 
No,  I  can't  say. — I  think  it  would  be  a  good  thing  for  both  sides  to  know 


876       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

which  side  of  the  fence  the  dual  citizens  are  going  to  be  on. — Anyway,  I 

will  wait  and  see  whethei-  our  Government  has  "an  attitude  to  this  law 

or  not". — Do  you  have  any  word  on  J.  ships'  being  scheduled? — None, 

except  in  the  newspapers. 
1315  ?    NI. 

1355  i     /FPM/.    Too  brief. 
1400  i     /FPM/.    Girl  to  SAKAI  re  XP  applied  for  around  New  Year's.    Yoshito 

HIROTA.    NC. 
1406  i    /Cont.  of  1400  conversation./     SAKAI :  Your  XP  arrived  3  July,  #433.— 

I  had  heard  nothing  about  it. — The  details  aren't  here  yet,  but  I  will 

look  them  up  by  tomorrow. 

End 


1-Jtl6 


Thursday,  9  October  1941 


0918  o  XX  to  woman  at  NATSUNOYA  TEA  HOUSE,  saying  he  forgot  to  bring 
home  the  syohin  /could  be  'trophy,  prize' ;  'stolen  goods' ;  'commodity, 
merchandise'./  last  night.  Please  put  the  smaller  package  of  photo- 
graphs in  an  envelope.    I  am  sending  some  one  to  pick  them  up. — Alright. 

1028  i  Man  at  NATSUNOYA  /?/  to  SAKAI  saying  that  he  will  send  his  KT  to 
X  by  mail. 

1040  i  Man  re  deferment  of  J.  military  service.  He  asks  OG  whether  the  re- 
quest must  be  sent  to  the  village  office  in  Japan. — Yes. — But  if  the  P.  O. 
here  should  "open"  these  requests  for  deferment,  wouldn't  there  be  a  lot 
of  trouble? — Why  don't  you  come  up  to  the  office  with  it?  /It  developed 
later  that  was  for  advice  only.  The  forms  must  be  sent  in  by  the  indi- 
vidual direct  to  the  village  office  and  should  reach  that  office  as  soon  after 
1  December  as  practicable,  especially  in  view  of  the  uncertainty  of  mail 
connections  with  Japan./ 

1130  i     Brief.    NI. 

1140  o  MURAOKA  to  GOTO  re  arrival  of  XP  permits  for  several  members  of 
the  Goto  family.  Please  come  up  for  them  and  we  will  take  the  final 
_  step  in  XP  procedure. 

1253  i    Re  XP ;  NC ;  NI. 

1322  o     To  MIKAMI  requesting  him  to  come  to  X. 

1325  0  ?  to  NAKAMURA  of  HBD  asking  him  to  come  to  X  this  afternoon. 
/A  thing  that  never  fails  to  impress  me  is  the  fact  that  N.  is  not  only 
"familiar"  with  higher  members  of  X  staff,  but  he  tells  them  he  will  not 
come  up  when  they  ask  him  to  or  picks  his  own  hour.  No  one  else  is  so 
discourteous,  to  X,  as  N.  is./ — I  can't  make  it  today. 

1328  1  Woman  asks  OG  whether  she  can  get  money  through  to  Japan. — ^We 
don't  know.  /Later  switched  to  SAKAI./ — Is  it  hard  for  people  born 
here  who  do  not  hold  J.  citizenship  but  who  are  now  studying  in  Japan 
to  be  naturalized  Japanese? — They  will  have  to  follow  the  regular  pro- 
cedure and  apply  to  the  Minister  of  the  Interior.  Sometimes  it  takes  2 
months,  sometimes  it  takes  longer. — You  see,  I  have  children  in  school 
there  and  they  won't  pay  money  out  to  them  because  they  are  American 
citizens.  Aren't  they  Japanese? — No,  they  are  foreigners.  They  will 
not  release  funds  to  them. — Can  they  acquire  J.  citizenship  here? — No, 
they  must  be  in  Japan  to  be  eligible  for  naturalization. — Where  can  I 
take  steps  to  have  them  naturalized? — Do  all  this  in  Japan.  It  cannot 
be  done  here. 

1435  0  SEKI  to  NYK. — ^We  have  word  that  a  ship  is  coming  here  about  the 
20th. — Is  it  bound  for  Mexico? — I  suppose  so. — Are  you  free  Saturday? — 
Yes. — Then  let's  have  a  game.    /Golf./ 


1-J,78 


End 
Friday,  10  October  1941 


1305  0    OG  to  woman.     NI. 

1400  i     Man  to  VX.— Call  5243. 

1457  i  Re  XP  of  KONO.  SAKAI  had  to  send  the  $3.00  check  back  and  re- 
quest cash.  Caller  wondered  why  he  wasn't  trusted.  S.  explained  that 
it  was  the  "freeze"  that  made  the  new  plan  necessary. 

End 


1-479 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  HEWITT   INQUIRY  877 


SaTXJBDAY,  11  OCTOBEB  1941 


0930  i  NAKATSUKA  to  XX,  saying  the  J.  short-wave  broadcast  this  morning 
/6 :  30-?/  reported  that  some  ships  were  definitely  going  to  be  sent  to 
America  to  bring  passengers  from  Japan  and  to  pick  up  some  to  take 
hack. 

0932  o     SEKI  to  restaurant  reserving  places  for  lunch  for  four :  TSUKIKAWA, 

YUGE,  SEKI,  and  one  other.    About  1  o'clock. 

0933  0     NI. 

0934  o     SEKI  to  ISHIZAKA  arranging  to  meet  in  front  /of  X-?/  at  a  little 

before  1 :  00.  They  are  going  to  lunch  together  and  plan  to  play  /golf/ 
about  2 :  30.  ISHIZAKA  then  tells  SEKI  that  both  AP  and  UP  news 
indicates  that  on  the  15th  the  Tatuta  Maru  will  sail,  on  the  22nd  the 
Taiyo  Maru  will  sail  for  Honolulu  from  Kobe.  From  San  Francisco 
the  Tatuta  Maru  will  sail  direct  for  Japan  while  the  Taiyo  Maru  will 
come  to  Honolulu  and  return.  The  Nitta  Maru  will  proceed  to  Seattle. 
Today  is  Sunday  in  Japan  and  I  have  had  no  wire  from  the  head  office. 

0939  i    NI. 

0955  i     NI. 

0957  i    /FPM/  To  OG.     Very  brief. 

1000  0    /FPM/  Re  picnic.     NC ;  NI. 

1012  i     Girl  to  OG,  arranging  picnic.     NC  ;  NI. 


1-480 


1-481 


End 

Sunday,  12  Octobek  1941 

No  activity 
Monday,  13  October  1941 


0900  0     MURAOKA  to  TSUSHIMA.— Out.— Have  him  call. 

0930  i  Woman  says  she  wants  to  send  parcels  on  the  ship  that  is  coming  to 
Honolulu,  but  supposes  that  is  not  permitted. — We  can't  say  about  that. 

0932  o  SEKI  to  MIKAMI  re  football  and  tennis  tickets  /apparently  the  police 
game/. 

1045  i  NAKATSUKA  to  XX.  The  first  edition  of  the  H.  S.— B.  Saturday 
reflected  that  X  had  had  no  word  re  the  ships,  but  this  was  changed  in 
the  second  edition  after  I'eceipt  of  official  news  from  Tokyo.  No  news 
since  Saturday. 

1049  i  Woman  re  request  for  deferment  of  J.  military  service  which  she  wishes 
to  send  on  the  steamer  leaving  here  the  15th.  He  suggests  that  she  send 
it  registered.  Rest  NI.  If  she  sends  it  through  X,  however,  he  requests 
her  not  to  send  it  before  December,  for  the  dates  are  1  December  to  31 
January  of  the  following  year.  /Time  and  again  I  have  observed  that 
9  out  of  10  calls  connected  with  deferment  are  from  women.  Apparently 
they  look  after  this  detail  of  keeping  their  husbands  or  sons  out  of  the 
J.  Army./ 

1135  0  MURAOKA  to  Mrs.  FUKUMOTO,  a  language  school  principal,  re  a 
questionnaire  which  he  will  send  her  by  mail  since  he  hasn't  time  to 
bring  it  down.  It  may  be  that  he  had  a  child  at  her  school,  /Makiki 
J.  L.  S./?/,  but  no  real  clues  are  given. 

1144  0  MURAOKA  to  Mrs.  KIRIHARA  asking  her  to  telephone  X  tomorrow 
morning  after  9 :  00. 

1320  0  OG  orders  tickets  in  Japanese  for  VX  as  a  private  individual,  not  as  VX 
/to  what?/. 

1433  i  KANEKO  to  YUGE  asking  whether  it  is  alright  to  give  the  wording  of 
the  cable  from  the  F.  O.  to  X  to  the  press  as  received. — Yes,  I  think  so. 
/YUGE  starts  to  ask  a  question  put  as  K.  hangs  up  on  him./ 

—END— 


878       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Tuesday,  14  October  1941 

0910  i    For?  —  Still  at  home. 

0940  i  KIRIHARA  to  MURAOKA,  Mostly  about  arranging  a  social  affair  early 
enough  in  the  day  to  permit  children  to  attend.  Later  M.  tells  K.  that 
Saturday  is  a  holiday  because  of  the  great  ceremony  at  the  Yasukuni 
Shrine  /enshruiement  of  war  dead/.     They  will  get  together  then. 

1003  i  NAKATSUKA  to  XX  saying  there  are  800  J.  residents  who  are  going 
to  leave  the  Pacific  Coast.  Have  you  heard  how  many  are  leaving  here?  — 
The  NYK  is  maldng  all  arrangements  and  I  can't  say  what  the  whole 
number  is.  —  Do  J.  nationals  have  to  clear  any  papers  with  you  first 
before  leaving  for  Japan?  — No. 

1026  i    HBD  to  NAKAMURA  of  HDD.  —  He's  left  here. 

1307  i    Castle  &  Cooke  re  pensioners.  —  Person  in  question  not  here  yet. 

1330  o     SEKI  re  some  printing  jobs. 

1343  o    Re  camphor  and  formalin. 

1420  i     "Have  NAKASUJI  call  91043  if  he  comes  in." 

1430  0  /FPI\I/  Man  calls  re  passport.  Matanosuke  MURAKAMI.  Routine 
check  if  arrival. 

1443  i  MacNaughton  /?/  of  Castle  &  Cooke  asks  SAKAI  for  addresses  of  these 
persons  who  are  C&O  pensioners  now  living  in  Japan.  Under  General 
License  No.  32,  C&C  are  permitted  to  make  these  monthly  remittances  to 
them,  but  the  Bank  of  Hawaii  has  no  J.  funds  available.  Should  we 
approach  the  YSB  or  Sumitomo  direct?  —  The  secretary  in  charge  will 
call  you  back  tomorrow.     He  has  left  for  today. 


1-483 


End 


Wednesday,  15  October  1941 


0913  i    Kiichi  KUWAHARA  applied  for  XP  in  August.     He  is  expecting  a  new 

KT  on  the  next  ship.     Shall  he  bring  it  in? — Yes. 
0925  i    DATE  to  SAHARA,  reporting  death  of  SHINJIRO  SHINO.     He  wonders 

whether  it  has  been  reported. 
0927  o     SAHARA  to  DATE.     Yes,  it  was  reported  on  the  day  he  died. 
1152  i     Re  application  for  deferment  of  J.  military  service.     Routine. 
1206  i    /FPM/  Sports  talk.     They  will  play  Saturday  afternoon.    /One  of  the 

junior  members  of  the  staff  and  a  friend./ 


1-m 


End 
Thursday,  16  OcxoEBai  1941 


0853  0     Sakai  to  ISHIHARA.— Out. 

0858  o     Sakai  to  OHIRA  at  NJ.— Out.— Have  him  call. 
/Ichimatsu  OHIRA  is  NJ  collector./ 

0902  i    Nakatsuka  to  XX.— Not  in  ;  call  back. 

0913  i  NAKATSUKA  to  XX,  saying  he  will  be  up  in  15  or  20  minutes  to  see 
XX. 

0915  i    KUWATA  to  Sakai  re  application  for  deferment.     Routine. 

0918  i  Woman  asks  whether  she  can  get  her  /son's  or  husband's?/  application 
for  deferment  off  on  the  Taiyo  Mani.  OG  thinks  so.  The  woman  is 
worried  for  fear  the  J.  Govt.  wiU  not  grant  deferment.  OG  thinks  every- 
thing will  be  alright. 

0928  i  /FPM/  Man  to  X,  saying  something  is  at  5  o'clock  today,  or  something 
at  9  o'clock. 

1000  i  Calling  in  to  ask  about  the  draft  deferment  request. — He  should  send 
it  in. 

1024  i  NAKATSUKA  to  XX,  reading  to  him  in  English  interview  for  S-B  10/16 
re  his  ideas  for  the  consular  probe  suggested  by  Senator  Gillette. — "How 
do  I  say  about  the  Hawaii-born  Japanese?" — No.  I  make  little  refer- 
ence to  the  Hawaiian  born  Japanese.  The  talk  is  all  more  or  less  all 
pertaining  to  the  when  I  say  the  Japanese  people  of  Hawaii,  I  take  it 
for  granted  that  that's  the  older  people. — Yes.^ — Because  otherwise  I 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT   INQUIRY  879 

I  would  say  Americans  of  Japanese  ancestry. — Yes.  And  you  remember, 
one  place  I  said :  'The  elder  Japanese  also  gladly  send  their  American 
born  sons  into  the  Army'. — "Oh,  yes,  yes"  /rapidly  expressing  under- 
standing/.— That  gives  the  impression  that  all  along  I've  been  talking 
about  the  older  Japanese. — Yes,  that's  alright. — Because  the  younger 
Japanaese,  vpell,  everybody  would  take  it  for  granted  that  they  are 
loyal.  /Hearty  laughter  by  XX  in  which  N.  soon  joins.  XX  breaks  in 
with :/  "Yes,  yes ;  quite  natural."  /More  laughter  by  XX,  of  a  polite 
sort./ — N :  Do  you  want  to  mention  anything  about  your  X  here?  I  have 
omitted  it  because  I  knew  it  is  very  delicate. — I  think  it  alright  just  as 
you  say  now.     Thank  you.     Goodbye. 

1039  0     To  HBD  for  supplies.     NX. 

1-485 

1043  o  To  a  pharmacy  for  a  substitute  for  medicine  formerly  gotten  from 
Japan. — Will  send  up  %  lb. — If  OK,  may  get  more. 

1045  i    Dr.  ■  to  XX,  inviting  him  to  dinner  on  the  19th  at  YMCA 

/?/  at  6:80. 

1053  1    To  Sakai  re  request  for  deferment. 

1055  i    NC;  NI. 

1135  o  OG  to  Mackay  Radio  /FPM/.  OG: message  received  this  morn- 
ing.—What  number  is  it?— HC  169  SN  /?/— 169,  one  moment  .  .  .yes, 
here  it  is.— It's  the  third  word.— Third  word?  OG:  The  first.— The 
first?— First.— 1  uhh  00  980.— Yes.— Do  you  want  that  word  checked?— 
I  want  this  tenth  word  checked.— Tenth?— Yes.— That's  J  U  U  G.— 
The  next  one.— The  next  one,  G  O  N  A  N  I  G  O  N  I  T  E?— Yes.  I  wish 
to  have  you  check  if  it  is  G  O  N  A  N  A.— It  should  be  G  O  N  A  N  A. 
OG :  So  we'd  like  to  check  on  that. — Yes.  I'll  check  that  up. — And  who 
is  calling? — The  Japanese  Consulate  /no  particular  person/. 

1209  i  From  Mackay  Radio :  This  morning  you  got  a  message  from  Toko  by 
Mackay  Radio  and  you  wanted  a  confirmation  of  the  next  to  the  last 
word.     That's  GONANANIGOONIT  E.— I  see  /repeating  it/. 

1310  i    To  Sakai  about  the  draft  deferment,  whether  he  needs  to  report.    NI. 

1320  i.     NI. 

1434  o    NI. 

1440  o    Lee  for  taxi  right  away  to  go  up  to  X. 


1-486 


End 


Friday,  17  October  1941 


0900  i  YAMASHIRO  no  other  name  given,  but  X  understands/  to  X.  Y.  sent 
off  a  letter  concerning  the  deferment  for  Tomimatsu  SHIGETOSHI. 
Received  under  date  of  August  5  from  Japanese  city  or  town  hall  a  noisy 
or  vigorous  letter,  saying  he  was  to  return  to  take  his  physical  exam  for 
conscription.  What  is  the  best  way  to  reply?  Native  village  is  Takaoka 
Prefecture,  Hikujo  Country,  Kurotsuchi  Village.  He  was  born  August  8, 
1920.  X  will  see.  Please  wait.  X  tells  him  to  send  off  something  as 
soon  as  possible  and  then  wait  imtil  January  anyhow. 

0905  i  Girl  in  English :  "Ah  wanta  inquire  where  to  have  where  the  Japanese 
go  to  see  about  th'  expatriation  papers.  Can  you  tell  me?"  /Apparently 
someone  who  -wants  to  have  her  maid  expatriated.  Accent  mainland 
American,  probably  Southern.     Calls  in  long  distance./ — At  this  office. 

0925  i  Inquiry  whether  OK  to  forward  draft  deferment  by  mail. — OK,  but  to- 
morrow is  a  holiday,  so  if  you  get  stuck  don't  come  in  then. 

0987  i    NI. 

1000  i  NAKATSUKA  to  XX,  reporting  the  latest  news  just  in  "that  U.  S. 
merchant  ships  have  been  ordered  from  the  Chinese  and  Japanese  waters. 
Of  course,  this  isn't  straight  from  the  Navy  Department,  but  it's  what 

some  iwople Have  you  received  any  word  to  that  effect?" 

/No  answer.  Perhaps  XX  doesn't  quite  understand./  N :  We  have  some 
word  even  in  Honolulu  that  ships  dovra  here  have  been  ordered  to  stay 
away  from  the  Asiatic  waters  ....  The  only  reason  is  that  the  Navy 
considers  the  situation  in  the  Pacific  quite  serious.  I  think  that's  the 
only  interpretation. — XX  replies  that  he  hasn't  heard  anything  about  it. 


880        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

.  .  .  wants  to  know  when  it  came  in  /as  he  didn't  quite  get  it  tlie  first 

time,  when  conversation  was  in  English/. 
1017  i     To  Muraoka  /private ;  NI/. 

1027  0     Muraoka  to  someone  in  connection  witli  private  plans.     NI. 
1047  i    Evidently  a  mistake. 
1203  i    NI. 


1-Ji87 


1-m 


l-U 


Saturday,  October  18,  1941 

No  Activity 

(Japanese  Holiday) 

Sunday,  October  19,  1941 

Out  of  commission 

Monday,  Octobeb  20,  1941 


0840  o    /FPM/  Muraoka  /?/  to  /?/  re  :  sports.  NI 

0845  0    Muraoka  /?/  to  Nishimoto.     Is  out. 

0846  o     Muraoka  /?/  to  Suzuki,     re :  tennis.     NI 

0847  0     Muraolca  /?/  to  /?/  who  is  out. 

0848  o    Muraoka  to  Fujikawa.     Are  you  coming  to  the  party?    NI 

0855  o    Muraoka  to  Sasaki.     NI. 

0856  i     NI 

0857  o    Muraoka  to  another  Muraoka.     FPM 

0859  o    To  Mr.  YOKOTA  of  Occidental  Life.     Not  in  yet.     Have  him  call  2243, 

Mr.  MURAOKA. 
0859  i     To  VX.    Not  in  yet,  but  soon. 

0904  i    01  calling  re :  a  conscription  deferment  for  someone. 
0908  i     To  MURAOKA.    NI  /about  the  party  and  getting  geishas/ 
0956  o     To  RCA  for  messenger. 

1003  i     Man  asks  how  soon  he  must  hand  in  his  application  for  deferment. 
1028  o    MURAOKA  to  NISHIMOTO  inviting  him  to  a  party  at  the  Natsunoya 

the  ■26th. 
1030  0     MURAOKA  to  TOMIKO  (?)  inviting  him  to  dinner  Sunday.     Apparently 

not  private  invitation  for  the  price  of  $2.00  is  mentioned, 
10310    NC;NI 

1035  i     .  .  .  .  Call  5243  (Line  #2) 
1100  i    Woman  to  Muraoka.     NI. 

1120  i    YSB  to  TSUKIKAWA  saying  a  draft  has  come  for  him. 
1126  i    KURISHIMA  to  Muraoka  re  tennis  and  other  sporting  events.     Later 

there  was  mention  of  5  cases  of  liquor  for  the  big  event.     There  will  be 

exhibition  game. 

1136  0  MURAOKA  to  Mrs.  HIROKOTO  (?)  re  tennis  next  Sunday.     NI 

1147  i  NI 

1248  i  re  office  hours. 

1249  i  Re  XP.     The  man  XP'ed  a  number  of  years  ago  and  then  later  had  his 

J.  citizenship  restored.  His  father  or  an  elder  man  wants  to  get  his 
status  with  regard  to  (J.  ?)  military  service  cleared  up.  SAIKI  asks 
him  to  come  to  the  office  to  talk  it  over.  (It  seems  that  the  boy  is  now 
trying  to  dodge  J.  military  service  after  becoming  a  Japanese  citizen. 
"Restoration"  of  J.  citizenship  should  automatically  XP  from  American 
nationality,  because  "restoration"  requires  an  act  on  the  part  of  the 
individual  and  is  not  on  a  par  with  the  accidental  citizenship  acquired 
by  birth.  This  dual  citizen  lost  his  J.  citizenship  when  he  XP'ed  and 
then  lost  (or  should  have)  his  American  citizenship  when  he  had  the  J. 
citizenship  restored.) 

1305  o    An  outsider  calls  out  for  information  re  a  form  he  is  filling  out.    NI. 

1325  0  KUNIYOSHI  of  K.  store  in  Moiliili  to  old  man.  He  had  asked  for  his 
KT  in  connection  with  XP.     Call  8323  and  ask  for  Takazu. 

1328  0    KUNIYOSHI  to  ?  complaining  that  his  XP  has  not  come  yet. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT   INQUIRY  881 

1334  o  KUNIYOSHI  to  4221  re  his  BC  (Birth  Certificate).  There  is  a  dis- 
crepancy in  the  birthdate.  K.  is  much  perturbed  but  J.  girl  at  4221 
tells  him  not  to  worry.  The  old  man  was  probably  late  in  registering 
K's  birth  with  X  and  didn't  wish  a  scolding  or  fine  for  late  registration, 
so  gave  a  later  date.  The  Board  of  Health  date  is  here  taken  as  the 
correct  one. 

1448  ?     (FPM)  NX 

End 

l-],90 

Tuesday,  Octobeb  21,  1941 

0910 o  NT  (Maraoka  about  beer  for  the  party!) 

0915  o  MURAOKA  to  NISHIMURA.     Not  in.     NI. 

0917  o  MURAOKA  to  NISHIMURA.     Not  in.     NI. 

0918 o  MURAOKA  to  NISHIMURA.     In!    NI.    /More  about  the  beer.     4  or 

5  cases?/ 

0926  o  MURAOKA  to  YOKOTA.     NI.     /a  geisha— to  arrange  for  THE  party/ 

1003  o  MURAOKA  to  FUJIKAMA.     NI. 

1004  o  MURAOKA  /?/  to  SAKATA  Bon  Ton.     Out. 

1016  i    NISHI  of  NYK  to  YUGE  reporting  that  they  have  received  a  definite 

telegram  that  the  ship  will  be  off  port  10  a.  m.  day  after  tomorrow  /i.  e. 

Thursday/ 
1019  i     NAKATSUKA  to  XX — has' he  had  any  word  as  to  the  exact  arrival  time 

of  the  Tatsuta.     Yes.     It  will  arrive  on  the  23rd  and  not  on  the  24th. 

But  he  doesn't  know  the  exact  time  of  its  arrival  ( !).     Can't  think  of 

anything  else. 
1045  o     MURAOKA  to  Sec  of  Hawaii  re  SHIOMATSU   (or  CHIYOMATSU  or 

CHINOMATSU).     Secretary's  man  wants  "everything  on  the  card." 

"His  birth  September  5,  1873. 

"Arrival  November  2,  1906." 

"Is  that  the  only  arrival?" 

"I  see  several  times  he  went  back  to  Japan." 

He  will  have  to  check  and  find  out  just  when  he  first  came.     Continues 

re  wife  Hina,  now  dead. 

Also  re  one  SUZUKI. 
1059  0     Muraoka  to  pal.     NI. 

1103  o    Muraoka  to NI. 

1121  o     Muraoka  to  Mr.  Medeiros  re  Yamashiro'  CHIYOMATSU   (Chiyomatsu 

YAMASHIRO?)  when  he  came  etc. 

1-^91 

1145  i     KANEKO  to  VX  saying  the  prospective  repatriates  are  very  numerous 

and  the  accounts  connected  therewith  are  most  troublesome.     Many  of 

them  are  trying  to  get  permission  from  Washington  to  get  money  from 

New  York  and  so  on  etc.  we  are  having  an  awful  time  with  them. 

VX — How  about  sending  them  up  here  to  pay  their  fare? 

k — That's  all  right,  but  there  are  immigration  problems  too. 

VX — Let's  take  the  whole  matter  up  with  Mr.  Strench. 

K — You  mena  with  Coleman? 

VX— Yes.     With  Coleman. 

K — What  about  white  passengers? 

VX — White  passengers? 

K — Yes.    The  head  office  has  arranged  for  some  haole  musicians  to  sail 

with  us.     A  Mr.  Si Si 

VX— Mr.  SIROTA? 

K — Yes.  Mr.  and  Mrs.     There  is  a  group  going  first  class  to  Slianghai. 

They  are  Americans. 

VX — People  going  to   Shanghai  must  take  a   transport.    There  is  no 

other  way. 

K — These  people  are  "foreign  correspondents"  of  some  "news  service". 

They  must  be  newspapermen. 

VX— The  name  is  not  NEWMAN,  is  it? 

K— No. 

End 


882       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 
1-492 


1-493 


Wednesday,  October  22,  1941 
Out  of  commission 
Thursday,  October  23,  1941 


1400 o    Muraoka  to  tai  (female).     M. — "Tlie  person  is  not  a  passenger." 

"He  didn't  come  back  then."     "No.     He  didn't." 

1413  i     inquiring  "one  information  about  my  girl  friend."     NI 

1414  i     Inquiry.     Hard  to  hear.     NI. 
1427  o    To  RCA  for  messenger. 

1434  i     fragment.     NI. 

1554  i     F.P.M.     NI 

1603  i    KATO  to  KANEKO.     "How  late  will  you  be  open?" 
Planning  details,  beds  etc.     NI. 

1618  i  Dialogue  between  KANEKO  and  XX  re :  who  is  to  issue  the  tickets  and 
how  they  will  be  paid  for.  Apparently  the  rates  are  much  lower  for 
this  trip  than  the  usual  ones.  Kaneko  is  worried  because  many  of  the 
passengers  have  paid  in  yen  and  the  company  keeps  its  books  in  dollars. 
Kaneko  says  taking  into  account  the  discount  they  will  get  only  about 
$69.75  for  $85.00  and  suggests  that  the  "simplify"  the  system  ?perhaps 
keep  receipts  in  dollars  or  yen/  and  cable  to  the  main  office  for  authority 
to  do  so. 

1816  i     Seki  to  KOTOSHIRODO  asking  him  to  come  over.     He  will. 

2032  0    N.R.    Man  (not  VX)  asks  for  taxi. 


1-494 


End 
Friday  24  October  1941 


0900  ?     (FPM)  Re  sailing  of  TATUTA. 

0912  o 

0934  i    Re  deferment.     Routine. 

0943  o    Re  deferment. 

0947  i     NI  - 

1010  i  Man  to  MURAOKA  re  meeting  at  NATSUNOYA  (Tea  House)  Sunday 
morning  early,  which  they  wish  to  postpone  a  week. 

1020  o  Seki  to  MIKAMI  asking  him  to  come  to  take  XX  to  ship  in  very  few 
minutes.     He  wants  to  be  there  before  1100. 

1048  i     Redeferment.     NI 

1112  i    Re  BC ;  NC ;  NI. 

1105  o  Seki  to  SAKAMOTO  re  cameras.  Have  your  cameras  all  gone  up 
15%? — No,  only  10% — One  of  my  friends  wants  to  buy  but  they  had 
sold  all— we're  out  of  those  foreign  made  ones  too.  No  new  ones  come 
in,  and  everyone  bought  before  the  price  rise  on  1  Oct.  We  have 
super  DX  and  super-6  with  meter — How  much  are  the  Super-6's? — • 
$176 — Is  that  the  best  one  you  have? — No  we  also  have  some  for  $219 — 
Does  that  include  the  case? — No. — I  may  be  in  soon  to  look  them  over, 

1110  i  FUJITA  of  YSB  to  X  saying  he  would  like  passage  on  the  TAIYO. 
A  letter  has  come  from  the  Yokohama  office  ordering  me  home.  X  prom- 
ises to  arrange  passage. 

1130  o     To  NAKAMURA.     Out. 

1138  i     Very  noisy.     NI. 

1153  i    Re  deferment.     NI. 

1255  i     Some  sort  of  query.     Very  faint/    NI. 

1-495 

1845  i  For  xx.  Mr.  NEWMAN  calling.  N.  arrived  yesterday  on  the  Tatsuta. 
Mr.  MAEDA  said  he  would  speak  to  XX  re  NEWMAN'S  going  back  on 
the  Taiyo.  XX  saw  Maeda — but  hedges  when  asked  if  anything  had 
been  arranged.  He  hasn't  "approached"  the  NYK  yet,  but  he  will  "have 
a  talk"  with  them.  N.  dropped  around  to  see  XX  but  got  to  his  office  a 
little  too  late  today,  so  missed  him.  N.  is  busy  this  afternoon  having 
eyes  examined — is  getting  new  glasses  made  here  before  he  goes  back. 
N.  won't  be  able  to  make  it  before  XX  goes  home  at  3.  Could  he  (N.) 
see  him  early  tomorrow  morning.  He  has  a  letter  from  Mr.  KISHI  of 
of  the  Joho  Kyoku.  "He  has  a  few  things  that  he  wants  you  to  get  for 
him  so  I  can  take  them  back.    Also  N.  has  to  get  a  reentry  visa  to 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  883 

Tokyo.  He  spoke  to  Mr.  Kishi,  and  also  to  Mr.  Yokoyama  and  also  to 
some  of  the  people  in  the  foreign  office  and  they  said  the  best  thing 
would  be  first  to  start  it  thru  here  and  the  application  has  to  be  made 
and  it  will  have  to  go  thru  the  regular  channels  but  they  may  facilitate 
it  from  the  other  side.  XX  thinks  that  in  that  case  they  will  have  to 
refer  the  matter  to  the  Foreign  Office.  Says  that  in  fact  "about  any- 
body that  came  thru  now  we  have  to  refer  it  back."  Laughter  by  XX/ 
Does  XX  think  tomorrow  would  be  all  right  to  do  that?  He  does.  N. 
says  they  know  all  about  him  over  there  and  thinks  approval  will  be 
just  a  routine  matter.     He  will  drop  around  tomorrow  morning  ok. 

1312  0  To  KANEKO  NYK  from  SEKI  of  X  who  will  come  to  the  point  at  once 
re  a  long  cable  which  KIMURA  came  and  sent  on  the  8th  of  August  to 
the  tune  of  $45.82.  The  cable  was  sent  to  Tokyo  to  NYK  main  office. 
X  would  like  payment  please.    OK. 

1315  0  To  XX  HAKUBUNDO  from  X  to  order  some  small  swords  (or  small 
trees)  for  some  of  the  people  sailing  on  the  boat  today.  OK.  Appar- 
ently left  addresses  during  earlier  personal  call. 

1330  i  Some  inquiry  re  Japanese  made  products  or  Japanese  nationality  /?/. 
X  doesn't  know  either.     NI/ 


1-496 


End 


Satubdat,  25  October,  1941 


0925  i  Man  discusses  entering  his  son  in  a  J.  school.  The  boy  is  without  J. 
citizenship  and  the  authorities  in  Japan  will  not  admit  him.  Caller 
wonders  whether  X  cannot  write  a  letter  to  the  authorities  that  will 
explain  the  situation  in  Hawaii  and  facilitate  the  boy's  admission.  S. 
says  the  boy  must  go  thru  the  regular  procedure  of  having  his  J.  citizenship 
restored.  He  must  apply  to  the  foreign  minister  for  naturalization.  As 
a  person  of  J.  descent,  the  procedure  applied  is  different  and  simpler.  It 
is  called  the  "restoration  of  citizenship"  instead  of  "naturalization"  even 
in  cases  such  as  this  one  where  the  boy  never  was  a  J.  citizen  because 
he  was  not  registered  at  X  (born  subsequent  to  1  December,  1924).  XP 
procedure  must  be  instituted  here,  while  citizenship  restoration  proceed- 
ings must  be  instituted  in  Japan. 

0929  i  KAWAMOTO  of  NJ  to  Sakai  saying  the  FBI  is  investigating  the  consular 
agents  and  also  the  members  of  the  NJ  branch  office  (for  Kauai). 
They  are  accused  of  being  Army  or  Navy  officers.  K.  suggests  the  giving 
the  NJ  men  identification  cards  to  prove  they  are  members  of  Domei 
News  Agency. 

0955  o     SEKI  to  MIKAMI  asking  him  to  come  to  X. 

1013  0  Sakai  to  Mr.  Creighton  at  S-B.  Creighton  sent  the  money  yesterday 
with  Mr.  Newman.  The  amount  was  $20.  N.  has  an  appointment  with 
Mr.  Kishi  (error  for  Kita?)  this  morning.  The  secretary  must  have 
the  money  before  he  can  send  the  wire  (for  permission  for  Creighton 
and  Newman  to  travel  on  the  Taiyo).  S.  can't  send  the  wire  without 
the  money,  and  it  has  been  mislaid  somewhere.  C.  promises  to  get  it  into 
X's  hands  by  noon. 

End 

1-497 

1427  0  Yuge  to  IKEZAWA  at  YSB.  /This  line  got  deep  in  the  rain.  Very 
hard  to  catch/.  What  the  main  trend  of  the  conversation  is  I  don't  know, 
tho  the  conversation  sounds  important.  Something  is  "funny — strange." 
Whether  a  man  /  one  of  the  three  getting  off  tlie  Harrison?/  is  from  Tokyo 
or  Yokohama.  Also  mention  of  the  "situation  being  bad."  Some  men- 
tion of  the  Pensecola  Hotel  having  something.  The  following  sequence 
cannot  be  vouched  for,  but  the  words  sounded  like  the  following : 
"You're  not  returning." 
"No." 

"Keep  pistol,  eh."    /This  line  in  English?/ 

"Yes  I  have,  because  the  situation  is  so  bad."     /The  last  sentence  in  a 
very  grave  voice,  and  clear./ 

End 

79716 — 46 — Ex.  149,  vol.  2 15 


884        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

1-498  Sunday  26  October  1941 

no  activity 

Monday,  Octobek  27,  1941 

0855  i    NI.    Wrong  number. 

0900  i    MURATA  of  Waialae  to  inquire  about  the  notification  of  arrival  at 

military  age.    Is  referred  to  book  stores  or  newspapers,  advised  to  mail 

it  on  the  Taiyo. 
0915  o    MURAOKA  to  YOKOTA  retennis.    NI 
0926  i    Inquiry  about  method  of  forvparding  military  age  attainment  forms. 

Either  thru  X  or  personally  is  ok. 
0943  i     Inquiry  about  expatriation  procedure.    Is  advised  to  visit  X  for  help 
1026  i     Inquiry  regarding  first  steps  in  expatriation  procedure.     Is  informed 

takes  about  3  months. 
1030  i    Pan  Pacific  Union  callion.    NC.    Not  able  to  come  to  lunch  today. 
1117  o    To  Hakubundo  from  Muraoka  re  engraving  on  trophy  cup.    NI. 
1130  o    NC/    Ran  out  of  blank  cylinders  at  this  point  until  1420. 
1135  0    To  RCA.     (NR)  On  2oth  of  this  month  33  word  telegram  in  code  was 

sent.    How  much  is  cost  of  telegram  ?    $4.79. 
1424  o     Seki  to  01  discussing  some  sort  of  "applicants"  /for  passage  on  the 

Taiyo?/  until  the  31st.    Apparently  the  X  doesn't  want  to  handle  them. 
1437  0     To  RCA.    "Will  you  send  a  messenger  boy?" 
1443  o    XX  to  RCA.     Your  message  #154  /poss.  164?/  which  we  received  today 

has  two  pages.     We  received  one  page.     She  will  send  the  other  right 

over.    Now  XX  says  they  have  received  three  pages  already!     It's  all 

right ! 
1450  i    To  OG.    Very  brief. 
1458  0    NI. 

End 

1-500  Tuesday,  Ootobeh  28,  1941 

0820  o    NI 

0828  i    To  Sakai/?/    Not  in. 

0907  o    Conversation   with   YANE   wanted   to   write   it,   but   hasn't  a  pen   or 

anything,  so  can't  /a  country  woman/    NI. 
0921  i    NAKATSUKA  to  SAKAI     ?Also  asks  if  Kita  is  there.     No./    Asking 

about  IIZUKA,  his  dates  etc.     SAKAI  was  working  there  but  "doesn't 

kOGD  tr3.ck  of  tliG  d&tGS  " 

0928  i    NAKATSUKA  for  XX— Not  in.     "What's  happened  to  him  this  morn- 

ing?"   Gets  phone  #4416. 

0929  i     For  Muraoka.    Inquiry  from  KONISHI  re  FUKUDA,  Michizo  of  Yama- 

guchi  prefecture,  Oshima  county,  Okika  village.  M.  will  phone  him  after 
he  has  looked  it  up. 

0940  0  To  KANEKO  from  SEKI  at  X.  Is  K.  returning?  He  is.  Then  he  must 
be  busy,  but  S.  wiU  trouble  him  with  a  little  business  re :  the  forthcoming 
Taiyo  call.  S.  has  received  a  cable  that  the  Taiyo  will  be  here  on  the  1st 
instead  of  the  31st.  Also  a  cable  that  there  is  on  board  a  man  Taro 
TOKUNAGA  who  was  on  the  Asama  Maru  /  and  of  course  had  to  go  back/ 
who  wants  to  get  off  here  and  take  an  American  boat  to  S.  F.  Doesn't 
know  whether  he  is-  a  man  of  wealth  or  influence  or  not.  They  aren't 
clear  if  there  ate  two  of  them  or  only  one.    If  S.  finds  out  he  will  call. 

0956  o  SEKO  to  KANEKO/?/  regarding  2  passengers  on  the  Taiyo,  one  from 
San  Juan,  the  other  from  Philadelphia.  American(s?)  and  honorary 
consul  (s?)  Pardin  is  a  high  personage  who  was  returned  to  port  on 
order  of  the  government  as  he  is  going  to  the  mainland  on  the  Taiyo. 
They  have  orders  from  the  Foreign  Ministry?/  to  put  them  off  and  take 
care  of  them.  Doesn't  know  how  old.  They/?/  are  Roman  Catholics. 
Then  the  problem  arises  about  the  money  the  said  passengers  will  need. 
Will  arrange  about  it  later. 

lOOOo     To  Rosecrans  for  Taxi. 

1004  i     FPM.    Very  brief. 

1008  0     To  Secy,  of  Hawaii.     Line  is  busy. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  885 

1012  i  KONISHI  TO  MURAOKA  request  for  information  on  RIKIZO  and  his 
wife — how  long  have  they  been  on  Kauai. 

1-501 

They  came  September  9,  1898.     Re :    OTAMA.     M.  doesn't  know.     Re : 
SAITO,  Kuislii  and  Fukuishi ;  get  their  dates  also. 

1020  i  SHIMOKURI  re :  filing  of  report  on  conscription  attainment  of  military 
age.     Will  they  receive  it?    They  will.     He'll  bring  it. 

1022  o  To  NAKAMURA  at  /YSB?/  inquiry  about  yesterdays  rates.  N.  Bays 
they  are  changing  all  the  remittances  for  Japan  into  dollars,  and  they 
are  paid  in  Yokohama.  The  price  is  about  $24 — 24  points.  /This?/  is 
to  pay  for  a  telegram  so  what  will  $5.9.3  be  in  yen?  N.  says  the  rate  is 
about  $24  for  ¥100  /  then  giggles  and  opines  that  $24  is  quite  a  bit  to 
pay  tho  tliat  is  the  rate  they  give  their  guests !/ 

1058  i  NAKATSUKA  reads  long  rebuttal  by  Kita  denying  acquaintance  with 
Tadaake  IIZUKA  /see  papers  for  10-28-41/  N.  at  one  point  says  he 
wants  "to  clear  (Kita)  from  this  case"  by  pointing  out  that  IIZUKA 
was  here  in  1935,  long  before  Kita. 

1110  o    TUGE  to  01.     NI. 

1131  i    Family  talk.     NI. 

1140  0    To  RCA  for  messenger. 

1141  o     For  time. 
1150  ?     (FPM)  NI. 

1152  i    NISHI  to  Sakai.     NI. 

1200  o    No  answer. 

1201  o     MURAOKA  to  HIGA  (girl)   asking  for  her  father.     He  invites  him  to 

come  to  the  office  this  afternoon  about  3,30. 

1415  o     (FPM)  The  ship  will  be  in  on  the  31st. 

1420  0  Sakai  to  ITAGAKI  re  one  cloisonne  vase  belonging  to  to  the  honorary  J. 
consul  at  San  Juan,  probably  an  American,  but  whose  name  we  do  not 
know.  Things  could  be  handled  infinitely  better  if  w^e  knew  the  other 
man's  (I'ecipients?)  name.  (It  is  from  the  present  or  the  previous 
Foreign  Minister  to  the  honorary  consul  at  San  Juan.  There  is  no 
price  indicated. )  Itagaki :  I  think  we  had  better  wait  till  it  arrives 
and  then  see  how  to  handle  it. 

1-502 

1432  0  Sahara  to  YOKOYAMA  /?/  Out.  Have  him  call  if  he  gets  back  by  3 
o'clock. 

1484  0  Seki  to  SATO.  Out.  (To  MIYAMOTO)  Seki  wishes  to  talk  over  with 
SATO  the  question  of  4  yards  of  some  kind  of  cloth. 

1440  i    Re  various  children  of  a  man  who  died  on  Kauai. 

1441  i     Re  oflice  hours.     Up  to  three.     Caller  then  asks  whether  a  child  born 

two  months  ago,  but  of  whose  birth  the  family  had  just  learned,  cannot 
be  registered  immediately  with  X  and  thereby  acquire  Japanese  citizen- 
ship— No.  It  is  absolutely  impossible. — Isn't  there  any  way  it  can  be 
done? — No.  None  whatever — (as  a  matter  of  fact  there  is  a  way  called 
"restoration"  of  J.  citizenship,  but  the  child  would  have  to  be  in  Japan 
in  order  to  have  his  previously  non  existing  J.  citizenship  "restored".) 
1445  i  An  eldest  son  wishes  to  return  to  Japan  and  asks  what  steps  he  must 
take  as  an  eldest  son  who  has  an  eldest  son  born  here  who  was  not 
registered  at  X  within  the  prescribed  period.  He  wants  the  child  to 
be  a  J.  citizen — After  two  weeks  it  is  impossible  to  give  the  child  J. 
citizenship  if  not  registered  at  X. — Isn't  there  any  way? — If  you  return 
to  Japan  with  the  child  "restoration"  proceedings  may  be  inaugurated — 
You  can't  restore  J.  citizenship  here? — No.  there  is  absolutely  no  way 
of  doing  it  here.  After  two  weeks  have  elapsed  the  child  is  an  American 
and  nothing  else. — Even  if  my  ignorance  of  the  child's  birth  until  today 
prevented  registration  at  X?— That  has  nothing  to  do  with  it.  If  the 
child's  birth  was  registered  with  the  Board  of  Health,  take  documentary 
proof  along  with  you  and  the  whole  thing  can  be  arranged  in  Japan. 

1447  o    to  UEDA.     Out.     Have  him  call  tomorrow  morning  for  a  correction. 

1448  o     Sahara  to  KAWAMOTO  re  mistake  in  data.     Please  bring  for  correction. 

1450  o     To  RCA  for  messenger. 

1451  i     Woman  to  OG  re  XP  procedure.     Routine. 

1459  i  Same  woman  for  further  details.  She  asks  whether  she  has  to  have  her 
parent's  consent.  They  are  opposed ;  she  is  1&— You  will  have  to  have 
their  consent  if  you  are  under  20,  for  you  will  have  to  have  them  sign 


886        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

the  petition  (Caller  is  under  considerable  strain.  Her  parents  want  her 
to  return  to  Japan  and  want  her  to  keep  her  J.  citizenship  but  she  wants 
to  cut  loose  from  it  entirely.). 

End 


l-SOJf 


Wednesday,  29  October,  1941 


0905  i     (FPM)  Woman  asks  whether  it  is  true  that  all  baggage  must  be  on  the 
docks  early — Yes  (She  then  asks  about  deferment  of  military  service.). 

0945  i     Inquiry  as  to  the  meaning  of  "Maru". 

0946  i    /can't  hear  it  because  of  ruoise  in  record — something  about  a  chokusen 

— straight  line/. 

0947  i    NISHIMURA,  Mataso,  asking  something  about  enlistment. 

1021  i    To  SAKAI  re:  Conscription  levies.    Routine. 

1022  o    to  NYK.     YUGB  calling  for  "Take"  YOSHIOKA  giving  information  re 

CHRICHTON,  Colvil  M.  directing  him  to  issue  a  ticket  for  him.    He  is 
on  the  Taiyo.    Also  re:  a  NEWMAN  /to  take  care  of  him?/. 

1034  i    Fragment. 

1035  o    To  S.  B.  to  Mr.  CHRICHTON— will  he  come  up  and  fill  in  the  application 

for  a  visa.     They  hear  he  is  trying  to  go  to  Japan  and  /they?/  have 

received  a  wire  from  Japan.    C.  will  come  in  this  afternoon. 
1103  i    Inquiry  whether  there  is  time  to  get  an  exemption  claim  back  for  the 

conscription  summons.    This  boat  will  be  okay. 
1105  i    To  MURAOKA.     NC.     Somebody  too  busy  to  play  today. 
1111  0     For  Mrs.  SMYTHE  of  the  Senate  chamber.    Call  59471. 
1111  0    To  59471.    Mrs.  Smythe  speaking.    Would  like  a  copy  of  the  M-day  bill. 

Doesn't  know  if  they  have  any  more.    .Will  check  and  mail  one. 
1302  i     Inquiry  as  to  hours  of  business. 
1318  i     Inquiry  about  conscription,  deferment. 
1326  i     Inquiry  about  conscription  deferment. 

1333  i    Inquiry  about  conscription  deferment.    X  will  receive  them. 
1341  i    Inquiry  about  sending  money  to  Japan.    Country  person.  NI. 

1-505 

1540  0     to  RCA.    Will  you  send  a  M.  B. 

1712  i    No  answer 


1-505 


ThuBSDAT,    30   OCTOBEB   1941 


0845  o    Staff  member  to  sister  (or  sister-in-law)  about  groceries.    NI. 
0901  i     Man  to  Sakai.    NI. 

0926  i     to  MURAOKA  re  something  he  wishes  to  send  to  Japan  by  Parcel  Post/ 

Will  there  be  duty  levied  on  it? — We  can't  say.  A  great  deal  depends 
on  the  man  inspecting  the  particular  parcel  in  question.  Old  or  new, 
one  or  many — all  these  considerations  enter  in. 

0927  0     to  Mr.  Hallett  ABEND  at  RH  Hotel.    (Connection  with  Abend  not  made.) 
0935  o     OG  to  Nakatsuka  for  address  of  ABEND,  who  is  supposed  to  be  living 

at  the  RH  Hotel.,  OG  reports  he  wasn't  there  this  morning/  N.  sug- 
gests she  try  the  Moana.  (Then  to  XX)  SB  wants  a  list  of  the  Taiyo 
Maru's  departing  passengers.  We  haven't  a  complete  list  yet.  There 
may  be  further  applications.  We  have  turned  the  matter  over  to  NYK. 
Would  you  permit  us  to  publish  the  list  Monday? — I  think  it  is  all  right. 

0944  i    A  haole  at  our  place  wants  to  send  some  chocolate  candy  to  Japan.    Is 

that  permitted? — I  imagine  so  but  I  don't  know. 

0945  o    OG  to  Moana  for  ABEND— Not  in.    Have  him  call  2243. 
1002  i     FPM.    Man  re  deferment.    Routine. 

1020 0  XX' to  ABEND  at  Moana.  Not  in.  Shall  I  page  him?  Tell  XX  called. 
— I  left  that  message  for  him.  He  will  call  you  when  he  comes  in. — 
When  do  you  think  he  will  come  in? — I  don't  have  the  information  when 
he  will  come  back.  The  message  is  in  his  box  and  under  his  door  and 
he  will  receive  it  as  soon  as  he  comes  into  the  hotel.  I  have  not  any 
urgent  need  (XX  interrupts  for  a  long  laugh)  but  I  am  one  of  his  old 
friends  and  would  like  to  hear  his  voice. 

1030  o  KAWAMOTO  of  NJ  re  deadline  for  applications  for  passage.  Saturday 
noon, 

1033  i    SATO  to  Seki.    NI. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY 


887 


1-506 
1100  i 

1105  o 

1107  o 

1108  o 
1114  i 


1116  i 

1120  i 

?  i 

1205  i 


1210  i 
1252  i 

1255 
1315  i 


1340 
1355 


-  1413  i 

1500  o 
1-507 
1502  o 

1-^08 


0848  0 
0849 


0851  o 
0855  i 

0902  i 
0913  0 
0923  0 

0934  i 

0935  i 
0940  o 


0945  i 

0946  i 

0950  0 
1108  o 


1116  0 
1123  0 
1-509 
1127  i 


Man  asks  whether  he  can  send  5#  sugar  and  2  or  3#  nails  to  his  parents. 
Yes,  but  there  may  be  duty  to  pay.    NO ;  NI. 
Seki  to  merchant  re  bill.    NI. 
NI 

Seki  to  MIKAMI.    Out.    Have  him  call. 

Dr.  Wickerson  at  Moana  Hotel  to  XX.    OG  says  XX  is  out  and  she  can't 
make  out  Wickerson's  name.     W.  insists  he  foimd  a  message  requesting 
him  to  call  XX.     (Could  Dr.  Wickerson  be  Hallet  Abend's  nom  d'exile? 
Or  was  the  note  to  Abend  put  in  the  wrong  box?)     Call  4416. 
MIKAMI  to  Seki  asking  him  to  come  over. 
Elderly  man  to  Sakai  re  XP  ed  deferment. 
Dr.  Wickerson  to  XX.    XX  wanted  ABEND,  not  W. 

Komatsuya  Hotel  to  YUGE  re  the  allotment   (of  space  on  the  Taiyo) 
according  to  ken.    Is  there  any  disctinction  made  with  regard  to  citizen- 
ship status? — ^All  circumstances  are  taken  into  consideration.    The  funda- 
mental division  is  into  kens. 
Girl  to  X.    He's  left.    Re  XP. 

Re  application  for  passage  on  the  Taiyo.    The  usual  system.     (What  is 
the  usual  system?    Via  NYK). 
KANEKO  to  VX.     Out.     Have  him  call  6198. 

To  MURAOKA  re  number  of  declarations  of  applications.  Quite  a  num- 
ber left. 

Miss  IMAMURA  to  Muraoka.     NI. 

Girl  asks  for  YAGI,  ABE,  AND  HORI.  None  of  them  there.  (The 
three  lads  who  transferred  from  the  Harrison  to  the  Taiyo  here  last 
week. ) 

FPM.     TOGASHI  mentioned,  but  this  conversation  was  interrupted  by 
the  next  one.    NC. 
NI 


NI 


End 


FbEOAT,  31  OCTOBEK,  1941 

Muraoka  to  ?  saying  the  tennis  matches  will  start  at  10  o'clock  Sunday. 
ABEND  to  XX.     Out.     When  wUl  he  be  in?    In  a  few  minutes— When 
I  got  in  yesterday  your  office  was  closed.    I  am  going  out  this  morning, 
but  I  will  call  him  later  in  the  day. 
Muraoka.    NI. 

Woman  to  Muraoka  re  deferment.    Routine  except  that  M.  tells  her  X 
will  be  closed  Monday,  a  holiday. 
Re  deferment.    Routine. 
Seki  to  01  of  JCC.    Out ;  I'll  have  him  call. 
To  Glabe  wireless  for  ISHII.    Out. 
Re  deferment. 
Re  deferment. 

Seki  to  HARADA.  He  left  a  few  minutes  ago.  Then  to  Mrs.  H.  asking 
about  a  cool  room  for  a  (Mr?)  TAKEMURA  arriving  the  next  day  or  so 
(presumably  on  the  Taiyo)  who  will  be  here  a  week  before  proceeding 
to  the  states.  She  has  already  had  word  from  XX  to  this  effect  and  is 
going  to  give  him  a  cool  room  being  vacated  very  shortly. 
Re  deferment.     Question  by  woman  as  usual. 

SHINAGAWA  to  Seki  re  deferment  (First  re  office  supplies).     Seki  men- 
tions ABE  and  his  prices.     (ABE  appliance  Co.?)     NI/ 
Muraoka  to  INADA  ordering  groceries. 

XX  to  KIMURA  re  necessary  supplies.  Replenishment  of  the  oil  is  the 
main  thing.  (Long  discussion  but  nothing  of  interest.  K.  seems  very 
cooperative.  He  is  trying  to  make  arrangements  for  cleaning  a  place  for 
the  customs  searches.  He  expects  the  ship  to  dock  about  0800.  He  ex- 
pects to  be  down  at  the  dock  at  0730.  Both  are  in  good  spirits. ) 
Yuge  to  MIKAMI  asking  him  to  come  to  X. 
NI 

SAKAMOTO  requests  information  as  to  data  of  his  family. 


888        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

1145  i  Query  re  an  application  for  XP. 

1148  0  Muraoka  to  friend. 

1152  0  Moraoka  to  Tosliio  (first  name).     Sports.     NX. 

1154  o  Muraoka  NI. 

1155  o  Muraoka  NI. 

1155  i  Seki  to  Yuge  re  some  financial  matters  and  how  to  treat  the  public  funds 
collected  /for  the  Taiyo/. 

1238  i     Query  re  conscription. 

1239  i    for  SEKI.    Out  /?/. 

1244  i     Inquiry  for  someone — ^Not  in. 

1305  o    Muraoka  to  NAKAMURA.    Sports.    NI. 

1306  o    Muraoka.    NI. 

1308  i     Inquiring  re  afternoon  hours. 

1308  o     Muraoka  to  KIMURA.    Out.    Left  message.    NI. 

1315  o    KITA  to  someone  re  Monday  being  a  holiday,    v.  brief. 

1320  i  OTANI  (woman)  to  SAKAI.  Something  about  a  copy  of  the  census 
register.  She  wants  to  take  it  home  and  he'll  get  it  that  evening  or 
something.  She  has  to  make  the  proper  moves  it  seems  to  i*e-register 
the  fishing  boats  previously  confiscated.  He  is  explaining  to  her  the 
difference  between  having  the  boat  owned  by  one's  own  son  who  is  a 
citizen  and  having  it  owned  by  a  stranger  or  mere  acquaintance  who 
acts  as  a  dummy.  /But  they  agree  that  it  amounts  to  the  same  thing./ 
He  asks  her  to  be  sure  to  return  the  papers  he  is  lending  her  and  she 
promises  to — she  probably  won't  work  at  it  after  9  PM  this  evening. 

1341  0  YUGE  for  SEKI.  His  superior  over  there  /in  Japan/  says  that  /it/ 
is  good.  IWANAGA  is  /on?/  the  boat.  Yes.  probably.  So  there  is 
only  TOKUNAGA.  Something  about  loading  /chocolate?/  onto  the  boat. 
The  words  hachi  hachi  are  mentioned  toward  the  end  of  the  talk.  One 
says  hachi  hachi  /lierally  eight  eight/  and  the  other  says  "I  under- 
stand." /The  recorder  doesn't !/  This  expression  is  used  for  a  game 
of  cards.    Also  for  a  squadron  of  8  battleships  or  8  cruisers. 

1407  o  X  to  Mr.  NEWMAN.  Can  he  come  tomorrow  or  Tuesday  since  Monday 
is  a  Japanese  holiday.    He'll  try  to  come  tomorrow. 

1448  o  to  NYK  for  Mrs.  Nishi?  Asks  where  KANEKO  is.  He  is  phoning.  Here 
he  comes.    K.  is  so  distorted  I  can't  understand  him  at  all. 


1-511 


End 
Saturday,  1  Novembee  1941 


1038  o     NI. 

11)10 o    To  Yamashiro  Hotel  for  a  children's  room,  (for  whom?) 

1128  i    Man  asks  for  correct  spelling  (in  Japanese)  of  new  premier's  name. 

1140  i    NI. 

1149  i  to  Seki.  FPM.  Caller  went  down  to  the  ship  to  see  if  he  could  locate 
the  cosignee  thru  the  purser's  office,  but  no  such  message  had  been  left 
there  at  all.  As  a  matter  of  fact?  did  come — I  made  enquiry  thinking 
one  of  the  passengers  might  have  brought  it  in  his  baggage,  but  again 
the  quest  was  unsuccessful. — Is  that  so? — The  Embassy  (probably 
J.  embassy  in  Washington)  intervened  with  the  treasury  to  facilitate 
entry.  I  don't  think  there  would  have  been  any  trouble — Is  it  a  big 
thing? — Yes.  Rather.  (In  the  part  recorded  no  name  was  mentioned,  no 
article  was  specified.     I  have  no  clue  as  to  the  nature  of  the  article.) 

1241  o     NR. 

1306  0  Seki  to  Kyorakkan  ) hotel)  asking  for  one  room  up  to  the  departure  of 
the  Taiyo  on  the  4th.  She  tells  him  to  wait.  (Cut  off  in  the  rush,  but 
gist  elsewhere  in  log  as  monitored  direct. 

1300  1     NR. 

1309  ?    FPM  Re  mail  on  Taiyo. 

1310  i     Kyorakkan   (a  hotel)    (a  call-back)   to  Seki  asking  how  many  guests 

there  are. — One. — When? — Right  away. — What  food?  Probably  occi- 
dental.—  (K.  will  take  him.  Not  sure  who  it  is,  but  probably  one  of 
the  diplomats  or  otlier  leading  man  from  the  ship.) 
1315  i  Man  wants  to  send  a  package  on  the  Taiyo  but  has  heard  that  she  will 
take  no  mail.  He  wonders  whether  this  was  a  J.  govt,  decision. — ^No. 
It  was  the  American  Govt's  decision. — I  heard  that  the  P.  O.  was 
turning  down  and  returning  packages  already  mailed.     There  are  mobs 


PROCEEDINGS   OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  889 

of  Japanese  at  the  P.  O.  who  want  to  mail  letters  and  parcels. — They 
can't  get  anything  very  definite  out  of  the  P.  O.  The  P.  O.  apparently 
doesn't  know  itself  what  it  can  accept  and  what  reject. 

1-512 

1317  o  Seki  to  Mrs.  Harada  asking  her  how  the  matter  of  the  room  was  finally 
decided  this  morning.  When  they  came  back  from  the  ship  this  morning 
Mr.  IWANAGA  alone  (of  the  diplomats?)  came  here.  A  little  later  Mr. 
TOKUNAGA  called  in  about  a  room  and  I  had  to  report  that  matters 
were  a  little  hard  to  manage  just  then.  FUJITA  is  leaving  shortly  and 
his  room  will  be  free  then!  Mr.  TOKUNAGA  said  he  has  a  iuton  of  his 
own  and  would  be  glad  to  sleep  in  the  closet  or  anywhere  if  space  could 
be  spared.  Food  can  be  arranged  for  them,  but  the  main  thing  is  a  place 
to  sleep — I  discussed  this  with  Mrs.  Yuge  and  she  thought  they  could 
stay  at  XX's  house — But  it  would  be  not  quite  proper  for  a  married 
couple  to  stay  there  (Does  Seki  think  XX  would  neglect  to  observe  the 
canons  of  diplomatic  immunity  as  he  did  the  night  of  the  Sumida  wedding 
when  he  got  drunk  and  chased  the  Sumida  maid  round  and  round  the 
bedpost?) — Fujita's  room  would  be  free  on  the  4th  and  the  Tokunagas 
could  take  it  then.  How  long  would  they  want  a  room? — Till  Friday — 
If  they  could  stay  somewhere  till  Tuesday  we  could  take  care  of  them— 
If  they  were  an  older  couple  they  could  stay  at  XX's  without  hesitation, 
but  they  are  a  newly  married  (or  young  married)  couple  which  compli- 
cates matters.  (They  both  laugh  knowingly).  In  full  realization  of  the 
risks  involved  in  a  young  woman's  staying  at  XX's.  Mrs.  H.  agrees  to 
ask  Mr.  HASYIYA  to  move  to  a  small  room  for  two  nights  to  make  way 
for  the  TOKUNAGAS  if  no  other  suitable  place  can  be  found. 

1325  o  Seki  to  Kyorakkan  re  the  young  couple.  Seki  tries  to  be  sure  a  married 
couple  will  be  welcome  there.  (The  hotel  is  often  used  by  people  less 
interested  in  the  enduring  bonds  of  life.)     She  says  it  will. 

1452  o    NA.     Fragment  while  caller  was  waiting  for  XX. 

1545  o     to  ?  for  messenger  boy. 

1547  o    NI. 

1605  o    To  Pensecola  Hotel.     NR  ;  NA. 

16-?  i    re ;  Age  for  draft  /American/. 

1-512~A 

(Addition  entries  missed  on  first  log) 

0907  i     Inquiring  re  passenger  on  Taiyo.     Haven't  got  list  yet. 

?     ?   To  6907.    The  awful  nes  breaks.    The  Taiyo  will  not  take  any  mail ! 
The  P.  O.  says  so.     Washington  has  sent  a  cable  to  the  postmaster. 

0945  0    To  Mackay  radio  for  messenger. 

0950  i    What  time  did  Taiyo  get  in  ? 

1000  1    Personal  call  for  Sakai? 

1007  i  Fro  Sakai  in  good  english  from  Alice  YONENAKA.  Could  I  come  and 
see  you  this  morning.  Wants  to  bring  her  copy  of  certified  census  reg- 
istra  rather  her  mothers.  /Probably  getting  expatriated/.  He  tells  her 
to  bring  her  sheet  and  he'll  look  it  over. 

1047  i    Wrong  number. 

1050  i  FPM/  Inquiry  re ;  report  of  residence  abroad  for  deferment  of  J.  military 
conscription. 

1108  i    NI. 

1135  o  for  HIROKAWA  of  registry  department  of  P.  O./different  Hirokama  no 
doubt/  to  check  on  the  mail  situation.  H.  only  knows  what  he  heard 
and  picked  up.     Refers  X  to  P.  M. 

1137  0    To  P.M.     Not  in.    Asst.  P.  M.  will  be  in  about  1230. 

1159  ?    Fragment  re  XP. 

1202  0  To  NYK.  Message  from  Minister  of  Communications  via  XX  which  is 
referred  to  TAKASAMA  at  2772  /?/,     Gives  his  own  number  as  4416. 

1213  0  XX  to  KUSUNOBU  /?/  his  cook  /?/.  Wants  lunch  for  four  people  at 
his  residence.     /Probably  KIMURA  is  one. 

1215  o  XX  to  /maid  at  home?/  In  about  10  minutes  4  guests  will  be  coming. 
But  no  one  is  there  and  cook  is  out ! 

1217  0    XX  to  /another  kitchen?/    Today  is  a  wedding  day.     Therefore  SO 

SORRY  !     /Poor  Kimura  ?/ 

1218  0    He  tries  again.     Hooray  !     Success.     Orders  a  simple  meal  not  party  style 

since  he  planned  to  have  them  at  his  home  originally,  he  says. 


890        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

1-512-B 

0956  i  01  calling  about  "educational  films"  /?/.  Afterward  talking  about  a 
Kwanto  style  doll  /?/  /Wasn't  there  some  question  whether  one  could 
be  carried  as  an  "award"  to  some  American  commission  or  something? 
Apparently  the  verdict  was  negative  from  the  tone  of  the  voices. 

— End— 

1-51S 

Sunday,  Nov.  2,  1941 

1510  i    Rang  a  long  time ;  finally  answered  but  callee  not  there. 

End 

Monday,  3  Novbmbke,  1941 


1-5U 


0909  i  from  SOGA.  Recently  Mr.  TOKUNAGA  has  come  from  the  Foreign  Office 
and  Japan.  Am  inviting  him  for  dinner,  also  Dr.  Motokazu  MORI  and 
VX/&  others  ?/6  P.  M.  tonight.  Some  possibility  of  another  farewell  at 
the  boat.  Invitee  will  have  to  excuse  himself  from  that  if  he  can.  At 
the  first  part  of  the  conversation  SOGA  explains,  I  think,  that  he  knows, 
or  knows  of  TOKUNAGA  thru  Mr.  Ken  HARADA,  his  son's  wife's 
brother,  who  is  in  the  Foreign  Office,  tho  born  in  Hawaii.  Not  very  sure 
of  this  tho. 

0934  i    From  OMI  Shoten.    When  will  the  Hikama  get  to  Yokohama? 

0955  i    NI 

1004  i    Conscription.     Routine. 

1024  i    NI 

1026  i    NI 

1221  o    Routine.    NI. 

1224  o    to  HARADA  /?/.     If  he  comes  in  have  him  call  X. 

1355  i  HARADA  asking  about  Taiyo  mail  situation  as  concerns  the  notification 
of  attainment  of  conscription  age  reports  which  have  to  arrive  by  Nov. 
31  in  order  to  comply  with  Japanese  law.  Is  asked  to  call  tomorrow 
since  today  is  a  Japanese  holiday.  They  say  that  since  the  Taiyo  is 
out,  another  boat  will  probably  be  all  right. 

1400  i    NEWMAN  to  XX.     Would  like  to  come  up  for  a  few  minutes  right  away. 

1508  i  Inquiry.  Woman  with  no  passport  is  worried  /lest  the  boat  return  to 
Hawaii?/  She  introduces  herself  as  an  ordinary  woman.  Probably  in- 
teresting but  not  urgent  just  now. 

1611  i    NI. 

1-515 

#2  log 
0820  i    NR.    Star  Bulletin  calling.    Call  after  9 :00. 
0939  i    NI 

1046  i    NI.    Re  deferment.  , 

1047  o    01  of  JCC  to  Chamber  of  Commerce  (Hamilton)  asking  whether  there 

has  been  word  on  mail  situation.     No  word  from  Sam  King  either.     The 
postal  inspectors  expect  word  this  afternoon. 


1-516 


End 
Tuesday,  4  Novbmbeb,  1941 


0918  i    Man  to  Muraoka  re  3  games  (tennis?)  tomorrow. 

0927  i  FPM.  NAKATSUKA  to  XX.  XX  has  no  news  from  Washington  re  mail 
situation.  XX  wanted  the  Taiyo  Maru  to  take  mail  to  Japan.  ( See  the 
S-B.)  XX  "Mr.  King  knows  (the  character  of)  Mr.  Haan."  This  in 
answer  to  N's  remark  about  the  "fight"  between  the  two. 

0986  i  /VX  and  YOSHIOKA/  YOSHIOKA  seems  furious  at  something.  Sounds 
as  tho  he  thinks  he  is  being  cheated.  Perfectly  enraged.  Something 
about  /the  authorities?/  not  thinking  it  worth  while  to  telegraph  on  the 
advice  /or  request  or  for  the  sake  of/  a  nikkei*  or  a  whole  boat  load  of 
them.  (*nikkei  American  citizen  of  J.  ancestry.).  YOSHIOKA  cites 
the  discrimination  shown  towards  the  nikkei — the  niunerous  personal 
questions  asked  etc.  etc.  compared  with  the  treatment  accorded  other 
Americans  and  VX  /?/  replies  that  it  is  discrimination,  isn't  it?    Perhaps 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT   INQUIRY  891 

he  is  talking  about  the  questions  asked  of  the  incoming  Taiyo  passengers. 
Anyhow  he  is  still  furious  and  very  indignant.  Also  something  about 
the  mail  being  held  up.  Towards  the  end  of  this  long  harrangue  Y. 
suggests  that  VX  intercede — just  how  is  not  clear — possibly  thru  the 
Federal  courts,  for  the  nordsai  bansho  is  mentioned.  Probably  the 
effects  of  red  tape  plus  extra  work,  worry  and  anxiety  have  added  fuel  to 
Yoshioka's  rage.  He  is  very  disturbed  to  say  the  least.  They  cool  down 
enough  to  laugh  a  bit  toward  the  end. 
1028  i     TAKAYANAGI.     NI. 

1002  i    Re  deferment. 

1003  i    Re  deferment. 

1045  i    From  a  fellow  returning  to  Japan  regarding  military  service  there.     Is 

advised  to  explain  to  Japanese  authorities  his  real  address  (in  Japan). 

and  they  will  understand. 
1053  i    KANEKO  to  VX  re  baggage.     Inspected  yesterday  at  7  and  today  again — 

they  have  been  trying  to  get  cigarettes.    Will  VX  help  as  they  can't  get 

enough?    He  will.    Discuss  sailing  time  etc. 
1126  0     SEKI  to  TOKUNAGA  /?/  to  say  that  DOI  is  waiting  for  him  at  X.    /A 

little  other  talk — can't  get  it  easily./ 
1-517 

1142  i    VX  to  XX He's  busy  with  someone  in  "that  room"  (the  lowered-to- 

inaudibility  voice  indicated  that  it  was  a  conference  which  she  had 
instructions  not  to  interrupt).  Tell  him  when  he  finishes  to  please 
wait  on  the  matter  of  the  (NYK?)  company's  telegrams. 

1144  0  /to  RCA?/  "Your  messenger  just  came  in  here  and  and  took  3  messages 
back.  We'd  like  you  to  hold  them,  return  them,  if  you  will  please. 
O.  K. 

1203  i  To  SEKI  to  inquire  as  to  a  reasonable  price  for  stockings,  eh !  Bought 
1  dozen. 

1327  i    FPM.     For  TAKAGISHI.     Out.    Gone  to  Ala  Wai. 

1345  i  to  SEKI  from  TOKUNAGA.  /very  blurred,  but  something  about  a  car, 
probably  asking  SEKI  to  have  him  driven  somewhere  either  by  taxi 
or  by  X  car. 

1350(0    To  Hiberly.     XX  would  like  to  come  down.     Make  date  for  2:10. 

1405  o  to  KYORAKKAN  asking  if  TOKUNAGA  has  gone  out  yet.  No— not 
yet.     Well,  the  car  is  "dry",  so  please  have  him  wait  a  little  please. 

1407  i    for  SAKAI.     He's  out  till  3. 

1407  i    Wrong  number  for  Easy  Appliances. 

1435  i     Fragment 

1450  o    XX  Will  you  send  a  messenger  boy. 


1-518 


End 
Wednesday,  5  November,  1941 


0917  ?    NO ;  NI 

1002  i    Re  deferment. 

1005  i    WEST  of  UH  wants  name  of  XX. 

1007  i     JARAKI  of  Mitsukoshi  to  VX. 

1023  i     NI;  NO 

1038  i     Re  expatriation;  NI 

1058  i     Inquiry  re  mail 

1005  i  HARADA  to  IWANAGA ;  wanted  to  invite  him  to  dinner  tonight,  but 
since  it  is  an  hour  earlier  than  usual  will  invite  him  for  lunch.  Did. 
Something  about  HACHIYA  and  Nov.  24th.      Can't  get  last  part  at  all. 

1113  i     For  /VX?/  from  YOSHI  at  NYK. 

1115  o     NI. 

1343  o    For  messenger  boy. 

1449  i  NAKATSUKA  to  XX  re  KURUSO.  Is  XX  planning  any  reception? 
Hasn't  yet  decided.  XX  has  received  a  message.  It  will  take  about 
5  days  from  Hong  Kong.  Foreign  Ofiice  message  said  he  would  arrive 
by  clipper,  but  didn't  say  when  he  would  arrive  here.  XX  doesn't 
know  much  about  KURNSO.  Wife  is  real  Caucasian.  Oh !  Oh !  Oh ! 
Ah !  Ah ;  "She's  quite  a  Japanese  lady.  She  eats  Japanese  food  and 
is  very  polite  and  looking  very  nice. 

1457  i     NC;  NI. 

1459  o     NI. 


892        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

1636 o    to  (4)?    YUGE  to  Mrs.  NISHL     She  asks  him  to  call  and  gives  him 

the  number  67182  /that  of  the  boat/. 
1640  i    KANEKO    to    YUGE    arranging    about    working  and    the   tickets    etc. 

tomorrow  morning.    /A  lot  of  accounting  still  to  do.    Long  discussion./ 
1711  i    About  sailing. 
1-519 

Thuesday,  6  November,  1941 
1000  i    NI. 

1020        Seki  to  Nakamura  of  HBD.     NI. 
1035  i    NAKAMURA  to  Seki.     NI. 
1045  o    Routine  data  call.     Very  lengthy. 
1055  o     Sakai  to  George  SAKAMOTO  re  deferment. 

End 


1-620 


1-521 


Fbidat,  Saturday,  Sunday,  Novembee  7  to  9 

Out  of  Commission. 

Monday,  10  November,  1941 


0905  0     Sakai  to  PAA  asking  about  arrival  of  clipper.    About  1700  tomorrow. 

0910  i  NAKATSUKA  to  XX  re  delay  in  arrival  of  KURUSU— VX  and  I  will  go 
out  to  meet  him — The  N.  J.  says  he  is  going  to  stay  at  the  R.  H.  Hotel — 
That's  right. — Are  you  going  to  have  a  lunch  for  him? — No.  I'm  not 
organizing  any  parties — Will  there  be  a  private  party  at  X? — Yes.  I 
think  so. — When  is  he  leaving? — He  will  stay  overnight. 

0915  i    Komatsuya  Hotel  to  Sakai  re  XP.    NI 

0916  i     Girl  for  VX  re  KURUSU.    Not  in  yet.    Please  have  him  call  to  let  us 

know  when  the  Ambassador  is  arriving. 

0918 0  Muraoka  to  friend  re  cup  (athletic  trophy).  NI.  Very  lengthy.  Sports 
chatter. 

0925  o    Muraoka  to  friend  re  sport.    NI. 

0927  i  Nakatsuka  to  XX  asking  whether  KURUSU  will  call  on  governor  and 
army  and  navy  leaders  here — I  don't  know.  No  word  yet — Are  any  of 
the  leaders  of  the  J.  community  going  with  you  to  meet  him? — SATO 
[pres.  of  JCC  and  UJS]  may  go.  On  Saturday  morning  he  was  sure 
whether  he  would  be  allowed  to  go  to  the  landing  at  Pearl  City.  He  will 
check  with  the  authorities  today. — Who  is  going  to  be  at  the  dinner? — 
Not  decided  yet ;  we  are  still  discussing  the  matter — There  will  be  about 
10  guests.  XX — ^Any  haoles? — No.  A  strictly  Japanese  gathering. — • 
What  time  will  it  start?— About  6.30. 

0930  i  ITAGAKI  to  Seki  re  the  possibility  of  sending  parcels  to  the  Embassy  re 
American  Railway  Express. 

0936  i  For  XX ;  busy ;  for  VX ;  "You'll  have  to  call  him"  "Oh  shux.  What's  the 
number."    "5243". 

0943  0  To  tell — ? — that  tho  tomorrow  is  a  holiday  the  stores  will  probably  be 
open.  WiU  he  make  preparations  to  get  in  touch  with  them  and  have 
them  stay  closed. 

0951  o  To  ONOH  to  Sumitomo  Bank.  Tell  him  that  party  is  postponed  till 
tomorrow  at  6.30  because  of  delay  of  clipper  etc.  Will  be  at  oflScial 
residence. 

1030  i    To  XX  from  Pan  Pacific  telling  him  about  Education  week  and  that 
Mr.  Long  is  speaking.    She  is  hoping  XX  and  VX  could  come.    Sorry — 
today  they  both  have  to  attend  to  "my  friend's  luncheon." — Yes.    VX  too. 
-  Too  bad. 

End 

1-522 

Tuesday,  11  November,  1941 

Holiday;  closed. 

1207  o     Seki  to  Morimura  saying  KURUSU  has  been  delayed  a  day  and  as  a 

result  XX's  kitchen  help  has  been  driven  crazy.  Seki  then  asks  M.  to 
come  over  with  KIKAWA  /?/  this  evening  about  1800  for  dinner  with 
XX  [to  help  eat  up  the  excess  food  prepared.] 

1208  i    Seki  to  ?  announcing  delay  and  inviting  him  to  XX's  house. 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT   INQUIRY  893 

1-523 

Wednesday,  Novembee  12,  1941     ■ 

0839 0  For  IMASASHIIMA.  Shall  she  have  him  call?  He's  out,  will  be  back 
about  10.  He's  at  the  corner  of  Kukui  and  Hall  where  /he/  just  sent 
a  blacksmith.  Something  about*No.  2  /house  beyond  a  Chinese  family's?/ 
She  finally  has  X  call  at  10. 

0845  i     Wrong  No. 

0855  0    Yuge  /  ?/  calling  Bob.    Not  in. 

0915  i     FPM     Routine  inquiry 

0930  i  For  XX  from  Mr.  FORE  /?/  of  the  Airlines.  Wants  to  come  up  this 
morning.  OG  says  OK.  /Probably  going  to  explain  what  happened  to 
the  plane !/ 

0933  0    To  SASAKI  at  YSB.     Muraoka  re  sports. 

0935  0    Muraoka  re  sports. 

0937  o    For  cigarettes.     NI 

0939  i    Re  Illumination  for  the  party.     NI. 

0954  i    To  Seki.    The  party  is  off.     Much  laughter  about  something. 

0958  o  To  "Jimmy"  from  NAKATA.  "You  tell  one  of  my  boys  come  get  me  at 
the  Japanese  Consul  right  away."     NI. 

1000  i    Routine  re  J.  conscription. 
1015  o    to  ?    No  come  down  yet.     NI 
1035  0     From  MORIOKA.     NI 

1048  0     to  KUSANOBU  /?/  re  seating  arrangements.     15  persons  can't  be  divided 

well.     How  about  16?    Also  about  times  etc. 
1130  i     Lt.  Riddick  to  XX  reporting  clipper  left  Midway  at  7.30  this  morning. 
1133  o     To  S/B/  to  NAKATSUKA.     Not  in. 
1145  i    Inquiry  on  KURUSU.     OG  doesn't  exactly  know.     Inquisitor  gets  hot  at 

such  ignorance.     5  :10  she  says. 
1150  o    To  HBD  for  NAKAMURA  from  Seki  to  ask  how  the  photographs  turned 

out.     Be  careful  of  them. 

1-524 

1325  Q    To  Royal  Hawaiian  Hotel.     SEKI  went  down  yesterday  to  make  a  reser- 
vation and  asked  XX  to  tell  hotel  that  plane  is  coming  in  this  afternoon. 
1345  0    Inquiry  re  China  Clipper.    5  :  15 

End 
1-525 

Thubsday,  Novembeb  13,  1941 

0925  0  To  P.A.A.  from  X.  What  time  is  the  China  Clipper  leaving  for  the 
coast?"  .  .  .  "Three  o'clock."  X  thought  it  was  1  or  5.  Mr.  KURUSU 
must  be  there  at  2. 

0935  0    NI.     XX  asking  when  plane  is  leaving  for  S.  F. 

0942  i  NAKATSUKA  of  S.  B.  to  OG.  XX  did  give  KURUSU  a  private  party 
last  night  (according  to  OG). 

1001  o    to  II  airways  re  China  Clipper. 
1025  o    Wrong  no. 

1030  i    KAWAZOE  to  VX.     He's  phoning.     Call  on  other  phone. 

1045  i    KAWAZOE  to  SSKI  tho  he  really  wants  VX. 

1147  o    NI 

1155  i  From  a  man  from  Royal  Hawaian  who  has  called  SEKI's  home  and 
can't  make  himself  understood  there.  "The  ambassador  is  putting  up 
a  real  fight  to  pay  his  own  bill.  He's  not  to  pay  it,  eh?"  "Yes  (!)  Mr. 
YOUKI  is  to  get  the  bill  and  he  will  pay. 

End 


1-526 


Fbiday,  No\t:iiber  14,  1941 


1045  0    For  someone  who  is  out. 

1048  0     For  TSUSHIMA— out.     For  FUJIKAWA.     Morioka  calling. 

1050  i     For  MORIOKA  from  TSUSHIMA.     The  cup  is  finished.     NI. 

1103  o    To  HBD.    Fragment. 

1302  o     MURAOKA.     NI. 

End 


894        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

1-521 

Satubday,  November  15,  1941 

0930  0     OflScial  at  X  wants  someone  to  call  him. 

0948  0     To  Mackay  radio.     "Will  you  send  a  messenger  boy?"    XX. 

1058  i  To  SAKAI  from  CLAUDUS/?/who  will  come  tonight  to  his  house  about  6. 
One  asks  the  other  if  he  has  seen  the  new  Shimpo  /weekly/.  There  is  a 
discussion  of  the  necessity  /of  having  or  of  not  having/  bonds.  Asks 
whether  he  has  studied  the  problem  in  relation  to  the  freeze.  They  are 
worried  about  the  future  possibility  of  war  and  especially  something 
that  ABEND  has  lately  written  /probably  Shimpo  has  quoted  from  the 
last  "Life",/  also  worried  about  the  future  of  commerce. 

0915  o  To  Mackay  Radio.  XX  has  received  message  #238,  but  has  received  only 
page  1,  not  page  2.  M.  says  last  night  they  sent  two  pages  at  about  7 
o'clock.  Then,  at  7.25,  he  sent  corrected  copy  of  page  1.  Seattle  made  a 
mistake,  so  they  sent  a  corrected  copy  of  page  one.    Page  2  is  all  right. 

11151     To  XX.    Busy.    Nakatsuka. 

End 

1-528 

Sunday,  November  16,  1941 

No  activity 

Monday,  November  17,  1941 

0946  i     Inquiry  re  expatriation. 

1005  0     to KANE  from  SEKI.     This  morning  they  are  paying  bills. 

1045  i  TAKAHASHI  /woman/  re  :  the  fate  of  a  25  year  old  U.  of  H.  graduate  of 
dual  citizenship  who  has  become  a  public  school  teacher.  He  has  never 
been  registered  as  a  Japanese  citizen.     First  step  is  to  get  registered  etc. 

1316  i  From  KOMATSIYA  about  "yesterday's  case"  /  The  hotel  is  apparently 
handling  the  deferment  petitions  of  KOICHI  and  FUJIKAWA.     NI. 

1340  o  SEKI  to  OI.  Something  about  paying  /?/  for  registration.  Instruc- 
tions have  come  by  cable  from  the  minister.  There  is  some  other  problem 
to  it  tho.  They  were  advised,  after  conversations  with  the  American 
government,  that  there  might  not  be  any  necessity  of  registering  /the 
money?/.  So  SEKI  thinks  it  is  ok.  /Some  diggerel  about  somebody 
from  X  rparrying  a  fatty  /?/  Seems  to  be  between  a  Miss  DO  and 
KIMURA  of  the  bank. 

End 


1-529 


1-530 


Tuesday,  November  18,  1941 


0905  i     FPM.     Muraoka  on  tennis. 

0910  0  To  HBD.  MORIOKA  to  NAKAMURA  whom  he  asks  for  FUJIMURA 
with  whom  he  discusses  tennis  at  length. 

0915  o    MURAOKA— tennis 

0917  i  from  a  man  who  wants  to  speak  to  the  "one  who  uses  cables."  Caller 
iS'Eigo  CHIROMA — a  senior  at  U.  H.  who  is  making  a  sociological  study 
of  the  Okinawas  in  Hawaii.  Would  like  to  get  statistical  material  about 
their  occupation  status,  distribution,  numbers,  how  many  have  left  for 
Okinawa  etc.  X  doesn't  have  those  facts.  C.  says  the  Jiji  Annual  has 
some  information — he  thought  they  had  got  it  from  X.  X  says  they 
don't  keep  record  of  how  many  come  and  go,  and  especially  this  was  a 
long  time  ago — They  keep  "just  if  they  come  and  report — but  don't  keep 
track  of  the  numbers.  C.  asks  how  he'd  get  the  materials.  X  says  to 
ask  the  Okinawa  people  "they  have  some  sort  of  club  you  know," — but  he 
doesn't  think  they  have  such  records.  But  X  thinks  he  can  get  the 
general  idea.     Refers  him  to  immigration. 

0928  i     To  SAKAI  re  hospital  bill. 

0954  0  To  SATO  Music  Store  saying  the  radio  at  the  official  residence  of  XX  last 
evening  and  for  some  time  past  has  been  so  when  you  listen  there  is 
freekune  /?/  — something  the  matter  with  it  anyway.  Asks  him  to  come 
up  and  look  at  it. 

1007  o     For  Mr.  /UE?/  MASE.     Out.     Call  2634. 

1008  0     To  OYAMA.     Out.     Try  6311  /?/. 
1120  i     From  Mrs.  NISHI  to  say  goodbye. 

End 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT   INQUIRY  895 

1-531  Wednesday,  Novembek  19,  1941 

1009  o    Fragment 

1028  o  MURAOKA  to  girl.  Someone  is  to  bring  "bron  paper"  (birth  certificate) 
in  within  two  weeks. 

1127  i     to  MORIMURA  /?/  frag. 

1415  0     YUGE  to  N.  Y.  K.'s  TAKEI.     NT 

1437  i  From  ONODA  of  Sumitomo  who  supplies  or  is  supplied  some  data  on 
addresses  and  names  in  Japan. 

End 

1-532  Thubsday,  Novembee  20,  1941 

No  activity — Holiday 

Friday,  November  21,  1941 

0930  i    FPM./  Mistake  in  log?/  Sounds  like  UEMURA  to  maud.    "They  haven't 

come  yet,  have  they?"    "No." 
0934  i    Routine.    NI 
0955  0    Asking  YAMAMOTO  about  a  souvenir  for  a  deceased  friend.    /Has  he/ 

TGCGivGd  It  *^    Ygs. 
1011  o     URAOKA  to  YAMAGUCHI.    Wants  to  get  some  information  re  him  or 

his  mother.    Y.  apologizes— he  has  received  the  letter  from  X  but  has 

been  too  busy  to  answer.    Will  answer  in  2  or  3  days.    M.  says  Saturday 

till  noon,  other  days  till  three  /for  him  to  come  in?/ 
1022  0     Something  is  at  6  tonight,  gurobu? 
1027  i     to  MURAOKA  re  club  affairs. 
1033  i     From    OAHU    JUNK    CO.    re   matter     called   about   previously,      the 

YAMAMOTOT  business.     No  one  is  around  now.     This  evening  /we?/ 

will  inform  /him?/  and  tomorrow  a.  m.  he  will  let  you  know  how  much 

it  is. 
1347  i    to  SAKAI  from  MACHIDA.    The  pictures  are  finished.    Shall  she  bring 

them?    No.    He'll  pick  them  up. 
1420  i    to  SAKAI  from  KOMATSUYA  with  a  new ?  Paketto  HIROSHIMA 

on  August  23.     "I  don't  remember  attaching  and  due  /paper?/  on  it." 

Probably  NI. 
1-533  Monday,  November  24,  1941 

0050 o  X  for  U.  S.  Coast  Guard  for  Mr.  Anthony,  (Someone  speaking  for 
Mr.  VX.)  re  letter  rec'd  from  CG.  CG  is  preparing  new  passes  for 
everyone  who  has  legitimate  business  on  the  waterfront  and  has  re- 
quested list  of  such  people  from  X. 

End 

Tuesday,  Novembeb  25, 1941 

1008  0  FPM  re  the  evening  KURUSU  was  here — asks  for  the  bill  for  photo- 
graphs of  the  occasion.    $27.50. 

1128  i     NAKATSUKA  to  XX  telling  him  about  a  Frederich  Kuh  U.  P.  report 

from  London  of  a  provisional  agreement  between  J.  and  U.  S.  in 
Washington.  XX : — "Is  it  from  London?/ !/  It  is  !  N.  al.so  reports  that 
the  new  dual  citizenship  bill  has  been  approved  by  the  House  sub-com- 
mittee. Provides  for  compulsory  renunciation  of  foreign  citizenship  by 
persons  in  U.  S.  Gov't,  or  armed  forces,  and  voluntary  renunciation  of 
,  foreign  citizenship  by  all  others  holding  dual  citizenship.    XX  heard  on 

the  Tokyo  radio  about  the  Tatsuta,  but  hasn't  received  any  official  word — 
he  says.    He  doesn't  know  if  there  will  be  a  ship  to  Hawaii. 

1157  i  From  applicant  for  XP.  "For  a  person  in  the  government  service  it  is 
very  inconvenient  to  be  a  Japanese  citizen."    Wants  to  hurry. 

1402  o     To  Maekay  for  messenger. 

1410  o  To  HBD.  Muraoka  for  either  NAKAMURA  or  FUJIWARA.  Gets  F.  re 
tennis.  , 

End 


896        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

1-535 

Wednesday,  November  2G,  1941 

0931  0    From  SAHARA  /?/  Something  about  Satiu-day.     NI.     Not  regular  X 

call. 
1025  i     For  SEKI  from  SATO  SHOTEN  about  a  bill. 
1102  i    To  SAKAI  from  YAMAMOTO.     Something  about  an  order  for  2,000 

cases  of  something  Friday,  and  about  the  price,  and  about  a  wire  in 

connection  with  them. 
1131  0     To  AKAYAMA  (girl)  from  MURAOKA.    NI 
1140  o     to  MACKAY.    X  for  messenger. 
1258  0     for  ?  Out.     If  he  returns  have  him  call  SAKAI 
1317  o    re  Sa  to  Kinjiro  and  Saito  Karoku  /to  a  girl/     The  place  isn't  written 

in.    Please  drop  in  and  sign  them. 
1357  o    To  Mackay  for  messenger. 

End 
1-536 

Thursday,  November  27,  1941 

0924  i  to  SAKAI  from  /Seiichi/  HAYAMA  /Pharmacist  of  Honolulu  Pharmacy 
Co./  Your  photographs  are  finished.  OK.  I'll  get  them  tomorrow  or  the 
next  day. 

1014  i  girl  /INAGE?/  asking  for  a  census  registration  person.  She  was  regis- 
tered /in  Japan/  24  years  ago,  but  the  receipt  has  been  lost.  What  to  do? 
Girl  explains  she  is  calling  for  a  girl  whose  /parents?/  have  died  and  be- 
cause of  her  job  it  has  become  inconvenient  not  to  have  it  /XP/  Finally 
some  satisfactory  arrangement  is  made. 

1041  o  MURAOKA  to  girl,  ISHIURA  giving  an  address  and  family  information 
in  Japan.    Also  re  some  relative  in  Pahoa.    NI 

1045  i  Fro  SEKI  from  YSB  re  some  "usual  bills".  YSB  wants  to  write  a  letter 
about  it. 

1342  i     To  SEKI  from  MIYAMOTO  of  YSB.     It  is  $14.00.     They  have  finished 

the  investigation  of  cash  on  hand ;  will  bring  it  up. 

1343  i     NAKATSUKA  to  XX.    N  asks  him  to  answer  Sen.  GILLETTE'S  charges. 

XX  says  he  has  heard  from  the  Japanese  radio  that  the  Tatuta  is  coming 
to  L.  A.  and  Balboa.    "I  received  no  information  at  all  from  Tokyo.    I 
was  very  sorry." 
1502  0     to  NAKASHIMA  or  ?  MOKIOKA?  for  a  date.    She  puts  him  off  till  Tues. 
of  next  week. 

End 


1-537 


Friday,  November  28,  1941 


0900  i  NAKATSUKA  to  XX  asking  for  a  reaction  to  Sen  Gilette.  Asks  XX 
if  he  knows  that  Jack  Wakayama  has  said  that  the  Hawaiian  Japanese 
Civic  Association  would  welcome  an  investigation.  XX  asks  if  he  is  here 
in  Honolulu !  /XX  is  well  uninformed  on  most  subjects !/  XX  says  he 
has  repeated  that  same  statement  many  times  already  and  thinks  that 
is  enough.  He  feels  that  if  there  were  an  investigation  things  would  be 
more  than  100  percent  OK.  N.  says  if  they  do  find  some  un-American 
activity  going  on,  the  sooner  the  better  so  they  /the  U.  S./  can  get  rid 
of  them.    /Friendly  agreement  and  polite  laughter  Curtain/. 

0922  i     About  date  for  some  dinner  in  past.    NI 

0950  0  Private  call  by  sonieone  from  Star  Bulletin.  Everybody  /at  X?/  is  out. 
What  to  do?    They'll  be  there  in  a  few  minutes. 

0952  o    Man  to  girl.     NI  , 

1005  i    for  SAKAI  from  man.    Lunch  date. 

1030  i    FPM    Routine  inquiry  re  nationality 

1038  0     Short  conversation  but  can't  get  it.    Something  about  "three  o'clock." 

1052  i    From  ONO  of  Osaka  Shoten  re  attainment  of  military  age  form. 

1100  0  to  RCA  re  message  received  this  morning.  No.  1070  want  to  check. 
"On  first  page,  second  line,  8th  word :  CCFGR ;  10th  word,  ITLJS ;  on  page 
two,  line  2,  9th  word:  P(B?)  MEDZ-^  last  line,  first  word,  IRWPB  and 
third  word  ZZGRO,  and  the  ninth,  FPOEN. 

1125  i     Is  SAKAI  there?    This  afternoon  at  1.30  I'm  coming  to  your  /house/. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  897 

1328  i     FPM  about  something  /someone  has  left?/  in  a  drawer. 

1338 o     SAKAI  asking  about  films.     They  (the  store?)   called  about  them  this 

morning  whether  to  send  them  or  not.    They  agree  that  someone  is  to 

bring  them  over. 

1-538 

1442  i  to  MURAOKA  from  MIKAMI  re  deferment  of  conscription  blanks.  If 
born  in  August  6,  1905  you  don't  need  to  fill  out  the  blank  do  you.  No, 
you  don't.  Or  if  born  in  1925  you  do  not  need  to,  do  you.  No.  Thank 
you. 

End 


1-539 


Sattjbday,  November  29,  1941 


0905  o     SAKAI  to  ?  about  doing  something  on  a  commission  basis.    Also  wants 
him  to  takejsome  pictures  of  the  graduation  /or  a  member  of  the  gradu- 
ates?/   Wants  2  pictures.     /Personal  NI 
0925  i     ProVX.    "Will  you  call  his  other  phone?" 

0936  0     FPM  from  VX.    Sounds  important,  but  very  hard  to  get  because  of  faulty 
recording./     Mention  of  a  /black?/  smith's  shop  of  Fort  St,  and  a  few 
isolated  words,  but  no  other  clue. 
0950  i    For  SAKAI  from  HAYASHI  /can't  get  this  message  but  tone  sounds 

legitimate  and  innocent./ 
1015  o    to  OKUMURA  /having  something  to-  do  with/  children.     His  "card" 
in  the  X  is  incomplete.    Will  he  come  in  and  finish  filling  it  out?      He 
will. 
1025  o    for  NAKASHIMA.     Out.     Have  him  call  2243.    Caller  not  or  VX.    Man. 
1150  o    For  Yoshino,  a  girl  /from  MURAOKA/    This  is  the  same  girl  that  put 
him  off  before.    Sample  talk : 
Yoshino? 
Yes. 

How  about  it? 

I  don't  know  what  you're  talking  about. 
Don't  say  that! 

Have  you  some  matter  to  talk  about? 
Of  couse. 
What  is  it? 
etc.    NI 
1200  0    XX  /home?/  wants  to  eat  right  away. 


1-540 


End 

Sunday,  Novembeb  30 
No  activity 

Monday,  DECEMBEit  1,  1941 

1000  0     to  RCA,  for  messenger 

1045  0  to  NYK  TAKEI  from  SEKI  who  says  he  received  a  telegraph  /to  be 
sent  thru  X?/  some  time  ago  and  wants  now  to  settle  accounts.  $45.82. 
They  are  bringing  the  money  up  today.  T.  asks  about  the  situation 
but  SEKI  doesn't  tell  him  anything  startling.  TAKEI  is  worried  for  not 
being  able  to  get  home,  but  admits  he  doesn't  know  what  the  situation  is. 
(Doubt  is  S  does  either!) 

1115  i  Inc.  to  XX,  NAKATSUKA  quoting  an  AP  dispatch  based  on  Asahi 
despatch  from  Washington  that  the  closing  of  J.  consulate  is  imminent. 
First  public  reference.  "Have  you  had  any  information?"  XX  has  not 
had  any  information  from  TOKYO  to  prepare  for  possible  closing  (he 
says).  He  saw  "a  few  lines,"  in  this  morning's  Advertiser.  XX  thinks 
the  Tatuta  will  leave  tomorrow,  but  on  all  else  he  is  his  usual  blank  self. 

1150  0  to  HBD  for  NAKAMURA.  Tsukikawa  calling  re  day  before  yesterday. 
This  morning  /it  was  set?/  at  9.S0,  __  no  10.  At  X?  Yes.  /This  con- 
versation pretty  fast.    Translation  a  little  unsure./ 

1305  i    For  someone  who's  not  there  yet.     Girl  calling. 


898        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

1326  0     YOSHIOKA  to  MATSU/DA?/    Won't  you  come  out  in  front  of  the  office. 

/Possible  taxi,  because  he  emphasizes  the  words  "in  front  of."/ 
1330  o     for  NAKASHIMA.     Date  with  her. 
1352  o     to  a  girl.     NI 
1405  o     to  HBD  for  NAKAMURA.    Out.    When  back?    3  or  4.    Well  then  please 

/have  him  call  me?    First  part  was  missing/. 

End 
1-5U 

Tuesday,  December  2, 1941 

1429  o    to  TANAKA.    Has  he  sent  the  things.    Yes.    The  price  will  be  about  $30 

since  prices  are  going  up.    Too  bad.    NI 
14291    MURAKAMI  to  SAKAI  re  Fujino.     "Is  it  all  right  or  do  we  have  to 

send  a  letter  first?    The  latter  M.  will  come  over.     XP.     NI. 


Discontinued 


/ !  Sic  transit  gloria  mindi !/ 
RX 
R.  P.  P. 


Hewitt  Inquiry  Exhibit  No.  3SB 
INTERCEPTS,  JAPANESE  VICE-CONSUL,  HONOLULU,  10/1/41—12/2/41 

SECRET 

Wednesday,  1  Octoeeh  1941 

0915  0    VX  to  MIKAMI  for  a  car  at  3 :  45. 

1143  i    XX  to  VX.    XX  is  going  to  Waikiki  at  about  2 :  30. 

End 
2-2J,8 

THxmsDAY,  2  October  1941 

1027  o    VX  to  KIMURA.— He's  out.— I'll  call  again. 

End 
2-2^9 

Friday,  3  October  1941 

1011  0  VX  to  KAWAZOE  at  NJ  dictating  a  statement  in  reply  to  Gillette's  state- 
ment.    /See  NJ  for  text./     Interrupted. 

1016  0     VX  to  KAWAZOE,  continuing  the  statement.    K.  reads  it  back  as  a  check. 

1020  o  VX  to  KAWAZOE  /?/  of  the  HH  with  the  same  statement  on  the  Gillette 
question. 

1030  0  VX  to  KAWAZOE  at  HH  /?/  adding  that  the  S-B  carried  on  4  January  a 
statement  by  Senator  Gillette,  followed  the  next  day  by  a  S-B  editorial. 

End 

2-250 

Saturday,  4  October  1941 

No  Activity 
2-251 

Sunday,  5  October  1941 

Not  Covered 
2-252 

Monday,  6  October  1941 

0925  o  /To  #4./  VX  tells  wife  that  he  will  have  lunch  at  the  Pan-Pacific. 
/Gilbert  Bowles,  Sr.,  spoke./ 

End 


2-253 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  HEWITT  INQUIRY  899 


TtTESDAT,  7  OcrroBEB  1941 


0913  i  Woman  to  VX. — Out.  /Woman  speaks  in  English  at  first  and  then  latdr 
in  Japanese.  It  was  probably  MORIMURA  who  answered./ — When  will 
he  be  back,  do  you  know? — Very  shortly.  And  what  is  your  name, 
please? — /She  falters  a  little  in  her  embarrassment  and  says:/  I  just 
wanted  to  talk  to  him  personally. — I  see. — I  suppose  that's  all  right, 
isn't  it?  /M.  hangs  up  without  answering  or  giving  her  a  chance  to 
finish./ 

1000  i  /FPM/  /Verbatim,  woman  spealjing:/  It  is  the  second  street  toward 
the  sea  from  King.  It's  just  in  front  of  this  Castle  Church.  You 
probably  know  it,  don't  you?  The  Makiki  Church  that  looks  like 
o-shiro  /Japanese  for  "castle"/.  It's  just  the  other  side  of  McKinley 
High. — Oh,  is  that  so?  I  think  I  can  find  it  quite  easily. — Between 
Pensacola  and  Piikoi. — Oh,  I  see. — Most  anybody  knows  it,  because 
it's  just  this  side.  There  are  several  apartments  around  a  court.  The 
entrance  to  the  court  is  just  across  the  street  from  the  entrance  to 
Makiki  Church,  this  o-shiro  church. — I  see. — So  I  think  you  will  find  it 
easily.  1116-A  Elm  Street. — Is  there  any  indication  at  the  gate  of  the 
house  or  .  .  .? — Well,  the  number  is  out  on  the  .  .  .  /indistinct/. — You 
see,  1116-A  faces  Palm  /?/  Street  and  1116-A  is  inside  the  court. — 
Alright,  quite  right. — I'll  look  for  your  tomorrow,  then.  Thank  you  very 
much. — Shall  I  take  Mr.  XX? — Ah  ha,  please. — And  my  wife? — Please.. 
Thank  you  very  much. — Not  at  all. — Goodbye. 

1121  i  /Prom  #4/.  /Due  to  technical  difficulties  I  couldn't  understand  any- 
thing.   Neither  could  the  principals./ 


2-254 


End 

Wednesday,  8  Octobeb  1941 


1405  0    VX  to  MIKAMI  /?/  to  send  a  car  to  X.    Do  you  know  Elm  Street?— 
No,  but  I'll  check  it.— The  number  is  1116-A  Elm  Street. 


2-255 


2-256 


End 

ThuKSDAY,  9  OCTOBEE  1941 

No  Activity 
Friday,  10  Octobee  1941 


1125  ?    /FPM/    VX  and  woman.    It  is  apparent  that  a  picnic  is  being  planned 

for  this  weekend.    Woman  reports  there  will  be  5  or  6  to  a  car. 
1401  i    MIKAMI  to  VX.— Send  a  taxi  over. 
1415  i     /FPM/    From  #4 :  Mrs.  VX  to  VX.    NX. 
1427  0     To  #4 :  VX  to  wife.     VX  will  soon  be  home. 

End 
2-251 

Satueday,  11  October  1941 
0958  i    YAMADA  asks  VX  whether  XX  and  VX  can  come  to  Shunchoro  on 
Monday  evening,  the  13th,  at  6 :  00. — Yes. 


2-258 


2-259 


End 

Sunday,  12  October  1941 
•  No  Activity 

Monday,  13  October  1941 


0925  i  /FPM/  ?  to  VX  re  nature  of  the  ships  being  sent.  The  word  hikiage 
/evacuation/  is  to  be  avoided,  and  "temporary  relief"  used  in  connection 
with  these  ships. 

0940  o    VX  to  Kimura. — Out.— Have  him  call. 
79716 — 46— Ex.  149,  vol.  2 16 


900        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

0947  o    VX  to  KUCHIBA.— Not  in. 

0950  ?    /FPM/  ?  and  VX.    A  few  remarks  about  mail  just  received  after  a  long 
delay. 

End 


2-260 


Tuesday,  14  October  1941 


0952  0  VX  to  KAWAMURA  of  HH.  The  Nitta  Maru  is  being  replaced  by  the 
Hikawa.    /K.  thinks  this  is  "very  interesting."/ 

1000  0    OG  to  "Trouble". 

1000  0  OG  to  Repair  Service,  wondering  why  5243  cannot  be  connected  with 
6091. — Try  again,  and  dial  slowly. 

1005  0  VX  to  KAWAZOE,  saying  the  Nitta  Maru  has  been  replaced  by  the 
Hikawa  Maru.    /Probably  this  Kawazoe  is  at  NJ./ 

1010  0  /To  #4 :/  VX  to  wife  saying  a  cable  has  come  for  him.  He  has  talked 
the  matter  over  with  the  NYK.  /No  clue  given  here  as  to  the  nature 
of  the  discussion,  but  it  may  be  that  VX  and  family  will  return  to  Japan 
on  the  "evacuation  ship"./ 

1020  i  Mrs.  HAMAMOTO  to  VX,  who  can  hardly  understand  her  at  all.  She 
is  one  of  the  fastest  chatterers  ever  heard  here./  At  5  o'clock  Saturday 
she  invites  herself  up  to  see  him. — How  about  7  Thursday  evening? — 
If  business  should  make  it  impossible  for  me  to  see  you,  how  may  I 
reach  you  by  phone? — 8428.  /She  jumbles  it  so  in  pidgin  English  that 
neither  VX  nor  I  could  understand  her.  After  long  shots  wide  of  the 
mark,  he  finally  asks  her  to  give  it  in  plain  Japanese.  It  turned  out 
to  be  8429./ 

1040  o    VX  tells  ?  that  the  Nitta  Maru  has  been  replaced  by  the  Hikawa  Maru. 

1203  i  Castle  &  Cooke  to  VX  re  three  pensioners  of  the  Waialua  Ag.  Co. — 
The  person  in  charge  of  these  matters  has  just  gone  home.  Will  you 
call  2243  after  1:00? 

1430  i  KANEKO  to  VX  notifying  him  of  the  arrival  of  a  cable  re  the  ships  being 
sent.  Passengers  and  mail ;  no  cargo.  There  are  to  be  1000  persons  on 
the  Tatuta  Maru  and  500  or  600  on  the  others.  There  are  no  reductions 
from  the  full  rate.  Third  class  is  $165.  There  are  so  many  uncertain- 
ties that  the  rest  of  the  conversation  was  conjecture  of  little  interest. 


2-261 


2-262 


End 
Wednesday,  15  Octobee  1941 

No  activity 
THtTRSDAY,  16  October  1941 


0943  i  xxxxsxxx  VX  to  /Mikami?/  re  the  October  6th  issue  of  Life;  buy 
5  copies.     /Note :  issue  contains  two  articles  of  possible  interest./ 

1130  o  To  01  re  the  Women's  Club  /Fujin  Kai/  something-or  other  wants 
to  find  out  if  it  is  today  or  tomorrow. — It  is  today.  /He  finds  this 
out  after  a  pause  in  which  he  apparently  asks  someone./ 

1148  i  KANEKO  to  VX  to  speak  of  what  they  discussed  before ;  quotes  rates : 
1st  Class,  $205 ;  2nd  Class,  $105 ;  3rd  Class,  $58 ;  Children  /?/,  $49.  Says 
if  they  lowered  "compartments"  to  $165  they  would  be  losing  about  $40 
per  person ;  also,  the  rates  are  set ;  says  he'd  like  to  have  an  order 
to  do  that. — VX  says  not  X's  business  to  decide.  The  practical  details 
are  up  to  the  Company ;  also,  the  money  alloted  to  X  is  Govt,  money  and 
the  Govt.  /Japanese/  is  responsible  for  spending  it.  All  that  will  have 
to  be  decided  in  Japan.  /Apparently  K.  has  hinted  that  X  might  make 
up  the  difference.  K.  then  brings  up  the  practical  problem  of  provision- 
ing the  ship  /with  fuel?/.  They  have  already  applied  for  it,  I  hear. 
There  are  about  800  /feet?/  of  pier.  They  go  on  talking  about  prob- 
lems apparently  connected  with  the  ship./ — K:  Well,  it  (Taiyo  Maru) 
will  get  in  on  the  31st,  won't  it?  One  week  before  that  / /  Some- 
thing about  leaving  the  matter  until  the  22nd — about  a  week  before  the 
ship  comes  in,  I  think./ 

End 


2-263 


PROCEEDINGS   OF   HEWITT  INQUIRY  901 


Fbiday,  17  October  1941 


0921  i  Mrs.  GADDIS  to  VX.  Finds  out  that  it  is  the  same  TOJO  they  knew. 
/This  was  former  War  Minister  in  Japan/.  Mrs.  G :  "Didn't  he  have 
something  to  do  with  aviation  once,  sometime  ago?" — VX :  Well  /laugh- 
ing a  little/  I  don't  know  about  that.  /Then  VX  confirms  that  Eichi 
TOJO  and  Hideki  TOJO  are  one  and  the  same  person./ 

1101  0     VX  to  KAWAZOE  of  NJ,  dictating  newspaper  release.     See  NJ. 

1105  o  Ditto  to  other  KAWAZOE,  of  HH.  /After  dictation,  K,  asks  if  VX 
has  heard  anything  special  about  the  Tatuta  or  the  Taiyo.  VX  has  not, 
so  they  agree  that  everything  probably  is  alright./ 

1126  o  VX  to  Sumitomo  Bank  for  Ono-san  /manager/  to  ask  about  Ilatte  no  ken 
/?/.     Ono  says  will  tomorrow  a  little  before  8 :  00  be  alright.     It  is. 

1348  i    From  HARADA  to  make  a  date  for  a  conference  about  1 :  20  tomorrow. 


End 


2-264 


Saturday,  18  October  1941 

No  Activity 

(Japanese  Holiday) 

Sunday,  19  October  1941 

Out  of  Commission 

2-266  Monday,  20  October,  1941 

1018  i  KANEKO  to  VX.  VX  explains  that  it  is  not  true  that  X  is  deprived  of 
all  funds.  X  is  permitted  to  draw  out  money  to  provide  necessary  food 
and  shelter  for  the  staff.  VX  explains  to  K  the  difference  between  a 
diplomat  and  a  consul.  K  implies  that  some  of  his  staff  may  be  trans- 
ferred to  China,  especially  Nanking. 

1031  i  KANEKO  to  VX  asking  whether  he  thinks  the  Taiyo  and  Tatsuta  Maru 
will  get  here.  VX  thinks  so.  Then  K.  mentions  that  there  is  someone 
who  wants  to  pay  for  his  passage  here,  but  VX  says  it  cannot  be  sent  out 
of  the  U.  S.  if  paid  here.  (The  inference  is  that  fares  should  be  paid 
at  the  other  end  to  avoid  the  freeze. ) 

1035  i  TAKEO  of  NYK  to  VX.  T.  says  the  accounts  (connected  with  the  spe- 
cial trips  of  J.  vessels)  will  be  handled  at  X.  T.  will  handle  all  the  de- 
tails as  usual  except  that  all  expenditures  and  receipts  from  whatever 
source  must  be  entered  in  a  separate  set  of  books.  T.  will  go  up  this  after- 
noon to  talk  it  over  with  XX,  VX,  and  company. 

1112  0  /Technical  disturbances/.  VX  to  TAKEI  (?)  re  difficulties  in  making 
the  arrangements. 

1520  o  VX  to  KIMURA  re  a  dinner  for  the  crew.  XX  thinks  it  may  be  possible 
in  the  case  of  the  Taiyo,  but  there  will  be  no  time  in  the  case  of  the 
Tatuta.  XX  thinks  it  may  be  all  right  to  have  the  purser,  the  (mer- 
chant marine)  captain,  and  the  Engineering  officer  to  dinner.  We  could 
even  limit  it  to  the  (merchant)  captain  and  the  engineering  officer  if  the 
others  are  busy. 

1525  0  VX  to  KANEKO,  apparently  a  call  back.  K  asks  what  the  word  "permit" 
means  (on  the  ticket  issued  by  X).  "This  transportation  ticket  is  issued 
for  THe  Imperial  Japanese  Government."  Is  fo7-  correct?  —  Yes.  — 
It  seems  to  me  it  should  be  62/  or  through.  —  No.  This  is  for  the  Cus- 
toms (U.  S.  or  Japanese?)  K.  continues  to  find  fault  with  the  ticket, 
but  VX  defends  it  legally.  Finally  VX  comes  around  to  K's  view  that  it 
should  have  been  hy,  not  for.  No  sooner  does  he  make  this  admission 
than  he  reverts  to  his  old  position  that  for  st